# FRENCH RECORDS

## RELATING TO THE HISTORY OF THE MARATHAS

### VOLUMES I & II

CORRESPONDENCE OF M. ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT
FRENCH CONSUL AT SURAT, 1774–1780
AND OF
M. DE ST. LUBIN, FRENCH ENVOY AT THE MARATHA COURT
1776–1780

*Translated & Edited*

*By*

**Dr. V. G. Hatalkar**

# FRENCH RECORDS

# FRENCH RECORDS
## ( Relating to the History of the Marathas )

**VOLUMES I & II**

Correspondence of M. Anquetil de Briancourt
French Consul at Surat, 1774-1780
and of
M. de St. Lubin, French Envoy at the Maratha Court
1776-1780

*Translated & Edited*

*By*

**Dr. V. G. Hatalkar**

STATE BOARD FOR LITERATURE AND CULTURE
MANTRALAYA, BOMBAY 400 032

March 1978



**Publisher**

Secretary
Maharashtra State Board for Literature
and Culture, Mantralaya, Bombay 400 032

**Printer**

Manager
Government Central Press
Bombay 400 004

**Price Rs. 27**

# FOREWORD

Considerable work of a high order has been done by the scholars in reconstructing Indian political history of the Modern period on the basis of the material available. But there are rich stores of original material lying in the Archives of Paris, Lisbon, Goa, etc., whose fringes alone have so far been touched by our historical researchers, and which when turned to account will add greatly to, if not revolutionize, our knowledge of Modern India.

While in Paris in 1950–1952, Dr. V. G. Hatalkar lighted upon the documents stored in the National Archives of Paris. These documents are of paramount importance for the history of the eighteenth century, as they throw a flood of light on the events and personages of this decisive period of Indian History. The fullness of the information contained, for instance, in the letters exchanged between the French agents in India like the Governor of Pondicherry and the Directors of the Factories at Chandernagore and Mahé, on the one hand, and the authorities in France, on the other, may be estimated from the fact that every general letter carried information under the following heads invariably: political situation in India, commerce of Europe, commerce of India in India, affairs of Pondicherry, affairs of the factories (Chandernagore, Mahé, Surat), the troops, the employees, the fortifications and buildings, the Isles of France and Bourbon.

On the occasion of his next visit to France in 1962, Dr. Hatalkar happened to speak to the late Professor G.D. Parikh, then Rector of the University of Bombay, about this priceless store of state papers on Indian History preserved in well-bound volumes in the National Archives of Paris. A man of broad vision, Professor Parikh thought of contributing the humble mite of his University towards publishing at least a part of this vast source material for the use of the scholars of Indian History. With that view, he advised Dr. Hatalkar to obtain micro-films of the manuscripts pertaining to the history of the Marathas and to that of Mysore. Accordingly, Dr. Hatalkar selected about 6,500 documents for micro-filming. The micro-films arrived in India in 1963. For ease of reference, photostat copies of these micro-films were made in 1964.

It would have been ideal if the documents had been selected in a chronological order and not topic-wise, for the reason that if the former principle of selection had been followed, all the documents bearing on the relations of the French with every country power with which they had dealings could have been collected. But the publication of this huge collection would have taxed beyond measure the finance of any single University, and under the circumstances, the only feasible method was to select only such documents as have a bearing on the history of the region in which the University is situated.

In publishing this material in English the University was rendering valuable service to scholars engaged in the study of the history of the Deccan. It is not possible for any researcher to master the different languages in which the sources of the history of India are dispersed. The successful completion of this project would make this primary material accessible to scholars in a common language.

Since the publication of this material—transcription and translation of the manuscripts—would cost a considerable sum of money, the University of Bombay approached the Maharashtra State Board for Literature and Culture for financial help for this project. The State Board generously agreed to assist to the extent of 75 per cent. of the total expenditure. Unfortunately, in spite of such munificent grant, the University suddenly decided to close the project after a period of 2½ years on a flimsy excuse, but handed over all the papers and the manuscripts to the Maharashtra State Board for Literature and Culture.

The Board has its heavy programme of publications. But in spite of that, it has decided to publish the material already prepared by Dr. Hatalkar himself as Editor. The Board has also undertaken to slowly publish the material that remains to be translated.

As complete material relating to the history of the Marathas was available in the National Archives of Paris for the period 1769–1787, this material was first selected for translation. The present scheme is as follows:

Vol. I .. Correspondence of M. Anquetil de Briancourt, French Consul at Surat (1774–1778).

Vol. II .. Correspondence of M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin, French Envoy at the Court of the Marathas (1777–1778).

Vol. III .. Correspondence of M. Chevalier, French Director at Chandernagore (1767–1778).

Vol. IV .. Correspondence of M. Law de lauristion and M. de Bellecombe, Governors of Pondicherry (1765–1778), of M. Picot, French Director at Mahé (1765–1778).

Vol. V .. Correspondence of M. de Montigny, French Resident at the Court of the Marathas (1781–1783).

Vol. VI .. The same (1783–1787).

The first two volumes of this series will be published immediately, the third and the fourth in another six months and the last two in the course of twelve to eighteen months.

Once this series is completed, it will be possible to undertake the translation of documents relating to the period of Dupleix and Bussy (1751–1754). This is the most sensational period in the history of the French in India, the period of their dream of founding an Empire in India. These documents also explain the causes responsible for the failure of the French in realising that dream.

I have no doubt in my mind that these volumes will be of immense value to the historians and research scholars who want to make a special study of the activities of the French in India.

R. C. MAJUMDAR

# PREFACE

The State Board for Literature and Culture has been set up by the Government of Maharashtra for the modernisation and development of the Marathi language and literature and for encouraging research and publication with a view to protecting the rich heritage Maharashtra has in the fields of literature, history, culture and fine arts. To attain this objective, the State Board has undertaken a manifold programme of literary activities, one of these being to initiate, assist or undertake schemes for editing, translating and publishing, in Marathi and English, relevant important published or unpublished source material which will have a direct or indirect bearing on the history and culture of Maharashtra, as well as the scheme for the preparation and publication of the socio-political, cultural and literary history of Maharashtra.

2. The State Board has made a valuable contribution in this direction by publishing the following worthy books, as its own publications, viz. (1) Professor N. R. Phathak's translation of " Rise of the Maratha Power " by the late Justice M. G. Ranade, (2) " Raigadachi Jeevankatha " by the late Professor S. V. Avalaskar (3) " Portuguese Source Papers " relating to Maratha History, Volumes I and II translated by Shri S. S. Desai from the original Portuguese Collection, and (4) " A History of Maratha Navy and Merchantships " by Dr. B. K. Apte. Besides, taking into account the need of the modern emergent Maharashtra, the State Board has undertaken the work of compiling a full history of Maharashtra in Marathi, in five volumes (of 500 pages each) dealing with the ancient, medieval, Maratha (Shivkal), Maratha (Peshwa) and modern periods which are progressing with the concerned scholars.

3. Under this scheme, the State Board has further undertaken the work of translation and publication of French Records on the history of the Marathas. Initially, the University of Bombay had been able to secure microfilms of records from the French Archives in Paris pertaining

to the history of (1) the Marathas and (2) Mysore and had requested the State Board for financial assistance for preparing transcription and translation of 6,500 French documents obtained from Paris. Looking to the fact that this source material has not either been available to Indian scholars until now or even been preserved anywhere in the country, the Board felt that publication of this material will throw new light on a significant period of Maratha history and may be of great benefit to scholars generally all over the country and, accordingly, grant-in-aid equal to 75 per cent of the estimated cost of the work was sanctioned to the University. Dr. V. G. Hatalkar, a veteran Professor of French from the Bombay University has transcribed and translated about 1,500 documents out of 6,500 available documents, in the first stage.

4. The State Board now feels extremely gratified to publish the 1st and the 2nd Volumes of the French Records entitled "Correspondence of M. Anquetil de Briancourt, French Consul at Surat, 1774–1780" and "Correspondence of M. de St. Lubin, French Envoy to the Maratha Court at Poona, 1776–1780" translated by Dr. V. G. Hatalkar.

5. With great industry and patience, Dr. V. G. Hatalkar has done an admirable job, first in collecting, arranging and deciphering and then in translating and editing these important records. On behalf of the State Board, I record here my gratefulness to Dr. Hatalkar for undertaking and doing this job for the State Board. I also sincerely acknowledge the share and co-operation of the Bombay University in the preparation of there Volumes. The State Board is now glad to release these first two Volumes in the French Records series.

LAXMANSHASTRI JOSHI

*Chairman*

*State Board for Literature and Culture*

Bombay,
Phalguna 15, 1899 Saka
6th March, 1978

# FRENCH RECORDS
## ( Relating to the History of the Marathas)

**Volume I**

## INTRODUCTION

M. Anquetil de Briancourt arrived at Surat in 1757. Next year, he succeeded M. Le Verrier as Chief of the French Factory at Surat. He continued in this capacity till 1771 when the French East India Company ceded all its establishments in India to the King of France. In that year, Briancourt went to France on leave. He was appointed French Consul at Surat in August 1773 and sailed once again for India in April 1774. He arrived at Surat on November 5, 1774, on the ship *Le Duras*.

Briancourt's special instructions were to negotiate certain political matters, i.e. (*i*) establish the right of the French to hoist their flag at Surat in pursuance of the privileges conferred upon them by a firman from the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1666, a right enjoyed by the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese, and (*ii*) to assure the safety of the French Ships sailing on the Malabar Coast (actually the Konkan Coast) by seeking passports for them from the Maratha nation. He was also entrusted with looking after the commercial interests of his nation at Surat. Thus, Briancourt's duties were two-fold, commercial and political. Let us deal with his commercial activities first.

As he had considerable experience (1757–1771) of the conditions prevailing in India in commercial matters, he was the best person to guide the interests of his fellowmen in this field. Unfortunately, they did not bother to seek his advice, with the result that both the French traders and the French Consulate, which depended to a large extent on the customs for its subsistence, suffered. Thus, in a way, the French Minister's plan to restore to the French name the glory which it enjoyed formerly at Surat, and at the same time, to secure from this town for the other French factories

in India and even for France all the advantages, which the other nations had so far derived from its commerce, was defeated. The shippers almost made it a point to visit other ports before coming to Surat. They not only brought trash by the time they reached this place but also arrived there so late, i.e. at a time when the advanced season offered almost no market for the goods from Europe. They also thereby could not purchase goods for their return journey, for not counting on their arrival, the weavers at Surat worked only on orders placed with them by the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese brokers. Moreover, the French traders had formed the self-ruinous habit of contracting business at Bombay where the English bought a fourth or a third of their cargo and sent it to Surat where they earned large profits, thus depriving the French Consulate of its customs.

Secondly, Briancourt had been specially entrusted by the owners of the ships *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* to look after the commercial transactions of these two ships, with powers, as Briancourt asserts it, to draw Bills of Exchange on them, in case of need. Unfortunately, *Le Duras* arrived at Surat at a time when the war between the Marathas and the English had begun and of which Surat itself was the main theatre. Obviously, the selling and buying operations of the ship was no plain sailing. Another misfortune befell the ship; its supercargo died suddenly, thus interrupting its operations. Moreover, in spite of the protests of the Captain of the ship, the owners had not cared to dock it before it left the French port. As ill luck would have it, the ship sustained heavy damage during the unloading operations and had to be careened at Bombay where the English collected very heavy charges for this service. To make matters worse, a

raging storm, unprecedented in this region for more than 100 years, dealt a mortal blow to commerce. Briancourt had about twenty thousand rupees worth of luxury goods from *Le Duras* transferred and loaded on a small Dutch ship, the *Adriana*, to be dispatched to Batavia on the account of the ship-owners, for these goods were difficult to dispose of at Surat because of the scourge of war. The *Adriana* was lost like the other ships at a day's distance from Surat on the second day of the hurricane. As a result of these combined misfortunes, there were no funds available at all to complete the cargo for the return journey of *Le Duras* to Europe. Briancourt had perforce to devise means to secure funds for this purpose, and in view of the powers conferred on him by the owners to draw Bills of Exchange on them in case of necessity, he negotiated with Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay, who advanced him one hundred and sixty thousand rupees for a Bill of Exchange on the shippers. With this succour, he completed the transactions of both the ships *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère*. But the owners, it is difficult to surmise on what grounds, refused to honour fully the Bill of Exchange drawn by Briancourt on them. The result was that the Nawab of Surat, at the instance of the English, set up a chowky at the French Consul's residence which was raised after 48 hours when Briancourt entered into a written agreement with Mr. Hornby's attorneys and gave the jewels of his wife and daughter as security for the payment of one lakh rupees.

It is very difficult to form a proper judgment on this sorry and controversial affair. In the first instance, Briancourt asserts that he had been invested by the owners of the ships *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* with powers to draw Bills of Exchange on them in case of need, which fact is proved

because they paid nearly half the amount of the Bill of Exchange. It is an enigma as to why they refused to pay the balance. Secondly, when Briancourt, on hearing that his Bill is not honoured, asks Mr. Hornby's attorneys to return to him the Bill in kind as well as the protest for non-payment, they reply that they do not have these two documents. This is very astonishing. Next, later on, when Briancourt solicits Montigny to write to the Minister in his favour, Montigny, who has been apprised of all the facts of the case by Briancourt, expresses his inability to intervene in this affair and categorically says that Briancourt was wrong in interfering with the shippers' affairs and that on this point the Minister's orders were very strict and explicit.

Be that as it may, we feel extremely sorry at the fate of this Frenchman who showed considerable activity and resourcefulness in handling the commercial operations of his compatriots. By his character, activity and long experience, he enjoyed a great prestige in the higher commercial circles of Surat, and the English were only too happy to deal a deadly blow to this prestige. As for the owners of *Le Duras*, they behaved purely as mercenaries, utterly unmindful of the repercussions of their action on the national interest, for Briancourt played a vital role for his nation, as he was in a position to collect valuable information about the activities of the English on the Malabar Coast. Besides, they could easily have had recourse to arbitration by the Minister, as did a little later, the owners of the ship *Le Sartine* in the case of M. de St. Lubin, since after all Briancourt enjoyed an official position.

As regards Briancourt's political activity, this may again be regarded as two-fold. He was asked to see that the right of the French to hoist their flag at Surat was reestablished.

In spite of his very serious efforts in this direction, he did not succeed in the attempt, mainly due to the obstacles raised by the English. The matter was subsequently referred to the higher authorities in England for their decision in this behalf.

Briancourt had also received instructions to assure the safety of the French ships sailing on the Konkan Coast by obtaining passports for them from the Maratha Government. This proved to be a complicated affair. In fact, the contact with the Maratha Government was facilitated, because that Government, as soon as they heard about the arrival of Briancourt at Surat, were the first to make overtures to him. A wanton aggression had just been committed by the English against that nation by capturing the Island of Salsette. To punish the English, the Marathas wanted to negotiate with Briancourt for the assistance of 200 French troops from Pondicherry in return for the grant of a place on the Konkan Coast. The French Consul, however, replied that he could not promise any troops, unless he obtained beforehand proof of their good faith and friendship by furnishing him passports for all the French ships sailing upon the Maratha and Malabar Coasts; that he would then write to the Minister and to the Governor of Pondicherry on the question of assistance in French troops to them. The Court of Poona, through their negotiator, gave Briancourt to understand that the French ships had nothing to fear and that on the arrival of the French in the Maratha territory, they would grant them any concessions they desired. The negotiations thus dragged on. In the meantime, Briancourt's dispatches, which contained a report of these negotiations, fell by accident into the hands of the English. Briancourt had therefore to suspend his

negotiations with the Marathas for some time. When the French Royal ship *Le Brillant* appeared at Surat in March, 1777, the Marathas expressed their joy at this event through an express messenger whom they secretly dispatched to the French Consul. The correspondence between Briancourt and the court of Poona was then resumed. The former demanded Gheria and Baroda and undertook to write to the Governor of Pondicherry and to that of the Isle of France to procure them assistance in European soldiers which they solicited. The Maratha agent assured the French Consul that Gheria, Baroda, Bassein and Gogha would be granted to the French at their choice, if 400 Frenchmen were dispatched to Poona. By this time, M. de St. Lubin had arrived at the Maratha Court as an envoy from the King of France, and Briancourt left his secret negotiations to the French envoy's care.

It may also be mentioned here that Raghoba, dissatisfied with the Treaty of Purandhar which had dashed all his hopes of regaining the office of the Peshwa, had also made overtures to Briancourt to obtain succour from Pondicherry or else a promise to obtain it from Europe, for the realisation of his dream. The French Consul, a man of scruples, knowing that Raghoba's cause was not a just one, did not encourage these overtures.

As mentioned above, the customs at Surat, on which the French Consulate, to a large extent, depended for its existence, were gradually and definitely falling. The French Consul was, therefore, extremely worried about the future of the Consulate and was mak ing desperate efforts to seek other resources to maintain it. Besides, the rumour that the port of Chaul had been ceded to the French by the Marathas added to the Consul's anxieties, because the new cession

was bound to damage the interests of the French Consulate at Surat. If the French ships stopped at Chaul, they would perhaps not sail up to Surat, he thought. Believing that St. Lubin, after his success in concluding a treaty of alliance and commerce with the Marathas, had acquired great influence with that government, Briancourt made a suggestion to St. Lubin to obtain Gogha as a jahgir for the French from the Maratha Court. In his opinion, the French could derive great advantage from it ; its position was such that the trade of all the big neighbouring towns, including Surat, would find its way to this port, if the French possessed it. This port, till then frequented only by sailors, would, according to Briancourt, assume great importance when properly developed. Briancourt had been assured that the port was spacious enough to hold a big squadron, had a muddy bottom everywhere and sufficient water for the biggest ships which could enter and go out of it in all seasons. To find out if this port really possessed these good qualities, Briancourt had sent two men to study the surroundings and the bearings of the port. There is reason to believe that Briancourt was satisfied with the examination he had made of Gogha, for only two months later, he wrote to St. Lubin to try to obtain the port as a jahgir for the French.

In his anxiety to make the French Consulate at Surat subsist independently of trade, Briancourt made another proposal to St. Lubin, i.e. to obtain Dumas as jahgir for the French from the Poona Government. He had likewise sought information on this place : Dumas was a big borough, 16 kms. to the south-west of Surat, situated at the mouth of the river Tapti in the direction of the harbour, and belonged to the Marathas. The revenues of Dumas

amounted to from Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 25,000 a year, and all expenses paid and different allocations made, there would still remain a balance of at least Rs. 15,000 for the French. This parawana for Dumas, Briancourt believed, was of such little consequence for the Marathas that they would easily grant it to the French, especially in view of the treaty signed by St. Lubin with them. Besides, the situation of the place, which stood at the mouth of the river, would give the French mastery over all the trade in the region, in case of war. The third advantage was that Dumas was the most suitable place to make a landing, if the French had any designs on Surat. Briancourt, therefore, pressed St. Lubin to procure this triple advantage for the French by his negotiations in Poona. Unfortunately, in his ardour to save the French Consulate at Surat, Briancourt lost sight of the fact that the Marathas would never make the smallest cession to the French unless and until they saw a French force land on their territory to put bounds to the English designs against them.

If, in the commercial field, Briancourt's activity was commendable, it could be styled as extraordinary in the political field. He had not only welcomed the Maratha overtures for procuring them French assistance, but kept them alive in the hope of obtaining something solid from that nation before making them any definite promises. These negotiations were handled very tactfully and secretly. He had tried to obtain first hand information about the usefulness of Gogha and Dumas before asking St. Lubin to obtain them as jahgirs for the French. These places could be of strategic importance in case of war. He had also opened negotiations with the Portuguese Governor of Daman for establishing a residence there. In all these places, the

French would enjoy the right to hoist their flag, a matter which Briancourt had nearest to his heart, and if war was declared between France and England, the French Consul, who knew that he would not be allowed to remain at Surat, could easily shift to any one of these places, if not made a prisoner of war.

Side by side with his negotiations with Poona, Briancourt had sent a trustworthy person to Delhi to open contact with this part of India, as if to anticipate his Minister who dispatched M. de Montigny to India in 1777 to win the support of the Mughal Emperor and of other chiefs in that region for the French in case of war with the English.

Not to leave any stone unturned to get sympathy and assistance for the French in case of war, Briancourt had kept very intimate relations with Ali Nawaz Khan, the uncle of the Nawab of Surat, the only person who could oppose the English if a suitable opportunity offered itself. They were fully conscious that, supported by the Europeans, Ali Nawaz Khan was capable of immediately levying 20,000 men in the town. He had even given Briancourt to understand that on the arrival of the French at Bombay, he would not fail to prove to him all his esteem and consideration for the French nation.

To crown his political activity, he even went to the extent of suggesting to St. Lubin that if war was declared in Europe between France and England, he should urge the Marathas to attack Surat. The plan would not be difficult to execute, for the French Consul would then utilize all the knowledge he possessed of the situation of this town to serve his nation and prove his zeal for it. It was for this purpose, it appears, that he had managed to obtain a copy of the plan of the city and castle of Surat, made from the English original, with

notes in his own handwriting, and wanted to send it to St. Lubin who, in his turn, would dispatch it to the Marathas. The plan would help the latter to study the vulnerable points and direct their assault on the place accordingly. Unfortunately, at about this time, Briancourt was made prisoner of war by the English. This was certainly an extraordinary activity on the part of a person holding a small post of that of a Consul at Surat.

However, Briancourt's complaint against the English that they had broken the neutrality, so sacred at Surat, by making him a prisoner of war has no solid grounds. His political activity, though praiseworthy, was definitely directed against the English nation. On one occasion, his dispatches, which contained information about his negotiations with the Marathas, had accidentally fallen into the hands of the English. Briancourt only deluded himself when he thought that he had completely put the English off the scent. Moreover, the English were fully aware of the fact that he was in close correspondence with both M. de Montigny and M. de St. Lubin. Perhaps he did not know that some of St. Lubin's letters had been intercepted by the English. Finally, Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay, was perfectly right when he told Briancourt that it was the French Consul who was the first to break neutrality by clandestinely obtaining a copy of the plan of the citadel of Surat, which was found among his papers with notes in his own handwriting. The plan was found along with a letter addressed to St. Lubin by Briancourt. It was this discovery too which was solely responsible for the treatment, though certainly unbecoming, given to him and his family by the English at the time of his removal from Surat to Thana.

On the whole, Briancourt was a thorough gentleman. He was a good friend and a very kind-hearted man. He had run to the rescue of the Dutch Factory at Surat in 1762 when involved in certain difficulties with the English. He had maintained the entire staff of the Dutch establishment, outraged by the English and blockaded by more than 2000 sipahees of the Nawab. He was an excellent host. He had given hospitality to Mr. Bolts who was vigorously persecuted by the English. Mr. Bolts and his family stayed for nearly five months at the French Consul's residence. Briancourt entertained friends including Mr. Boddam, Chief of the English factory at Surat, of course, in a true French fashion. He had won the esteem of the leading citizens of the town and his advice on commercial matters was very often sought by them. Highly sensible of his duties, he had done his best to help M. de Montigny and M. de St. Lubin, both sent to India on very important missions by the French Government. It is a tribute to his resourcefulness that he maintained a friendly contact at Bombay, which supplied him with useful information. Sensing an arrest by the English in case of war between France and England, he managed to keep in safe custody all his important papers as well as the portfolio of Montigny. In spite of vigorous search, the English could never put their hands on these papers which, it appears, Briancourt received back intact, prior to his departure for England. Finally, his patriotic outbursts evoke our sympathy and admiration.

This work is divided into three parts. The first is the Diary of the administration of Briancourt from November 5, 1774, the day of his arrival at Surat, to May 5, 1779, the date of his departure from Bombay to England. The second

constitutes his Reflexions in the form of questions and answers, calculated to supply most complete information about Surat, civil, military and commercial, which he places before his Minister. And the third is his correspondence, arranged chronologically, with the French Minister for the Navy, the Governor of Pondicherry, M. de St. Lubin, French envoy at the Maratha Court, M. de Montigny, entrusted with a political mission at the Court of Delhi, and M. Chevrean, Chief Account's Officer for the Navy and Pay-Master at Pondicherry. It must be mentioned here that only that part of the correspondence of Briancourt has been selected, which mainly relates to the history of the Marathas.

VINAYAK GAJANAN HATALKAR

C[2] 126

(195) *

## THE CONSULATE DIARY
### OF

M. ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT, at Surat, which includes political, military and commercial transactions of this town and of the Indian territories connected with its history and a detailed account of the expeditions of the English against the Marathas, from November 3, 1774,[1] the date of arrival of M. Anquetil at Surat, to May 5, 1779, the date of his departure from Bombay, from where he was transported, as a prisoner of war, to England, at which place he arrived on December 27, 1779.

Paris, May 4, 1780

---

(196)*

To.

Monseigneur De Sartine,

Minister and Secretary of State for the Navy.

My Lord,

The Diary, which I have the honour to place before you, is the result of my labours produced during the voyage on board the English vessel the *Royal Admiral*, on which I embarked with my whole family, as a prisoner of war, from Bombay to England. I am conscious that extra care has to be taken while submitting an account before a Minister whose august functions, since the revival of the Navy, embrace the entire world. Your kindness, my Lord, reassures me; the special protection with which you honour me, sets my mind at rest; my ardent zeal will make up for the shortcomings of my labour. The faithful, shall I say unfortunate, subject has always the privilege to report himself to you; and it is the abstract of a Diary which I implore you to kindly scrutinize.

May 4, 1780

I have the honour to be,
With most profound respect.
My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant
ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT

(197) *

# DIARY OF THE FIVE YEARS OF OFFICE OF M. ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT AS CONSUL AT SURAT

1774

## I. *Situation on the Malabar Coast at the time of the arrival of the French Consul at Surat, on the vessel* Le Duras. *War between the Marathas and the English who support Raghoba the usurper.*

SURAT, celebrated since long for its revolutions and its commerce, is situated to the north-wes' of the Indian Peninsula, at the upper end of the Malabar Coast, in latitude 21° North. Its situation, at the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay, somewhat midway between Persia and Hindustan, has transformed it into a storehouse of the riches of the two Empires for the Europeans who emulously set up large factories there. Those of the English and the Dutch are always maintained on a respectable footing. That of the French, flourishing at the start, has been since long, for want of commerce, in a condition which would hardly do honour to the French nation.

In order to restore to the French name, the glory which it enjoyed formerly at Surat, and to secure from this town for the other French factories in India and even for France, all the advantages which the other nations have so far derived from its commerce, the Minister, (197v°) resolved to establish a Consulate there. I was chosen to fill up the post of the Consul and received the appointment order from the King in the month of August 1773. I had managed the affairs of the King and the Company at Surat for 14 years as Chief of the factory. I embarked at Lorient in April 1774 on the ship *Le Duras* equipped by Messrs. Bernier, De Roth and Foucault, and arrived in the Surat harbour on November 5, the same year.

The first piece of news I received on landing was the death of Mr. Price, Chief of the English factory. This sad event grieved me very much. I had lost in Mr. Price a good friend, with whom, two years ago, I had made suitable arrangements for the execution of the plan with which I was entrusted.

*The figures in bracket indicate the folio numbers of the original documents in the National Archives of Paris.

Far from getting the same friendly co-operation from Mr. Gambier, successor of Mr. Price, I experienced much opposition from him in connection with my installation as Consul at Surat and the selling operations of the ship *Le Duras*.

The difficulties I met with in these different negotiations can be easily understood, for the English, jealous rivals of the French everywhere, are the masters of the fortress of Surat and the Nawab, who governs the town in the name of the Mughal Emperor, (198) is only their puppet and their slave.

After many unpleasant wrangles which I had to go through while trying to have all its privileges restored to the French nation, I finally all but succeeded in my goal and the selling operations of *Le Duras* went on without any direct impediments. But so far as loading the ship with fresh cargo was concerned, it was no plain sailing.

The complexion of affairs had changed at Surat. In 1772, I had left this town in a sufficiently flourishing state, as much, of course, as the vicinity of Bombay, which for the last twenty years has been drawing away all its trade in its port, could permit it. On my return in November 1774, I found everything topsy-turvy, the Navab under a tighter yoke of his masters (the English) and the commerce entirely ruined, because of the projects of conquests and the ambitious views of the English.

This nation, always anxious to seize others' property in India, had been coveting the island of Salcette for more than twenty yea₁s. It belonged to the Marathas, but as it was contiguous to the island of Bombay, the English found that it completely met with their requirements. Thus, bent upon securing it by hook or crook, they grabbed the opportunity to support the unjust claims of the Maratha Chief, Rogunatrao (Raghunathrao) *alias* Ragouba (Raghoba), who was then at loggerheads with his family.

(198v°) This fallen Chief had been Regent of the Maratha possessions, in Poona. He was driven away from his capital and his post for the assassination, committed in his presence and by his orders, of Nanan Rhao (Narayanrao), son of Nana (Nanasaheb, Peshwa Balaji Bajirao); he was his nephew, and heir apparent to the Poona Government, which Raghoba wanted to seize for his adopted son.

In order to achieve his end, he threw himself into the hands of the English and sought their help to reconquer his kingdom, which, however, did not belong to him. It rightfully belonged to Mado Rhao Savaye (Sawai Madhavrao), then 3 to 4 years old.[2] It is he who rules today and who is the son of the assassinated young prince. In spite of the incontestable rights of his grand-nephew to the office of the Peshwa, a title which means the Prime Minister or King of the Marathas, Raghoba resolved to leave no stone unturned to obtain it for himself, and promised the cession of several places and especially that of the island of Salcette to the English, in recognition of their service.

Raghoba's offer favoured the ambitious designs of the English too admirably for them not to take advantage of it. They warmly embraced the cause of this Maratha Chief, wandering and cast off by his own subjects for crimes of misappropriation and assassination. Their equally unjustified (199) encroachment on Bhadoch, a Mughal town situated 48 kilometres to the north of Surat, and in which they had just succeeded, encouraged them. They had driven out the Nawab, who lost his life like a brave soldier in defence of his patrimony, and this important place, which they have considerably fortified, is for the last six years in their hands.

This conquest, achieved in 1773,[3] made them the sole holders of all the cotton and the grain crops which are abundantly grown in this fertile region. It considerably increased their commerce and their revenues. Besides, Bhadoch and its dependencies fetch them annually five to six lakhs of rupees as additional income, and adjoin the rich territories which they also hold in the neighbourhood of Surat; the fortress of this town belongs to them since 1759 according to the law of "might is right".

Such continuous and handsome success did not yet satisfy them. They wanted to annex the island of Salcette, near Bombay, to these acquisitions. Their boundless ambition had conceivably solid grounds because, if, somehow or other, they could acquire Thana, capital of Salcette, they would become masters of the whole territory between Bombay and Bhadoch as well as of the vast revenues which the Marathas collected annually from this stretch of more than 400 kilometres.

Besides these general advantages for (199v°) the nation, every Englishman in the Government of Bombay, Surat and Bhadoch hoped to receive large amounts of money, if they succeeded in installing Raghoba on the throne of Poona.

This attractive prospect made them connive at the injustice of Raghoba's claims. While offering protection to this murderer of his own nephew, they had only set their eyes on the treasures of the Deccan. for in exchange of a small unit of 400 to 500 Europeans which he demanded from them, he ceded to them in perpetuity vast territories which did not belong to him. The question of justice hardly bothered them. The advantages of these territories and the opportunity to enrich themselves and increase their possessions by appropriating them, were the sole criteria before them.

Thus, in 1774,[4] from Chaul, a few kilometres to the south of Bombay, moving up along the coast as far as Bhadoch and Cambay and in the whole of the Gulf, a distance of 400 kilometres, all the places were filled with troops. The English and Raghoba were invading and plundering and the various Maratha armies, some of them 60,000 strong, were marching from one place to another to defend their own territory and burn what (200) they could not protect.

It was precisely at this troublesome epoch that the vessel *Le Duras* arrived at Surat. This commercial place was then, because of its position, in the centre of general devastation.

In December 1774, that is to say, a month and half after the arrival of *Le Duras* at Surat, the English seized Thana, the main fortress of the Island of Salcette, which, by this fresh conquest entirely fell into their hands.

This Island is considered to-day as a bulwark of Bombay against the Marathas, and moreover, as its foster-mother because it is a key to the Deccan for all the supplies of food and other provisions required for Bombay. It is also a great market for all the goods from Europe. The possession of this island, covetted for more than 20 years by the English, was at once ratified in their favour by Raghoba, who ceded it to them in perpetuity by a regular Deed.

1775

A few months after this conquest, consolidated by the wholesale massacre of the garrison of Thana, the small English army proceeded to Surat to join Raghoba, who had also arrived there but routed and running before the enemy. He was very annoyed with the English, for he held them responsible for his recent debacle by their long delay in furnishing the promised troops. He summoned up courage (200 v°), however, when he saw them arrive as victors. Without losing time, he collected all types of provisions from Surat, a town vital for obtaining supplies of all kinds in such cases, and set out again with the English in the month of March 1775.

The latter at once conferred upon Raghoba the title of *Peshwa* or the King of the Marathas. The two armies left Surat amidst the sound of trumpets to punish the rebels, as the English announced, then march straight on Poona and crown Raghoba, their protégé. But the *Barbhais*, a term which signifies *Twelve Brothers*, dedicated to the areopagus of Poona and composed of twelve Maratha Chiefs, were watching all their movements. They occupied all the positions on the way with their individual detachments of troops and awaited those of the new allies of their enemy with a firm determination.

## II. *Losses suffered by commerce in general and by that of* Le Duras *in particular.*

By this short account of the war between the English and the Marathas, of which Surat and the surrounding territory was in some sort the battle-field, it is very easy to conceive that the vessel *Le Duras*, which arrived there at this time of trouble and confusion, could not carry on a very prosperous business. The best speculations in the world are bound to go wrong in times of such a revolution. Surat then resembled more a (201) camp full of soldiers than a city of merchants. Besides the limitless power which the slavish Nawab publicly conferred upon the English, their political jealously avowedly furnished them a thousand secret ways to thwart this first attempt of the French at Surat, although made in pursuance of incontestable rights.

In spite of all these obstacles, my conciliatory attitude had cleared all the difficulties in my way. It can be established that in view of the times, the first commercial transactions of *Le Duras*, were fairly successful. But the great damage which occurred at the time of unloading and the ruinous prospect of complete careening which the vessel needed, greatly worried me as well as the supercargo from the very first month about the loading operations.

A fresh misfortune suddenly stopped the operations of *Le Duras*. The Supercargo fell ill in the beginning of January 1775, and died on the 11th of the same month.

M. DeMoncrif, Secretary to the Consulate, made on the spot an inventory of all his belongings, but neither found therein registers of stores, nor invoices of sales, nor any notes of the damage which the ship had suffered at the time of unloading. (201v°) I then instructed the French broker to continue, under my supervision, the shipping operations of *Le Duras* according to the plan drawn by the late M. Dulaurent, supercargo, which at the same time complied with the instructions of the ship owners. I did my best to safeguard their interests, as far as the dignity of my position allowed it. I did not, therefore, expect the outrageous treatment they made me suffer in return for all my troubles.

The death of the supercargo of *Le Duras* was the cause of much grief as well as great embarrassment to me. It put a heavy burden on my shoulders. As the preparations for the voyage to Mocha, where the ship had to be sent immediately, required much attention and as the season was advancing, I had no time to ascertain the damage; this work entailed lot of labour; which was not at all possible for me at that time. I kept a register of all the purchases made by the French broker, and opened books, making double entries, for the accounts of the shipping business.

In spite of all the difficulties, which prevented the entry of goods into the city, I so much accelerated the delivery of those ordered for Mocha that the ship was dispatched to this place on 27th March, the usual time for the departure of the vessels from Surat for the Red Sea, for the monsoon.

(202) The trouble I had taken to dispatch *Le Duras* at the proper time proved in vain; the ship missed its voyage and after sailing on the sea for two months, without reaching the African Coast, it went to Bombay on the 21st May.

All the ships from Surat and Bombay which left after *Le Duras*, also missed their voyage and were obliged to take shelter, some at Bombay and others at Muscat. The failure of these voyages was due to too quick a change in the monsoon this year which was unexpected and which *Le Duras* could not avoid, although it had been dispatched 12 to 15 days before all the other ships. It was thus a general calamity.

Another misfortune dealt a mortal blow to commerce,. A raging storm never to be forgotten in this country, completely ruined what the war had spared. The tempest lasted 3 days in all its fury, and all the ships which happened to be on the sea along the coast suffered from its terrible effects. It was the 16th of May. All either went aground or were dashed to pieces; several perished with all hands.

(202 v°) Huge losses were incurred at Surat, Daman and Bombay as well as at other ports on the Coast, from where ships had to be dispatched because of the approach of the monsoon season.

I had about twenty thousand rupees worth of goods from *Le Duras* transferred and loaded on the *Adriana*, a small Dutch vessel. It was lost like the other ships at a day's distance from Surat on the second day of the hurricane. The scourge of war had ruined the trade at Surat to such an extent that I had thought I had done the right thing in sending to Batavia, on the account of the ship-owners, the luxury goods from *Le Duras* which were difficult to dispose of in this Mohomedan city once so flourishing. My calculations proved wrong, like those of the other merchants, who had not foreseen either this terrible hurricane, for which there exists no other example in this city for more than 100 years. They have all lost the sums advanced, without having even the time to go in for insurance.

Finally, the ship *Le Duras* met with another misfortune, due to the negligence of the ship-owners. In spite of the protests of the captain M. de St. Hillaire, the ship had not been docked before leaving Lorient; it had to be careened at Bombay, where the English collected very heavy charges for this service. This job added considerably to the losses (203) which the damage, caused by the bad state of the ship, had already produced, and which should have been foreseen before its departure from Europe.

III. *Efforts of the English to ruin the trade and those of the French Consul to support it. The incident of the flag. Belated arrival of the ship* Le Sévère *at Surat. Its commercial operations. Chinese voyage assured by the efforts of the French Consul.*

WHILST I was doing my best for the ship-owners and whilst their business was going on as profitably as it could, considering the critical circumstances in which *Le Duras* had reached Surat, I had not lost sight of the main object of my mission and was negotiating with the Marathas of Poona. They had been the first to write to me. The object of my negotiations was to obtain from them proper Paravanas for the security of trade of French vessels along the Malabar Coast, infested as far as Surat by big and small pirates who were their tributaries.

But as the demands and offers of the Marathas were bound up with the political affairs of the English, and as I had no desire to take part in the quarrel of Raghoba, the negotiations dragged on. If I failed to see therein all the advantages I expected, they at least served to point out what the French nation could expect from such allies, if the Ministry of France was prepared to accept them as such, and in April 1775, I gave a detailed account of these negotiations to the Minister.

My plan on arriving at Surat was to have the French flag hoisted there according to the right which the French nation possessed (203 v°) and which was set forth in the Paravanas of the Mughal Emperor. I would have put it into execution, if, on my return to this city, Mr. Price had been living. He had already agreed with me on the rights of the French nation in the exercise of this privilege.

This English Chief had promised to help me in this connection, as soon as I returned. Mahomet oldin Khan,[5] Nawab of Surat, had also given me his promise in writing in December 1772, a few days before my departure for Europe. He had then assured me that he would allow me to hoist the French flag, if I returned with a ship richly laden with cargo. Mr. Price's death, the almost complete subjection of this very Nawab to the English, the new war with the Marathas, which forced the English to be vigilant about everything that could give some prominence to the French, prevented the execution of my plan.

Besides, I was afraid that by hoisting the flag straightaway, the English, even without direct interference, might force it to be removed with an insult to the French nation. Moreover, they, as well as the Nawab of Surat, were always in need of money. Nothing stops them whenever there is a chance to obtain it. Thus, it was to be feared lest the cargo on *Le Duras* should fall a prey to their cupidity. The sequence of events will prove that I was not (204) then wrong. I, therefore, judged that, for want of power behind me, conciliation was the only way to achieve my object. It was also advisable to wait till the cargo from *Le Duras* was secure from all molestation.

There were at that time in the harbour two other ships which had arrived from Mauritius, *La Seine* and *Les Trois Amis*, and which belonged to M. de la Rochette : handsome prizes for the English, if I had given them the slightest pretext to seize them in the name of the Nawab.

To assert the claims of the French nation, I was, therefore, obliged to wait until the French goods were out of reach of the rapine of these despots. I chose the moment when *Le Duras* was lying in the port of Bombay and when there were no French ships in the harbour of Surat. I started the negotiation in the month of August 1775, first with the Nawab. This prince, replied, in spite of his own letter which was produced before him, that he could not discuss this matter with the French Consul without prior consent from Bombay, thus admitting that he was a slave of the English. I had to put up with it.

After two months of fruitless negotiations, the Council of Bombay wrote to me in substance that since the clause about the hoisting of the French flag at Surat did not appear (204 v°) in the last treaty of peace, it was for their superiors in Europe to decide the question, and that they were going to make their report on it, as well as on the rightful claims of the French Consul in this respect. At the same time, they wrote to the Nawab to be very cautious about his dealings with me, and warned him that at the slightest leniency shown to me, he would be removed from his office as Nawab.

The English had nothing to fear from him. The Nawab of Surat was too fully conscious of their power and of his helplessness to risk losing his position by favouring the cause of the French. A few months later I sent

an account of the whole negotiation to the Minister. At the same time, I had communicated to him my own views on this subject.

At the end of October, the ship *Le Duras* returned to Surat after careening and spending the whole bad season of the monsoon at Bombay, and on 10th December, set off again for Mocha. It had loaded cargo worth about twelve thou-and rupees which my credit obtained for it in goods from the city, in addition to its own cargo. All the ships from Surat which had missed their voyage, like *Le Duras*, also set out again for Mocha almost at the same time.

The ship *Le Sévère*, equipped out like *Le Duras* by Messrs. Bernier, Roth and Foucault, (205) was expected at Surat in the beginning of January 1776. After stopping at Mahé, it was to unload there (at Surat) a large portion of its cargo and collect in return two thousand cotton bales and eighty thousand rupees in cash. This cash was meant to purchase sandal-wood on its way back from Surat to Mahé, from where it was to proceed to China and finally return to Europe.

1776

The month of January passed without any news about *Le Sévère* at Surat. The French broker explained to me his difficulty in holding the two thousand cotton bales purchased for this ship, in accordance with the instructions of the ship-owners, which were passed on to me. *Le Sévère*, whose arrival was already too long delayed, placed me in a state of great anxiety and continuous worries, because of its big operations at Surat.

The merchants were pressing hard the French broker for the payment for the two thousand cotton bales, amounting to more than a hundred thousand rupees, and I was afraid I might have to return them for lack of funds. If, in this extremity, I had not used my credit secretly and quite opportunely, *Le Sévère* would have missed her voyage to China, and the ship-owners would have suffered a heavy loss.

(205v°) The repeated demands of these merchants of Surat, who gave no respite to the French broker for the payment for these two thousand cotton bales, were the result of the secret machinations of Mr. Gambier, the English Chief in this city. His object was to bring

about the failure of this first commercial transaction of the French at Surat with China. Moreover, he covetted for himself this cargo prepared by my efforts.

In order to appropriate it, he spread the rumour that the ship *Le Sévère* would never arrive at Surat, because after leaving Mauritius it had proceeded to the Seychelles Islands where it was lost. I left no stone unturned to scotch this rumour, which had no foundation, but the most difficult thing was to prevent the merchants from delivering these two thousand cotton bales to Mr. Gambier who was quite ready with his money.

On the other hand, the ship *Le Duras* had just carried away to Mocha goods from Surat which were to be replaced by consignments of coffee. Moreover, depleted by the damage, the losses of *L'Adriana*, the failure of the voyage to Mocha, the careening, the expenses of the halt at Bombay, and severely affected by the unfortunate circumstance of the war which ruined everything, the shipping business lacked funds for completing the cargo for the return voyage of *Le Duras* to Europe.

In these circumstances, as critical (206) for *Le Duras* as for *Le Sévère*, I negotiated so skilfully that Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay, advanced me one hundred and sixty thousand rupees for a Bill of Exchange on the shippers.

This succour, obtained in the nick of time, produced the double advantage of ensuring the voyage of *Le Sévère* to China and a rich cargo for the return journey of *Le Duras* to Europe, in accordance with the wishes of the shippers who owned both the ships. On the 10th March 1776, I delivered to Mr. Hornby Bills of Exchange and received in cash one hundred and sixty thousand rupees which I immediately entered into the registers to the account of the shippers.

With these funds I made a party transfer, which the state, in which the two ships were, then necessitated. As I anticipated that the too belated arrival of *Le Sévère* at Surat would present difficulties in the sale of its goods sufficiently in time to obtain funds for its purchase of cotton bales and for its cash which it would require to purchase sandalwood at Mahé, I utilized those which I had just received from Mr. Hornby for my Bills of Exchange on the shippers and although borrowed on the account of *Le Duras*, I at once employed them for making the payment

for the cotton bales of *Le Sévère*, amounting to a hundred and ten thousand rupees and for making an advance of eighty thousand rupees, which (206v°) I sent in cash to Mahé by the same vessel to pay for the sandal-wood. I postponed the disposal of goods brought by *Le Sévère* till they would fetch a handsome price, that is to say, four to five months later, for they would fetch nothing at the time of its arrival ; the proceeds would help me to make the repayment for *Le Duras*.

At last *Le Sévère* arrived at Surat ; but so late that all hopes about its appearance had been given up ; I had also begun to despair of it. It was on the 24th March, 1776. The monsoon season had then advanced so far that the Captain, M. de Brulôme, did not dare leave his ship because of the sea risks. He remained on board during the whole stay of *Le Sévère* in the Surat harbour. In twenty two days, in spite of bad weather, and the distance of 25 to 30 kilometres from the harbour to the city, I had this big ship unloaded and reloaded, and dispatched it to Mahé, where it arrived safe in the beginning of May. I was, therefore, very happy to have so profitably utilized this succour which the Bills of Exchange had offered me, and I was authorized to draw them.

But these transactions appeared to me so necessary for the benefit of the shippers of *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* that, even if I had not been furnished with powers, I would still have employed all my credit to obtain these funds (207) for the shippers. They had not appointed any-one to replace M. DuLaurent in case of death ; they had requested me to provide for it. If I had not done it, their business would have been completely neglected. I considered their property as that of minors, which in my capacity as a Consul, it was my duty to protect and improve ; and I had taken all the pains towards this end.

As for profit or loss, having acted with the best of intentions, not being answerable for anything, having no interest in the shipment, I should have had no worries. I should still less be ruined by those very persons for whom I had employed all my energies and taken so much trouble, and yet that is what happened.

My zeal for the shippers of *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* is beyond doubt. The important service I have rendered to *Le Sévère* in ensuring its voyage to China which appeared hopeless, is evident. The manner in which I employed my credit in order to wipe out all the losses of *Le Duras* for which, however, I was not responsible, by procuring for it a rich cargo

for its return journey to Europe, is equally evident. When I shall get to the disgraceful scene of 20th September 1778, it can be judged if I deserved the deadly blow which was dealt to my honour, my reputation, my credit and my fortune.

How could the shippers, respectable by their position as well as by their capacity, (207v°) go to such extremes ? How could they not think that, especially in view of the powers they had given me, if one or several Bills of Exchange drawn on them were presented to them, it was because the position of their business at Surat demanded more funds than they had dispatched ? How could they not consider, before seizing my property by force of arms, the critical position of business at Surat at the time of the unloading of their cargo in this city ?

*Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* arrive there in the midst of troubles. The war of the English with the Marathas, of which Surat itself was the theatre, had ravaged the countryside and ruined all trade for more than 400 kilometres around. *Le Sévère* is in need of funds for its cargo. Without those which I obtain for it by my credit its voyage to China fails, and its stay in India is consequently prolonged entailing for the shippers a very heavy loss which is foreseen and saved by my efforts. *Le Duras*, in spite of all its misfortunes, appeared to promise a profit or at least no loss. This was the chief aim of the loan of 160 thousand rupees received from Mr. Hornby to the account of the shippers. If my work is upset at the time of the departure of this vessel for Europe, it is due to fresh mishaps. Can I be held responsible for them, (208) I, who neither am nor can be an agent or a guarantor because of the post I am holding ?

### *IV. Continuation of the war of the Marathas with the English, who let down Raghoba by making peace with their enemies ; plundering, burning, ravaging in the neighbourhood of Surat.*

In September 1776, *Le Duras* returned from Mocha, where it had a very satisfactory venture, both from the point of view of sales as well as purchases. It arrived at Surat apparently in favourable circumstances, because peace was concluded between the English and the Marathas. But what a peace! a peace worse than the most disastrous war.

The English, as has been mentioned above, had set out in March 1775, accompanied by Raghoba to punish, as they said, the rebels. But they were defeated near Baroda by the main Maratha army which barred their route, and in June they had already returned to the neighbourhood of Surat.[6] Unable to do better and cover their shameful defeat, they ravaged Gujerat and attacked the small Chiefs and Rajas who were deprived of their fiefs. These pillages enriched the English commanded by Col. Keating who has since returned to Europe to safeguard his six lakhs of rupees amassed in this campaign.

Raghoba was not so satisfied as Mr. Keating with these marches and counter-marches, planned, as the report goes, in consultation with the English Chief of Surat, Mr. Gambier who undoubtedly shared the booty with the Colonel. The barbarous conduct of the English army towards the local people, (208 v°) far from gaining for Raghoba an inch of ground, increasingly deprived this Maratha Chief of the esteem of his nation and of his family. In his association with it, he was only destroying his own territory and exhausting his treasures. He had entrusted these to the care of the English who had deposited them in the citadel of Surat, as a guarantee for the expenses of the war. Instead of marching straight on Poona, as he wanted them to do, they always made him scour the country.

The English fooled him thus for more than a year, under different pretexts of which he was for a long time a dupe. Raghoba bitterly complained to the Governor of Bombay that the English had failed in their engagements, for which he had even made payments in advance by the cession of the Island of Salsette and jahgirs in the neighbourhood of Surat. Finally it was resolved to change the course of action. The two combined armies marched on Poona with all the paraphernalia of war, necessary to lay a siege to this city. Suddenly this project of conquest was destroyed by a simple order of the English administration of Bengal, which was neither expected at Bombay nor at Surat. This is how it happened.

The Barbhais, that is to say, the twelve great Maratha Chiefs of the provinces of the Deccan and Bengal, whose headquarters are at Poona, had throughout shown a bold front. They had not (209) incurred any heavy losses, since the joining of Raghoba with the English, except that

of the Island of Salsette and a few jahagirs in the neighbourhood of Surat. On the other hand, they had almost always defeated the English and Raghoba, in the different engagements that had taken place.

But their perpetual differences with Haiderali Khan, whom the English secretly set against them, obliged them to maintain continuously an army, sixty to eighty thousand strong, to oppose him ; this conqueror was slowly encroaching upon their provinces. They also needed another army, almost equally strong, in the field against the English and Raghoba.

Their forces thus being divided, they feared they would eventually succumb. They secretly made overtures to me to obtain succour from France. But I could give them only vague hopes which did not satisfy them. Moreover, as Raghoba's war was a family quarrel, this Maratha Chief's party, although driven from the capital, was sometimes gaining strength. The areopagus of Poona, finding his situation critical, wanted to take advantage of the dilatoriness of the English in helping Raghoba and the time they lost (209v°) in their marches and countermarches. He tried, on the one hand, the channel of negotiation with the Government of Calcutta, whilst, on the other, he held his own against the English and Haiderali Khan.

Thus, on the advice of Nana Phadnis, Sakharam Bapu, Morobadada, Holkar, Phadke, the principal advisers of this Maratha areopagus, Princess Nana, Raghoba's sister-in-law and grand-mother of the little ruling Prince, wrote to the new English administration in Bengal.

She represented to it the justice of the claims of her grandson to the Maratha Government and the injustice of those of Raghoba. She pointed out that he was trying to install his adopted son in the place of Sawai Madhavrao, her own grandson and son of Narayanrao assassinated by the order and in the very arms of Raghoba, and who was the rightful heir to the kingdom of his ancestors. She added that, in the capacity of Mother Regent, she sought the assistance of the English of Bengal against those of Bombay and Surat and that the latter had waged an unjust war against her children in order to crown this Raghoba, murderer of her son Narayanrao, nephew of the barbarous man.

In support of these strong arguments, which sufficed to determine the (210) Supreme Council in Calcutta in her favour, the Princess of Poona offered to cede to the English Company some of the provinces which she

possessed in Bengal, to defray the expenses of the war and conclude with the Government of Bombay a solid peace by which her rights would be established, as also to recover possession of the Island of Salsette, and some jahgirs near Bhadoch and Surat and at the same time wean the the English from Raghoba's party.

This princess negotiated so skilfully that she achieved her objectives in return for her offers which flattered the English of Bengal a good deal. Consequently, the new administration of Calcutta at once wrote to the authorities in Bombay, in accordance with the wishes of the Princess Nana, to stop their activities against the Poona Government, and at the same time bring home to the Governments of Bombay and Surat, its superiority.[7]

The English administration of Bengal, in its letter, sharply reproached the Council at Bombay for this armed action taken without its permission and even without giving it any intimation about it, and for its unjust war to support the interests of a murderer against a great power, of which the Company had strong reasons to seek the alliance. It enjoined upon the Governments (210v°) of Bombay and Surat to lay down their arms immediately on the receipt of the present letter, cease all hostility against the Princess Nana, completely abandon Raghoba's party and be prepared to restore Salsette Island.

The letter written to the Council of Bombay further stated that the Royal administration was dispatching commissioners to Poona to discuss the rights of the claimants to the Maratha Government with instructions to conclude peace and that the Government of Bombay should abide by all the articles of the treaty, which would be drawn up and signed at Poona by its agents.

This order, emanating from the Supreme Council of Bengal, came as a thunderbolt to the Governments of Bombay and Surat. It reached them, as has been mentioned above, precisely at a time when they were marching for the second time to crown Raghoba at Poona. They had, therefore, to decide to retrace their steps once again and renounce their project at least for the time being.

The Bengal deputies arrived at Poona and as things had been arranged in advance, peace was soon concluded. The articles were drawn up and signed by Colonel Upton at Purandhar, near Poona, on 25th March 1776.[8]

(211) Although this peace was sufficiently advantageous to the English Company, which augmented its possessions in Bengal, at no cost and without any bloodshed,[9] it was considered at Bombay and Surat in a very different light. They had to be prepared to restore the Salsette Island so vital to the interests of the English of Bombay and other jahigirs so lucrative for those of Surat and Bhadoch, and finally abandon their foster-father, Raghoba, at a time when they were about to crown him, he who had promised all of them lakhs of rupees, as soon as he would assume the reins of the Maratha Government in his capital.

As it was not possible to evade the execution of the treaty of peace, they complied with it, but very slowly, and dispatched to Bengal Mr. Taylor, Councillor of Bombay, in deputation to explain to the Council of Calcutta the reasons which had prompted them to undertake this war and promote the claims of Raghoba. At the same time they tried to get the article concerning the restoration of the Salsette Island, either cancelled or at least modified.[10]

They also negotiated with the Poona government, to whom (211 v°) they deputed Mr. Mostyn, another Councillor of Bombay. The object of all these negotiations was to gain time, in order to receive fresh orders from Europe, superseding those of Bengal, which might authorize them to recommence a war, the success of which was represented as very advantageous to the Company and very honourable to the nation.

But to begin with, they sent back to Bombay, about two months after the signing of this treaty of peace, their troops which had returned to Surat and were cantoning there and as, by the treaty of peace, a fortress in the centre of the Deccan was designated as a place of retreat for Raghoba with a very decent maintenance, the English asked him to disband his army also. It was camping at Poulpara (Olpad), a small town 8 kilometres from Surat.[11] They informed him to keep himself ready to retire, accompanied only by his household staff, to the town which was assigned to him, because such were the orders of the Supreme Council of Bengal. Thus, after two years of assistance, which were a sheer loss to Raghoba, the English abandon a great Maratha Chief, who had enriched them all in a very short space of time with his own substance.

(212) Evidently, Raghoba did not acquiesce in this treaty of peace, signed at Purandhar, on which he had not even been consulted. Consequently,

Surat and its surroundings felt the effects of his dissatisfaction. He did not disband his troops. His sarafs or brokers, seeing him without funds to repay them and moreover, abandoned by the English, refused him all assistance in money. It was believed that this would be a way to rid Surat of his army, vagrant and which had now become superfluous because of the treaty of peace. Unfortunately, it had the contrary effect.

The troops of Raghoba were disbanded. The leaders, displeased with the English and also with Raghoba, placed themselves at their head to plunder all the villages in the neighbourhood of Surat. They devastated all the countryside. The unfortunate inhabitants of these places, in order to protect their life and that of their wives and children and save what little of cattle and belongings had escaped from plunder, came to take refuge under the walls of the city; but they were still pursued and killed in this shelter, although entrenched under the canon of Surat. The Nawab was then obliged to admit all these poor unfortunate people, fleeing from death, inside the ramparts of the city. Surat could quarter in these times of calamity six to seven hundred thousand souls, including all the poor people (212 v°) of the country side who had taken refuge in the suburbs. The sight of so many victims of Raghoba and his allies the English, aroused the pity of the old and young, and even filled them with horror.

The risks and the dangers were such, even within half range from Surat, that I was obliged to engage the sipahees to save from plunder the piece of ground which was the property of the King of France, known as the French Garden. It accommodates, in a well developed area of 1,400 to 16 00 metres, the Consular House and its out-buildings, and is situated on the trenches of the city, near the walls. How indeed could the countryside and the neighbourhood of Surat have escaped this brigandage, since the troops, left to themselves, could subsist only on what violence and depredations furnished them?

Raghoba, the chief enemy of the Ministry of Poona and on whom was thrown the blame for all this disorder, at last feared that he might be delivered by the English into the hands of the Barbhais. The latter were pressing them to execute the articles of the treaty of peace, especially those concerning him. Finally he decamped in the months of June to seek his fortune elsewhere and secure a safe retreat during the monsoon which had already begun.

V (213) *Extreme difficulties for trade. Departure of* Le Duras *for Europe.*

It is precisely at this time of peace, worse than war, that *Le Duras* 3 pts arrived from Mocha at Surat, and on the 30th December, 1776, the day on which I dispatched this vessel to Europe, the cinders of this general devastation, though extinguished, were still smouldering there.

From this description, which is not at all exaggerated, one can imagine how all the trade transactions were progressing at Surat and also the troubles and the anxieties which I experienced in attending to the interests of the shippers of *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* during these troublesome times.

The sale of the goods and cargo of the latter vessel was effected to the best advantage by the French broker and in my presence. The funds advanced to *Le Sévère* from the loan of 160 thousand rupees by Mr. Hornby, were consequently credited to the accounts of *Le Duras*. But I went through infinite troubles while completing the cargo, in goods from Surat and Gujarat, for the return of *Le Duras* to Europe. It is difficult to form a very clear idea of them.

The collection of all the goods at Surat was still done at a very slow speed, with great risks and at great cost. There was no parity between their prices at the time of the delivery and when the first order was placed. One had to put up with it because of the huge expenses occasioned by war of which the (213 v°) memories were still fresh. The weavers had suffered the most from this terrible calamity. The looms, all hauled with the luggage placed above, had been, for the most part, either burnt or broken or looted.

The silk fabrics and linen goods from Bhadoch, Cambay, Baroda. Ahmedabad and even Surat, had either been plundered or held to ransom or even robbed on the way from one place to another. There was no security on the highways which were, if not blocked by the Marathas, infested by the brigands who spared nothing. The boats, carrying goods, were not more safe in the whole Gulf of Cambay. The Kolis, small sea-robbers, pounced upon what had escaped from the hands of the big pirates.

In the midst of so much disorder, trouble and confusion, I considered it an impossibility to obtain for *Le Duras* its cargo for Europe, as

opportunely and as advantageously as I wished it to be for the benefit of the shippers. I was in continuous anxiety. All the funds were scattered with the weavers within a radius of more than 250 kilometres, and twenty days before the departure of the ship, I still waited for the completion of its cargo more than fifty thousand rupees worth of goods from Ahmedabad and Bhadoch.

(214) In vain did I urge the broker, who himself had placed the orders and distributed the funds, for the collection of goods. There was no sign of them, and my fears for the funds of the shippers increased for they were in an evident danger of being lost. M. de St. Hylaire, captain of *Le Duras,* was pressing me to dispatch the ship at the latest about the 31st of December, to enable him to pass through the Mozambic Channel; the old age of his ship, he feared, rendered it unfit to face the heavy seas in the high altitudes of the Cape of Good Hope and did not permit him to follow the main route. He could not delay his departure any longer, he declared, unless I undertook all the responsibility on myself.

I managed to avoid this delay and yet ensure that *Le Duras* did not depart without the goods which were still not collected. At the same time, I did not wish to leave funds on the responsibility of the broker, as, after the departure of the ship, I would have had infinite difficulty in collecting them. In order to fulfil all these objectives, I replaced the fine goods which I was expecting by those which were available at Surat with the merchants, and I at once arranged the payment for them through the broker at the local price. These fine goods which I got loaded on *Le Duras*, were on the model of those, which the English, the Portuguese (214v°) and the Dutch annually dispatched from Surat to Europe.

## 1777

The ship left on the 30th December, 1776, well and richly laden with goods which the funds from Mr. Hornby had procured. I also dispatched with it, for the guidance of the shippers, books which recorded these transactions and which were kept in double entry. I then fell ill through fatigue and exhaustion, and was on the very point of death. And it was during my illness that the rest of the linen and silk goods arrived. The broker received them and sold them on his own account.

### VI. *Cautious conduct of the French Consul at the approach of war in Europe. Arrival of M. de St. Lubin at Poona. Ingratitude of the shippers of Le Duras.*

I WAS convalescing when the King's ship *Le Brillant*, commanded by M. de Tronjoly, cast anchor in the harbour of Surat in March 1777. The English, as soon as the war with the Marathas was terminated, seemed occupied with seeking means to recommence it and started defensive works everywhere. They appointed a Committee to visit their different fortresses, and made a special halt at Bhadoch, which they wanted to turn into a bulwark against the attack of the Marathas.[12]

But what worried them most was this sudden appearance of *Le Brillant* at Surat, the simultaneous arrival at Bombay of *La Consolante*, the King's frigate, and especially that of M. de St. Lubin, a month later, at Poona where he was received in the capacity of an envoy from the Court of France to that of the Marathas.

(215) The English were evidently concerned about the excellent reception accorded to M. de St. Lubin by the Maratha areopagus. They themselves expressed to me their anxiety on this point. They had then all the greater reason to fear this new envoy, as they knew that he was quite capable of unravelling their intrigues and thwarting all their negotiations at this Court. Subsequent events have proved only too well that their fears were justified.

In fact, the English in vain attempted to spread slanderous reports about him in order to prejudice everyone against him, but that did not prevent him from fulfilling the mission with which he was entrusted. The treaty of Alliance between France and the Marathas was signed at Poona on March 26, 1777,[13] in spite of the English. I owe this confession to truth as long as M. de St. Lubin remained at Poona. Their plans on this capital and all negotiations of Mr. Mostyn, their agent, miscarried and even took the adverse turn for this ambitious nation. I thought it my duty to help, as much as it was possible for me to do so, the King's envoy to the Marathas with funds and advice, without, however, entering into any engagements in my name, for which I could subsequently have been reproached, as I was the representative of the French Nation.

I employed the same cautious attitude (215v°) towards Mr. Bolts, who arrived at Surat in September in the capacity of Lieutenant Colonel of the Queen Empress of Hungary, Commanding the ship *La Marie*

*Thérèse.* I showed him all the attentions which the alliance, which exists betwéèn his August Sovereign and our King, required; I welcomed him in my house, in which he has been staying for nearly five months with his family; I received his sick officers and sailors in the French Garden and I gave him all the help which the English had cruelly refused him. But unaware whether France was interested in this new commercial establishment (Gogha), I confined myself only to giving him the explanations he desired, and I thought I noticed that he was more dissatisfied with my reserve than satisfied with my attentions.

I also noticed that, during this time, the English visited my office more frequently. They put me questions about the negotiations of M. de St. Lubin, about the sudden appearance of *Le Brillant* and *La Consolante*, and about the news which I received either from the Malabar Coast or from Pondicherry, or from Europe. I was not embarrassed to put them on a false scent. But I feared their seduction of the Frenchmen in my house, and even of my servants, whom they tried to bribe. It is a well known fact that on such occasions, this nation spares neither gold nor money (216) and it made abundant use of these means against me, by bribing those who appeared most attached to me.

At the same time as the English employed these questionable methods against me, they wanted to intimidate me by the display of their power. I had a wooden staircase constructed in the French Garden in order to go down to the river and had obtained from the Nawab all the necessary permission. But the English Chief fancying in this staircase a redoubt which had to be pulled down and moreover, losing no occasion to show me his resentment, obliged the Nawab to order it to be destroyed. I gave an account of this event to the Minister in great detail, as I did not wish to keep him in the dark about anything which could reveal the evil genius of the English nation and the tyranny which it exercises at Surat.

Whilst I was tormented by all these underhand vexations, I experienced a very mortifying ingratitude on the part of the shippers of *Le Duras*.

On August 16, Messrs. Crockatt and Dorion, English Councillors of Surat, brought me a letter from Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay. They told me that they had come as his Attorneys to inform me that the Bill of Exchange for Rs. 1,60,000 had not been (216v°) honoured by the shippers of *Le Duras*, when presented to them by Mr. Hunter, at Lorient,

on December 13, 1776; that on this very date the protest *for non-acceptance* had been lodged in this town; that a copy of this protest for *non-acceptance* was enclosed with the letter of the Governor which they had brought me; that their orders were to ask from me, either a security for this sum of Rs. 1,60,000 or at least documents which would prove that it must be paid at maturity, for they were sure, they said, that the shippers of *Le Duras*, on the arrival of their ship laden with merchandise purchased from this sum borrowed on their account, would not offer any difficulty in paying the Bill of Exchange *when due*.

Personally offended with the shippers, I could not, however, disapprove the precautions taken by Mr. Hornby. I, therefore, told Messrs. Crockatt and Dorion, that the demands of the Governor of Bombay were just, that I would endeavour to give him full satisfaction, and that upon presentation of the documents which I would deliver to him, he would himself admit that I was in order, and that, on the contrary, the shippers, who exposed me to such an affront by refusing to honour the Bill of Exchange (217) under the pretext *that the drawer had no funds*, were completely at fault in their behaviour with respect to me.

Immediately, after putting myself in order by legal formalities I got a copy made of the article from the registers, day-book and abstract which showed that the money for the Bill of Exchange, drawn on their account, was entered in their cash register on March 10, 1776 and that this amount of Rs. 1,60,000 had been employed in purchasing goods from Surat and other places and charged to their account. I also had a copy made of the powers which the shippers of the *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* had given me to draw a Bill of Exchange on their account, which all greatly exceeded the amount of the loan.

All these documents when assembled were shown by me to Mr. Boddam, English chief of Surat, who himself compared them with the originals, along with Messrs. Crockatt and Dorion. I addressed them all along with a much detailed letter, dated August 24, 1777, to Mr. Hornby at Bombay. This Governor must have indeed dispatched all these documents to Mr. John Hunter, his attorney in London, by the first opportunity he must have found. In November, I dispatched the duplicate of these papers (217v°) *via* Aleppo to my attorney in Paris, M. Anquetil de L'Etang, with an *ad hoc* power to proceed against the shippers, in case

of the refusal of payment of the Bill of Exchange at maturity, which had one year to run. It was M. Boicervoise, first deputy of the Consulate at Surat, who was bearer of these second dispatches.[14]

When all the work of preparing these documents was over and when these documents were dispatched in duplicate, I thought I should have no anxiety and would have even nothing to fear in this matter. All the sensible people and experienced merchants of Surat were also of the same opinion. But the sequel to this affair proves that the right cause does not always triumph.

### *VII. Alternatives of war and peace. Intrigues between the English, the Marathas, Raghoba and Haider Ali Khan. Arrival of M. de Montigny at Surat.*

DISSATISFIED with the treaty of peace concluded in March 1776, his army left to commit all kinds of brigandage under the very walls of Surat and fearing that he would be delivered by the English themselves to the Barbhais, Raghoba had, in June, taken the decision to run away in order to seek his fortunes elsewhere. But this little army diminished every day, and thereby he became more incapable of holding his own against the Marathas, who continued to be on his heels. Abandoned even by his men, and not knowing any more which way to turn, he tried (218) to throw himself under the protection of the Portuguese.

However, before turning to this nation, Raghoba had attempted to seek support from the French. Twice, at midnight, he had sent to me one of his agents. The object of this secret negotiation was to obtain, through the French Consul at Surat, succour from Pondicherry, or else a promise to obtain it from Europe at a certain fixed time. His offers were proportionate to the services demanded. I knew Raghoba for a long time, and was aware of the risks in espousing his cause, which was very unjust. I did not wish to enter into any agreement with him and dismissed the nocturnal envoy, after promising him to keep his errand secret so long as his master was in the hands of the English.

Having failed to obtain support from me and abandoned by the English, this Maratha chief marched straight to Daman, and appeared before the gates of the town. He promised the Portuguese to help them to

reconquer from the Maratha Government the provinces to the north of Goa, which had formerly belonged to them, and of which the island of Salcette formed a part, if they furnished him the help he demanded. He thought that he would thereby tempt the Portuguese, as he had done the (218v°) English. But the genius and the resources of these two nations are very different. The Governor of Daman refused admission to Raghoba into his town explaining to him his inability to grant him Portuguese protection, unless and until he had received permission to that effect from the Governor General of Goa, to whom he was going to write in this matter.

In its turn, the Poona Ministry, informed of Raghoba's overtures with the Portuguese, negotiated with the Governor and Commandant-General at Goa to prevent them from sending him any help he demanded.

The Portuguese, having no desire to pick up a quarrel with the Marathas, turned a deaf ear to the flattering proposals of Raghoba. He did not receive any reply from them and still less any help.

During the several months that these negotiations lasted, Raghoba consumed all his provisions. He also began to feel the shortage of funds. He was thus obliged to live as a brigand chief and again devastated all the countryside he passed through. He wanted to fall upon Bassein, of which he believed he had won over the Commandant. The latter, faithful to his Poona masters, increased his alertness and preserved his post, which Raghoba did not even dare to attack.

But he passed very near the place and was persued by a detachment from this fortress, which (219) pressed him so hard, that he had just the time to escape with a handful of men, and pass a small arm of the sea near Bombay. He was too happy to throw himself a second time into the hands of the English. Otherwise he would have been captured, and all the trouble ended. The English received him with joy in their town. Little anxious to break the articles of the Treaty of Purandhar and very eager to recommence the war, they again promised help to Raghoba.

It will be remembered that Mr. Taylor had been dispatched to Bengal by the administration of Bombay in order to explain the advantage for the Company in espousing Raghoba's cause. His negotiations had produced their effect. The Company, which had approved the capture of the island of Salcette, now sent orders to continue to support the claims of this Maratha chief. Consequently, the Council of Calcutta had

already dispatched for this purpose. a body of troops consisting of 7,000 to 8,000 sipahees, who were crossing the whole interior of Hindustan to join the forces at Surat and Bombay. Raghoba was informed of these measures and he took fresh heart.

The Poona Court, abandoned by the English of Bengal and once again exposed to the machinations of Bombay and Surat, remonstrated against this injustice, treated the English as perjurers and placed (219v°) Mr. Mostyn and all his men under confinement. Till then this Commissary had enjoyed all the liberty in the Maratha capital, although the English continued to support Raghoba clandestinely. But as soon as the latter was received at Bombay, Mr. Mostyn, under very close observation, was like a prisoner in Poona.

It was not the only embarrassment which the English gave to the Court of Poona. They fomented the quarrel which had always existed between it and Haider Ali Khan. This conqueror, by drawing upon himself the main forces of the Marathas, created a great diversion in favour of the English.

During this kind of calm, which portended a fresh storm, Raghoba maintained a sufficiently powerful party at the Court. He had already incited there, during the last twenty months, two revolutions in his favour, and had, on each occasion, been on the point of reoccupying his place of Regent of the Kingdom, especially on the last one.

The young Princess Nana, widow of Narayanrao, whom Raghoba had had assassinated, had just died. The prestige of the Grand-Mother Regent had suffered much by this unforeseen death, which was imputed to a criminal cause. The young Princess had been accused of a love intrigue with Nana Phadnis. The English had been the first (220) to encourage this scandalous report, which was without foundation. The discontented at the Court, jealous of the power of the First Minister, had listened to the favourable proposals of Raghoba, and had given credit to the calumnies spread against the Princess. But Nana Phadnis had proved the imposture and shown that her death was due to an accident natural to her sex. The cabal had then disappeared. Nana Phadnis, who had not at all quitted the young Prince Sawai Madhavrao, had recovered his credit and things returned to normal as before.

1778

Raghoba, who had left no stone unturned at Bombay, did not lose courage at the failure of his designs. In February 1778, he made fresh efforts. The former discontented men, among the Barbhais, resented the avarice and intolerable arrogance of Nana Phadnis. The English distributed money. Raghoba promised great rewards. His party gained strength more than ever. He was on the point of being proclaimed Peshwa in Poona, where he was summoned at all events. Mostyn, detained as prisoner in this capital, strongly urged Raghoba to come and enjoy his triumph, and everything was ready at Bombay to support him.

It is said that it was M. de St. Lubin (220v°) who discovered the mine about to touch off and informed Nana Phadnis about it. This minister at once left the capital. At the head of ten thousand men he retired to Purandhar with the young Prince. Nana Phadnis opened his treasures in time. He presented to the soldiers the young Prince Madhavrao, their sovereign, proclaimed that the design of the rebels was to kill him as they had done in the case of his father, and swore in the presence of all the troops to defend him to the last drop of his blood.

The scene suddenly changed. The conspirators abandoned Morobadada, their chief, who was captured, confined in a fortress and condemned to spend the rest of his life there. His property, which was considerable, was confiscated, and almost all the conspirators punished with death. Raghoba's party disappeared once again, and his principal enemy, Nana Phadnis completely triumphed.[15]

This news reached Bombay in April[16], that is to say, at the time when they were preparing to lead Raghoba to Poona in triumph. This Maratha chief, seeing that all his attempts as well as the assistance of the English forces could not regain for him his place as Regent of the kingdom of the Marathas, despaired of his (221) plans, abandoned them, and now concentrated upon making peace with his relations, thereby putting an end to this cruel war, which had been devastating for several years the whole Maratha Empire, and from which the English alone had benefited.[17]

What influenced him besides to take the latter decision, was the fact that Haider Ali Khan had begun to realize his real interests. Since long, efforts were being made to impress upon him that he ought to cease his hostilities against the Marathas, lest the English, destroying one power

by the other, might finally fall on him. This great conqueror, at whose court the French and the English negotiators vied with each other finally opened his eyes, and made peace with the Marathas[18]. The English were all the more astonished at this occurrence, as Raghoba had just received from Haider Ali Khan funds and promises of help in men from his own army. Neither this abandonment by Haider Ali Khan, nor the failure once again to obtain the Maratha throne for Raghoba, or rather for themselves, could induce the English to give up their resolve. They knew that the troops which were coming to their succour from Bengal, were nearly half way, and they were very much convinced that, if Bombay was not attacked this year (1778) (221v°) by a French squadron, as it was feared during the month of September, all the forces of Bombay, Surat and Bhadoch, joined to those of Bengal, would capture Poona at the first attack. They, therefore, consoled Raghoba, assuring him that his crowning in his capital was just a matter of time, since they were going to employ all their forces towards this end. Raghoba believed them or at least pretended to believe them.

In the month of May, M. de Montigny, a Major of His Majesty's troops, arrived at Surat. He had followed the route of Suez to reach this place. Various mishaps had prolonged his journey beyond expectation. But his capacity and special genius enabled him to derive from his delay a substantial advantage for his nation by important observations which he made on the way. As the Minister had strongly recommended this officer to me, I procured him the information and other material comforts, and he could continue his journey at the end of the same month, to fulfil the mission with which he was entrusted. Before my transfer from Surat, I received very encouraging news from this excellent officer. It confirmed the good opinion which I had formed of (222) his talents and his patriotism.

Between the months of May and October and November, the English made great preparations of war at Bombay. As their intentions were to attack the French colonies in India, although war was not declared in Europe, they were afraid the French, in their turn, might do likewise. They, therefore, spent huge sums of money in order to put themselves in a state of defence especially at Bombay, where they constantly expected an attack by a French squadron.

They reinforced this place with European troops stationed at Bhadoch and Surat, numbering 400 to 500 Europeans at the most. The Nawab of Surat furnished them with about two thousand sipahees. They drew as many from Bhadoch. All these troops, together with those at Bombay, could form a corps of eight to nine hundred Europeans and five to six thousand sipahees.

Surat and Bhadoch also feared an attack at a time especially when these two towns were stripped of their forces.

New batteries were erected at Bombay and a number of houses (222v°) standing outside the ramparts, which barred the view, were demolished. By dint of work, day and night, this bulwark on the Malabar Coast was put in a state of defence against a sudden attack. But as the French squadron did not appear, they employed their troops to make a last effort against the Marathas towards the end of the year.

### *VIII. Chowkey by the Nawab. Heavy losses which this act of violence, ordered by the English, representing the shippers of the vessel Le Duras, inflicted upon the (French) Consul at Surat.*

I OBSERVED all these activities. The reputation which I enjoyed among the leading citizens of the town, who respected my counsels, was sometimes a cause of embarrassment to the English, when the conduct of the shippers of *Le Duras* deprived me of this advantage. As if they were in league with our enemies, they destroyed, by an atrociously unjust behaviour, all my credit at a moment when I needed it the most.

I was not worried about the protest *for non-acceptance*, convinced as I was that as soon as the shippers would see their ship arrive, laden with goods purchased from the loan, they would not fail to pay, especially when they would realise, from my letters, the trouble I had taken for the success of their business. In fact, I had succeeded in procuring for the vessel *Le Sévère* its voyage to China, which it was about to miss, and in making the return of the *Le Duras* to Europe as least unprofitable as possible, in spite of its great damage, the death of the supercargo, the ravages of war, the hurricane, (223) the adverse winds and mishaps of all kinds.

I was in this state of confidence when I learnt from private sources, on September 15, 1778, that Mr. Hornby had just received letters, not so favourable, from Mr. Hunter, his representative in London, in respect of the Bill of Exchange, which had not been paid. I had not yet received any letter from my attorney in Paris, nor from my family nor even from the shippers. At the same time I knew from public reports that M. Demoncrif had arrived in Bombay on the 8th of the same month by way of Suez, and that it was he who had brought packets, which also contained letters from the shippers of *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* and from Mr. Hunter, to Mr. Hornby.

Mr. Demoncrif was returning to Surat to resume his post as Secretary of the Consulate. He was entrusted with the dispatches from the Minister for me. These were opened in Bombay and the letter which he wrote me from this place, was in all probability intercepted by the English, since I did not receive it. This absence of letters from all sides, especially on the part of the Secretary of the Consulate, not so far away from Surat, the dismal silence which all my friends observed with me on the subject of the Bill of Exchange, which was not paid, worried me much. At last, everything cleared up.

On September 20 Messrs Crolhatt (Crockatt) and Dorion paid a visit to my house. They told me that (223 v°) non-payment of the Bill of Exchange given to Mr. Hornby on the shippers of *Le Duras*, was the subject of their visit. I expressed to them my surprise, and conveyed to them my belief that the shippers had paid; that, if they had not accepted the Bill of Exchange, when presented, it was because the failure of the first voyage to Mocha by *Le Duras* must have perhaps, without, however, any reason, irritated them against me, but after the arrival of *Le Duras* at Lorient before maturity of the said Bill of Exchange, I indeed thought that the shippers had not at all refused the payment; that otherwise they would be liable to heavy compensation to me when I would indict them in the court for this refusal.

Mr. Hornby's attorneys replied to me that my reasoning appeared to them sound but that Mr. Hornby had not been entirely paid and that they had come on his behalf to demand from me one lakh of Rupees (about, two and a half lakh francs) which fell short of the payment of the said Bill or a security for the same amount.

" Very well, Gentlemen, " I replied, " since my Bill of Exchange is not honoured, kindly return it to me in kind, as well as the protest for non-payment. These two documents which prove that my Bill of Exchange is dishonoured, are very essential for me for my appeal in the Court (224) against the shippers, in case I am obliged to make any payment to Mr. Hornby, which is what you are actually demanding from me. "

They replied that they did not have these two documents. " But allow me to tell you, Gentlemen, this proceeding is not all all in order. On what then do you base your demand against me ? " Mr. Crockatt tells me: "Here is the letter from Deroth, one of the shippers, to Mr. Hornby, according to which the latter demands from you about one hundred three thousand Rupees, capital plus interest, or two hundred fifty eight thousand francs (minted at Tours) which have not been paid to him from the Bill of Exchange for 160 thousand Rupees, equivalent to 400 thousand francs. The papers are in English : we shall translate them for you."

On the spot, Mr. Crockatt made the translation, so obscure and so hurried that I could hardly understand a word in it. I only remarked to him that I have no account with Mr. Hornby, bearer of the Bill; that Mr. Hunter, his representative in London, cannot have received half the payment of a Bill of Exchange, without my orders or consent as the Drawer, and that in default of this order or consent of the Drawer, it is for the bearer of the Bill of Exchange to answer for the balance, if he has received half of it, more or less, and not for the Drawer, who (224v°) does not at all come in the picture in this agreement; that such are laws of commerce in England as in France and in all countries of the world.

In the midst of this discussion, my wife who was in my room, sent for me to tell me that the Nawab was going to send the Chowkey in the French Garden. The Chowkey, at Surat, is a troop of sipahees which the Nawab stations in the house of an individual who has committed some offence.

I returned to my study and apprised Mr. Hornby's attorneys of what my wife had just said to me. Instead of acknowledging the fact, Mr. Crockatt flew into a temper and reproached me for having imputed to him the imposition of the Chowkey which the Nawab was going to send.

He vehemently protested that he was only Mr. Hornby's attorney, that he had no knowledge of the fact that the Chowkey was to be set up in my house, that he had no connection with the Nawab, that if the latter insulted me, I had only to complain to Mr. Boddam, English chief, and not at all to Mr. Hornby's attornies.

Mr Crockatt was well aware of the weakness of the role he was playing, but he did not wish to admit it. Therefore, realizing that I was wasting my time in trying to have an explanation on the subject of the Chowkey, I returned to Mr. Hornby's matter and said to them.

" You show me, Gentlemen, (225) papers in English which I do not understand at all. Leave them with me till tomorrow so that I can get them translated. Remember that I am a gentleman, and that I shall not deny any agreement with Mr. Hornby as soon as he proves that I owe him money, which I do not admit yet; and on this latter assumption, I am in a position to satisfy him. "

" Since it is so ", replied the Attorneys, " we leave the two papers in English with you and tomorrow morning let us know your final reply : we shall wait for it ". I gave them the promise and they took leave of me with a contented look. While accompanying them to the door. I repeated this promise in the presence of witnesses that on the next day morning, one way or the other, I would give them satisfaction.

That took place at 8 o'clock in the evening, and at 10 my house was invaded by 500 soldiers, who broke doors and windows, ransacked, tore away, seized, threatened, sword in hand, my wife, my daughter, and all the Frenchmen in my house. They set up in it what is called the Chowkey, that is to say an insolent garrison, which, after committing this violence, continued to keep us prisoners without allowing any visitors, or permitting the entry of provisions except on payment of money.

The officers, who put in their appearance only (225 v°) two hours after the soldiers, and after the most atrociously violent acts were committed, declared that they were sent by the Nawab, because I did not wish to fulfil the agreement I had entered into with an English merchant.

This action was in violation of all the rules of correct procedure; good faith, commercial laws, propriety, humanity, public security and finally the law of nations.

1°. *Good faith.*—because the English publicly announced that they had ordered the Chowkey to be set up in my house in virtue of a protest for non-payment, whilst they had never presented to me anything except a duplicate protest for non-acceptance. It is true that, in order to create a false impression, and deceive me, they had *committed a forgery on a protest for non-acceptance,* by writing on the back of it *protest for non-payment.* I got hold of the original document which proves the stratagem.

2°. *Commercial Laws.*—because no judicial action could be taken against me, such as the Chowkey in India, except *the protest for non-payment on presentation,* as it is proved by this decision extracted from the Hand-book for the merchants page 443: " If, on the contrary, the Bills of Exchange are in usance or at another long term, the drawer can neither be compelled to pay its value, nor pay any damages and (226) interest, except by virtue of *a protest for non-payment,* made when due; whereas the bearer cannot receive his repayment before the time fixed by the drawer. All that can be required of him on the *protest for non-acceptance* is to give a security that it will be paid in its time, and in case of refusal, he could be compelled to repay its value.

3°. *Propriety.*—by authorizing searches contrary to the code of conduct which demands respect due to me as a public man, to my wife, to my daughter and to other women in my house who were insulted.

4°. *Humanity.*—by exposing to the brutality of an unruly soldiery children who were ill-treated and patients who were refused surgical help and medicines necessary for their sick-condition.

5°. *Public Security.*—my belongings were plundered, all my silverware was taken away—it was lying outside since it was supper time, table-cloths and napkins were stolen, chests were broken open, and a quantity of wearing apparel and fine Indian linen, handkerchiefs, stockings etc. disappeared in the tumult.

6°. *Finally the law of nations.*—Since, in spite of the prerogatives of my post, violence was carried to such an excess, in my own house (226v°) and on my own person, that, surrounded by two thousand siphaees with

fixed bayonets, my shirt and coat were torn on my person by these brigands, who wanted to carry me off by force.

The shippers will perhaps contend that they had not given such orders but they are conversant with the Indian laws, and ought to have even presumed that these laws would be applied against me with the greatest severity, since their interests were committed to the care of a Despot (the Governor of Bombay), a judge as well as a party to the case, and absolute master in the country (under his jurisdiction). Thus they were aware that by not making payment for the debt contracted by their order and for their benefit, they exposed me to this affront, which, in the present case, fell on the entire nation.

The means which I would have employed to prevent this scene of violence and horror, if the other side had been honest, were applied by me to terminate it. I gave the jewels of my wife and daughter, who willingly sacrificed them. I entered into a written agreement, and the Chowkey, placed and extended at the instigation of the English, was raised after 48 hours, but I failed to recover any of the precious objects which had been plundered and stolen during the tumult, as also the credit (227) which could render me useful to the nation. This latter loss, sensible to a Frennchman and to a man in my position, was the fatal blow which the English had intended to strike at me.

Three days after this catastrophe, i.e. on September 28, 1778,[19] M. Demoncrif arrived at Surat. As I had not received any letter from him, neither from Suez, nor from Mocha, nor from Bombay, I had treated as false the report that had been spread about his return. I was, therefore, extremely surprised to see him make his appearance in the French Garden. He told me that he had sent me letters form Mocha and from Bombay, and that he was ignorant of the contents of Mr. Hunter's letters, and of those of the shippers of *Le Duras* which he had handed over to the Governor of Bombay, and I trusted his word.

I had protested against the Chowkey of the Nawab, and dispatched my protest to the English Council of Surat. I also sent a protest to the Council of Bombay through a letter on October 11. But neither the administration of Bombay nor that of Surat, sent me any reply, nor either the Nawab, to whom I had made the strongest remonstrances in writing.

### IX. *The English make the French Consul a prisoner of war : French flags saved.*

However, war was threatening between France and England. The English Company or the Ministry itself, had sent (227v°) special dispatches to Bengal *via* Suez and Basra. They were so important that no money was spared to forward them to their destination. The two captains of the vessels who were entrusted with them, each received more than twenty thousand Rupees (fifty thousand francs) to carry them with all speed: it is by such means employed timely that important operations succeed in England.

The result of the delivery of these packets, paid for so dearly, was that neutrality was broken for the second time in Bengal; Chandernagore was captured by the English and M. Chevalier, Director of the establishment, was made prisoner along with all the other Frenchmen.

The first act of hostility of the English in India was committed in June 1778. In August their army and that of the Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan, forming together a corps of nearly 25,000 men, left the environs of Madras in order to lay seige to Pondicherry.

Determined to expel all the Frenchmen from India, they certainly considered the French Consul at Surat as a thorn in their side. Nothing was easier than to remove the anxieties which I could cause them. They had in hand the same means which had expelled M. Chevalier from Bengal. Neutrality was not more sacred to them at Surat than it had been at Chandernagore. But fearing (228) that their attempt might fail, they employed a ruse to remove all suspicion.

On November 1, 1778, the English Chief at Surat, Mr. Boddam, paid me a visit in the evening and inquired, by way of conversation, what attitude the two nations, England and France, had adopted at Surat during the last war. I replied that neutrality had been strictly observed in this town; and that I could give him a very concrete proof of it in the conduct of Mr. Spencer, English Chief at Surat. After seizing in 1759 the fortress of this town, he had returned to me *Le Louis Quinze* and *Le Postillon*, two French ships then anchored in the river of Surat, which M. le Verrier, my predecessor, had left at my disposal, and which the English had seized and even used during the first days of the attack on the fortress.

I added that, besides this act of justice, I had always lived in peace during the last war, successively with Messrs Spencer, Hodges, Price, English Chiefs at Surat. I was myself managing in this town the affairs of the (French East) India company in the capacity of the Chief of the French factory without any obstacle on their part. Threreupon, Mr. Boddam assured me that he believed that the *status quo* would be maintained during the present war which was threatening, but that, nevertheless, if he received orders to break the neutrality at Surat, as it had been done at (228v°) Chandernagore, he would secretly inform me about it and this is how he kept his word.

On November 3, 1778, Messrs. Bourchier, Morlay and Crockatt, English Councillors at Surat, followed by four European officers, and a detachment of eighty sipahees arrived at 11 O' clock in the morning at the French Garden and surrounded the Consulate. Far from expecting such a visit, I was then busy discussing affairs of the utmost importance with the French broker.

M. La Vary LeRoy, captain of a merchant-ship, had just arrived at my house from Daman. He had left M. de St. Lubin, who had taken refuge there, a month earlier. Unable to risk any letter, M. LeRoy had communicated to me in general the intentions of the Marathas. With the help of some papers in cipher, which he delivered to me on behalf of M. de St. Lubin, I then became aware of the military operations of this nation during the impending campaign. As They concerned Surat, in case the French squadron appeared on the Malabar Coast, I was already seeking means to find out how the plans which the Marathas, as allies of the French, were about to execute, could benefit the French nation.

I was conferring on these matters with the French broker, on whom I thought I could depend, and was taking with him measures, when suddenly I was interrupted by this unexpected visit (229) of the English. The broker Doulope had just time enough to reach the backdoor and escape. The three Councillors entered my house to communicate to me the object of their mission.

They informed me that they were sent by the Chief and the Council of Surat in order to acquaint me that, in consequence of hostilities commenced in India between the two nations, they had to arrest the French Consul and all the other Frenchmen in Surat, that my wife and my daughter and

all my family would have the liberty to go wherever they wanted, that *none of my personal property would be touched,* and that I would be given a decent maintenance, which had been fixed for the whole of my house at Rs. 20 per day, that besides, they had instructions to send me to Bombay, with all the Frenchmen in four days' time, that a house, suitable for my residence, had been prepared for me there, until my departure for Europe by the earliest ship that would leave for England, that my wife and my family could follow me there, if I so desired, and that the same arrangements would be made for M. Demoncrif, Secretary, who was not to be separated from the Consul.

The Commissioners informed me that in consequence of the same orders, they had arrested in the town Messrs. La Vary Le Roy, Quiblier and Gilbert, a Capuchin, Abbot of the French mission, who (229 v°) were all going to be sent to Bombay with M. de Charlevalle who was at that time with me in the French Garden.

After stating the object of their mission, they did not wait for my remonstrances for breaking the neutrality, which had been observed on all occasions at Surat. They placed guards and sentinels at all the gates of the Garden, seized all my papers which they put under the seal of their Company, examined all my belongings and left with me a European officer who had orders not to leave me out of sight and accompany me during the walk in the Garden, from which I as well as other Frenchmen, prisoners like me, were forbidden to go out.

The English, the Dutch and the Portuguese, at Surat, had in their factories a mast at the top of which flies the flag of their nation. The French, who enjoyed this privilege likewise in 1728, are, since then, alone reduced to two small white flags which the chief has the right to carry in front of him, whenever he goes out of the factory, officially to any place. Thus, one very important thing was missing in the conquest of the English, if they did not seize these flags. They demanded them from me; they pressed me, but I refused to deliver them. The English searched for them in vain, and it is, in my misfortune, a very sweet consolation to a Frenchman, to be able to place at the feet of his King these national symbols (230) saved from the avidity of an enemy who respects nothing.

All being well anticipated and well ordered to assure their singular conquest, the English commissioners went at one o'clock in the afternoon to give an account of their military operation to their chief. If it did not

do them any honour in the town, it at least created a terror in the minds of all the local people and even among the other European nations.

Neutrality at Surat no longer being a sacred obligation for the English and the Nawab, more than ever their slave, unable any longer to uphold his rights in a town, in which he was commanding, ostensibly on behalf of the Mughal Emperor, the Dutch and the Portuguese were continuously on tenter-hooks. They were constantly harassed in their administration, which declined from day to day and which could not be maintained except by the unsuccessful weapon of remonstrance. Standing witnesses of the extortions which were being daily committed before their eyes, English despotism shut their mouth, and they did not dare to open it in favour of the French, in respect of whom the rights of neutrality were being violated, rights which, since times immemorial, had been the security of commerce at Surat, and had contributed to its prosperity.

As soon as the English commissioners had left, to put myself in order I addressed a letter (230 v°) in the form of a protest to the English Council at Surat, from whom I did not receive any reply.

M. de St. Lubin had left Poona in July. He had been for the last two months staying with the Portuguese Governor at Daman, a small well-fortified town about 60 Kilometres from Surat. This proximity was the cause of great concern to the English who believed that they would find with me the secrets of the Court of Poona. These Commissioners, therefore, returned on the next day and the following five or six days to examine all my papers.

Moreover, they had found, in Bombay, among the papers of M. Demoncrif, a letter in cipher, included in another, addressed to M. de Montigny. They knew that I had furnished him all the help and information necessary for the object of his mission of which the English were still ignorant, but which they suspected concerned the Great Mughal, because this officer had followed the route to Delhi.

This letter in cipher, found in the papers of M. Demoncrif, worried me much because of its consequences. In fact, the Nawab of Surat had immediately orders from the Council of Bombay to have a thorough search made in the houses of families of my servants and in that of the Vakil or the Persian master whose services I had loaned to M. De Montigny (231) to obtain some indication which might help them to solve the mystery. which was hidden from them. All the searches of the Nawab proved in vain, but the English thought that theirs would not be so unfruitful,

Consequently, they examined my papers for more than seven to eight days without, however, finding therein the key which they sought in order to decipher this letter addressed to M. de Montigny or the secrets of the cabinet of the Maratha areopagus.

The failure of these searches put them into a bad humour and from the French Garden, where I had some liberty, they transferred me to the town with all my family on November 30, and lodged me, as well as M. DeMoncrif, in my own house. They had transformed it into a veritable prison, by barring almost all the windows, and by walling up the several doors. They placed a guard of sixty sipahees at the main door and sentinels in my study, dining room, on the terraces and even at the door of my bedroom. Two gendarmes commanded this cohort, under the orders of a European officer, who slept in the same house, and was relieved by another every twenty four hours.

The Frenchmen, made prisoners along with me, had just been sent to Bombay, from where they were relegated to Butcher's Island. (231 v°) M. Crockatt had specially mentioned to the officer, in charge of transport arrangements, M. La Vary Le Roy, captain of the merchant-ship, as a man whom he should not let go out of sight. The crime of this good Frenchman was that he had faithfully served his nation under my orders. In fact, he was so much persecuted that he received at Bombay and on the ship the *Royal Admiral*, on which he was placed, the mere subsistence of a sailor. But I tried to alleviate his suffering during the voyage by sharing with him the little comforts for which the English made me pay so dearly.

I demanded in vain my private papers from the English to settle my affairs; they did not return any to me. They did not even condescend to reply to me. As they were reproached for the bad treatment which they meted out to the French Consul, who, because of his position, could not even be made a prisoner of war, but who, at least in this capacity, ought to be freed on his word of honour, they declared that I would soon have the permission to move freely in the town, and that I could then attend to my affairs. This liberty which was to be shortly granted to me, according to the statements of the English, was, in my opinion, very risky because I knew very well that it was bound up with the fate of a great military expedition which (232) as will be seen later on, resulted in a heavy loss for them and covered them with disgrace, instead of bringing in huge fortune which they had expected from it.

X. *The English continue to make use of Raghoba, are deluded, fail for the third time in their project against Poona, and return to Bombay, covered with disgrace.*

ENJOYING an unrivalled sovereignty in India, the English once again represented to Raghoba the capture of Poona as a conquest which could no longer evade them. They had reduced Pondicherry after a siege lasting 59 days and a most vigorous resistance. In spite of the bravery and skill of the Governor General, M. Bellecombe, this bulwark of the French on the Coromandel Coast had been compelled to surrender on 18th October 1778. They already considered as theirs the town and fort of Mahé, which their troops from Madras and Bombay were going to besiege. This colony too could not escape from their grip.

Such continuous and sustained prosperity made them finally decide to attempt once again the project of installing Raghoba in the capital of the Marathas. The troops from Bengal, although a little reduced in number on the way, were advancing; their junction with the troops from Surat, Bhadoch and Bombay ought, according to them, to achieve this great object.

They had also their designs on Bassein. (232 v°) They wanted to have a survey made of it and one of their engineers, dressed as a gentile, was entrusted with the job. Although a prisoner, I discovered the plan and found the means to inform Nana Phadnis, who frustrated it.

As soon as the administration of Bombay were satisfied that the squadron of M. Destaing had gone to America, they took the decision to break completely with the Marathas, seize the capital and install Raghoba on the throne, a project which had already failed twice but the success of which this time appeared certain.

The fear about the arrival of the French squadron had induced the English to strip Surat and Bhadoch of their garrisons for the defence of Bombay which port is of vital importance to them. All these forces were to be joined there by those of Bengal, which were already reported to have arrived at Barhanpur. The time had thus come to crown Raghoba, acquire new possessions for the English Company, and with the same stroke enrich all its servants on the Malabar Coast as far as the farthest end of the Gulf of Cambay.

Poona is only 160 kilometres from Bombay, by the direct route, but to reach it by this road, which is the shortest, it is necessary to climb very steep mountains, called the Ghats. It was by this very (233) difficult route that the English planned to carry their guns. It was, therefore, necessary to reconnoitre the passage suitable for the transport of their artillery to the top of these high mountains. It was also necessary to examine the different roads, on the right and left, in order to select the one which could be followed as the shortest and the surest and on which water would be easily available.

Mr. Stewart, an infantry captain and an excellent officer, on whose experience and competency, the whole success of the expedition depended, offered his services. His zeal received the approval which he deserved, and he was chosen to undertake this important and perilous task.

He started his job in the month of October and dressed as a Portuguese monk, he pushed as far as Poona in the capacity of a doctor. His intention was to meet and make arrangements with Mr. Lewis, a servant of the English Company, who was said to be sick and who resided in this town in place of Mr. Mostyn. This new agent was held prisoner since the time the English had taken Raghoba again under their protection. This stratagem of Captain Stewart did not meet with success. Discovered at the moment when he was about to have his interview (with Mr. Lewis) he had just time enough to run away in all haste. As this intelligent and (233 v°) brave officer was the A.D.C. of Raghoba, the Marathas would not have spared him, if he had fallen in their hands. [20]

But he had completed his observations. He returned to Bombay and submitted his report on the best route that they should follow and on the necessity to blast a few rocks which blocked the transport of the artillery to the top of the Ghats. This Herculean and expensive job did not deter the English. Accustomed to conquer, everything appeared feasible to them.

More than 500 to 600 big bullocks, as many buffaloes and a very large number of coolies or labourers were brought from Surat to Bombay to blow up the rocks as well as to open out a new route across these steep mountains by human strength.

For three or four months, Raghoba had been seriously thinking of making peace with his relatives. He negotiated and offered to come to Poona. A condition was put on his return that he should come alone.

But the English insisted that they would accompany him. They would lead him there in triumph and to do him greater honour and better assure his reinstatement, all the troops from Bombay would escort him to his capital.

This prince, tired of serving as (234) a stooge of the English, had his own designs which he concealed from them. He accepted everything, provided they marched to Poona. The Marathas, who had penetrated the real intentions of the English under the feigned pretext to personally restore Raghoba to the bosom of his family, assembled under the walls of the capital an army 80,000 strong. There they waited for the English without trying to obstruct them in the new route which they were cutting across the Ghats.[20]

The English considered Poona as such an easy conquest that they ignored the small number of troops they were leading to reinstate Raghoba. Their army was composed of 8,000 to 10,000 men at the most, among whom were six to seven hundred Europeans. They started their march at the end of November 1778, with a powerful train of artillery, a large stock of ammunition, and provisions of all kinds. They landed their troops on the enemy's territory at Belapur, at the entrance of the Kalyan river. After seizing a small Maratha fort near the village, they reached the foot of the Ghats, about 60 kilometres from Bombay without any obstacle.

Lieutenant-Colonels Cay and Egerton commanded this expedition and Captain (234 v°) Stewart directed the march. He was in charge of the perilous enterprise while the political affairs were in the hands of Mr. Carnac, then Second in Command at Bombay, the same person who, a few years before, had commanded the English troops in Bengal. After the conquest of Poona, he was to settle everything with Raghoba (who had just a handful of men with him) to the greatest advantage of the Company, without however, forgetting its faithful servants.

Bombay was at that time defenceless. It was so stripped of men, that the defence was entrusted to the employees of the Company and to the citizens. Surat and Bhadoch were not better guarded. But the English had nothing to fear. The squadron of M. Destaing had gone to America, and it was in this certainty that they had marched once again for the conquest of this capital of the Maratha territory, which almost insurmountable barriers seemed to protect from any attack.

It is impossible to conceive the obstacles the English met with at every step across the mountains and the fatigue which they had to endure in order to climb them with the artillery. They were hindered every now and then by the rocks which had to be blown up and the ground which had to be opened for the (235) passage of the canon and the transport of their provisions and munitions. This task completed, for the distance of a few yards only, it was another fatiguing duty equally tiring; the coolies or labourers cut the trees and the sipahees filled up with them the precipices which they continually came across. At times they had to dig up or excavate, at others they had to fill up the ground to open this new route, with the result that the army moved only a distance of 200 yards during the day. The work was often so hard that some of the coolies and even the soldiers, exhausted with fatigue, died on the spot. They had suddenly to stop their march to get water. It had to be sent for from a long distance, for the Marathas had thrown poison in wells and the ponds in the vicinity of their route.

Finally, after vanquishing, so to say, nature by a stubborn and almost superhuman toil they reached at the end of one month the summit of the last Ghat, which, however, was only three day's distance from Bombay.

They met with just a skirmish across the mountains. They did not lose people in it but it proved very disastrous for them. The Marathas had engaged them only to fall on the convoy, which followed and daily supplied their army with provisions. They (the Marathas) seized it, along with the beasts (235 v°) of burden and their drivers.

Having reached the summit of the Ghats and the plain which could lead them to Poona with just a two days' march, they set up a camp there in order to give rest to their little army. After the fatigue, the risks and the perils they had experienced on the way, from Bombay to the summit of the mountains, almost without meeting the enemy, they believed that once they had reached the summit, they had already achieved their triumph.

Indeed, the English thought that they had only to march straight to Poona to gain their objective. They had imagined that the negotiations of Raghoba, supported by theirs, had cleared up all the difficulties, and that after a small battle, which could take place only for form's sake, because of Nana Phadnis who would not allow himself to be supplanted without a struggle, the gates of Poona would be thrown open to them.

The English should have known better Nana Phadnis, who had been making a fool of them for a long time. They noticed that he was not to be so trifled with as they had imagined it at first, only when they learnt that a corps of 10,000 to 12,000 Marathas had reached, by an unfrequented route, the foot of the Ghats and that it had occupied this post to cut off the communication (236) of Bombay with their small force, which itself was at the mercy of the main Maratha army.

1779

In fact, the court of Poona had not tried to disturb the march of the English across the mountains; it could have stopped them there at any moment. But its plan was to catch them between two fires, as it actually happened, to prevent them thereby from receiving neither help nor victuals from Bombay, and to fall upon the fugitives in case of rout.

Thus, the English began to realize that they had too imprudently advanced relying on the flattering hopes of Raghoba and the reports of Captain Stewart to induce them to set out. They would have very much liked to wait for the troops from Bengal who were speeding up their march. Their small army lacked everything, and slowly worn out by too long an inaction, it exposed itself to perish completely without a fight.

All the officers of this expedition were full of bravery, but desperation prevailed over counsel and they decided to advance. There was a heavy loss of life on both sides, and if the English canon played havoc with the Marathas, the contrivances of the latter did not cause less damage among the English, who feared them as much (236 v°) as bombs.

These contrivances are bows of big bamboos armed with arrows, blades of sabres and knives fastened and floating, which the Marathas lance like flying rockets, being horizontally directed with skill. They are called fouguettes among the people of the country. As they are garnished with cutting and poisoned irons, they cause infinite damage and spread death wherever they reach.

In one of these murderous actions, the brave Stewart lost his life being struck by a canon ball from the enemy. The Marathas had in their army a fairly efficient artillery manned by Europeans, for the most part Portuguese and deserters of all nations. This brave Captain fell dead at the feet of the adopted son of Raghoba. He was regretted by all the army

and wept by Raghoba himself, who considered him as his right arm. Colonel Cay was also wounded along with a number of other officers, and eighteen to twenty lost their lives on the battle field. Colonel Cay died from his wounds at Bombay.

Raghoba pressed the march as much as he could. He had his reasons. The English always won a little bit of ground (237) with their artillery, very well handled and which cleared the passage. They had advanced so far that they were only half a day's distance from Poona.

The two armies were now facing each other. That of the English, very small as compared with that of the Marathas, was waiting only for the signal to pounce upon these 80,000 men. The English knew well that to open the way which might lead them straight to Poona, they had to win or die. Everything was ready on both sides.

The signal was given and the fight began; but hardly did it start when the Marathas gave another signal which announced peace. The fight stopped and from the Maratha army emerged deputies who wanted to speak to Raghoba. These were several chiefs of the Maratha areopagus. They embraced Raghoba, to whose presence they were conducted, and after a few minutes' conversation, they took him with them to the centre of the large army. The English, stupefied with this strange reconciliation, made under their very eyes, asked for the return of Raghoba. They were told that he was with his kith and kin and he himself declared that they could go back, because he was going to settle his affairs personally with his family. The English enraged at such a (237 v°) betrayal, which they noticed too late, became furious. They wanted to wreak vengeance for it on the spot by the slaughter of the enemies.

But it was too late. The Maratha army, during this negotiation, apparently peaceful, had divided itself into four bodies of troops. This movement promptly executed, this handful of Englishmen were surrounded on all sides. Mr. Carnac, duped and as if entrapped, was faced with the alternative of witnessing the massacre of his brave compatriots before his own eyes, if he did not immediately order them to lay down their arms. Courage, desperation, rage were of no avail. They had to submit. He obtained his own safety and theirs only by signing the humiliating agreement to surrender all the territory which Raghoba had granted to the English namely the Island of Salsette and all the territory they had also

seized in the region of Surat and Bhadoch. This agreement was guaranteed by the delivery of two hostages sent immediately to Poona, and the English had then the freedom to return to Bombay with their arms and baggage.

It was for the third time during the last four years that they had succumbed before the political wiles of the Court of Poona. After fifty days of their triumphant departure from Bombay (238) they returned covered with disgrace and wounds and after losing half their army and their best officers. But nothing could equal their resentment at thus being fooled by Raghoba, who, by this strategem, had paid them in their own coin for signing the Treaty of Purandhar.

In fact, since this moment which he could not forget, he had been trying to wreak his vengeance on them, and free himself from their bonds one way or the other. Everything seemed to force Raghoba to take this decision. At the very moment of succeeding in his plans, he saw that he was abandoned by the English because of the orders of the Supreme Government in Calcutta. He could not obtain from France either an assurance of assistance or at least a refuge by his secret negotiations with me. He had not succeeded any better with the Portuguese, whose protection he had sought. He had failed at Bassein which he thought he could surprise and he had been obliged to throw himself once again into the hands of the English, otherwise he would have fallen into those of the Barbhais, his deadly enemies. Finally, he had the mortification to witness the failure of his last efforts for his re-installation at Poona, which had quite recently cost the life of his best partisans, including Morobadada, one of the ministers of the areopagus who was secretly devoted to him. So many misfortunes had completely disappointed him with regard to his claims (238 v°) to the sceptre of the Marathas and still more with the English, his allies, who, for the last four years, had been enriching themselves at his cost.

He had, therefore, only pretended to listen to the flattering hopes they had given him once again. But in reality, all his negotiations, after so many failures, were aimed at a reconciliation with his kith and kin, and deriving from it the best possible advantage for his adopted son. It was for the execution of this plan, kept secret, that he had induced the English to accept the proposals of peace which his relatives came to offer him, when the battle had already started between the two armies.[20]

His stratagem succeeded for the time being, but while duping the English, he was himself duped by Nana Phadnis. This minister of the Maratha areopagus knew well that, as long as Raghoba lived, the Deccan would always be in combustion, and he himself continuously in danger of losing his property, his position and even his life. He clearly saw the necessity to snatch him away from the hands of the English, but this course was not easy. In order to succeed in it, he had, therefore, conceived this idea of reconciliation. He had informed Raghoba, who, at the same time, was trying to rejoin his relatives that he should come all alone to Poona, that otherwise he would not be welcomed there and to remove all suspicion (239) from Raghoba's mind, he had pretended not to fall in with this plan of reconciliation and to accept it only when forced by a majority of votes from the Maratha chiefs, who were all tired of this cruel war, which since the last five years had been devastating the rich territories of the young ruling Prince to the advantage of the English alone.

Raghoba, for his part, thinking that he was outwitting the English who insisted on leading him to Poona in triumph, himself fell into the trap which Nana Phadnis had laid for him. He was beaten by his own weapon. Thus, after his removal by his relatives from the small English army to the main Maratha army under the pretext of peaceful negotiations, he was immediately taken to Poona, from which he was only 20 to 25 kilometres away. Nana Phadnis was waiting for him, and this crafty minister, a greater intriguer than Raghoba, ordered him to be taken to a place of safety, while on the other hand, the English were returning to Bombay, full of rage and despair in their heart, covered with disgrace and deprived of the rich territory which had been ceded to them for the last four years by their protégé, Raghoba.

The news of the failure of this great expedition of the English against Poona, that of the treachery of Raghoba who had escaped from their hands and that of the disgraceful retreat of their troops (239 v°) to Bombay, reached Surat on January 25, 1779. There was a general consternation not of course in the town, for the English are not at all popular there, but among their compatriots.

The humiliating treaty, which they had been forced to sign under the walls of Poona to save their lives, grieved them all the more, because they were compelled to restore and abandon all their gains, and because they

saw vanishing before their eyes the immense riches which they hoped would accure to them from the conquest of this capital of the Marathas and from the crowning of Raghoba.

No sooner did the news of this unexpected disaster reach me than I clearly saw that this liberty of free movement in the town, which had been promised to me a fortnight before, would not be granted to me. But I did not expect the unworthy treatment which the English meted out to me.

### *XI. Cruel and outrageous treatment which the English allot to the French Consul and his family.*

AT noon on February 2, 1779, I saw a fresh band of sipahees enter my prison with fixed bayonets, led by four European officers and three councillors Messrs. Morlay, Crockatt and Gambier. They pounced upon me and ordered their guards to surround me. Being astonished, I asked them the meaning of their strange behaviour : " To send you at once to Bombay ", they (240) replied. " *What, half covered, without linen, without clothes* " ! " *They will be provided for* " , they said, " *let us leave* ". My wife, hurrying up at the noise, wanted to follow me. She was placed between two sentinels, who neither permitted her to dress up nor carry away anything. My daughter, aged 17, at the same request, was treated likewise. The latter clasped her brother aged 3, the former took in her arms her nine month old little daughter. My servants, women and others, got into the carriage some behind, others in front. We thus passed through the town of Surat. A French lady, who had seen us pass by in this state, sent us a bottle of fresh water, another of milk which had been denied to us. From a small boat into which we were thrown, we passed into a very uncomfortable craft, in which we remained, without cover, exposed to the severity of the cold during the night, as we had been to the heat during the day, and finally we found on the next day in the harbour a very small boat, on which we were kept for another five days, before being dispatched to Bombay. After our arrival in this latter port, we were transported to the citadel of Thana, capital of the Island of Salsette. My wife and my children, imprisoned like me, fell ill there, and owed only to the weakness of their sex or their age the little liberty which they consequently enjoyed.

As for myself, I had none other, except during the last eight days, than that of taking a walk for two (240 v°) hours a day for a distance of 400 steps, limited between two canons, where there always stood a sergeant to watch me.

The English once freed of my presence at Surat, opened all the boxes, threw down my belongings, made searches in the Garden, in the cellars and in the very walls, in order to find out the papers of the Ministry. But even if I had thought it my duty as a man in public life to remain exposed to their violence rather than abandon my post, the same would not have held good in respect of the secrets of the government. I had placed them in safe hands, from where they have not yet reached me, and they found nothing.

The English had sent me in the harbour of Surat only with a few unmatched garments. They had snatched me away from the midst of my property without making any inventory of my furniture which was large enough, because I was obliged to maintain the dignity of my position, and which was really my sole property. I do not know what has become of all of it; whether everything has been preserved, whether the gold and silver coins, the jewelry, the small precious articles scattered here and there in the house, those which different individuals had entrusted to me, have been collected; whether they are being taken care of; whether they are sold; whether the proceeds of the sale will be delivered to me; whether my papers, my private accounts, which are very important for my financial claims, have been put aside to be returned to me with care. The letters which I have (241) received on this subject are so conflicting that I cannot cherish any hopes in this respect.

My kidnappers would have spared me these anxieties, if they had at least permitted me, after the visit, as in the case of the Secretary of the Consulate, to close and myself arrange my boxes, and have an inventory made in my presence, of the considerable assets which I have been obliged to leave in their custody. But it was reserved for me to drink the cup to the dregs.

I remained at Thana very closely confined for more than two and a half months. I could neither write nor receive any papers unless they were examined by the Commandant of the fortress, and nothing entered my prison, neither provisions nor clothes nor any other thing, unless they

were inspected by the sentinels who kept a day and night watch on me. All the precautions taken on my account were certainly due to the proximity of the Maratha territory just a kilometre away from the fortress of Thana, and separated by a small arm of the sea fordable at low tide. All my servants were withdrawn and replaced by those of the English, so that continuously observed, I could learn nothing about the outside world. But they made it plain to me that I was in the position of a conspirator, who should be shunned indeed by gentlemen. (241 v°).

Some Frenchmen, traitors to their nation, and besides very bad subjects, had spread falsehood about me which had no foundation. The truth could have been known, if there had been a des re to come to me for clarification. This, far from making me lose the esteem of gentlemen, could only win me even that of our enemies, who, in such cases, should have behaved like me.

But the bitter politics of the English ordained that they should avoid asking for such explanations. To throw dust in the eyes of the people it was more convenient to lend an ear to the calumny. At least these reports, while serving as an excuse for the wicked treatment meted out to me and to all my family, had given the English a handle to get rid of a watchful enemy at Surat, in the vicinity of Bombay, and expel from this neutral town, which belonged to the Mughal Emperor, the French Consul as well as the Frenchmen who lived there with him, at a time when they had resolved not to leave any Frenchman in India.

Therefore, when I bitterly complained on March 9, 1779, to the Council of Bombay, about the outrageous treatement given to me and to my family, which was still being continued by (242) confining me so closely in the fortress of Tnana, and asked for reasons for such a strange proceeding, the issue was eluded, and without referring to this atrocious conduct adopted towards me, I was only told that there were sufficient reasons for my removal from Surat.

My family found in the Governor of Thana, Mr. Halsey, as much humanity as they had experienced barbarity on the part of the English at Surat. This honourable quaker used all possible gentleness in the execution of the rigid orders given to him. But he was very reserved with me on political matters. The silence in this respect was so scrupulously observed that I could neither discover anything about the sequel of the expedition

against Poona, lost by the English, nor about the execution of the treaty which had saved their lives under the walls of this town, nor about the fate of Raghoba.

The only news I learnt was that the troops from Bengal, who were on their way and who were expected since so long, had at last arrived at Surat, numbering 5,000 to 6,000 sipahees among whom the only Europeans were officers; that this reinforcement, which had arrived too late for the expedition to Poona, was reduced on the way by nearly 2,000 men; that Colonel Goddard, commanding this little army, (242 v°) was occupying the French Garden in Surat; that the French factory in the town served as a lodging for his officers and that they were making preparations at that time, i.e. in April 1779, for a fresh expedition at Surat, where according to reports, everything was on the move in order to return to Poona again. The perseverence of the English, in spite of their defeats, ought to focus the attention on the advantages they expected to derive from the capture of this town.

But what I knew for certain is that the English never lost sight of either Chaul or Bassein, important places which belonged to the Marathas and which were offered to the French for the protection of their ships and for the landing of their troops, and which from the north and south can catch Bombay between two fires. They had also their designs on Gogha, another maritime place which likewise belonged to the Marathas and which was situated at the extremity of the Gulf of Cambay. They knew that I had its soundings taken, that with a little expense it could be turned into a very good port in order to protect the ships from tempests during the most stormy weather, that the vicinity of this place, if in the possession of the French nation, could become a danger to Bombay, even for its commerce. I had carried on negotiations with the Poona Court for this place and for Dumas, a big village situated at the mouth of the (243) river of Surat 12 to 15 kilometers from the harbour. These two places formed part of the apanage of Nana Phadnis and their cession had been promised to me.

Finally, after two and a half months of hard captivity at Thana, I was transferred to Bombay at the solicitation of M. Duplessis, Lieutenant-Colonel and Second in Command at Mahė. This French estalishment on the Malabar Coast had just surrendered (in March) to the English. M. Duplessis, transferred to Bombay as a prisoner of war, stayed with

Mr. Hornby. He forcefully represented to him the injustice and the odiousness of my detention. The Governor of Bombay yielded, and the order was given to bring me to Bombay.

I had talks with Mr. Hornby in this town on the public as well as personal matters. As for the latter, although he was fully aware that the shippers were in the wrong in their behaviour towards me, he all the same obliged me to give him a bond for 2,00,000 francs, for which the jewels of my wife, the debts due to me and several of the belongings I have left at Surat are partly a security and for the payment of which, in case of refusal by the shippers, I would perhaps be compelled to invoke justice from the Courts of law. I was a prisoner of war, in the hands of the English. I had for the (243 v°) moment no alternative but to sign the bond. As for the political reasons of my imprisonment, he maintained that he was justified in taking action, because I was first to break neutrality by clandestinely ordering the drawing of the plan of the citadel of Surat, which had been found in my papers with notes written in my hand. I had no difficulty in refuting these charges, but he had force on his side.

### XII. *The Franch Consul transferred from Bombay to England as a prisoner of war.*

The *Royal Admiral*, ship of the (English East) India Company, was only waiting for its dispatches in order to leave Bombay for Europe. The talks which I had with the Governor on political matters worried me about the treatment, on the part of the English, which may not be very different from that which I had endured, and which unfortunately all the time recoiled on the whole of my family along with me. After properly weighing the inconvenience of a sudden departure with that of a long sojourn in the prisons of Thana, which would in any case terminate in my transfer to England, I took the decision to leave at once.

Anxious to give an account of my administration to the Minister and lodge my complaints with the administration of the (244) English (East) India Company, I made a sacrifice of all my belongings which I left in India. For the last three months I have been receiving promises that they would be returned to me. Thus, I, as well as my wife and children.

deprived of everything and almost without clothes, prepared ourselves to undertake this long voyage in the worst season for the passage through the Cape of Good Hope as well as for arrival in England, and on May 5, 1779, I embarked with all my family on the ship the *Royal Admiral*, commanded by Captain Huddart.

At the time of making me a prisoner of war at Surat, the English had promised me a good berth on the ship. I had only one room, seven feet by four feet to lodge my large family. I had, therefore, to rent from the officers of the ship two rooms for which they charged me twelve hundred Rupees for the voyage, and it was M. Duplessis who advanced me the funds.

For the last eight months I had been suffering from a lingering illness to which medicines had not brought any relief. A continuous fever and severe stomach aches gradually wore me away. It is easy to understand that my constitution had considerably suffered from all the onslaughts that had been made on me since (224 v°) the dreadful events of September 20, 1778 and February 2, 1779, till May 6, the day of my embarkation for Europe. Thus, how can they escape blame, the English, on the one hand, and the shippers of *Le Duras*, on the other, who all seem to have conspired to crush an honest man, a father of a family whose cause militates equally against both?

Not satisfied with having ruined me completely, they have made me as well as my wife and my children suffer heaps of insults. Without speaking of the damages and losses for which I have the right to sue them in France and in England, am I not justified in demanding the severest compensation for the loss of my credit, which they have made me suffer by their most ignominious treatment. Their irregular, cruel and degrading proceedings call aloud for vengeance.

On the one hand, when the conduct of the shippers of the vessels *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère* will be illuminated by the torch of justice and when it will be weighed in the balance of equity, how can they account for these self-interested relations with the English of Bombay and Surat, who, by arming the Nawab of this town against the French, have exposed me and my family to the worst insults on the occasion of the Chowkey of September 20, 1778. It will be remembered (245) that it is to demand the rest of the payment of the Bill of Exchange of £ 20,000 sterling, wholly

payable by the ship-owners, that this band of 500 sipahees, without officers, came like a gang of dacoits to pounce upon me and practice on my family acts of violence with which the customs of the country are hardly familiar.

On the other hand, how will the English of Bombay and Surat justify the total dispersion of my furniture, belongings and papers, abandoned to the rapacity of their agents, when on February 2, 1779, they forcibly snatched me away from my house with my wife and children? What account can they give me of my property, seized without a preliminary inventory of my belongings, those of my wife and my children, snatched away, like me, almost without clothing from their homes, and separated by a distance of six thousand leagues from assets which are the fruit of twenty-one years of service?

After struggling against so many assaults, my health at the time of embarkation was in such a weak state that my condition was considered as very serious. I was almost on the threshold of death while passing through the Cape of Good Hope. What aggravated my sickness was certainly the torments I had gone through and the sight of a large family, suffering, (245 v°) deprived of everything, and made a victim for the zeal with which I had defended the honour of the French name at Surat.

At last I rallied from my illness, my health slowly improved and after about three months I arrived at St. Helena. After experiencing for more than one month very rough weather and very unfavourable winds in the latitudes of the Cape of Good Hope, the *Royal Admiral* cast anchor in the port of this island on August 21, 1779.

This stop over at St. Helena lasted two months, a much longer time for me, for I was obliged, as also all the other Frenchmen, to maintain myself at my own expense. I remonstrated on this point with the local administration to obtain my subsistence. It was all in vain. The island was short of provisions: they were so dear that I spent 80 francs per day for my family, and yet we were much underfed. It cost me at least 4000 francs during these two months and it was once again Mr. Duplessis who advanced me money.

The expenses during this stop over ought to have been paid by the English Company all the more as it derived all the benefit from it. During this interval all the ships from India, numbering nine, met at St. Helena.

They left (246) in a fleet on October 22, 1779, under the convoy of the warship "*Warwick*," commanded by Captain Colens, and all of them reached Portsmouth on December 24, in good condition.

On the 27th I left the *Royal Admiral* and landed at Gosport with my family and the little luggage left to me. From there I was taken, all the while at my expense, as a prisoner of war to Whitechurch where I was allowed, on parole, the freedom of movement for a distance of 5 miles.

I addressed myself to the Superintendent of Prisoners for a maintenance. But the administration refused to recognize me as a prisoner, claiming that I was wrongly treated as such by the English Company, and that I could and should sue it for compensation.

Thus, by a queer turn of fate which pursues me everywhere and which is peculiar to me, of all the prisoners I am most ill-treated, and when I claim at least this wretched privilege for my maintenance, I am told that I am not a prisoner, and to the loss of property and liberty, they add bitterness by depriving me of the little consolation granted to my unfortunate companions in distress.

### *XIII. Conclusion*

(246 v°) I summarize in a few words the main features which concern me more particularly in this diary, and which describe my situation more vividly.

I start for Surat, honoured by the post of a Consul, with orders from the Minister to negotiate certain political matters which concern the honour and security of the French nation. I am also entrusted with looking after the commercial interests of the French in this city, and particularly of the ships *Le Duras* and *Le Sévère*, the owners of which testify to great confidence in me. An ever recurring war thwarts my efforts and impedes me in the performance of my duties. The dealth of the supercargo of *Le Duras* obliges me to go into all the details of the shipping business, without any other compensation for the expenses which this work entails on me than a commission of 2½ per cent. I sacrifice therein my money and my health, and employ all my credit. On the pledge of the ship-owners, I enter into arrangements which do not

offer me any advantage but from which they get all the benefit. In short, I do what a brother, perhaps would not do for his brother, and they repay me with the basest ingratitude.

They bring about against me in Surat the Chowkey which strips my wife and my (247) daughter of their jewels, and inflicts a heavy loss on me at the moment and a still heavier one consequently but the total ruin of my credit; they force me, when the circumstances bring me back to Europe, to place myself under the bond of a debt which, if it were really due, would greatly exceed all my fortune.

Finally, the English, breaking the sacred bond of neutrality, always maintained at Surat, remove me as a prisoner of war from the midst of my property and my duties. They separate me from these, against my will, without making any inventory of the belongings which they detain, without giving me any hope of recovering them, except after great hardship and heavy expenses, and not content with depriving me of everything that I possess, they stretch their barbarous behaviour to the point of treating my wife and my children in the same manner and recklessly. Such is the epitome of the last six years that I spent in Surat.

Justice is universal and eternal. A moment of inebriation, caused by multiple successes, can make the English turn a deaf ear to the cries of a gentleman whom they have ruined.

The losses of *Le Duras*, nevertheless compensated by the profits of *Le Sévère*, might have dictated their owners to pass orders, of which they did (247 v°) not envisage the disastrous consequences.

I recall them all to their own conscience. This is the tribunal to which I summon them now.

It suffices me to have faithfully presented, in this Diary, my conduct and reasons which guided me in my transactions. My work lies before a Minister, avowed patron of a faithful, zealous and unfortunate subject. That was the good fortune to which I aspired without daring to claim it, when the English snatched me away from the post which His Majesty had conferred on me. My prayers have been granted.

Paris, May 4, 1780. ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT

(248)

*Itinerary of Mr. Anquetil de Briancourt French Consul at Surat, Prisoner of War of the English, from Surat, situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Cambay, in India, till his arrival in Paris, and of the continuous harassment of the said Consul and of all his family by the English at Surat, Bombay, Thana, Salcette Island, St. Helena and in England.*

November 3, 1778

Mr. Anquetil de Briancourt, made prisoner of war by the English in the French Garden at Surat. A guard of 60 sipahees posted at the gate of the French Garden. The Consul forbidden from going out. Obliged to suffer the presence of an English officer at his table. Maintenance of Rs. 600 per month granted. All the papers of the Consulate, along with his private ones, as well as the furniture and the assets of His Majesty, removed. After the departure of the three English Councillors, who had come to make the Consul and all the Frenchmen prisoners of war, a report drawn up against this act of hostility, signed by (248 v°) Messrs Anquetil de Briancourt and Demoncrif de la Grange. On the same day, a protest despatched to the English Chief at Surat, against this act of hostility perpetrated in spite of the neutrality established and practised at all times at Surat.

December 1, 1778

Transferred from the French Garden to the town with his wife and children. Confined in his own house, turned into a prison by walling up its windows and guarded at sight by 80 men. Sentinels posted everywhere inside his house, including his bedroom, even at night. An English officer always by his side. A fresh protest by the Consul in support of the rights of neutrality maintained at all times at Surat and violated by the English by making him a prisoner of war at Surat and harassing him and all his family. Maintenance of Rs. 600 granted and paid for the first month, afterwards reduced to Rs. 400.

February 2, 1779

The Consul in his jacket and without hat, his wife and 17 years old daughter in a simple undress, his two other children one aged 3 years and the other six months old, in night-dress and without the cap, socks

or slippers, forcibly removed from their prison, six days after (249) the failure of the English expedition to Poona. This forced and sudden removal carried out by another body of 100 sipahees with fixed bayonets and two European officers, commanded by the three English Councillors of Surat. Removed also with all his family and forced to abandon all his furniture and personal and household effects of which no inventory was made nor any seal put on them in his presence; led in this state with his wife and children in the streets of Surat, escorted by more than 200 sipahees with fixed bayonets in broad day-light to the boat which took them to the harbour and from there to Bombay, after 4 days of forced stoppage in the harbour of Surat, during which time cupboards, boxes and trunks were broken open, searches were made in the ground, at the factory as well as in the Garden; everything was overthrown and examined without any results, but not without heavy losses and considerable damage to the Consul. And on the 6th, left the harbour of Surat for Bombay, on a small ship of the English Company the *Betsif*, commanded by Mr. Hardy.

February 9, 1779

From the Bombay harbour sent to Thana, Salcette Island, and confined in the fortress, restricted to a small house, with the sentinel (249 v°) at the door. The wife and children of the Consul allowed to go out of the said house only after 12 days because of their impaired health, on the report of the surgeon. As for the Consul, strictly forbidden to go out of the fort, and because of ill-health merely two hours' of walk granted on the ramparts in the said fort within a space of 400 steps only, limited between two canons and watched by a sergeant during the walk; guarded so closely that food and other domestic provisions could not enter his prison without first being strictly examined by the sentinel posted at the door of the prison. No permission to receive or write any letter without being shown to the Commandant of the fort.

March 4, 1779

Furniture and effects, as well as his private papers, left at Surat, demanded for the second time by the Consul.

March 5, 1779

Received from Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay, a personal letter asking him to be ready to leave by the first boat sailing shortly, by which it had been decided to despatch him to Europe.

March 9, 1779

(250) The Consul writes to the Council of Bombay demanding the reason for his outrageous removal and that of all his family from Surat on February 2, 1779. At the same time, he requests that his departure for Europe, fixed by the first available ship, be put off to after the rains, the present monsoon being too dangerous for his family, because of the passage through the Cape, and moreover, absence of his personal belongings left at Surat also obliges him to seek this delay to enable him to receive them.

April 6, 1779

Received a reply from the Council of Bombay to the above letter. Permission to the Consul to delay his departure granted, solely because of his family, i.e. out of pure compassion. Sufficient reason, but not stated, says this letter, for removing him from Surat. Maintenance of Rs. 400 reduced to Rs. 300 if the Consul does not leave immediately.

April 12, 1779

The Consul once again asks for his belongings and furniture left at Surat. No reply on this point since his departure from Surat and his detention at Thana.

April 18, 1779

Reply from the English of Surat, tending to oblige the Consul to authorize the Dutch (250 v°) to receive his belonglings from their hands. The Dutch appointed as proxy for the Consul. Refusal on the part of the English to deliver the belongings to them. Vexations, fresh delay in this respect. Order from the Governor of Bombay so that the furniture and other belongings be sent immediately to the Consul. Fresh difficulties. Furniture and belongings not yet received.

April 22, 1779

The Consul sent from Thana to Bombay on a boat of the Governor of Salcette; a journey, a matter of favour, to meet Mr. Duplessis, Lieutenant-Colonel and Second in Command at Mahé, who had then arrived in Bombay as a prisoner of war.

April 28, 1779

Six days after his arrival in Bombay with all his family, the Consul resolves not to wait any longer for his belongings, since all the delays indicated at the unwillingness of the English to return them to him. The Governor of Bombay shows him the plan of the fortress of Surat which, he asserts, the Consul had ordered to be drawn with notes in his own hand-writing; a packet had recently been sent to him from Surat, of which the ground for complaint was going to be examined by the Secret Committee, along with the motives which concerned the political affairs of the Marathas, and which was (251) the cause of his removal from Surat. The Consul replies to everything in an appropriate manner, and refutes all these complaints; but is confirmed in his resolve to leave, fearing some other fresh ill-treatment which would always recoil on his wife and children, although almost without clothes, to whom only a very small part of their clothes, and that too unpaired, had been returned. He makes the sacrifice of his belongings and wants to leave as it had been decided originally by the English themselves. Consequently, a reply from the Council that he would be embarked with all his family on the ship the *Royal Admiral*.

May 6, 1779

The Consul embarks this day with all his family on the ship of the English Company the *Royal Admiral*, commanded by Captain Huddard, who on the next day left the harbour of Bombay for St. Helena and England.

May 10, 1779

He is given on the ship only a very small room for his whole household, although he had been promised a very good berth. He is obliged to hire two rooms from the officers of the ship who charge him Rs. 1,200 for the duration of the voyage.

August 20, 1779

(251 v°) Having arrived at St. Helena this day, the Consul writes to Mr. Skotteau (Scott ?), Governor, for permission to land with all his family. Reply from the Governor who refuses this permission, saying that, according to the orders of the English Company, he cannot allow any prisoner to land. Finally, favour to land granted on the ground of sickness.

October 15, 1779,

Maintenance demanded by the Consul from the Council of St. Helena. Refusal in writing from the English administration to grant it. The island was short of provisions. High prices cause the Consul to spend 4,000 francs to support his family during the two months of the stop over at St. Helena.

October 21, 1779

Departure from St. Helena, all the ships moving in a fleet. The Consul still embarked with his family on the ship of the English Company the *Royal Admiral*, forming part of this fleet of ships from India, numbering 9, led as far as England by the warship the *Warwick* with Captain Kolens, (Collins ?).

October 22, 1779

Arrived at Portsmouth; permission demanded by Captain Huddart to allow the Consul to land with all (252) his family. Mr. Newsham, Superintendent for the prisoners at Portsmouth, gives order to Captain Huddart to allow the Frehch prisoners on his vessel to land not at Portsmouth, but at Gosport.

December 26, 1779

The Consul sent ashore with all his family and his luggage, at his expense, by Captain Huddart, with one of his officers who delivers them at Gosport in the hands of the Superintendent of prisoners.

December 28, 1779

The said Superintendent makes the Consul and other Frenchmen from Surat and Mahé sign their parole, as prisoners of war, destined to go to Whitechurch; immediate order to proceed there with his family and baggage. Forced journey on land, made at his expense, for all his family, and baggage and belongings transported on three carriages.

January 1, 1780

Arrival at Whitechurch. Maintenance demanded from Mr. Stheat, Superintendent for Prisoners.

January 4, 1780

Letter from the Superintendent for Prisoners at London to the Superintendent of (252 v°) Whitechurch, disapproving the landing of the French, who had arrived from India and wrongly sent to Whitechurch. Order not

to allow them any maintenance, the said Frenchmen strictly speaking not being prisoners of war, and the Company being responsible for taking them to France at its own expense.

January 9, 1780

The Consul writes to the English Company this day and on the 11th and the 13th to complain against the ill-treatment of its agents in India. He sends it the bill for his expenses, incurred on the way from Bombay to Whitechurch and thence to Dover, amounting to £ 650. Repeated entreaties to obtain the payment or reimbursement of his monies. No reply form the English Company.

January 26, 1780

Passport as prisoner of war delivered to the Consul by the Superintendent for Prisoners at Whitechurch. Departure for Dover with his family and his belongings, still at his expense.

February 4, 1780

Left Dover for Ostend on the English ship for want of a Cartel-boat. (253)

February 5, 1780

Arrival at Ostend on the same English ship. The Consul, landed, gets his passport as prisoner of war viséd by M. Garnier, Consul-General for France at the said place. Writes from there to M. Collin and Cie, French agents in London, entrusting them with his affairs and claims for recovery of money from the English Company, from whom he has not received a réply.

February 10, 1780

Finally returns to Paris with his family and children on February 10, 1780.

## Table of Summaries

(326)

To

My Lord le Marquis de Castries,
Minister and Secretary of State,
Department for the Navy.

My Lord,

When in 1778, I was pondering over the situation of the English in India and particularly over their influence on the Mughal Government in Surat, I jotted down on paper my reflexions, calculated to give all the information about Surat, civil, military and commercial, which I could have been asked to supply. I have, therefore, kept no other order than the questions which I put to myself and which, my Lord, I now place before you.

(326 v°) 1st Question:

In what capacity do the English possess the fortress of Surat ?

Reply:

In the capacity of the Admiral of the Mughal Emperor. Although the Surat river as well as the harbour is neutral, the fortress commands it The Governor has under his orders the Mughal fleet intended to defend the harbour from the Kolis and to convoy to the north of Surat merchant ships which are liable to be attacked by this kind of pirates and other robbers who, from the Gulf of Cambay, sail as far as Cape St. John, situated to the south of Surat, and who had their head-quarters in the little pirate island near Gogha.

This fortress or citadel (327) of Surat had been for a long time one of the apanages of the Siddi of (Danda—) Rajapuri near Chaul. Siddi Ahmedkhan was its Governor in 1759. This very year the English drove him out of the fortress, seized simultaneously his fleet, consisting of a dozen gourabs, sufficiently well fitted, and enforced all the prerogatives attached to this conquest and which they declared they held from the Mughal Emperor, as masters of the fortress. They have, therefore, left the Mughal flag flying on the citadel and hoisted theirs nearby upon another bastion.

This Mughal fleet, which at any rate does not always bear the name, although it is actually English, is today reduced to 6 well-fitted boats. The biggest has 20 guns and the smallest 8 to 10. It is commanded by (327 v°) English officers and forms convoys to the north and the south when Bombay is short of warships, and it is the merchants of Surat and of all this maritime portion of the coast who bear the expenses of the fleet.

The Chief of the English factory in Surat holds, since the conquest of the fortress, third rank in the administration of Bombay. He commands the fortress as the Great Admiral of the Mughal Emperor, a title which his nation has usurped by force and which they got ratified by a firman from the Mughal Emperor, at a time when the revolution of Bengal and that of Delhi placed all these vast territories under the yoke of the English.

(328) 2nd Question:

In what condition is this fortress?

Reply:

In a much better condition today than it was when the English drove the Siddi out of it. They have incurred considerable expense for its restoration. It had only 4 bastions, now it has 5. That which faces the town on the side of the Dutch wharf and the French piece of ground is entirely newly constructed and is very strong; it was built when they seized possession of this fortress. It is also the only important one, and the four others and all the ramparts which overlook the river, are only replastered. That part of the fortress which faces the town is renovated and is in (328 v°) good condition. But the walls on the northern side are not 1 ft. thick; the heavy artillery is rarely fired from this side, because the buildings inside which are in a very bad condition and the surrounding walls, would crumble; everything shakes at the smallest volley. Therefore, to prevent crumbling a barbette battery has been constructed at the base of the walls on the river side for outside salvoes.

This fortress, built on Tapti, river of Surat, is situated in the centre of the perimeter of the town and forms almost an oblong semi-circle. The only impregnable part is this new bastion, called the Royal Bastion, which indeed is very strong. But only that side which it defends can

withstand a large-scale attack. The rest is only a show and can hardly sustain (329) two hours' firing of a heavy artillery, and still less withstand the fire from the one which would warm it a little. It is surrounded by ditches which are filled with water only at high tide. It has two gates, one big and spacious with a draw-bridge, overlooking the parade-ground on the side of the town, called Entrance Gate, and a small iron one which could be considered as a gate for retreat, and which opens on the river.

The fortress has within it about 150 guns, the bastions being pierced with two or three batteries and the ramparts studded with embrasures. But it is impossible for a third of this artillery to fire at a time because of the small fire emitted by the guns and the dilapidated condition of almost all the walls. That's the report which I have received from those who have been (329 v°) inside this citadel, the admission into which is forbidden to all European foreigners.

3rd Question:

What is the strength of the garrison in Europeans and in sipahees? Are they well-paid and well maintained?

Reply:

The English may have today in the fortress at the most 150 Whites or Europeans and 2000 sipahees. Their troops are well maintained, in good uniform, even the sipahees, well disciplined and well paid. The European soldiers get a loaf and Rs. 8 per month, which is equivalent to 20 francs and the sipahees get rice and Rs. 6, which (330) is equivalent to 15 francs, and from the monthly pay are deducted annually expenses for clothing. Every day, in the morning and evening, they have firing exercise on the parade-ground, opposite the fortress. They have enlisted at least 20 to 25 French deserters; those who are of doubtful character are dispatched to Bombay.

For some months there has been much desertion among their sipahees who have joined the Maratha troops at Poona, they (the Marathas) recruit them on the spot even in Surat itself which furnishees them as many as they want to raise, but they are not so well trained as those who have spent some time in Bombay.

4th Question:

What was the position of the English at Surat before the capture of (330 v°) the fortress? Is it a military officer who commands the fortress?

Reply:

In 1758, before the capture of the fortress, the English had at Surat, like other nations, only a simple lodge, and the affairs of the Company were administered by a Chief and a Councillor, with the title of a Deputy Chief of the Factory, who, with a secretary, a medical officer and a chaplain, then constituted the whole English administration of Surat. It was in this form at the time of my installation in this town in the capacity of the French Chief at Surat. At this epoch, the English did there (331) a much more roaring trade than today. They were, it is true, like the other nations, exposed to the exactions of the Nawab. But the vicinity of Bombay always enabled them to get prompt reparation and gave them in trade as well as in the Darbar a preponderance in all matters which the other nations could not balance.

The conquest of the fortress in 1759 turned them from merchants that they were into regents of the government of Surat. They have the title and the rights of the Admiral of the Mughal Emperor, and in this capacity ought to act in concert with the Nawab, either during the attack, or during the defence, when the town is threatened with a foreign invasion. They have slowly arrogated to themselves such a superiority over the Nawab that in contravention of the constitutions of the (331 v°) mixed government of Surat, they treat him as a vassal or rather as a slave.

The English, in their capacity as the masters of the fortress, have one third share in the customs revenues of the town, which, combined with what they get from the jahgirs in the neighbourhood of Surat, can fetch them annually Rs. 3,00,000, or nearly 800,000 francs. This third part of the custom's duties, in the times of the Sididi, reverted to the Governor of (Danda) Rajapuri, as also the jahgirs, that is to say, the revenues attached to the fortress of Surat. If (Danda) Rajapuri, a maritime island between Goa and Bombay, could fall into our hands, which undertaking is very easy, we could claim from the Nawab of Surat all that the Englisman has levied from Surat in custom's revenues and (332) jahigirs, since 1759,

when he seized the citadel. These revenues today just suffice to balance the expenses at Surat which they are compelled to incur to keep the fort in a state of defence and defray the expenses of their commercial lodge of which the old administration has remained unchanged.

From two Councillors that they were in 1758, they are today seven under the Chief. It is in this Chief that resides the authority of the Governor of the fortress of Surat and of the Grand Admiral of the Mughal Emperor. The Commandant of the fort, whose name is Mr. Stuart, is at present a simple captain, who every day takes his orders from the English Chief. His staff consists of nearly 25 to 30 officers, lieutenants and ensigns. He has a seat (332 v°) in the Council only when military matters are discussed. His tenure of office in Surat is fixed for two years, at the end of which he is relieved by another Captain sent from Bombay, and the latter like his predecessor assumes the command of the fortress, under the orders of the Chief and Council of Surat.

The English chief is considered as master of the town, for the Nawab has so much fallen from his original authority. Thus Surat groans under the yoke and tyranny, when the English Chief attaches greater value to money than to justice; this is a very usual occurrence in this town. As he is all-powerful, he rules as a despot and in secret league with the Nawab, he lays all under contribution in the town, and the Nawab, in his turn, pays to the English Chief (333) Rs. 7,000 to 8,000 per month and levies with impunity all the extortions which can augment his treasure, and the merchants and the shippers, Moorish, Gujarati, Persian, Arab, Mughal Turk, Armenion, Jewish, etc. are victims of this imperious association of the Governor of the fortress with the Nawab of the town, and therefore, they all curse the English nation in Surat. I have seen Surat thus governed, for more than 18 years. It is thus completely ruined.

Mr. Boddam, today English Chief at Surat, appears to be more fair-minded than his predecessors. He represses as much as he can the privileges of the Nawab. But the genius of his nation, which exerts great influence in Surat, triumphs in spite of him. And that is what exactly his deputy, Mr. Day, made me experience myself in 1777. (333 v°) He took advantage of the absence of his chief, who had gone on a visit to Bhadoch, to inflict an affront upon me through the Nawab, e.g., the forcible return of the iron guns of the vessel *le Sévère*, an action dictated by fear, and the destruction of a wooden stair-case which I had had constructed in the French Garden

with all the necessary permissions which are usual in Surat, a deed impelled by jealousy and wickedness. The English Council in vain ascribed to the Nawab this double infringement of our privileges, but no one in Surat was taken in by the excuse. The hand of the English could be discovered in spite of the cloak with which it was covered.

When the interests of the English demand that an affront be inflicted on a (334) foreign nation, they secretly charge the Nawab with it. He appears to act in his own name. The benefit goes to them and the ignominy falls on the Nawab. The French, the Portuguese, the Dutch have, for and by themselves, many proofs of this strategem of the English since 1759 when they seized the citadel of this town, and if the tyrannical misuse, which this ambitious nation makes of its power in Surat, is not checked, the other European nations, the French, the Dutch, the Portuguese, would soon cease to enjoy the rights and privileges which are granted to them by the Mughal Emperor.

5th Question :

What is the present state of the (334 v°) town of Surat, from the point of view of trade as well as from the point of view of its strength during war times ?

Reply :

The trade of Surat has fallen during the last 20 years by more than half. The English have completely ruined it. Whereas the trade of Bombay, into which it has poured, has increased by double. When I arrived in this town in 1758, there was still a steady navigation, about 20 Moorish ships left on voyages for Mocha, Jidda, Basra, Bengal and China. But since the English became masters of the fortress, and seized all the freight of the town, the owners and shippers of the Moorish ships have been forced to abandon their trade and (335) sell their ships, so that there are not more than 4 or 5 which belong to Tchelyby, a Turk by origin but born at Surat. He is even obliged to freight them all to the English because the latter do not permit any freighted merchandise to go out of the town unless they are loaded on their ships. The sale of merchandise from Europe has fallen by 15 to 20 per cent for the last 5 or 6 years that the English are at war with the Marathas, while all the local goods from Surat, specially in silk, linen and cotton, have considerably increased and they are even still

increasing every day. The countryside in the whole neighbourhood of Surat, for more than 200 kilometres around, being entirely ravaged and devastated by the continuous incursions (335 v°) of the English and Maratha armies, trade has fallen so much at Surat that the customs which gave the Nawab, 20 years ago, at least a million, today do not produce 200,000 francs. These customs are divided in three parts. The Nawab takes one third, the English as Governor of the fortress arrogate to themselves the second and the third goes to the Marathas. The last third occasions almost every year incursions and skirmishes in the neighbourhood of Surat, because the Nawab pays only against his will this reparation which the Marathas can but recover with an armed force.

The collection of these customs' revenues, divided into three parts, creates much embarrassment at Surat and scares away the foreigners who (336) see so many inspectors when their goods enter the town. In fact, the Nawab, the English and the Marathas mistrust each other and they each send there their officers and their men. When, however, the official of a particular nation is present at the examination and the nationals trust him, everything passes in a very orderly manner, as happens usually in the case of the French. In virtue of an old privilege, all the goods arrive without passing through the customs of the town, to the consular house and there they are examined and assessed in the presence of the Consul, with great care and without fear of damages and without confusion.

*Note.*—Bear in mind the rate of the customs charges.

As the customs forms the principal source of revenue of the Nawab at Surat, he is not at all happy with the English who are so powerful at Bombay, Bhadoch and (336 v°) at Surat, for it is they who have usurped all the trade which formerly fetched him four times the revenue he is getting today. Since their possession of Bengal all this rich region is ruined so that Surat, which held a prominent position therein because of its trade, feels the effect thereof considerably, and their last war with the Marathas has devastated the neighbourhood of Surat, from Bombay, Bassein, Daman as far as Gogha, Cambay and Ahmedabad, to such an extent that the prices of all the articles of food and other products of these places have increased by double, and that the goods from Europe do not find the market there easily.

But as Surat is the meeting place for all the foreign ships and occupies a central position (337) in India, and as it has a port best suited for communication and transport of all the goods into the interior of Hindustan, after a few years of tranquility and when the English are reduced by the treaty of peace, to a position which they occupied there in 1758, before the capture of the fortress, trade will revive and even flourish on the same scale as before.

The consumption of the town is very large. Today it counts at least 5,00,000 inhabitants, among whom more than 2,00,000 are weavers who work on all the silks coming there from Bengal and China and cotton, waste or raw, which is harvested in abundant quantity in all the neighboured of Surat. (337 v°). Besides the French, the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese who have their factories there, the Asiatic nations like the Turks, the Arabs, the Persians, the Mughals, the Kashmiris, the Gujaratis, the Armenians, the Jews, etc. also carry on there their trade, which will recover all its vigour and its past lustre when the English cease to be masters of the fortress.

The countryside round about Surat is extremely rich in wheat and rice. These essential foodstuffs grow there in such large quantity that the English rightly consider this town as their storehouse for provisions. This point along with others equally important, can be of great consequence to us in times of war, for when we attack Bombay, Surat is in a position to supply provisions and render help of every kind to (338) our squadron which will beseige it. Two warships or even one in the harbour of this town would suffice to supply to our squadron all the provisions it might need, and even coolies or labourers, beasts of burden like bullocks and buffaloes, carts and even sailors and sipahees. The English have rightly turned to account all these advantages which they have drawn from Surat, even in my presence, when in 1760 they obliged us to raise the seige of Madras and seized Pondicherry, when in 1778, they once again deprived us of this bulwark of the French in India, when they led their unsuccessful expenditions against Poona, capital of the Marathas, and even now, it is certainly with the succour drawn from Surat that General Goddard, who was camping there on the (338 v°) French piece of ground, has just captured Bassein, a coastal place which belonged to the Marathas and is situated to the north between Bombay and Cape St. John.

Wheat from Surat is reputed to be the best in India and becomes, in case of need, a source of very great help to our colonies, as I have utilized it on several occasions.

As for the strength of the town of Surat, it can only be defended against the natives. It is not in a position to withstand any European attack. But the English, who actually play the most predominant role in the government and on whom lies the responsibility to help the town in case of attack, today make it a little more difficult to capture. It has a double enceinte. The walls of the (339) inner one are all of them in a very bad state. Those of the outer one are in a fairly good condition and are strengthened from place to place with bastions half of which are worthless. The English are every day insisting on the Nawab repairing them. The walls are surrounded all along with very bad ditches. They are filled with water only in times of big floods.

The outer circumference of the town is six English miles with 12 gates, of which 6 belong to the Nawab and 6 to the English. The latter are in possession of those which are on the side of the river, as forming part of their jurisdiction. There may be about 150 canons on all the bastions which surround the town. They are mostly in a very bad state (339 v°), and for want of good gunners, the Nawab cannot put them to any service in all places unless fresh European troops arrive from Bombay. In case of an attack by the French, the English who fear treachery, will not quit the fortress to help the Nawab, for they themselves possess a very small number of troops for its defence.

On the side of the river, to the north of the town, there is a considerable portion of walls blown away. It is closed on that side only by a series of piles, not properly adjusted. No attempt is made to repair this fallen wall, because an attack is not expected from this weak spot. I am of a different opinion, because it is easy to reach it after first capturing Rander, a small town situated 2 kilometres to the north of (340) Surat and on the bank of the river, and which we could consider as a reserve camp or a camp of retreat. Instead of closing this breach, the English concentrate all their attention on the south-western part of the town accessible from the sea. This portion is close to the French piece of ground and as it is from this spot that they captured the fortress, they give it all their care so that this portion is well maintained.

6th Question :

How many troops are there in the service of the Nawab who commands in the town of Surat on behalf of the Mughal Emperor ? What kind of troops are these ? Are they well-maintained and well-paid ?

(340 v°) Reply :

He had 6,000 troops before the English seized the fortress. The latter, who possess actually about 2,000, have obliged the Nawab to keep the same number. But the two thousand English troops are indeed equal to 10,000 of the Nawab; his troops are so ill-disciplined and even more ill-paid.

7th Question:

What is the authority of the Nawab in the town? What is his age, his character, his dispositions? In what esteem is he held by his own people? On what relations is he with the English commandant? What is his attitude (341) towards this nation? Does he like them or does he hate them?

Reply:

The Nawab alone commands or ought to command in the town of Surat in the name of the Mughal Emperor, at least such is his exclusive right. His father, Sayyad Achan enjoyed it in full measure before the English made a conquest of the fortress. Thẹ authority of Bahaddur Muhammad-ole-ddin Khan (Mir Hafiz-ud-din Ahmad Khan Bahadur) to day Nawab of Surat, is so reduced from its righful position that he cannot actually take the slightest measure without informing the English Chief and obtaining his consent. He does this as secretly as possible to save his honour when faced with the European nations.

Thus, today his power (341 v°) is nothing but absolutely precarious but this position perfectly suits the interests of the English who prostitute him before the public by showing him as if he is acting alone in his own authority, when they secretly want to slight some European nation or collect some tax. But no one is deceived, because it is common knowledge that he cannot do the slightest violence to any one without the orders and secret instigation of the English.

The office of the Nawab is hereditory. This princedom is usually confirmed by a paravana from the Mughal Emperor to the son of the deceased. The present Nawab is 54 years old. He is of a (342) fairly meek nature but very indolent. He dislikes war, is very avaricious and is esteemed among his own people only because he is not cruel like his predecessors. Occupied with his seraglio, he blindly carries out all the wishes of the English, who often oblige him to give contradictory orders in the town. The dishonour comes down on him alone, but he does not feel it. His own interests alone touch him; on this point he is stubborn.

The English wanted to force him to levy 25 per cent duty on all European goods, since my return to Surat, especially on copper in order to hinder the trade of the French, the Dutch and the Portuguese, who overshadow them. The Nawab feeling that such a (342 v°) duty would compel the European nations to abandon Surat and shift their trade to Daman, a small maritime Portuguese town which is only 50 to 60 kilometres away, and that he would thus be deprived of his revenue from customs was never willing to accept the views of the English on this point, but on all the rest, he is their slave. Rightly or wrongly, he submits almost entirely to the wishes of his masters, not out of wickedness, but because of weakness of character, and sometimes to parade his power which is merely a show.

He does not hate the English nation because it has always preserved him in his place, in spite of his enemies' efforts to (343) supplant him. I do not think either that he likes them, because his revenues have been greatly reduced since this nation made itself master of the fortress. When Siddi Ahmed Khan commanded it, Miatchene (Mian Achan), father of the present Nawab, did a better trade at Surat. The latter, reduced to 4 lakhs of Rupees or a million francs as revenue, is occupied only with his seraglio. He has a brother and two sons, and keeps very harmonious relations with the Bakshi, Commander of his troops and his relative. All the family breathes effeminacy and has no sentiment of greatness. For the rest, it is as the English want it to be.

In this family they feared only Aliavankan (Ali Nawaz Khan) the Nawab's uncle. Miatchenne (Mian Achan), his brother, (343 v°) drove him out of the Darbar in 1758 and thus deprived him of the Nawaby which he seized at that time. The English nation then enjoyed no power at Surat. This Aliyavaskhan (Ali Nawaz Khan) is today Deputy Governor

of the town. He owes his post to the English who feared that he might create some disturbance if he had no occupation. He is the only man I know in Surat who can oppose the English in case of a revolution and become Nawab. This Mughal prince is a bit cruel but has lot of wit, great courage and very noble feelings. Although Deputy Governor of the town, he is still called Nawab in his palace; such is the respect his presence always inspires among those who meet him or who have some dealing (344) with him. He was compelled to quit the Darbar only because MianAchan won over his principal officers who betrayed him and because Siddi Ahmed Khan, then commandant of the fortress, deceived him by renouncing his cause at a time when he had promised to support him against this rival brother.

For seventeen years that I have been residing in this town, as Head of the Nation and French Consul, I am on very intimate terms with Ali Nawaz Khan. In 1761, he did his best to persuade me to obtain for him the assistance of 200 Frenchmen, who would have sufficed to restore him to the Darbar and resume the reins of the Government of Surat. But the English had then just seized Pondicherry. Since then, we have always lived on amicable terms and he has often given me proof of his (344 v°) friendship during the critical operations of the customs, which fall within the competence of his post. We have even had talks with each other on several occasions, but very secretly. He has to be extremely cautious today. The English are aware of his active and restless character. They are fully conscious that, supported by the Europeans, he is capable of immediately levying 20,000 men in the town and that we have always been on intimate terms with each other. So he is as closely observed at Surat as myself. Although we hardly meet each other, he has not at all changed his attitude towards me. He recently gave me to understand through a trustworthy friend that on the arrival of the French at Bombay he would not fail to prove to me all his esteem and consideration (345) for our nation. He is now dead.

8th Question:

What is the position of Rougnatrao (Raghunathrao) *alias* Ragouba (Raghoba), Maratha Chief who, three years ago, was responsible for the assassination of his nephew Nanan Rao (Narainrao)? What are today his power, his resources and his connections with the English? What esteem does he enjoy among the Marathas?

Reply:

Raghunathrao is at present at Bombay. In order to know what his position is, it would suffice to read the details of the military operations of the English on his behalf against the Marathas of the Poona Court. I sent them (345 v°) last year to the Minister for the Navy along with the articles of peace, which was concluded and signed at Purandhar on March 25, 1776, and which decides the fate of this Maratha prince.

Consequently, Raghoba left Surat last year, undecided about the course of action he should adopt. He did not know whether he should submit to the conditions of peace dictated by the Court of Poona or seek a protector other than the English to support his claims to the title of the Peshwa, King of the Marathas. He was not at first willing to disband his army whom he left free to live on brigandage which his troops committed in the neighbourhood of Surat as far as the walls of the town. Finding that there was nothing more left to devastate, he set out (346) with his small army and proceeded to Daman, the gates of which were closed to him. He negotiated with the Portuguese of this town for fresh assistance, but the latter did not wish to enter into any negotiations with him without the orders from the Governor-General of Goa. This Maratha prince, who had no time to wait, thought he was sufficiently strong to seize with his handful of men Bassein, a small coastal place, which belonged to his enemies. He was beaten and had just time enough to escape to Bombay with his adopted son and a few troops that still followed him. There he received a warm welcome from the English, who thereby indeed broke one of the principal articles of the treaty of Purandhar, and the Bombay Government fixed for him and his men a subsistence of (346 v°) Rs. 16,000 or 40,000 francs per month.

The English were extremely delighted to see him again return to their fold. They have given him shelter to foment another revolution, when it will appear favourable to their interests. He is still at Bombay and it is reported that the English are planning to help him to seize Chaul which the Marathas are likely to cede to the French if they make their appearance on the Coast; the English do not want to play the principal role in the expedition against this small coastal place which can be seen from Bombay.

This Maratha General does not enjoy any prestige today even among his nation by which he is hated because of the cruelties he allowed the English to perpetrate when they (347) were fighting as his allies.

While Raghoba was at Surat, he tried to form a friendship with me. Realising that not much reliance could be placed on his promises and the risks I was running by håving talks with him at the very time when he was the idol of the English, I avoided all negotiations and did not consent to any interview with him. He may still have with him 1,000 men in Bombay. His only resource today is in the fresh troops which may arrive from Europe to reinforce the English who are hardly at present in a position to help him. My surmise is that the English will finally sacrifice Raghoba to the Court of Poona. He will then meet the fate of Sadoba, his brother who ventured (347 v°) to make his appearance in public after an absence of 12 or 15 years, and who was treated as an imposter by Nana Phadnis, Chief of the Barbhais and Regent of the Kingdom of the Marathas, was beaten black and blue in Poona and put to death, 5 or 6 months ago, in this capital. Providence has reserved the same fate for Raghoba to punish him for his crimes, if he has the misfortune to be abandoned by the English who, out of sheer gratitude, ought to protect him to the last.

9th Question :

What is Bhadoch, 40 to 50 kilometres from Surat, which the English captured a few years back ? Do they derive from this conquest any advantages which they expected and which were to seize the trade (348) in wheat and cotton ? What is the revenue they collect therefrom ? What is the strength of the garrison in this place ? Is it well-fortified ?

Reply :

The town of Bhadoch is situated to the north of Surat and is today entirely an English possession. Four years ago it belonged to a Nawab whom the English expelled from the place under the pretext of affronts which he made them suffer, but in reality to thrive on his patrimony and join his rich jahgirs to those of Surat which touch each other. They had a lodge or a factory there, like the Dutch. The Nawab of this town, a very brave man, was twice attacked by (348 v°) the English, first in 1771 when they were obliged to raise the seige, and then in 1774, when they returned

with large forces and carried it by storm. The Nawab, betrayed by his Divan, was compelled, after a few days of vigorous defence, to flee, leaving behind him the town and all his treasures.

The English, now masters of the town, wanted to force the Dutch to lower their flag. The latter proved, by their special treaty with them and their privileges, that they could not lower it. There were heated arguments on both sides and finally they agreed to refer the matter to the decision in Europe. It appears that it has been favourable to the Dutch, since their flag still flies on their lodge.

(349) In seizing Bhadoch, the English wanted to appropriate all the trade in wheat, cotton and linen, and they have succeeded. They are at the present moment masters of these three articles of trade which are produced in abundance. It is not because these very articles of trade are not available in the neighbourhood of Surat, but the best cotton comes from the outlying parts of Bhadoch. This town and Surat furnish it in large quantities while Bengal, China and all the places on the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts manufacture linen.

The English take good care and pay special attention to preserve this rich conquest which, however, can be reduced only by the Europeans. The revenue which the English Company annually collects therefrom amounts (349 v°) to nearly 4 lakhs which is equal to a million of our currency. The walls of the town are said to be in a fairly good condition. It is built on a height and this favourable situation constitutes its defence. Like Surat, it can be reached both by land and sea, and the river flows in front and at the feet of the walls. There is no fortress, but many bastions surround the town. There is an English Council, the Chief of which is the Governor of the place. As this post is very important for the Company, it has a garrison of 300 to 400 European troops and about 2000 sipahees all commanded by a Colonel who is under the orders of the English Chief and Council of the town.

Bhadoch, well-built (350) as it is, still requires big repairs. As this will involve considerable espense, they have referred the matter to Europe for the decision whether this conquest should be preserved, or sold to Fattesing or any other Maratha prince. I feel that it is too valuable a possession for the Company to part with. In all probability, it will give orders to fortify it.

10th Question :

Does the Resident the English had posted at the Court of Poona still reside there, since differences have once again arisen on the score of the Island of Salsette which they do not wish to surrender ? And are the Marathas working on the fortifications of Bassein ?

(350 v°) Reply :

Major Upton who drew up the articles of the treaty, signed at Purandhar, had great difficulty in obtaining permission from the Marathas to leave Poona. Since he left, the quarrels have started again, as much because of the refusal of the English to surrender the Island of Salsette, they are even repairing the fortress of Thana, as because of the fresh protection they have given to Raghoba. The English have just dispatched one of their Councillors, Mr. Mostyn, as Resident to Poona. But he has lost much of his credit since the arrival of the French at Chaul. The leader of the French who was conducted from Chaul to Poona and whose name I do not know (M. de St. Lubin) was received (351) by the Maratha Government with great honours. He was immediately granted an audience, whereas Mr. Mostyn, English Resident, tired of waiting, although he had brought with him many presents, has been obliged to return to Bombay. As for Bassein, on which the English have since long been casting their covetous eyes, the Marathas do not appear to be thinking of constructing new fortifications there. This place is in a sufficiently good state of defence. With just a little negotiation with the Government of Poona, we can obtain from this Court this coastal place, which can subsequently develop into a very important post for us and very detrimental to the trade of Bombay. But if the French do not appear (351 v°) in force in India, the English will seize it sooner or later, because as it adjoins the Island of Salsette and Bombay, it perfectly suits their purpose.

11th Question :

In what condition is at present the trade of the French in all this region ? What are the prospects for its increase ? Do our ship-owners encounter there any difficulties or obstacles from the English as well as from the natives ? And in this case, what are the means to remedy the situation ?

(352) Reply :

If our merchant ships would sail up the Malabar Coast as far as Surat, it is more advantageous for the shippers to sell their goods only at this latter place. In fact, French goods are purchased at Goa, Bombay and Bassein only to be resold at a profit at Surat or dispatched in the interior, in the Gulf of Cambay. Since the last three years, the English have been doing considerable business with the French at Bombay, but it is always detrimental to our nation.

As these are individual Englishmen who deal in this trade, it has just been forbidden by the Company, whose interests it was (352 v°) damaging, thus forcing the French to stop going any longer to Bombay and carrying on trade there. The administration of this place has recently imposed 20 per cent customs duty on goods from Europe, especially on copper. The French, however, still contrive to carry on trade there by employing dodges which circumvent this embargo. The contract is made, as *Le Bourdelais* has just done it, at Bombay and goods are delivered from shore to shore on the way, thus disposing off at Surat what has been sold elsewhere, by sailing on the two coasts of Coromandel and Malabar.

In this manner, customs duties are paid neither at Bombay nor at the Surat Consulate which, however, has no other resource to subsist on.

(353) The English are jealous of the prosperity of our trade in this part of India, but as our shippers are injuring it, they are sure to lose by it. Thus, our trade will die its own death, without the English trying to put obstacles to it. I can visualize only two ways to prevent its ruin and assure its prosperity.

The first is almost impracticable. It is to stipulate the number of vessels which would carry on trade with India, and after fixing it for each place (two well-laden ships would suffice for Surat), give passports only for the place of destination. In this case, the sale of goods from Europe and the purchase of those from India, (353 v°) would be transacted without competition, thus resulting in large profits. In fact, the shippers, if well-served by their agent and advised in time (about the choice of goods to be sent to India as well as those to be purchased for sale in Europe), would gather profits from all their shipments. My experience in trade at Surat enables me to specify the goods from Europe which command a ready sale in this

town as well as those to be purchased for the return journey, and I am ready to furnish the details for dealings involving a million francs to the merchant who will be recommended to me by the Minister for the Navy.

The arrangement, it might be argued, of fixing the destinations and the number of the ships can be made only by the (French East) India Company. But can the Minister for the Navy not grant permission to ship goods for India only under this (354) condition? The reply will be in the negative. It would be violating the liberty of trade. If, however, this liberty is not a little restrained, the shippers, unless they come to an understanding among themselves, which is an impossibility, will certainly ruin themselves and this trade of India, after giving rise to many bankruptcies, will suddenly vanish without the English trying to destroy it. Would it not be better to compel the shippers by the means I have proposed, to be less greedy and enable them, so to say in spite of themselves, to make sure and real profits than to allow them to hasten to their ruin, as they are doing every day by multiple and non-coordinated shipments?

The second mode of assuring our trade on this coast, and increasing it, (354 v°) is in our hands. It is to seek a port from the Marathas for our ships. The safety of the seas against the pirates and the certainty of finding a shelter against the squalls and during the bad season of the monsoon, will induce the shippers, who will no longer have anything to fear from the pirates, nor from the tempests, to undertake shipments in such a manner as to ensure profits. The least contact the Consul of Surat will maintain with Poona, will deliver them from the pirates, and the agreements which the Maratha Government wishes to enter into with the French nation will procure us the port which we may desire on the Malabar Coast or in the Gulf of Cambay.

(355) It is to facilitate the execution of this project that I dispatched a month ago an expert seaman to Gogha, to prepare a plan of the harbour with all its soundings. If Gogha, situated in the heart of the Gulf of Cambay and opposite Bhadoch, responds, as I believe it, to my expectations, I am in a position, provided the negotiation is kept secret, to obtain it from the Court of Poona.

It is with the same object, always relating to trade, that I negotiated two years ago with the Viceroy of Goa to obtain from him the permission to set up a French establishment at Daman, near Surat. My demands

were conditional, and I saw from his reply, which was very satisfactory, that with a simple order from the (355 v°) Court of Portugal, he would grant me, not only at Daman but even at Goa, a residence to conduct all the affairs of the French nation. I took this step in accordance with the verbal orders from M. de Boynes to feel the ground on this question, and nothing prevents us today from taking a good advantage of it.

12th Question:

What are the rights and privileges of the French nation at Surat, in so far as honours as well as trade are concerned? Do the traders freely enjoy immunity granted to the Company by the Mughal Emperor at the time of the establishment of the (356) factory, and the liberty of trade, substituted for the exclusive privilege for the Company?

Reply:

Of all the honours, that of the hoisting of the flag, enjoyed by the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese, is denied to us. But it is probable that we shall soon enjoy this prerogative which is an essential part of our privileges.

Although the French flag is not hoisted in the lodge, the national abode, the French Chief has always moved about, whenever he wanted, with two flags or standards flying in front of him, and since my return here in the capacity of the Consul, I always follow this practice, and whenever I pass with these two small flags flying in front of me, either before the bodyguard of the Nawab or before those of the English, the troops always accord me military honours. M. de Tronjoly, commanding the warship *Le Brillant* and M. Baron de Couville his second mate, can bear witness to this fact. These gentlemen often accompanied me during such visits.

Following my instructions, I claim first rank in public ceremonies and precedence everywhere. The Dutch Chief, whose nation had been formerly most (357) prosperous in the town never wanted to give precedence to my predecessor, nor to me. I manage in such a manner as never to be in his company at banquets or state visits. I give precedence to the English Chief, because of his rank as Governor of the fortress on behalf of the Mughal Emperor. Because of this title, he forms an essential part of the Government of Surat, under whose protection subsist the European nations established in this town.

As for the trade, the French merchants enjoy at Surat all the immunity and rights granted formerly to the (French East) India Company and well stipulated in a firman from the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. This firman is preserved in the records of the Consulate. The traders, who are under (357 v°) French protection, pay 5 per cent duty on imports and exports. From this 5 per cent, 2½ per cent go to the Nawab who divides them in three parts, and 2½ per cent remain for the King to defray the expenses of the Consulate. Since the time the French have started selling everything at Bombay, it is impossible for me to maintain this Consulate, whose expenses, for the sake of the prestige of the nation, rise to the same figure at present as in the times of the Company. It is from my own funds that today I support this Consulate, whose expenses amount to not less than 800 to 900 Rupees per month, i.e. 25,000 to 30,000 francs per year.

The traders (358) sometimes complain against Surat, but if they considered the quality of goods that they bring and the time when they arrive here, they would be more restrained in their complaints. Usually they spend 4 to 5 months in sailing on the two coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, with a ship laden with 4 to 5 lakhs of Rupees worth of goods which is equal to a million and more of our currency. They stop at 7 or 8 places at least on the way, and after selling the finest and the best part they come to Surat to offer to our merchants who are in a position to contract on the spot for 10 to 12 lakhs of Rupees worth of goods, a trash which does not promise any profits to them. And when do they arrive? in February or March, i.e. at a time when the advanced season offers almost (358 v°) no market for the goods from Europe. They do not find either those to purchase for their return journey, since not counting on their arrival, the weavers work only on orders placed by the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese brokers.

The ships *Les Trois Amis, La Seine, Le Turgot, Le Sartine, Le Bourdelais, Le Filsjames,* furnish proofs in support of my assertions in the commercial operations which they have been transacting in Surat for the last two years. The shippers speculate in the wrong way, pay no attention to the monsoon and they shout against Surat. Is this town less profitable to the English, the Dutch and the Portuguese? The French could get the same benefits if they set about the job in the same way. (359) It has often happened that a richly laden French ship assigned to collect in Surat cotton for China or linen or silks for Mocha, arrives here to do its loading

only after touching Madras, Pondicherry, Cochin, Mahé, Telicherry, Goa and Bombay. What can it unload at Surat ? where it can then arrive not before January and February. In view of its trash, as mentioned above, and no goods prepared for the return journey, no wonder then that its commercial operations turn out very unprofitable at least at Surat.

Instead of stopping at all these ports, if it comes straight here in October, it can sell its cargo in 4 or 5 days, proceed to Mahé (359 v°) by December to contract for its sandalwood and return to Surat in February or March to collect its cotton which will have been prepared during its absence, and leave in the same month for China. If its trade objective is Coffee from Mocha, there is still the necessity for it to arrive at Surat between October and March; the proceeds from its cargo from Europe will enable it to purchase the kind of linen and silks which it can take in March to Mocha, as also the goods from Europe but which are of a different kind. With the spun cottons and drugs which it will collect on its return from Mocha, whence it will come back to Surat in September with a good cargo-load of coffee, and its cargo for (360) the return journey which will have been prepared at Surat during its voyage to Mocha, it will be in a position to leave for Europe richly laden in the course of December.

If the shippers follow this itinerary, they are sure to earn profits, and if *Le Duras*, which had followed this course, incurred losses, they are attributable only to the misfortunes : the considerable damages it suffered (during the unloading operations) and the cruel war of the English with the Marathas, of which Surat was the theatre and which devastated all its countryside for more than 400 kilometres around. But for this cruel scourge and other unexpected accidents that befell *Le Duras*, the commercial operations of this ship would have earned large profits for its shippers, and (360 v°) Surat will always produce these profits when tranquility returns and when the shipments are well coordinated.

It is very essential, as has been stated above, that the ship destined for Surat arrives straight there. If it contracts business at Bombay before that, the English buy a fourth or third of its cargo and send it to Surat where they are assured of the profits. Why should the French not earn these profits for themselves ? All the customs will pass through the French Consulate. The nation, thus well accredited, would transact here excellent business.

In fact, if the Surat Consulate could annually count on the dispatch of two ships (361) from Europe, which would follow the two routes specified above, and a third which would do the trip to Basra where the rich cargo from Surat has a lucrative and large market as also in Persia and Turkey, the flourishing trade of the nation at Surat would give such credit to the Consul that he could even in an emergency, help the colonies with money and provisions by means of loans which he will be in a position to raise here. This town much richer than one can imagine, can provide for everything, so long as trade will support the negotiations, but when it passes through the channel of the English, a circumstance which last year deprived the King of more than 40,000 Rupees in customs, the advantages expected by the Minister of (361 v°) France from this Consulate, discredited by the very conduct of its nationals, will vanish and the shippers will always incur losses.

I fail to understand why the customs-duties at Surat are exaggerated. The English customs-duty is 6 per cent at Bombay and Surat, and the brokerage is 3 per cent, which is levied only on imports. At the Surat Consulate the duty is only 5 per cent and brokerage 2 1/2 per cent. All kinds of trade is transacted at Surat without obstruction by any one, except arms which cannot be brought into the town without the permission of the Governor of the fortress. In times of peace, even this commodity (362) admits of no difficulty.

Thus, it is only because of the appearance of the King's ships *Le Brillant* and *La Consolante* at Bombay and Surat, that the English did not allow the unloading of bronze canon from *Le Filszames*, which formed part of the shipment of *Le Sévère*. I could have got them admitted into the town but for this critical circumstance which created alarm among the English of this coast. The earlier vessels have unloaded many guns without any obstacle since my return. With the exception of this single article, everything finds a sure and prompt sale at Surat and there is perhaps no other commercial town in India where one can collect one's funds so easily, no matter how large the proceeds are from a rich cargo. (362 v°) The 2 1/2 per cent brokerage assures the promptness of this operation and removes all risk.

There is only one inconvenience at Surat which might discourage the shippers. These are the charges for unloading, because the ships anchor in the harbour, 10 kilometres from the town, but as these charges exist

everywhere, it is only a question of a little more or a little less. And there is no delay once the operation starts, because the cargo-boats have a large size and capacity. Customs is rigid, it is true, and very minute, since four different authorities (363) supervise it—the Nawab of the town, the English as Admiral of the Mughal Emperor, the Marathas and the French. When, however, the matter is left to the Consul who acts through his agents in co-operation with the customs officers and the traders, the examination is more prompt and less embarrassing. There are many countries in which entire confiscation of goods is the punishment for fraud. At Surat the undeclared and seized goods are returned and only a double duty is charged.

It will be evident from what is narrated above that French trade can become very prosperous in Surat. But in order that it is carried out profitably, it is absolutely essential that the shippers and merchants operate in (363 v °) all their dealings only through the advice of the Consul and the first commercial deputy of the Consulate, and that they do not enter into contracts in any other manner except by their advice. This express order not to do anything without consulting the Consul indeed forms part of his instructions signed by the King, but scant heed is paid to it. If he tries to exercise it, they shout against his tyranny and they spread everywhere the report that it is the Consul himself who obstructs trade. They, however, ought to concede that he has sufficient experience and good knowledge of the place to furnish only sound advice to the merchants.

He has besides so much interest in strictly discharging the duties of the post with which His (364) Majesty honours him and which concerns the increase of French trade at Surat, that he is bound to do his utmost for the greatest advantage of the shippers and of all the merchants without any distinction. And it is on this score that he is granted a consular fee in the form of gratification.

13th Question :

What is the site offered to the Consul at Surat, M. Anquetil de Briancourt, by the Marathas ? What is its utility ? What are his negotiations, and what stage have they reached ?

Reply :

In November 1774, (364 v°) the date of my return to this town in the capacity of Consul, I found the Marathas of the Court of Poona at war with Raghunathrao, *alias* Raghoba, one of their Chiefs, disgraced, and supported by the English. At the end of the month, these Marathas secretly negotiated with me for the grant at my choice of a place on the Malabar Coast, but on condition that I should secure 200 troops from Pondicherry to assist them to reduce Raghoba and defend themselves against the English. The Ministry of Poona had talks with me through a trustworthy person. I gave him to understand that Gheria or Bassein would suit our purpose but that I could not (365) promise them troops which they demanded from me, unless I had beforehand proof of their good faith and their friendship. The person, who was negotiating with me, gave me many promises. I pointed out to him that he could begin by obtaining for me a paravana for all our merchant ships ensuring them protection along the coast and in their ports; that this paravana, properly ratified, would serve me as a sure proof of their friendship for us and of their good faith in negotiating with me, and that I would write about it to the Minister and to the Governor of Pondicherry. The Court of Poona gave me a reply, but still verbally through their negotiator (365 v°) that our merchant ships had nothing to fear and that on the arrival of our troops to assist them, they would grant us any concessions we could desire.

This verbal reply appeared to me to be too vague. The English got some wind of this secret negotiation. To remove all suspicion from their mind, I dropped my negotiations with the Court of Poona, which were twice or thrice renewed, without, however, any definite promise on their part until the arrival of out troops. I kept the Minister for the Navy informed about all these details at that time. As soon as the ship *Le Brillant* appeared at Surat, the Marathas expressed their joy through an (366) express messenger secretly dispatched to me. The correspondence between the Court of Poona and me was then resumed. After the departure of *Le Brillant*, I demanded Gheria and Baroda (the latter place is a big commercial town in the interior of the region to the north west of Surat), and I undertook to write to the Governor of Pondicherry and to that of the Isle of France to procure them European soldiers which they demanded from me, if they promised to cede these two places to us. The Maratha

agent assured me that Gheria, Baroda, Bassein and Gogha would be granted to us at our choice, if 400 Frenchmen could be sent to Poona. He even showed me the letter he wrote, on the (366 v°) spot, to the Maratha Ministry on this subject.

Seven or eight days later, in April 1777, my Poona correspondent wrote to me that a French ship had just arrived at Chaul and had brought an envoy from the Court of France to Poona. He expressed to me his surprise that I had not given him any hint about this sudden visit. I could hardly do so, since I was myself in the dark about it, and I heard about it only a month later by a letter from M. de St. Lubin. In this letter he confirmed to me the news about his mission to the Court of the Marathas and the favourable welcome he had received on his arrival at Poona. In reply I informed him (367) about the proposals of the Marathas and the progress of my secret negotiations with them, which I then left to his care.

14th and the last Question:

What has been the result of the negotiation on the subject of the right to hoist the flag at Surat, started in 1775, and how does the matter stand to-day?

Reply:

The dispatch of documents relating to this affair is the reply to this question. I have sent them all at that time to the Minister. This matter is on the right road, (367 v°) and a word from the Minister for the Navy to the English ambassador would indeed suffice to have this old privilege restored to us at Surat. Here is the explanation of the whole affair.

In 1721 the French flag was flying at Surat, a right which the English, the Portuguese and the Dutch continue to enjoy here. This town was then the head-quarters of the old (French East) India Company. It declared a huge bankruptcy especially at Surat. It straightened out matters by issuing promisory notes. The new Company, which succeeded it, established some years later its chief factory at Pondicherry and abolished that at Surat. There only remained a resident to supervise the liquidation of the notes, which was being carried out (368) only at a loss to the merchants. This resident, through negligence, allowed the flag to be stolen at night, and out of economy did not want to replace it. The

Supreme Council at Pondicherry, when informed of the discredit of the nation at Surat, forbade in 1732 Messrs. Martin and Cernet, its agents in this town, to hoist the flag again. In 1736, M. de Verrier, a member of the Supreme Council of Pondicherry, was sent to Surat in the capacity of Chief of the factory, which he slowly raised up again. He paid and withdrew many of these notes which constituted a debt of the old Company, so that this old bankruptcy was forgotten and the credit recovered. This new (368 v°) Chief of the factory did not want to revive the right of the flag, although, the Nawab Mianchilachin (Mian Achan), and Siddi Ahmad Khan, Governor of the fortress, pressed him very much to do so. He remained content with the two small white flags or standards which flew in front of him whenever he went out, as I have been practicing it myself for the last 20 years that I have been here.

In 1757, on my arrival in Surat, I expressed my sorrow to M. Le Verrier at seeing the French nation in this Muslim town deprived of the only privilege which impresses the people of the country, which imposes upon them, and which all the European nations freely enjoyed before our very eyes, (369) although our rights were the same as theirs.

In 1758 I succeeded M. Le Verrier as Chief of the nation, and in March 1759, the English seized the fortress of Surat.

In October of the same year, M. D'Estaing seized Fez Salam, a Moorish ship of Surat, which was on its way to Mocha and Basra. This ship, in keeping with the custom practised at Surat had a passport from all the European nations and therefore mine. At this news, the Nawab and the merchants, instigated by the English, fell upon me, and *Le Louis Quinze*, a 300-tonner, which M. Le Verrier had left me, was the victim of this seizure, so clearly made in contravention of the laws of nations that (369 v°) the administration of the Isle of France declared it invalid. Not only was I ruined, but my life was also in constant danger. My correspondence of this period stands testimony to it.

In January 1761, Pondicherry was captured by the English and the French flag ceased to fly in India. I decided to stop giving any passports to Moorish ships unless and until the nation was allowed to enjoy at Surat this right in keeping with our privileges, all the more, because M. de Montiel, commanding the Royal ship, had a few months back released

*La Fateremani*, a ship from Surat, after the inspection of my passport. Indeed, either the French nation ought to enjoy the full privilege of the French flag flying at Surat, which was a matter of honour for it, especially because it did not have any other in India, or in default of the maintenance of the privilege, the Moorish ships, not furnished with my passport, (370) if encountered by our ships, would become a lawful prize, thus resulting in a great advantage for the nation.

I, therefore, took my decision on this point. The old flagstaff was still standing on the Company's ground. Towards the end of 1760 I hoisted the French flag. After a week, the Nawab, always at the instigation of the English, had it removed and the flagstaff uprooted, and in my turn, I refused to give passports. But unfortunately, our cruisers did not meet any ship from Surat this year. When peace was signed, I once again began to give passports in consequence of fresh orders from Pondicherry. When the Company ceded all its establishments in India to the King, I went to France on leave in 1771, and in April (370 v°) 1774, I returned as Consul, honoured with this title by His Majesty as it is stipulated in my letters patent, signed at Fontainebleau in August 1773.

On my arrival in Surat on November 5, 1774, I laid all my plans to revive the privilege of the flag. I put forward all my claims and especially a letter which the Nawab of Surat had given me at the time of my departure from Surat for France in 1771. He had promised me by this letter to allow me full enjoyment of the right of hoisting the flag on the King's territory, otherwise known at Surat as French Garden, if on my return, I brought with me a ship richly laden with goods from Europe, and *Le Duras*, which I had brought, put me in a position to demand the execution of his promise and force him to (371) keep it with me.

The English once again opposed the maintenance of this essential part of our privileges and forbade the Nawab to keep agreements with me. I addressed them a letter of courtesy to obtain their consent as Governor of the fortress on behalf of the Mughal Emperor. Their reply of September 28, 1775, which is in my possession, is not at all founded on good grounds and is only a subterfuge, pure and simple. It terminates thus : *We think that the final peace treaty passed between our respective sovereigns excludes you from all claim to the privilege you desire. Whatever it may be, we shall*

*forward the copy of your letter to our honourable superiors in England, so that they shoud give on this subject their final decision which will certainly be communicated to you.*

Now we are in 1778, and in spite of continuous inquiries, they have not yet communicated to me the reply of their superiors on this matter.

(371v°)

My Lord,

The political side of my administration at Surat which I had the honour to present to you in April and these explanations which I place before you today in the form of questions and answers, together supply you the most complete information on Surat. All these documents will explain to you the importance of the Consulate which His Majesty has been pleased to set up there. The English have destroyed it in spite of the neutrality observed at all times in this Moorish town and which ought to be respected, but when peace restores everything to order, I am confident, My Lord, that you will neither forget the Consulate, nor the Consul, nor his large family, ruined by the English and whose sole resources today lie in the support of your protection.

I have the honour to be most respectfully,

Signed : ANQUETIL de BRIANCOURT

Paris, May 4, 1781

True copy :

Anquetil de Briancourt.

C[2] 144.
(39) *Copy of the letter to M. Auda**

Surat, 12 February 1775

Sir,

Divine Providence was so kind to us during our passage from France to this place that we arrived at Surat without any accident after six months' voyage. I had the honour to write to you from the Cape of Good Hope. M. Percheron had promised me to arrange to deliver my letters to you from there. The ship *Le Duras* (39 v°) cast anchor in the Surat harbour on November 4, and on the 5th we entered the town; we found M. Demoncrif impatiently awaiting our arrival. The whole town joined in expressing their joy at our return and we had a great reception from all the foreigners.

The English first appeared to take umbrage at my new title of 'Consul', but I behaved in the beginning with so much caution and such little ostentation that they slowly got used to it and along with the other nations they offered me their congratulations by formal letters. I am at present negotiating with the Nawab. Till now we are in full exercise of our privileges relating to commerce and I hope to have shortly our rights about the flag restored. This matter is delicate to negotiate because of the jealousy of our rivals, but I am using so much prudence in my proceedings that the Nawab, delighted at my return to Surat, will fall in with my views as soon as he can do so without offending the English. When I was about to negotiate, Sir, with them about the cartel, they got involved in a new war with the Marathas which would not have disposed them at all to come to terms with me. We even lost 19 men who took up service with them, but in spite of my protests on this point, I could not get any satisfactory reply from the English, except that the practice (40) established since so long at Surat did not permit them to return the deserters.

The war of the English with the Marathas is the result of a family quarrel among the latter. The Chief of the great Marathas who always resides at Poona, capital of the Deccan, died and a dispute arose in the

* These letters are arranged according to sequence and dates and not according to folio numbers of the original French Documents.

family about partition. Raghunathrao claims as his share certain provinces in the coastal region for which his niece Princess Nana contends with him. The former feeling that his party was too weak, thought of giving one of these provinces to the English in return for their support. The English had been coveting for a long time the Island of Salsette, in the neighbourhood of Bombay, as a place very essential for them. They had made numerous attempts to appropriate it and chance has just made them masters of it at a time when they expected it the least. To have on his side a European power which could help him to preserve the provinces for which his relatives contend with him, Raghunathrao has just made a cession to the English of this Island of Salsette, if they seize it. They achieved their objective without losing many troops. They stormed Thana, capital of this Island of Salsette on December 28, and put the whole garrison to the sword. This manoeuvre filled all the Marathas with horror, whether members of the confederacy or not. The party, which was compelled to yield, swore (40 v°) vengeance on all the Englishmen who would fall into their hands. Thus, they mutilate as many as they can catch hold of by cutting their nose and ears. There is a talk of reconciliation. I think I notice that it is the Maratha family which is making it up so that their union might enable them to avenge the common cause. The English have lost in this war Mr. Varson (Watson), General Superintendent for the Navy. They regret his loss so much because of his valour and his capacity that they are having a mausoleum erected in his honour in one of their churches in Bombay.

The trade of Surat has much declined at present on account of this war of the English with the Marathas. Fortunately, the major part of the goods of *Le Duras* was sold and linen contracted a few days before these troubles. It is not yet known how the new administration of Bengal will look upon this armed action of the English of Bombay which may raise against them, if ever good luck refuses to favour them, all the Maratha chiefs. If Haideralikhan, by any chance, chose to join the latter, the revolution would then become general in India, and the English would no longer be in a position to withstand it.

There are at the present moment (41) three French ships in the Surat harbour, a rare phenomenon for the inhabitants of this town who have never seen so many.

On the 20th of the last month, *La Seine*, the King's store-ship commanded by M. de la Perrouze and *Les Trois Amis* commanded by M. Bonfils, cast anchor in this Surat harbour. They have on board M. de la Rochette whom you certainly know. These two ships arrived too late to transact roaring business. They have, however, sold all their pepper amounting nearly to 200,000 francs and taken in return linen and other goods to sell along the coast, at Mauritius and in Europe. They could get only the trash in linen, for monsoon had too far advanced to place an order for new ones and M. de la Rochette would not have the time to wait for them. This gentleman, ex-syndic of the (French) East India Company, is doing big business. He is going to do his best to revive that of Surat. The customs duties, however, deter him a little in this respect. I shall amply dwell on this subject, Sir, in the next letter I shall have the honour to write to you. I am at the present so overworked that I have not a minute's leisure, and in addition to my normal duties and the attendant worries, I have actually on my head the whole cargo of *Le Duras*. We had the misfortune to lose M. Dulaurent, the supercargo, who died here on the 18th of the last (41 v°) month. This tragic event gives me lot of occupation. Nonetheless I am preparing to dispatch *Le Duras* to Mocha between the 15th and the 20th of the next month. As the fortune of so many individuals depends on the success or failure of business of *Le Duras*, the transactions of this vessel become today a major affair, because of the death of the supercargo. Thus, I had to replace him by a competent person. I have consequently entrusted M. Demoncrif with this commission to Mocha. In his absence M. Gastelier, whom I brought with me, will function as secretary. As he has done his law in Paris, he is in a position to fill up this post.

The Marathas attacked, Sir, the ships *La Seine* and *Les Trois Ami*, but the bold front shown by M. de La Perrouze forced them to retire hastily. A well cemented peace with these same Marathas would be a great advantage for our trade, and that is what I am actually negotiating with these pirates.[21] I have already had three secret talks with one of their agents. They feel today the necessity to have on their soil a force capable of offsetting that of the English. They are therefore secretly promising me on the coast a place of my choice where I shall be free to hoist the King's flag. Without evading the proposal, I replied that I was very much obliged to them for the offer, but that we could accept it only after (42)

a very solemn agreement on their part never to attack any vessel flying the French flag, that they should besides order their squadrons to give them (the French ships) all kinds of assistance and that admission for us in their ports should be absolutely free. I made it absolutely clear that only after the ships had tested the dependableness of such a firman that the Minister, to whom I shall report this negotiation, could accept a portion of ground in their provinces for the King of France as a symbol of alliance the results of which could not but be very advantageous to their own nation. It is against this background, Sir, that I am negotiating and I hope to succeed. My next letter will perhaps furnish you more information on this subject. But I shall take a final decision only after receiving the orders of the Minister, and in consultation with M. de Ternay whom I am sending a copy of this item.

About 20 days back, I learnt here *via* Basra the news of the King's death. I would be very much interested to know the changes, which the accession of Louis XVI to the throne, will have brought about in the Ministry of the Navy. I am absolutely in the dark about it. I request you, Sir, tc kindly always keep me in the good graces of M. de Boynes, and offset the false reports which some jealous persons at Pondicherry may make to this judicious minister against the Surat Consulate. My return to this town in the capacity of Consul has created enemies for me among my (42 v°) own nation, as if I had committed a crime in opening a new branch of commerce to the French. To avenge myself fittingly against these secret enemies, I ask nothing more from the Divine Lord than His blessings for its prosperity. Their efforts will hardly worry me when I know that you will always favour me with your patronage. You had kindly offered to obtain for me the Royal almanac.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest gratitude and the highest consideration, etc.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

(12) *Extract of the letter to M. Demoncrif, Supercargo*

Surat, October 14, 1775

I have received the letter from the Council of Bombay. It has not displeased me so much as you perhaps believe. I shall verbally give you the reasons for it and you will agree with me that they handled this affair in a very clumsy manner, but which can be promptly terminated to our satisfaction in Europe. I thank you very sincerely for all the trouble you have taken during this negotiation and I am obliged to you in the same way as if you had succeeded in it, etc.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

---

M. Law, Surat, December 1, 1775

Governor of Pondicherry.

Sir,

When I had the honour to write to you on the 9th June last, I was sure that my letter would fall into the hands of M. Gambier. It happened exactly as I had expected, for on the very day I had dispatched the duplicate quite designedly. My letter contains a partial account of my dealings, but these are indicated therein in such a manner that whatever information he might have obtained about my activities, the construction of my letter would give him an impression that it was either false or at least doubtful. Fortunately, he has nibbled at the bait, I had to allow some forty days to pass (12 v°) before giving you an account, I was unable to do it earlier, of my negotiations which had not reached a final stage, as also indeed of the proceedings of the English in connection with their war with the Marathas.

This is, Sir, what gave occasion to the well founded suspicions which the English were justified in forming about me.

Last April, I sent my dispatches to Europe *via* Muscat. The boat, which carried them, started in calm weather but was surprised by this raging hurricane on May 17. In order to avoid the winds, it was compelled to return and met with the misfortune suffered by so many other vessels.

It was broken up on the coast two kilometres from the Surat harbour. The Nakhuda's chest, thrown on the sand, fell into the hands of an English Captain. My dispatches were unfortunately in this chest. They were delivered without my knowledge to Mr. Gambier who sent them immediately to the Governor of Bombay. This surprise seizure of my dispatches was kept very secret. A confidential friend, who is kind enough to disclose to me valuable information, apprised me of it at once as something very authentic and about which I should be on my guard. Immediately I looked over my letter to the Minister again and found that the harm would not be very great, if I skilfully dropped into the hands of the Englishman (Mr. Gambier) a letter, which, although discussing the substance of my activities but not all the truth, might remove all suspicion from his mind. The stratagem succeeded. The first one reached you, and he has intercepted, as he (13) imagines, the duplicate. Since then I find that Mr. Gambier shows much more confidence in me. I pretend not to know anything to better hide my stratagem, and we appear in the eyes of all the people in Surat to be very friendly with each other. He no longer reproaches me, and even appears to tease me about my negotiations with the Marathas of Poona, and I had better hide my game which is going at a good round pace. This is, Sir, my confession and I am making it today in writing only because I am quite sure that this letter will be delivered into your own hands by M. Maugendre or dispatched very safely by Mr. Picot. Otherwise I would have never risked it by way of the Surat pattemars.

It is more than two months now, Sir, that my letter, addressed to Sawai Madhavrao at Poona, was dispatched. I am expecting the best results from it and especially the paravana which ought to serve as a security to all our ships all along the Malabar Coast as far as Surat and which will protect them against all attacks from the pirates. Doulope, our broker, is of great help to me in this transaction and if it has a good result, as he constantly assures me about it, I have promised him to solicit you, Sir, to write to the Minister in his favour as I have also myself undertaken to do in my turn. As soon as this matter is terminated, I shall negotiate about the place which these Marathas would be willing to grant us, but as this matter is most delicate, I shall first only feel the ground in order to have time to inform you and receive your views, or to be more exact, your orders, before finalizing anything, either by refusing or accepting

the offer. (13 v °) It is in this manner, Sir, that I am going to conduct myself and as soon as I receive a reply from Poona to my letters, I shall send you a copy of both.

God grant that I may succeed. It will be a great advantage for the commerce of the nation.

The question of the flag has taken quite a different turn from the one I expected. In spite of the Nawab's consent, the English have refused their approval. They have, however, based their refusal on such flimsy grounds that the very letter containing it is for us an authentic document which will help the Minister of France to terminate this affair to our satisfaction in the first interview he may have on this subject with the English ambassador. If the English had wished to torpedo my claim, they would have first secretly brought an influence to bear upon the Nawab and asked him to reopen the old quarrels, real or unreal, which the Surat Government can always revive. They would have then replied to me that they were not opposed to it, but that the Nawab could not shut his face against the demands of some influential creditors of the old Company and that unless they were satisfied, they could not force the Nawab to allow us to enjoy the right of the flag which we were justified in claiming. I would have certainly given a reply, Sir, but I would not have succeded better. This obstacle and others which they would have endeavoured to magnify, might have raised in Europe difficulties which it would not have been possible to remove except with money. Luckily for me, the reply from the Bombay Council (14) is quite different. It says in substance that the article of the French flag at Surat not being included in the last treaty, they could not on their own responsibility grant me this right, that, moreover, they would refer my claims in this respect to their high superiors and send them my demands on this point, that that notwithstanding, they were always eager to show me all the respect due to my post.

When the Minister of France will deem it opportune to finalize this affair orally with the English ambassador, it will be easy for him to point out that the letter of refusal from the Bombay Council proves that the French have a right *ipso facto* to have their flag hoisted at Surat for two chief reasons.

The first : this letter shows that there is no impediment at Surat to the hoisting of the French flag, since, in spite of the jealousy with which the English see the commerce of our nation increase since my return to this

town, this letter contains not the slightest difficulty about the enjoyment of our right, which could be raised either by the Nawab or by the merchants in this town.

The second : that the only difficulty which the English raise against us in this letter is deemed null and void because it is not at all admissible. In fact, how could the treaty of peace deal with the French flag at Surat ? This Mughal town belongs neither (14 v°) to the English nor to the French. It is a patrimony from the Mughal Emperor which annually pays him tribute in the form of customs. They (the French) as well as the English enjoy their privileges formerly granted to their nation by the Potentate of Delhi. The English no doubt, at the present moment, possess the fortress of Surat, but this fortress does in no way make them masters of the town which recognizes only the Mughal Emperor and moreover, it is only in his name that they are masters of the fortress. Thus, is it correct to think that a treaty of peace concluded in Europe can decide rights and privileges granted to the Europeans in Asia by the Prince of the country in a town in which he is the sole master, in which he alone can grant favours to the nations which he protects ? Since he is the only one who can either extend or curb the rights and privileges which he has once granted, it is quite inconsistent that these very rights and privileges should be discussed in a treaty of peace concluded in Europe. That is what the Minister of France can easily impress upon the English ambassador who will write to his court about it. The English Company will then be forced to allow us to enjoy here our right of the flag. The Bombay Council, by refusing its assent, arrogates a power which it does not possess. Why, then, it may be said to me, did you ask it for it ? It is out of sheer courtesy and to avoid a surreptitious blow which it can deal to the French nation by virtue of the neighbourhood of Bombay and the vast forces which their nation (15) possesses in India. This fact intimidates the Nawab to such an extent that he dares not do anything without the consent of the English. They have a great authority in Surat, but it is only precarious, and the English Council, in keeping with the rights of nations and even the conventions observed in this town, ought to ratify with its assent the permission I have obtained from the Nawab to hoist the flag according to our privileges as soon as French vessels laden with cargo arrive here straight from Europe. Now that their refusal is clear and there is no shilly-shally, I think there will be no difficulty in settling this affair in Europe. M. de Boynes had expressly

given me instructions to negotiate this affair in order to find out the source of the obstacle. I think I could not clear it up better, and I shall forward my report on it to the Minister. I deem it my duty, Sir, to keep you also informed about it, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will favour me with your actual opinion on this matter.

Raghunathrao's army is not 25 to 30 kilometres from here. The English unit, which is hardly 300 to 400 strong at the most, continues to be with the Maratha prince. It is quite uncertain what course this combined army will now follow which, by the different onslaughts, marches and counter-marches, is completely broken down. In spite of the truce, the Marathas of the Poona party continue to block the roads from Surat to Bombay, and the English as well as Raghunathrao are continuously under arms. As the Bombay Council has dispatched Mr. Taylor to Mr. Clavering to seek the approval for its armed attack against the Marathas (15 v°) of Poona, and explain the advantage resulting therefrom to the Company according to them by protecting Raghunathrao to the point of installing him in the capital, the English of this coast are awaiting the reply of the new administration of Bengal, either to pursue their operation or abandon Raghunathrao, who fears the latter course very much. Fattehsing has come to terms with the English by paying them a large sum of money, so that he remains undisturbed in Baroda. Raghunathrao has been greatly displeased with this agreement of Fattehsing, which has not either pleased his brother Govindrao. These two brothers are actually enemies of each other and Govindrao, who is near about Ahmedabad, is trying to reinforce Raghunathrao's army with all his troops. When these two armies are united, they intend, according to some people, to fall on Bassein, and according to others, to cross the Ghats whose passages are guarded by the troops of Nana, and continue their march up to Poona. As for me, I think that, as the English have proclaimed the suspension of arms, they will halt the march of their allies and will prevent all hostility until they receive the reply of the new administration of Bengal, with which Mr. Taylor will certainly be entrusted. I shall have the honour to inform you about it at the proper time.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

*Addition to the present letter on the question of the flag*

Some persons, Sir, have advised me to write to Mr. Clavering [22] on the subject (16) of our right to hoist the flag. I have the honour to know Mr. Clavering sufficiently well, from the several conversations I had with him at the Cape, to count entirely on his equity to do us justice. But I fear a surreptitious blow. The Bombay Council simply looks upon the new administration of Bengal with jealous eyes and has secret intentions to thwart it. They would then clandestinely move heaven and earth through the Nawab to stir up against me heaps of troubles, may be only to avenge themselves and not to show to Mr. Clavering that they had thoughtlessly given their refusal. On the contrary, if I refer the matter straight to Europe, it will not mean quarrelling with them openly, but accepting their decision to get orders from their high superiors to grant me what they tacitly agree I have a right to ask. This latter method of proceeding will indeed satisfy them, since they have chosen it, and though protracted, it will be nonetheless surer and more honourable for the nation.

True copy ANQUETIL

---

(120)

My Lord de Sartine, Surat, 2 April 1777
Minister for the Navy & (Triplicate)
Secretary of State, Paris.

My lord,

The occasion furnished by the vessels leaving very shortly for Mocha and Jidda from Surat offers me the Suez route by which I have the honour to write to you today. The object of my letter is to inform you about the arrival of *Le Brillant* at Surat. This King's ship, commanded by M. de Tronjoly, arrived in the harbour on the 21st of the last month and left on the 28th on its way to Pondicherry. Its appearance in this town raised the prestige of the nation, but greatly aroused the curiosity and the jealousy of the English. I cannot, Sir, give you fuller information about its mission than by sending you a copy (120 v°) of the dispatches of M. Bellecombes and of my letter to him, pending the explanations I am going to give him on all his enquiries. You will find in a letter my negotiation renewed with the Minister of Poona, capital of the Marathas. It is not at all unlikely

that I shall succeed in my project about the port of Angre. But if this port, which may belong to us in course of time is as good for trade with the interior of the country as for the safety of our ships, the success of my plan will no doubt bring about the fall of Bombay which has this double advantage. I shall give you full information on this subject in my dipatches, in case the Ministry of Poona frankly negotiates with me, which I doubt very much.

I am also writing to M. Bellecombes about two other plans, one which concerns Daman and the other Gogha. As Surat is full of exactions very burdensome for trade, the Governor-General of Goa intends to turn Daman, 80 kilometres from Surat and up till now idle, into a flourishing town. His plan is also to ruin the big trade of Bombay. Consequently, he offers attractive privileges to the merchants who would like to establish their trade there, and the exemption from many taxes,which are overwhelming at Surat, slowly induces them to move there. I am in close correspondence with this General. For the same object, i.e. improvement of French trade in this Gulf, I am going to try to obtain (121) outside the town in a big borough which adjoins it and which is only separated by a river and which is known as little Daman, a place suitable for establishing a residence for the French nation with the privilege of the flag and communication and common proprietorship of the port. This port, though small, is reputed for the good construction of frigates and warships. The King of Portugal has had them constructed there every year. The same liberty has just been granted gratis to those who would like to take advantage of it. The ships lay at anchor only at a distance of 4 kilometres from the town in the big harbour and the landing and cartage there are very easy. The letter I am going to write on this subject to the Governor-General of Goa will not commit us to anything, since I shall ask him this favour to be utilized only at our option and I shall present the matter to him from the point of view of uniting our nation with his to ruin the trade of Surat as well as to help that of Daman to flourish.

The plan which concerns Gogha is more important than I thought when I announced it to M. Bellecombes. I have been assured, my Lord, that the port is spacious enough to hold a big squadron, has a muddy bottom everywhere and sufficient water (121 v°) for the biggest vessels which coming down from the high seas between two islands which are at

the entrance, can enter and go out in all seasons. If this port really possesses these good qualities, its situation is such that the whole trade of the coast and the gulf can be carried on there with great advantage, as there are all the necessary openings in land for the disposal of all the goods brought at Surat and Bombay. I dare not, my Lord, guarantee you all these good qualities of the port of Gogha, but to have full information about it, I am going to send there in seven or eight days M. Leroy, captain of a private ship, a good pilot worthy of commendation for having made a tour round the world with M. de Bougainville. I shall send with him a person who is a draftsman and I hope that the soundings and the bearings of the ground will procure me the information I want. Of whatever nature it may be, I shall communicate it as well as the reply from the Governor-General of Goa, and the favourable or unfavourable result of my negotiation with the Ministry of Poona to M. de Bellecombe. I hope to give you in the next letter I shall have the honour to write to you, ample details on these three points.

The ships from this town for Basra will leave in 20 days from now. I hope very much I shall then be in a position to inform you about these three objects. (122) My dispatches will reach you from Basra *via* Aleppo, the route of the big caravan. I shall then send you the statement of the customs duties and the expenses of this Consulate. My sickness, as you you will see from the duplicate included in my last dispatch, did not give me time to send you these accounts by the present dispatch which follows the route of Suez and Cairo, the route of the small caravan.

I request you, my Lord, to induce M. Demoncrif, who left on *Le Duras* in December, to return to Surat in his capacity as the Secretary. If he refuses, he will indicate to you the type of person we require here. Every individual is not suitable for the Consulate at Surat which demands much outward appearance to maintain the glory of the nation, firmness and conciliation to assert the rights, and great tact to deal with the foreigners and especially to secretly unravel the intrigues and the negotiations of the English. Although these three objectives solely concern the Consul, a good secretary can help him a lot in this ticklish task. What induces M. Demoncrif not to return is the uncertainty about the customs duties which depend on the caprices of all the French traders who transact all their business at Bombay, in spite of the fact that they daily receive affronts there and that all their (122 v°) goods, except liquors,are better sold at

Surat than in this English island. If there was any way to find out a remedy to assure a source of funds if the customs duties do not yield enough, I shall be obliged to you, my Lord, if you think of it and M. Demoncrif's experience will perhaps suggest it to you. It would be, I think, a little hard to force the French merchants, as the Dutch do it, not to make a halt at Bombay but go to Surat and settle their business. That would add to the prosperity of the Consulate of Surat, but such an order would perhaps interfere too much with the liberty of trade.

We, M. Demoncrif and I, have appointed M. Quiblier interim Secretary. He made his mark during a fortnight. But today as he does not possess the qualities required, and as I know him by this time to be a very bad lot, I request you, my Lord, whatever protection he may set working and I do not know if he has any, not to grant him the commission of a Secretary. I shall patiently wait for the person you will chose to send me and if you are at a loss for the choice of the person, I request you to take your decision on (123) the advice which M. Demoncrif may tender you on this matter.

I have the honour to be respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant.

---

(142)

My Lord de Sartine, Surat, 12th April 1777
Minister for the Navy,
Paris. (Duplicate)

My Lord,

The delay of four days in the departure of the ship from Surat for Basra enables me to correct the news from Bombay I gave you by my letter of the 3rd instant. M. Boicervoise, first deputy of this Consulate, has just arrived from that place. He saw there *La Consolante* which made a halt only for two days. The Captain did not receive any affront. He did not receive the salute from the fort because he himself did not do so. It is the local pilot who brought him into the port. Thus, the news spread here about him is false. I am glad to be able, before closing my dispatches, to correct this news and give you the following which is quite reliable.

(142 v°) As soon as the Captain of *La Consolante* [23] finished his mission in Bombay, which was to deliver to Mr. Hornby, Governor of the said island, the letter of greetings from M. Bellecombes who communicates to him his arrival in India, he raised anchor and proceeded to Chaul. This is a small port which belongs to Angre, at the most 20 to 25 kilometres from Bombay. I do not know, my Lord, what orders M. de la Motte, Captain of *La Consolante*, had for this port, but having agreed reciprocally with the Maratha Commander on their peaceful intentions, he sent some officers on the shore and had all the necessary observations made with the permission of the said Commander about the position of this port which consists of a good river, but it is said, without any great depth. The instructions of the Captain were apparently to conclude some agreement with the proprietor of the place to set up there a residence for the French nation. Consequently, at the request of the Captain, the Maratha Commander furnished an escort to two officers of the staff whom the Captain dispatched to Poona, the Maratha capital, to negotiate this matter. The English, whom this mission to the Maratha Ministry intrigues very much, also dispatched there a Councillor of Bombay to counteract the French negotiations. They threaten (143) to release Raghunathrao, whom they retain in Bombay, and install him at Poona with the help of their forces in case Princess Nana negotiated with the French.

If the French warships can remain in India for the promotion of our trade in this country and if they establish a safe port of call, either at Chaul or still better at the port of Angre where, according to reports, *le Brillant*, which left here a fortnight ago, has actually cast anchor, the Ministry of Poona will certainly be in a position to scoff at the English threats and negotiate with us at its sweet will and to our advantage. But it is absolutely necessary that there should be in India 2 or 3 warships. If they return to Mauritius, the Marathas, who are negotiating with the French, will lose courage and the English will pounce on them even before our ships can return from the Isles. Forgive me, my Lord, these reflections. I make them only because of this occasion I get to communicate to you the news about Chaul where it is said, but I have no sure proofs of it, that the French flag is already hoisted. As this matter is entirely within the purview of M. Bellecombes, you will hear from this General, active and zealous for the welfare of the nation, exactly how far it has progressed.

I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of the letter I wrote to the Commandant General of the Portuguese (143 v°) at Goa. Though in French, it is modelled on the style of his nation and I hope it will have your approval.

To obtain the necessary information about the port of Gogha, I sent four days ago the two persons designated for this mission, as I mentioned in my letter of the 3rd instant of which the duplicate forms part of the present dispatches. I expect them to return in twelve days. My next dispatch will apprise you of the details of this transaction. I shall also communicate them to M. Bellecombes by my first pattemars.

I have been promised an early reply from Poona on the subject referred to in my letter of the 3rd instant i.e. my attempt to obtain the big port of Angre. However intractable the Marathas are, the present circumstance is favourable to us. The English have no warships in India and the rumour is current that our nation will always station three in these seas to cruise the seas and protect our commerce.

I have just established a correspondence with Delhi and shall have the honour to communicate to you the first piece of news I obtain from the Mughal empire.

The staircase which the English Council ordered to be destroyed (144) in the French Garden in the absence of Mr. Boddam, then at Bhadoch, has created much stir in Bombay to which I have referred the matter. As Mr. Carnack, formerly Colonel in Bengal and today Deputy Chief in Bombay, is actually here, having returned along with Mr. Boddam from Bhadoch, I have shown him the thoughtless exploit of the Council of this town in the absence of its chief. He realised the ignominy such a proceeding casts on his nation and did promise me to restore everything to order as soon as he returns to Bombay in 5 or 6 days. I am going to apprise M. Bellecombes of this affair, my intention being, my Lord, to give him also an exact account of all my dealings and conduct myself according to his orders.

I have the honour to be respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT.

(180)

3rd August, 1777

*Copy of a letter written by M. Anquetil, French Consul at Surat, to Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay.*

Gentlemen,

The groans of oppressed innocence and violated public faith ought to be heard in a well-civilized state. The claim of ' might is right ' is not always right. Here is a very convincing proof of it.

The French piece of ground in Surat exposed to the force of the current of the river is continuously receding. In order to avoid the danger of falling in with the earth with my family, whenever we want to go down to the river-bank, Gentlemen, I had a wooden staircase constructed in September. At first, an objection was raised, but as the said staircase was considered necessary and as in the opinion of the experts it would not constitute any offense, Mr. Boddam, the English Chief, and the Nawab officially gave all the permissions required for its completion. The Nawab's permission was superfluous, as the buildings constructed in the French Garden depend only on the control of the administration of the fortress in the capacity of the Admiral of the Mughal Emperor.

This staircase regarded by the whole public as a convenient descent for my family and for all the respectable people during six months, appears, after (180 v° ) the departure of Mr. Boddam for Bhadoch, as a piece of scandal to Mr. Day, then interim English Chief. It is, in his opinion, a redoubt which must be pulled down. Consequently, he gave orders to the Nawab who sent his men to my residence to raze it to the ground. I protested, I shouted, I invoked the law of nations, I declared in vain that this staircase was not a fortification, but Mr. Day's pusillanimous heart would not be easy until it was destroyed. The Nawab, though ashamed at the role he was made to play, for he remembered very well having himself officially given the permission, was at last obliged, on Mr. Days' repeated threats, to pull it down. Consequently, this staircase, which had stood there for six months without giving the slightest umbrage and constructed after having obtained formal sanction, is destroyed and broken into a thousand pieces.

On the day after this glorious feat of Mr. Day, I received the letter from the Council in reply to mine. This interim Chief had certainly dictated it, for it is illusive and fallacious in all its particulars. These gentlemen, quite willing, they write, to offer me their good offices with the Nawab, decide that I was mistaken about the facts, which they themselves did not know. " We are not aware that you had the permission for the staircase." If they had discharged their duties as mediators, which favour I claimed from them and which they ought to have granted me, they would have made thorough inquiries and decided with full knowledge of the case. This fine sentence written in golden letters (181) in all the English tribunals, *alteram partem audi* has therefore been sacrificed to bragging, caprice and calumny by these gentlemen.

Meanwhile, the Committee from Bhadoch, Messrs Carnack, Boddam and Ramsay returned to Surat. I placed before them my complaints against the wicked and inquitous proceedings of Mr. Day. These gentlemen visited the French Garden, the scene of the incident, cast their eyes on the spot which but offered the sight of a general upheaval of the ground full of deep pits which constantly threaten the fall of a belvedere built on the top of a perpendicular piece of ground in this place and to which the staircase served as a buttress. Mr. Day's repeated orders had been so meticulously executed by the Nawab that not even a piece of timber remained in tact. These gentlemen shrugged their shoulders at the sight of this depredation, condemned Mr. Day, agreed that my complaints were just and added that they very clearly saw that I needed a staircase for my convenience and that of my family.

These gentlemen of the Committee did not shift at all this violation of the law of nations on the Nawab's shoulders and no one in Surat was deceived on this point. Every one lay its shame and its heinousness on Mr. Day who wanted to make his reign of short duration conspicuous by slighting me by this iniquitous act of his authority. In order to try to save his honour and mask his wickedness in the public he spread the report before and after this destructive act of his that the staircase helped to evade the customs duties and that I secretly lent a helping hand to their embezzlement. This calumny scattered at haphazard did not convince sensible persons. He needed evidence, which he lacked although he sought it in filth and something worse. This disgusting and futile search did not

dishearten him. Besides, what did it matter to him, (181 v°) to seek reasons to justify his heinous proceeding ? It sufficed to palliate it in the eyes of the dazed public. He knocks down all reasoning, the claim for the law of nations is not heard and the staircase is pulled down, he triumphs and that is sufficient for him.

This staircase is, however, considered necessary for the convenience of my family and after a careful examination, can neither help to evade the customs nor give the slightest umbrage. It was constructed with the necessary permission and after a formal sanction. Inspection of the ground shows that it could not be located in any other position nor in any other place. That is what Mr. Day could have seen along with the whole public, if he had known proprieties which the Europeans owe among themselves. And if he were within his rights to act against me in the matter of this staircase, he should not have brought the Nawab into play, since all the constructions whatsoever in the French Garden fall within the competence of the Governor of the fortress and not in that of the town. But since it is the Nawab who did violence to me, although instigated by Mr. Day, I hope, Gentlemen, that you will order him to have my staircase replaced in its old position and that you will be kind enough to obtain for me from him compensation as substantial as the affront dealt to the French nation by this infraction of the right of nations has been public.

This is, Gentlemen, the substance of the memorandum which I sent you on 30th April and to which I refer on the subject of the destruction of my staircase along with the supporting documents. I am very sorry that your preoccupations so far should have deprived me of your reply to my just complaints and claims of compensation. I request you to give me justice after the perusal of this letter and I am expecting it from your equity. As I owe an account of my conduct to the Minister, I request you to enable me to prove to him, while submitting to him the report of this whole affair, your concern for my reproach and the good harmony which reigns between your Royal nation and ours in Surat.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(True copy) (Signed) ANQUETIL

(166)

*Copy of my correspondence with M. de St. Lubin at Poona.*

20th June 1777

Sir,

The intimation I gave you that I was in receipt of Rs. 6,000 on your account was a clue to find out if you were really at Poona and inform you that I was in correspondence with Perou Pandit. I am so closely observed here by the Nawab and the English that I dare not risk any letter and I did not know at all that it was you who were at Poona; I very firmly believed that you were still at Chaul; the English have assured me to this effect. Therefore, four days back I took action in connection with the amount of Rs. 6021 which I received here on your behalf, discount being deducted in Bombay. One of my friends was then leaving for this place. I delivered to him this amount and requested him to forward it to you immediately at Chaul, in case you were there; he, promised me to do it. Now that I know that you are at Poona, there is little doubt that these funds will return within 15 to 20 days at the latest. At the same time as I write to you, I am dispatching a man to Bombay so that when your Bill of Exchange returns, you should not suffer any delay. It is because I wished to serve you more promptly, (166 v°) believing as I did that you were really at Chaul, that I had taken this step; I am very sorry for it. Whether these funds return or remain in Bombay during the monsoon, you will get them without any delay as soon as I receive your reply to this letter. I shall borrow them rather than delay payment to you even by a day. Kindly, therefore, draw a Bill of Exchange on me by first and second for Rs. 6,021 payable 15 or 20 days after sight to the order of Govind Raghunath, the Sethia of Surat, and I shall honour it at its maturity. As I fear some delay at Bombay, I have already begun to make up this sum for you. You can therefore absolutely rely on it.

This letter will be delivered to you by M. LeRoy, captain of a ship, one of those who accompanied M. Bougainville on his voyage round the world. He has kindly undertaken to carry my dispatches to M. Bellecombes and I have requested him to make a diversion and proceed

to Poona and offer you my greetings. Accept, Sir, my very sincere congratulations on your appointment as the King's envoy to the Court of the Marathas. I received with great pleasure the happy news you gave me by your letter of the 11th May. Your arrival in this country has created a lot of sensation among the local people and greatly arouses the curiosity of the English.

You have arrived very opportunely in Poona. This court (167) needed your help to force the English to observe all the articles of their last treaty of peace. They will be constrained to do so, if Chaul, which your good offices have obtained for the French,[24] is well supported by the French nation and the Court of Poona. I have sure information that the English are watching the moment when Chaul will be in a weak state of defence to send Raghunathrao and his small army supported by their troops to expel the French from it. But I think that your presence in Poona will thwart all their attempts and they will at last recognize that the French nation has actually in this country at the helm of affairs persons capable of forcing them to retrogress as quickly as they had advanced to conquer almost the whole of India.

Besides, it is rumoured that the English intend to seize Bassein and in fact they are collecting an army for that purpose. This news appears to be true, because, in case of war, Bassein becomes very essential to them to ensure and maintain the communication between Bombay and Surat, which, to their great disadvantage, would be interrupted if Bassein fell into our hands. As the English expect a war in Europe in the near future, all their present movements are only preparations to protect their establishments. But these are so numerous in this country that they cannot defend all of them. The three most (167 v°) important actually on this coast are Bombay, Surat and Bhadoch, but the last two will hardly hold out for any space of time as soon as the first i.e. Bombay is attacked.

If you desire, Sir, to have some information about Surat, M. LeRoy will furnish it to you. I very strongly recommend him to you in view of his talent in his service. He is a perfect gentleman, but unfortunate in respect of luck. He has been living with me for nearly three years and I cannot but do justice to his merit. The ardour to serve his nation makes him actually undertake this long journey at the age of 52. He will furnish

you as complete information on Surat as you desire and if you approve what he will tell you on my behalf, I am quite ready in my turn to correspond with you for the benefit of the national cause. Pray ponder carefully what he will tell you on this subject and indicate to me your ideas which you can communicate to me by availing of the return of the Parsi servant who is accompanying M. LeRoy. He will bring me your reply as well as to Rouveau, head of a party (a band of French soldiers), actually at Surat, who intends to write to you to find out if he can enter your service. M. Rouveau commanded a party in Raghoba's service. He appears to be a very good gentleman and especially an excellent Frenchman. He is in a position to augment your forces by uniting (168) a number of Frenchmen scattered here and there in the country. He is, therefore, waiting for your reply to join you.

When you have obtained all the information you desire on Surat from M. LeRoy, he will continue his journey to Pondicherry. I am requesting M. Bellecombes in my dispatches to send him back to me as quickly as possible *via* Poona and I shall once again have the pleasure of receiving news from you on his return here.

I do not inquire from you, Sir, what your activities are in Poona. Your ability will vouch me for the success of your negotiations at this Court of the Marathas. The King could not have made a better choice than by appointing you as his envoy. The English are, therefore, in deadly fear here. But I shall be very much delighted if you would confirm to me the great advantages which the nation already derives from your negotiations in Poona. It is said here that Mr. Mostyn, Councillor of Bombay, cannot obtain an audience from the Princess Nana and that you have every day a very good reception, that you have with you 100 Europeans who are camping 40 kilometres from the capital where the Court is actually in session,[25] that you have already been granted 5 Lakhs of rupees worth Jahagirs near Chaul, that you have obtained the permission to have a fortress constructed there and that in conformity with your agreements (168 v°) with the Marathas, you are to receive three warships and troops at Chaul. If all this news is true, the English are not for nothing in deadly fear and the Nawab of Surat could indeed shortly repent the two affronts he gave me at the instigation of the English in the months of March and April.

Pray give me, Sir, the pleasant confirmation of your success. Two years ago I commenced negotiations with the Court of Poona through Govind Raghunath. I received good promises which were to be executed as soon as the French appeared in force in Poona. Divine Providence, supporting your zeal, has led you to success ! What more can I wish for the welfare of the Nation ? I have, therefore, abandoned this correspondence while indicating to you its source through this letter which incidentally announces to you the money I had received for you. If you need in Poona or at Chaul my services, kindly let me know. I doubt if there are stocks of wheat and other provisions at Chaul. I can supply them to you from Surat which the English rightly consider as their storehouse of provisions. If you don't have an opening for several kinds of goods there, I shall find here a market for them. Therefore, Sir, send me (169) your orders on these different items, in case you find my services as well as my correspondence useful and if the nation can derive any advantage therefrom.

Chaul is surely going to damage the interests of the Consulate of Surat which has customs dues as its only source of subsistence. If this new establishment works in close co-operation with Surat, I can certainly make use of it for the improvement of the Consulate of this town. You can, Sir, just think over this subject. Communicate to me your ideas, I shall share with you mine which, when coordinated, can no doubt contribute greatly to the welfare of the nation in this country. As I presume that in all your negotiations in Poona and your operations at Chaul, you are acting in concert with M. Bellecombes, I must not keep you in the dark about the examination I have had made of Gogha. It is M. LeRoy whom I had entrusted with this job. Therefore, if you question him, he will give you all the necessary information about the port of Gogha. I think that the French can derive great advantage from it; its position is such that the trade of all the big neighbouring towns, including Surat, will find its wary to Gogha, if we possess it. This town, which can become (169 v°) a very important port, is today frequented only by sailors. The Court of Poona will not refuse you its cession if you demand it. In our absence, the English will take possession of Gogha sooner or later.

These days an idea has occurred to me, which, if it is realised, would be advantageous to the French nation and would relieve me of many anxieties. There is every reason to fear that the new acquisition of Chaul,

no doubt excellent in itself, may entirely cause the ruin of the Consulate of Surat. This Consulate is, however, useful to the nation, but as it depends solely on the customs for its subsistence, it must fall, because its revenues will decline on account of the establishment of Chaul. The means to support this tottering Consulate is, Sir, in your hands. The smallest jahgir will render this service to the nation. Having sought here information on this subject, I found that Dumas, a big borough, 16 kilometres from here, which is at the mouth of the river of Surat in the direction of the harbour, belongs to the Court of Poona. Its revenue is small, but in case of absolute necessity it is sufficient for me to defray the expenses of this Consulate. The jahgir or revenues of Dumas and its dependencies amount to between 20,000 to 25,000 rupees per year, and all expenses paid and different allocations (170) made, there would still remain a balance of at least Rs. 15,000 for us. This paravana of Dumas is of such little consequence for the Princess Nana that she will grant it to you, I think, without any difficulty. But it is of great importance for the nation, since by this means the Consulate of Surat will continue to subsist independently of trade, whether big or small. Besides, the situation of the place, which stands at the mouth of the river of Surat, would give us mastery, in case of war, over all the trade of this town. The third advantage, as M. LeRoy will explain to you, is that Dumas is the most suitable place to make a descent in case the French had any designs on Surat. The French nation will be immensely indebted to you, Sir, if you procure it this triple advantage by your negotiations in Poona. And as it also conduces to economy, the Minister cannot but offer you his thanks. You have offered me your good office, Sir, for which I am very much obliged to you. I thought I could better respond to your wishes by indicating to you this way which enables you to support this Consulate and augment the revenues of the nation.

I cannot close my letter without making an important observation to you. (170 v°) If war happened to be declared in Europe, Sir, as the last gazettes appear to indicate, you have in your hands an excellent means to furnish to the Marathas sufficient cause to come and attack Surat. The fortress of Surat, occupied today by the English, originally depended on the Government of (Danda) Rajapuri. It was a Sidi of (Danda)—Rajapuri who possessed it in 1759 and who was expelled from it by the English that very year. The Maratha Government has strong claims to

(Danda) Rajapuri. This place is near Chaul; nothing is easier, therefore, than to seize it and then ask for accounts from the Nawab and the English for the customs and jahgirs of the fortress, revenues which ought annually to revert to (Danda) Rajapuri. Their refusal will decide the expedition against Surat. This plan presented by you and adopted by the Marathas, will not be difficult to execute at the first declaration of war. I shall then utilize all the knowledge I possess of the situation of this town, and my desire to serve my nation (171) will urge me to seize this occasion with ardour to prove my zeal.

Please take care, Sir, to see that this letter does not fall into other hands than yours. You are aware of its consequences.

I forgot to tell you, Sir, that about a month and a half ago, two pattemars coming from Poona were arrested in Surat. Among the various letters meant for the merchants of the town, there was one, I have been assured, addressed to me, and immediately the whole packet was dispatched to Bombay. I have no more heard about it. This letter apparently was not of any consequence. Please, be doubly sure about those with which you will honour me and which you can address to........, residing at Nozary (Navasari), 15 to 20 kilometres from Surat. We cannot be too cautious about our mutual correspodence. You have nothing to fear where you are, but M. LeRoy will tell you that I am night and day exposed to all sorts of insults since the French have established themselves at Chaul. I hope this state of anxiety will not last. The first merchant vessel which can arrive here in September or October will restore the Nawab to his good mood, (171 v°) provided, however, there are no canons or guns among the cargo.

In December, I expect to send either *via* Suez or *via* Basra one of my men to Europe. As he will be the bearer of my dispatches to the Minister, you can take advantage, Sir, of the occasion. Your letters will be properly and promptly delivered to their destination. Two months back I wrote to my Lord de Sartine *via* Basra about the expedition of Chaul. This happy news will soon reach him.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

(Signed) ANQUETIL.

M. de St. Lubin, 1st August 1777
Poona.

Sir,

I can write to you on this occasion only a few lines in reply to your letter of the 3rd July. Yesterday, I paid Rs. 6,000. Your Bill of Exchange was received by me three days ago, endorsed by Pandoba lacre (Pandoba Lakhade). I thus paid it one day before it was due. I was (172) still on the point of not paying it, but the fear of displeasing you induced me at once to effect a compromise. As Pandoba Lakhade had forgotten to endorse it, it was for him to pay for the delay of 40 days. But Jagzivane (Jagjivan), Saraf of this town, told me that he was going to return the Bill of exchange if I did not pay the interest. Get it refunded, if it is possible, by Pandoba Lakhade. The interest I paid here amounts to Rs. 58 1/2. As I owed you Rs. 6,021, I paid Rs. 37 1/2 from my own purse.

The report made to you is false. I am, it is true, closely observed by the English and the Nawab, but it has not at all proved injurious to me in anything. The dispute about the staircase arose from the muddle-headedness of Mr. Day who behaved with me like a true Don Quixote during the absence of Mr. Boddam, English Chief, then in Bhadoch. I am on very friendly terms with the latter. I often dine at his house and he has done so at mine. On this point, I refer you to the letter I sent you through M. Le Roy and to all that he must have told you on my behalf. I expect your reply by the return I have indicated to you. Your letter will enable me to tell you if there is safety in sending me one of your officers. In spite of my desire to meet you and confer with you, I doubt if I can be so lucky. The English Company (172 v°) has given very strict orders to all its factories so that you do not set your foot in any of them. This ban will render our interview a little difficult but not at all impossible. I am awaiting your reply to my letter, which M. LeRoy has delivered to you, to seek the expedient which can enable us, without compromising this Consulate, to communicate to each other our ideas relating to the interests of our nation, etc.

(Signed) Anquetil

M. de St. Lubin, 4th September 1777
Poona.

Sir,

Your letter of the 17th August has been delivered to me by Mr. Pascal du Santy[26] on the 1st instant and it gave me great pleasure. I am obliged to you for all the good services you have rendered to Mr. LeRoy at my instance. He is a perfect gentleman who deserves the kindness you will show him on his return and who will be grateful all his life for the favours you bestow on him. For a long time fortune has been adverse to him. He has suffered many misfortunes, but his conduct is beyond reproach. (173) You will find enclosed herewith the duplicate of my small letter of the 1st August by which I informed you that I had paid on the previous day the Rs. 6,000 in question. I was all the more surprised to find that on the 17th this amount had not yet reached you. Therefore, since Pandoba Lakhade has not paid it to you in advance as Jagjivan Pitamber of Surat had assured me, you must demand from Lakhade the interest which his agent made me pay him in spite of my protests and contrary to all reason. You will see clearly from my last letter that I consented to it only because I feared another delay which might have caused you inconvenience or at least anxiety. Here is the receipt from Jagjivan whom I reprimanded severely for his lie and his delay. I think Pandoba Lakhade deserves the same from you.

I pay you my very sincere compliments on the excellent success of your mission and am obliged to you for the information you have given me on this subject. This treaty of alliance and commerce concluded with the Court of Poona will do you great honour at the Court of Versailles, give infinite pleasure to M. de Sartine and result in a great advantage for France, if it wishes to turn this circumstance to account and if it supports you opportunely. (173 v°) The Minister has already been informed of this event. I wrote to him in April last about the arrival of the French at Chaul and the embassy to Poona, but as I did not know then that it was you who arrived there on *Le Sartine*, I could neither give any enlightenment to the Minister nor apprise him of the names of the persons who were at the head of this mission which I laid to the account of *La Consolante*, not knowing either the arrival of *Le Sartine*. My dispatches to the Minister were dated the 3rd and 12th April and

I dispatched them *via* Suez and Cairo, and *via* Basra and Aleppo, respectively.

The English of Surat have not yet received any news of your treaty of alliance. I am too intimate with the English Chief for him to hide it from me if he knew about it. I have not either spoken to him about it, because after all he is English and because this haughty nation at Surat, very powerful as it is here, might turn into ridicule what is not achieved or supported by force of arms. Therefore, I prefer that the English should themselves speak to me about it. I shall then fathom the sensation which this news has made on their mind. (174) They have already told me that it was impossible that the Marathas would enter into an alliance with the French, in virtue of an old treaty concluded with them by which the Marathas promised not to form any other alliance with any other European nation. The English are making preparations in Bombay, sometimes, it is said, to accompany Raghoba to Chaul or to Bassein, at other times, to conquer Gujarat and install him in Poona. As for me, I think it is to put themselves in a state of defence against the French in case of war or an unexpected attack.

I am sorry the jahgirs are not mentioned in the agreement, but I am sure you will soon find the means to include them in it, if the troops, you are promised, reach you. Without knowing anything about your mission, I earnestly requested M. de Sartine to very promptly send troops or warships to support the efforts of the French at Chaul and give more weight to their negotiations at the Court of the Marathas in Poona, and impressed upon him the consequences of delay. As you will see, I have fulfilled your objects, without your suspecting it and I without thinking of acting for you, for which I congratulate myself. Have we, (174 v°) Sir, the right of a lodge or a residence and the right of a flag at Chaul and at Bassein? These two prerogatives would greatly reassure me if the Nawab of Surat drove me too much to extremities at the instigation of the English. If the French are privileged and treated with honour in one of the two places, Chaul, I think, is preferable. From there with your help I can very well make the Nawab of Surat and even the English repent for their unjust behaviour towards me. But we havn't come to that yet. As I know that the Nawab is under their yoke and that at heart he likes me, I shall hold on till the last extremity.

It is sad for us that Princess Nana is dead. I am afraid this fortuitous incident may disturb your negotiations. The English say that she was poisoned and that it is actually public in Poona that the little prince is an alleged or illegitimate child she had from Nana Fadnavis. They add that it is the Minister who gave her poison because he did not want that his connection with her should become public.[27] Pray inform me what the exact truth is.

Our interview, Sir, becomes (175) a necessity because of what you write to me and I am already making arrangements so as to fix it at Daman, if you can go there on the date we shall mutually decide. I am, however, so closely observed that an absence of three days will be very difficult to conceal, for I could afford only this much time to have the pleasure to embrace you at Daman and have talks with you. I must get ready relays of palanquin every 40 kilometres and travel day and night. I shall inform you in my next letter of the date, when I can undertake this secret journey, to find out if it suits you. God grant that our ventures succeed since they have no other aim but the interests of the nation.

You inform me that you are trying hard to arrange for the cession of Dumas and Gogha and that you will not lose out of sight the Siddi of (Danda)—Rajapuri. I am impatiently awaiting the result of your negotiation about Dumas. As this small Jahgir belongs to Sakharam Bapu in his own right, if only he as well as Nana Phadnis wishes you well, he will easily grant it to me at your intercession. As this place (175 v°) commands the harbour of Surat, it is a toothing-stone which the smallest revolution in India will enable me here to turn to good account for the very advantage of the Marathas. The proposition presented by you under this aspect is bound to succeed. The paravana could be sent to me through Birou Raghunath who is in this town Chioquiat on behalf of the Court of Poona. I would also be obliged to you if you have secret orders given to this Chioquiat by Nana Phadnis and Sakharam Bapu so that this man corresponds with me without the knowledge of the English, when the interests of the national service demand it. I would also desire that he were informed of our alliance by the Minister himself from Poona.

M. Rouveau is sorry for the delay; he is already becoming impatient. However, he will wait for a month more for your orders. Perhaps by then you will be in a position to prescribe to him what he should do.

I would require a volume to send you my complaints against the English. I postpone this item to our interview.

I am very much obliged to you for having sent me the details of trade (176) which can be transacted at Chaul and in Poona. If, in the former place, the services of a broker were needed to look after the affairs of the nation, I know here several persons who would very well fill this post. But as I do not know anything either about the privileges which we can enjoy there or in what consist the customs-dues or how and on what they are levied there, I cannot yet persuade any broker from here to proceed there. Please give me full information on the subject.

M. Pascal cannot leave this place for Europe at the very most earlier than one month. He will accompany M. Boicervoise, first commercial deputy of this Consulate, on this journey and rest assured that I shall leave no stone unturned to see that both set out as early as possible. I know that in the interests of the national service, it is of the utmost importance that M. Pascal should promptly appear before the Minister, but the scheduled time for the departure of the caravan is still distant. If in a month's time none is leaving straight for Basra, I shall send them by a boat calling at different ports, namely Diu, Porbandar, Muscat to Bushire and Basra. This will take them to their destination without losing any time. Nevertheless, set your mind at rest, I shall (176 v°) find out the best and the most expeditious course. I shall give M. Pascal, at the time of his departure, Rs. 500 which you have asked me to pay him and shall put them down in my books to the King's account, being delivered under your orders.

As I am sending M. Boicervoise to France, the young man, about whom M. LeRoy spoke to you, is today needed by me here. I am all the same obliged to you for your goodwill for him as well as for your readiness to offer me your good offices. I have particularly in mind the service you can render me in connection with Dumas and if I obtain through your efforts the paravana for it, this Consulate will be under great obligation to you. M. de Sartine cannot but be greatly delighted at your achievement, since you will have thereby procured the means by which this place can subsist independently of the customs which actually produce almost nothing.

I received your Bill of Exchange and the advice note on M. Picot I have not yet ventured to negotiate it, because by his letter of 13th June, he had informed me that he had received only Rs. 6000 on your account, which he had sent me for being despatched to you and which I had paid you through Pandoba Lakhade. I thought I ought not to negotiate it (177) without a second advice from you, and it is for this purpose that I am sending you one of my peons who will bring me your final reply so that there should be no obstacle in this negotiation. M. Picot owes me Rs. 20,000 on accout of the transaction of *Le Sévère*. If he pays my Bills of Exchange in this respect and I shall know in two months' time whether he has done so, I could then advance funds for your Bill of Exchange. But today I am so short of money that I am living on the sale of goods which I have still in stock with me, and for the last eight months I have been advancing money from my own funds for the support of this Consulate. It is true that the King will compensate me for it and that is one of the objects for which I am sending M. Boicervoise to the Minister.

I have the honour to be, etc,

(Signed) ANQUETIL

---

M. de St. Lubin. 7th September 1777

Sir,

The English, for whom your negotiations have been the cause of great alarm, have spread here the report of your death and have even sent me word to that effect. (177 v°) I replied that a fortnight back it was said in Poona that I had fled from Surat and that the falsity of this news indeed proved the imposture of the one which was being spread about you, and that it surely emanated from the same source which I was going to try to discover. I request you also to try to find out the name of the Englishman in Surat who wrote to his friends in Poona that I had disappeared from the place, having been obliged to quit my post to avoid prosecution for debts by the Dutch. The English retracted their statement about me, for it is I who have instituted legal proceedings in Bombay against the Dutch Chief of Surat who fled eight months ago to the English establishment for debts and affairs of his Company. This knavish nation, at least it is so at the present moment in respect of you and me, has spread here since yesterday another piece of news which I do not believe

either. They assert that Mr. Mostyn, English Councillor, has just returned from Poona to Bombay, accompanied by Nana Phadnis. The purpose of the visit of this Minister, of the (Poona) Court, they state, is to offer the throne of Poona to Raghoba; they (Raghoba's party) are waiting for him there to install him and expel the little prince. As you point out to me in your letter of the 17th of the last month that there was trouble brewing between the English and the Poona Court, I am inclined to believe that if Mr. Mostyn returns (178) to Bombay, it is because he has been expelled from Poona with his retinue. Pray give me the clue to the riddle. They have also spread the report that the Captain of *Le Sartine* came to Bombay for business matters but that he was refused admission. From what M. Pascal told me on this subject, I think that it is rather one of the officers who stayed back at Chaul and who must have tried to sell some dessert wines and other unsold goods. If *Le Sartine* has not left Chaul before the 10th of the last month, she will certainly miss her voyage to China. Included herewith is a copy of the two letters which I received from Poona about three months back. They are written by Berou Rougnat (Raghunath), the one written in Marathi is addressed to Doulope, my broker, and the other written in Persian to me. After the translation made of both, you will see, Sir, that since the last two years I have been engaged in activities which constitute the essential part of your mission. I interrupted my negotiations when the English of Bengal sent their imposing embassy to Poona, the result of which was peace concluded with the Maratha Court. I resumed my negotiations through the secret interviews here with an agent from the Ministry of Poona which got into trouble again with the English. The latter continued to support Raghunathrao whom they ought to have abandoned according to the terms of the treaty of peace. Since your arrival, I completely gave up this negotiation. It is no more within my purview, because you were on the spot and sent very expressly by the Minister (178 v°) for this ticklish mission which you have so skillfully and so promptly achieved and for the success of which I offer you my heartiest congratulations. I am communicating to you the contents of these two documents only to show you the zeal which prompted me to strive for the interests of our nation on this subject, as soon as I arrived in this town and as far as my small sphere permitted it.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

M. de St. Lubin, 13th September 1777.
Poona.

Sir,

I had the honour to write to you on the 7th instant. It is the baker whom I entrusted with my dispatches. I am quite sure you must have received them all right. I refer to them in this letter. This one will be delivered to you by M. Bolts, Lieutenant-Colonel in the service of Her Imperial Majesty and commanding the ship *La Thérèse*. Half an hour's conversation with him will acquaint you with all the facts that concern him. I hope you will find in this witty and amiable gentleman all you need to give a more robust frame to your activities by uniting him to your cause. Perhaps you will also be happy to get such assistance and the occasion to prove to the Queen Empress (179) the ardour of every good Frenchman to do her service. Common misfortunes make even total strangers friends. The English look equally unfavourably on Mr. Bolts and you. The English Company has given very strict orders in Bombay to cripple his commercial transactions and even harm his person as much as possible. This respectable captain and his dear wife have now begun to feel the effect of this ban in Surat where I have tried to ease the severity of the situation for them as much as I could. As Mr. Bolt was Deputy Chief of Benares in the service of the English and as his differences with the Council of Golgocha brought shame on the Company to such an extent that the Ministry was obliged to send new administrators to Bengal, this Company persecutes him through its agents in India and will continue to persecute him there to the bitter end. That is his crime, Sir, and it is also yours, but two talented persons like you when united, can give the English a difficult job. That is what they will dread most as soon as they get news of the interview. I am confident that great advantage will result from it for the two nations. That is what prompted me to urge M. Bolts to meet you. I am convinced that you will be greatly pleased with my action. As the same views will unite you, this reciprocal exchange of ideas cannot but result in infinite benefit to all our activities. Besides, you will be delighted to know personally this worthy and respectable man whose reputation (179 v°) is already made and who needs no letter of introduction from me to meet you, being worthy of commendation by himself. I think you will thank me for having brought about such a visit for you. Pray do not forget to inform me about the good result. I have nothing fresh to communicate to you from this side and M. Bolts will

speak to you only of politics and of the French Garden, so far as Surat is concerned. The latter place is considered by the Nawab as Nazareth for the Imperial ship filled with men capable of throwing pestilence in the town if they were allowed to enter it. Therefore, the English, fearing the contagion and very zealous for good policing, have wisely anticipated it.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

---

M. de St. Lubin, 2nd October 1777
Poona.

Sir,

Two days back I received your letter of the 17th ultimo. I am writing this letter only to acknowledge receipt of it. I have nothing fresh to communicate to you. In my last letter I forgot to inform you about the arrival in this harbour of the Imperial ship commanded by M. Bolts. The English thwarted him so much that he could not unload anything, and without the hospitality I offered him, I do not know what would have become of him. Fearing the great gale at he went to Gogha where my letters (182) obtained him a good reception on the part of the local people. As I am negotiating with the Nawab to allow him to have business transacted here, he will return to this harbour after the bad monsoon, which will not last for more than a fortnight. But for that purpose the Nawab must be amenable. I doubt it because Bombay holds him under its yoke. M. Bolts was formerly Deputy Chief at Benares for the English. As he exposed before the public the ignominious administration of the Company in Bengal, it persecutes him hard wherever it meets him. But under the patronage of the Queen Empress where he is at present serving in the capacity of Lieutenant-Colonel of her troops and commanding the ship *la Thérèse*, he has nothing to fear from them. On the contrary, it is the English who ought to fear him since he is a man of great wits and is quite in a position to harm them in India. His wife is staying with me, (which fact greatly arouses the envy of the English), until his final decision one or two months hence according to the circumstances. I shall inform you about it.

Your last letter worries me very much because of the vague news you give me : *everything here, you say, is in a ferment, you will soon know its results.* Will Raghoba triumph through the channel of the English as this nation proclaims here ? In that case, we are sure to lose our grip there, and such a change will put you in a difficult position. Please set me at rest on this point.

(182 v°) I am awaiting your final reply for the Bill of Exchange on Mahé. My peon, who is accompanying the baker and the valet, cannot be long in bringing it to me.

M. Pascal will leave this place in 25 days at the latest. He will follow the route of Basra. That of Suez has been refused to me by the English. Never mind! I hope that once he leaves Surat, he will quickly arrive in Europe through the measures I am taking in this respect. I am giving him a travelling companion, M. Boicervoise, first Deputy of this Consulate whom I am dispatching to the Minister in connection with the affairs of the Surat Consulate and this factory. I thank you for the news you give me about M. LeRoy. I am impatiently waiting here for his return. If you have some consoling news, pray send me a word about it.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

---

(188)

*Extract from a reply from M. de St. Lubin, to M. Anquetil*
*15th October 1777*

Sir,

Here is the result I promised you and you will let me know if it is good work on the part of a dead person,[28] in case our friends still give me out for one.

The army commanded by Aripundet (Hari Pant), composed of 60,000 cavalry and 20,000 infantry, will continue its operations against Haiderali. It has two objectives : one to force him to pay the Chauthai, the other to

prevent him from joining Raghoba. It remained in camps on the banks of the river Tungabhadra on the frontiers of Haiderali during the monsoon season, with a view to opening the campaign early by an immediate irruption. In eleven days it ought to be in action.

Another army commanded by Bhimrao,[29] composed of 40,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry with a large artillery train is marching straight to Gujarat where it will effect a junction with the forces of Fatehsingh near Baroda and proceed to the very gates of Ahmedabad to fight Govindrao, another ally of Raghoba, set into action by those who no longer dare do anything in their own name. (188 v°) No one is taken in by their artifice, and that is why " another army, commanded by Ram Sandy Gadef (Ramchandra Ganesh), composed of 20,000 men, will act as an army of observation by occupying a central position between Bombay and, Surat."

At the same time, the Maratha fleet will cruise the whole coast lying between these two places.

This is one of the finest plans of campaign seen for a long time. You can judge if fever will be epidemic from Bombay to Bhadoch. Here is the pendant to the picture of 1767 which I traced for you in my last letter.

---

(182 v°)

M. de St. Lubin, 25th October 1777
Poona.

Sir,

M. Bolts is at this very moment leaving for Poona. He will deliver to you this small letter, along with the one I gave him for you on the 13th of the last month, and I refer to all its contents. I believe you will be very much delighted to meet this very amiable person quite full of wit and knowledge. His intention is to set up an establishment in India in the name (183) of the Queen Empress. The English thwart him as much as they can and consider him today as one of their bitterest enemies. They scoff, but slyly, at his projects as they do at yours. I am sure they will soon stop doing so. M. Bolts seems to have selected Gogha as the

place to set up his residence. If my views had been followed in the beginning, we should have already had there an establishment. We Frenchmen, we are always the first in devising but the last in operating. Pray, recall what I have already pointed out to you on this subject. You ever replied to me that you were attending to it. M. Bolts will certainly need your assistance at the Court of Poona. I am sure that it will be a pleasure for you to oblige him. For your part, you will be able to do much more efficaciously for him what I tried to do here for mine. Send me a pattemar to inform me about his arrival in Poona. I have assured him of the good reception he will get from you. I am confident that I am not mistaken and that you will be glad that I sent him to you.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

---

M. de St. Lubin, 26th October 1777
Poona.

Sir,

Herewith find three duplicates, that of 13th September is a copy of the letter which I have delivered (183 v°) to M. Bolts for you and of which he is the bearer. Since then I had the honour to write to you on the 1st instant and yesterday; the duplicates of these two are also enclosed herewith. The object of the present letter is to send you all the correspondence, if it is possible, before you see M. Bolts so that you should know before-hand how you stand with respect to him and prepare yourself for his visit, which he has undertaken solely because of the interests of his nation and his project to set up an establishment at Gogha. I, therefore, think you will not be sorry if I apprise you of everything that concerns him. However, I do not know if this letter will reach you before M. Bolts arrives there. He is following the road to Danou (Dahanu) where I have recommended him to one of the leading Christians of this small town and from there he will proceed to Poona as secretly and as quickly as possible. I have pointed out to you in my yesterday's letter what his intention is at present in going to the Court of Poona. I think he can succeed if you help him. It will perhaps be an extra support for you against Bombay. However, weigh properly the gain and the loss. We

have a prior claim in seeking a French residence at Gogha. It is I who first made the demand for it to the Marathas and I have no doubt at all that you will obtain it today. If my ideas had been accepted, we would already have had a flag there and set up a good factory which in a short time can ruin (184) the commerce of Bombay and that of Surat. A warship could stay there for a whole year without any fear from the monsoon. Your negotiations in Poona and my secret activities here could now execute this great work. M. Bellecombes will certainly very willingly consent to it. If *Le Brillant* spends the monsoon at Gogha as it has done at Trincomalee, it is the same expense for the nation, but the benefit resulting from it is very different and entirely to our advantage. The Minister will only be too happy to approve of such a fine plan. There is still time for it and I am ready to lend my support to everything that the welfare of the nation will require of me. But in what concerns M. Bolts, isn't there any way to unite our two nations in the scheme for the projected new establishment? Our possession of it may perhaps be distant, perhaps near. That of M. Bolts is certain and very near at hand, if he obtains for it the permission, which he is going to solicit in Poona in the name of the Queen Empress. His ship is already at Gogha and his men are landed and set up on the best spot in the town. At present it is for you, Sir, to see to what extent you can employ your influence on the Maratha Minister in favour of M. Bolt's negotiations and what advantage you can draw from it for France against the common enemy. Pray, keep me (184 v°) informed of your ideas and the decisions you have taken in this respect so that I should conduct myself here accordingly. I must warn you that M. Bolts is very frank about all he does against the English or all that is immaterial, but very reserved about all that concerns his activities and his steps. English is almost his mothertongue, he speaks French, Urdu and Persian very well, and since he does not need an interpreter to negotiate with the people of the country, you will find it difficult to read him. If, against his interests, he concealed his thoughts a little too much from you, although I am sure he will place all his confidence in you, at least he said so to me, I ought, however, to warn you about all that so that you should not be caught off your guard in the contrary case. He will talk to you about d'Haligoa where he has set up his residence and left a scribe and a few troops. He will speak to you about his disappointments in Surat and perhaps of the good turns I have done him, about his plan on Gogha and other places if he finds them (suitable),

and finally about two ships of the same class and similar to his which will soon appear in India. This letter and my previous ones will make up for what he might not tell you. Thus, you have now sufficient information to know in what manner you should behave, whether he communicates to you his plan or whether he conceals from you its extent. It is said here that Gogha is a dependency of Ahmedabad which is answerable for it (185) to Poona. If it is so, it will perhaps need a double negotiation, if you are negotiating for this place for our nation. But I am also assured that the Court of Poona could itself decide this affair in the last resort.

I promised, Sir, Rs. 16 as gratification to the pattemar, if he delivers this letter to you in Poona and brings me your reply in 16 days, counting from the day of his departure from Surat to that of his return here. Here is the reason for it.

I have just received a letter from M. Picot dated the 17th September. He informs me that he has received a sum of Rs. 12,000 on your account; that consequently, he is dispatching Rs. 6000 to me *via* Bombay and will send you the balance of Rs. 6,000 by next dispatch or through another channel. I have yet no information whether these Rs. 6,000 have reached Bombay. They will come there through a Bill of Exchange which will perhaps have 30 days to run. Tomorrow I shall write to Bombay to expedite the payment. Therefore, draw this amount of Rs. 6,000 on me, only 20 days after sight so that I shall have the time to send for it or receive it here, if by then it has not yet reached me. In case I receive it, as soon as Pandoba Lakhade presents me your Bill of Exchange, I shall deliver it to him before maturity. This circumstance and especially the following one obliges me (185 v°) to hasten the pattemar.

In about twenty days M. Pascal and his companion will leave. You sent me in your last dispatch a letter for the Minister. You tell me that its contents speak in my favour, and I am obliged to you for it, but my scrupulousness prevents me from sending it to its destination. According to what you write to me about M. Picot, I am afraid you have made some complaints about him to the Minister. I should be very sorry if I have been the innocent cause of it. M. Picot, as you will see it from the letter herewith included, on which I have put your address, did not forget you. Therefore, send me another letter for the Minister. My conscience will be at ease on that account and I shall return to you the one in question which I am

afraid to send to the Minister for the reason mentioned above, when you ask back for it from me. If the pattemar, whom I have promissed Rs. 16 for the return Journey to be completed in 16 days, keeps his word, this other letter for the Minister which is to replace the one I have, will arrive sufficiently in time to be included in my dispatches for Europe.

M. Picot demands three receipts from me for the sum of Rs. 6,021 which I have already sent you. This is a precaution to prevent, as you know, the accidents of the journey. I shall send these to him in three turns. He informs me that the warships will return to the coast (186) like last year. They will certainly sail up to Chaul and Surat and perhaps Gogha if M. Bellecombes has taken into consideration all that I had also written to him about it. We have not yet received here French Gazettes. The letters of the month of June and of the beginning of July from England continue to speak of peace between the French and the English. Besides, Mr. Bolts will give you all the news from Europe. Please reply immediately.

I have the honour to be very sincerely, Sir,

(Signed) ANQUETIL

P. S.—I have delivered, Sir, to M. Bolts two pistols for you in a small chest. He has kindly undertaken to carry them for you. These two pistols are the finest I have ever seen since I have been in Surat. I got them at the auction-sale of the articles of M. Grand-maison.[30] He had meant them, he said, for the Mughal Emperor. Please, Sir, accept them and I shall be very happy if you like them.

---

M. de St. Lubin, 28 October 1777

Poona.

Sir,

I have with me for the last fortnight a young traveller who can perhaps be employed in your service. His name is M. Charlevalle, Chevalier d'Anacles, a native of Zambesque in Provence. (186 v°) This young man seems to have a good knowledge of engineering. I have put it to test by asking him to draw a plan of the French Garden. It appears that he

has taken the decision to travel for reasons of some family quarrel. One of his brothers is an adjutant in the Regiment of Poiton and another in the Judicial Court of Provence. He travelled for a long time and worked in the Echelles in the Levant with the Baron Thot, Inspector and Consul-General of Echelles in the Levant. He left him to undertake the voyage to Abyssinia, but missed it, and travelled to Medina and Mecca. Since then he received orders from his parents to return home, but having met at Cairo Mr. Shaw, English Councillor of Bombay and Ex-Chief of Basra, he was attracted by his promises to make a fortune in the service of Raghoba. The latter was to pay him Rs. 1,000 per month on his (Shaw's) recommendation by employing him in the Engineering section. In fact, he gave him a letter for Raghoba and another for Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay. M. Charlevalle showed me both which were sealed. I gave him to understand that the reign of Raghoba was over but he could try his fortune in his service if he could do so, because we were not at war with the English. He seems to have a little cooled off (187) in his enthusiasm to proceed to Bombay and asked me if he could be employed with you. The great ambition of this young man is to make a deeper study of engineering. He is a hard-working man and possesses knowledge although he has not much experience of the world, and he is promising because he listens much. But he has not lost sight of his voyage to Abyssinia which he wishes to undertake after he has visited India. He can easily achieve his objective, for he is at the most 24 years old. Pray, let me know if you can find him some employment with you.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Anquetil

---

*Post-Script to the above letter*

29 October 1777

Having forgotten yesterday the enclosed letter on which I put your address and which I received from M. Picot, I send you the duplicate of my letter of yesterday with all possible dispatch. The first and this second one will probably reach you at the same time. It is Jaggivane

Pitemberg (Jagjivan Pitamber) who has undertaken to forward you this duplicate by my order and I shall pay him Rs. 15 on condition that it reaches you in six days from the date of this post-script. Jagjivan tells me that he can arrange with Pandoba Lakhade to draw on me the Bill of Exchange like the last one and Pandoba Lakhade will not forget (187 v°) to endorse it while forwarding it to the order of Jagjivan. To avoid all delay, draw payable rather one month than 20 days after sight, and if I receive money before hand, I shall not wait for maturity to deliver this amount to Jagjivan, as I have already told you.

The English are making an attempt on Gujarat. It is said they want to punish Fatehsingh and seize Baroda, but they have just met with a repulse while trying to pass over the territory of the Kolis. Jalom Jalia, their Chief, stopped the English troops at a big bourg called *Mai Caula Devane*. The English have just sent six to seven hundred of their trained sipahees from here as well as from Bombay to reinforce their troops and force the passage. Others say that Bhadoch being menaced by this chief of the Kolis, the English want to attack him and then proceed to Baroda where Fateshingh, who is no longer their ally, has set out, it is rumoured, to force them to retreat. This first repulse they have just met with, will oblige them to abandon the expedition, if Govindrao, who is in Ahmedabad or thereabout, united his forces to those of his brother Fatehsingh, Sir, would there not be (188 ) any means in Poona to secretly bring about this Union ?

---

C[2] 126

(315) *Copy of a letter from Le Chev de St. Lubin to M. Anquetil, from Poona, on April 20, 1778.*

Yesterday I received your affectionate and touching letter of April 7, every word of which bespeaking your deep anxiety, I went on re-echoing thousand times since the 25th ultimo. Oh! Heavens! I repeated every now and then, in what cruel state must be at this moment the good soul of this righteous patriot ! But alas ! My dear consul, it was impossible for me to communicate to you any information. All the channels were closed. Follow carefully my narration.

Ever since the Alliance was formed between the French and the Marathas, the English, alarmed at the possible consequences of such a union, employed every possible means to destroy it. False reports, offers, threats, all was in vain in the case of the Ministry which firmly adhered to its engagements. Another plan had to be followed. Morbadada (Morobadada), ex-Divan of the late King Maderarao (Madhavrao) and first cousin of Nana Phadnis, is the man they chose to incite the people and prepare them to accept their (of the English) protégé Raghoba as King. The absence of the armies occupied on the frontiers was the favourable occasion they seized to assemble more than 40,000 men under the command of Holkar, a reputed General, who supported Morobadada. This army, which appeared suddenly as if sprung from underground, surprised Poona on March 25, at 10 o'clock in the morning. A body of 10,000 men, drawn up in battle-array, was placed under my windows. Ready to die if necessary, but resolved to defend myself to the last breath and force my way to join the King at Purandhar, I put my guard in a fighting posture in front of my door. A party of 500 men was detached and came to reconnoitre it. I forced it to halt and declared that it was the guard of the Envoy of the King of France. Whereupon the commandant saluted me in the name of Raghoba and requested me on behalf of the King to remain tranquil in my house which, with its occupants, would always remain safe against attacks.

Raghoba was proclaimed King throughout the town in less than an hour and everything passed off with unparalleled tranquility. Nana had just time enough to withdraw to Purandhar with his guard : there it was soon joined by his friends and their adherents and swelled to 10,000 cavalry. Sattaram (Sakharam) Bapu and Nana sought the King's orders and his standard to fight the rebels. Oh! my dear Consul, the soul of Kings possesses something superhuman. " It is my person which will serve you as standard ", replied majestically this august child. " I shall come down to your camp and see with what face they will dare to approach it ".

(315 v⁰) At this moment, the King received a letter from me by which I informed him that " during the night I would proceed to Saswad, a place 8 kms. from Purandhar, where I requested him to send me an escort to facilitate my junction with him, that there I wanted to give an everlasting proof of the attachment of the King, my master, to His Majesty by defending his crown and life to the last drop of my blood, that,

really speaking, I had only my guard of 100 men as my whole army, but that even if I had only my body and a single arm, they would serve him as a shield and sword to the last breath of my life". He at once sent me a reply that "he earnestly solicited me not to leave my place, that he sincerely thanked me for my devotion, but that he had powerful reasons to forbid me this course, that besides there was no danger to his life, that neither his life nor his crown was at stake, but that a few ambitious chiefs, incited by the English, were striving after the office of the minister and that shortly everything will be restored to order, etc. [31] "

In fact, Sakharam Bapu, the Regent, and Krishenrao (Krishnarao), Minister for State, had already visited the camp of Morobadada and Holkar, on behalf of the King, to communicate to them the order to present themselves before him. Consequently, they went to offer their presents and their homage. While receiving them, the King placed a small note in the hands of Holkar.

It was proposed to grant only the Regency to Raghoba and the office of the minister to Morobadada. This change was agreed upon by both sides and they returned extremely satisfied.

After this agreement, Mr. Mostyn, the English ambassador, was sent for at Poona. He went to Purandhar; there he was told that everything had been settled, that it only remained to restore Raghoba to his place and that three persons of rank had been selected to accompany Mr. Mostyn and receive him (Raghoba) from the hands of the English on the Maratha frontier.

The Englishman replied "that he was ready to comply on condition that all the pledges given by Raghoba to the Council of Bombay, the payment of hundred lakhs of rupees for the expenses incurred by the English on his account and the cession of Chaul and Bassein with all their dependencies in return for their services, were fulfilled".

In the meantime, I had once again written to the King to say "that I was delighted to learn that order had been restored and that war had taken the form of a negotiation, but that not having served him on the previous occasion, I solicited him to allow me to be sufficiently (316) useful to him on the second, that consequently I had the honour to submit to him, as an envoy of France, a memorial which I requested him to communicate to the Council" [31].

How far have we got, dear Consul, to-day the 20th of April ? *Resunt teneatis amici* ! Day before yesterday, the English ambassador left Purandhar in a huff; yesterday he assembled his coolies to transport his luggage to Bombay. At the time of writing this letter, his trunks are strapped. Tomorrow morning, he leaves bag and baggage.

What will he do now with all the troops assembled at Bombay who were supposed to lead Raghoba in triumph here? This Raghoba is more banished than ever. All the Marathas have assembled under the sceptre of Mahaderao (Madhavrao) Narain, *alias* Savaye (Sawai) Madhavrao. That is the name of this august ally of our adored Monarch. True he is only six years old, [32] but dear Consul, Who can be this child ? *Quid putas erit pueriste* ? (said to each other the Doctors of Laws when they heard the child Jesus speak in the temple of Jerusalem). You are lost in astonishment : " It is I who shall serve you as a standard ". Who can be this child ?

The Government is thus (firmly) established. Sakharam Bapu continues to exercise the functions of the Regent, Nana those of the Prime Minister, Moroba Dada is Divan as in the days of Madhavrao. As for me, I have received the invitation to attend at the Court on the new moon day to conclude some matters about which I shall inform you in due course. This day, chosen as auspicious by the King's astrologer, will crown my mission, and crown the great work of M. de Sartine.

M. Charlevalle has arrived safe and sound. That is enough. You know too well if I shall do him service.

I embrace you with great joy, very dear Consul; convey to your amiable wife all my best sentiments for such a respectable family, and I express to you my great concern for the extreme anxieties which agitated your mind in the most critical situation of my life. As long as it lasts, this life will be dedicated to glory and friendship. I shall always utilize the first to extol what I owe you and the second to compensate you for it.

(Signed) LE CHEVALIER de ST. LUBIN

P.S. :

I refer you for the answer to the riddle to a phrase from your letter which begins with : " If this revolution " and ends with " Transactions or Operations. " Oh ! Consul, what a codifier you are ! The Englishman has only understood, but you had guessed. (316 v°) Please, let me know by an express messenger if there is still a possibility to send *via* Basra M. Pascal's brother who is with me. Otherwise, I shall send him by sea on 21st April ; I postponed till this morning the dispatch of the pattemar to have a little fun. The Englishman has left. In fact, he is starting this very moment, leaving behind him as a farewell this compliment of a man who is stung; " *Raghoba is at Bombay, entrusted to our guard by the King of England. If you feel strong enough to catch him, you can seek him there* ".

(True copy)

ANQUETIL

---

C²—126.

(262) *Copy of a letter from M. le Chev de St. Lubin to M. Anquetil, Consul at Surat, from Daman, 13th September 1778.*

Sir,

I begin my letter by an appology for the silence I kept with you since the packet delivered to you by M. de Charlevalle. I received yours of June 8 only on the 12th July, because the pattemar had hidden it in a wood on his route, for fear that it might fall into the hands of the English emissaries who, numbering more than 400, were lying on the watch for my correspondence. This honest Parsi was informed of it by some Portuguese pattemars on this side of the Ghats and prudently he came to meet me with empty hands. As I was on the point of my departure, I kept him with me thinking that I would go with him and find out the packet which, in fact, he delivered to me very faithfully, and immediately I dispatched your enclosed letters for Adoni and Pondicherry. This man is still with me here, afraid of returning to Surat, and I did not wish to expose him to the almost inevitable fate of dying on the roads. These are infested with vagabonds under all sorts of denominations, sipahees,

peons, faquirs, jogis, travellers who kill the couriers from Poona and strip them. This misfortune befell the pattemars whom the kind Governor of Daman sent on your behalf to Poona to inform me about the news of war. Your pattemars of 19th June and 2nd July no doubt met with the same fate since I did not receive either. I only received at Daman from the hands of Joachim Lopez your letter of 15th August on which I shall offer you a full commentary.

All these reports of rupture between France and England are a stratagem of the English copied from Machiavelli from the chapter on political lies to hoodwink the Court of Poona on the preparations of war they are making at Bombay, but no one is duped by this artifice: we know exactly their intended purpose. Everything will develop at the opportune moment. While waiting for the future, let us talk of the past.

You have seen in my letter of April 20 that at the time of the interview of Morobadada and of Tukoji Holkar with Sakharam Bapu and Nana in the presence of the King, the King put a small note in the hands of Holkar which contained these few words: *Tukoji, son of Holkar, will be righteous like his father. He will detest the assassin Raghoba, serve Madhavrao and receive 100 lakhs of Rupees.* On the day after the interview, Morobadada sought communication of the note from Tukoji Holkar who pretended to have lost it and added in an ironical tone that it contained a request from Madhavrao to renounce the cause of Raghoba, but that he was not in any way influenced by it, being determined to bring this venture to a close. Morobadada appeared to take this reply for gospel truth. However, every time after consulting Holkar on the ways to kidnap the King, surprise Sakharam Bapu, kill Nana and me too, Sir, (for the rebels judged me worthy of this honour) every time, I repeat, he insisted on the execution of the plan, he was forestalled, thwarted, stopped. Especially one night when I was to be removed from Poona, that is to say, massacred (for either I am very much mistaken or they would not have caught me alive), the kidnappers or assassins found at midnight my mansion surrounded by 500 cavalry of Sakharam Bapu and 100 Arabs of Nana who cut thirty four of them to pieces, the rest escaped through flight. It was Holkar who broke with one hand what he had kneaded with the other [33] and this stratagem lasted till the arrival of Haripant Phadke with his army which I had recalled from Haiderali's [28] frontier. The same day also arrived from the northern provinces brave Mahadji Shinde

with twenty thousand men. Morobadada firmly believed that all these forces had come to support him and he was proudly exulting when the King ordered him to return the standard and the seals which he had seized from the Poona Palace. At this order he realized that he had been duped; in a fit of despair, he tore the flag, rolled it round his head in place of his turban which he threw on the ground, tied the seals around his chest with the ribbon of his order, jumped on his horse, (262 v°) summoned his army, and resolved to win or die, marched in a disorderly manner against the King's troops.

Holkar accompanied him with his troops. The two armies faced each other. Morobadada wanted to attack, but no one obeyed; all the chiefs, all the soldiers cried: " These are our parents, our brothers, our children, our nephews; are we going to perish at the hands of each other ? Show other enemies and we shall fight with them. As for these, we can only embrace them." Morobadada, as if struck by lightening, fell from his horse in a swoon; they ran to his aid and he recovered consciousness. Then pocketing his earlier pride, he delivered the rags of the standard and the seals into the hands of Holkar, entrusted him with carrying them to Nana and soliciting him (Nana) to obtain the King's pardon for him. [31]

Generous hearted Nana did not allow himself to be carried away by his good luck; he obtained the grace for his cousin who was let off with exile in his estate at Bohol (Bahul) where he was dispatched under an escort. The ungrateful man, however, soon formed a fresh conspiracy with the English ambassador who urged him not to get disheartened but only to wait for the arrival of the English troops from Bengal to Bombay and henceforth no longer to trust any one but himself and the English. The plot was discovered. Ambassador Mostyn, when summoned to Purandhar, escaped from Poona, running at full speed by circuitous routes to Salcette and thence to Bombay. Morobadada was brought back as a prisoner to Poona and his case was examined in the Council of the Barabhais. As I have the honour to have a seat therein, I was entitled to speak and vote as a member but when I found that the majority of votes were only in favour of imprisonment for life, I refused to give my opinion as a member; in the name of the King of France, my master, and by virtue of the title of the envoy of France, I expressly demanded death for Morobadada and his accomplices as the only satisfactory attonement for the crime committed against His Very Christian Majesty

in the sacred person of his very beloved ally Madhavrao. This happy distinction between my two capacities necessarily changed the whole aspect of the case and they had to reconsider their opinions. Each one still held to his, either through moderation which is natural to the Brahmins who hardly ever inflict capital punishment in their judgements, or because the judges and the accused being almost all relatives, the voice of blood heavily preponderated. Particularly, Nana defended the life of his cousin, because, he said, his cousin had made an attempt on his (Nana's) life. I no doubt admired him, but arguing in the French manner against this Brahmin clemency as inapplicable to criminals of High Treason, and firmly insisting on complete satisfaction due to the affection of the King, my master, for Madhavrao, I proposed an expedient which conciliated irremissible punishment to criminals with the respects due to their respectable families for whom it was proper to spare the ignominy of public execution. Thereupon, the Regent Sakharam Bapu strongly supporting my demand, brought all the members one after the other over to his opinion. This expedient which Cicero had furnished me in the case of Catilina was to get them executed in prison, and I can indeed communicate to the French Consul at Surat the report which the Roman Consul happened to make in a single word to the assembled Senate which was waiting to see the end of this tragedy: 'fuere.' [31] However, I shall add to it the details. The executions were not carried out in Poona. Morobadada was sent a prisoner to Ahmednagar, near Aurangabad. Ragouba (Bajaba) and Govimba (Govinda), his brother, to Sanda Nandam (Chandan Vandan) near Satara. Goulparao Tanbeca (Gopalrao Tambwekar) to Rajmachi near the Cassour Ghat, Naropant (Ganesh) to Lohgad and Damberia to Mohol. All died on their arrival in prison. The only execution which was public was that of Jado (Jadhav), prince of the royal blood and one of the generals who served under Haripant Phadke in the war against Haiderali. He was executed at Purandhar at the foot of the fortress; he was blown up from the mount of a cannon for having betrayed Phadke by the orders of Raghoba who had instructed him to favour Haiderali's entry into the Maratha territory. [32] Let us pull the curtain on these infamous dead persons and let us witness other men dying with arms in their hands. These are the brave Englishmen to whom I referred in my last letter. The grand project to bring eleven battalions overland from Bengal to Surat and thence to Poona is confined to attacking the town of Kalpi in the province of Seronge bordering on Bengal-

Vissajipant Biniwale, Governor of this region, was absent because the Court had summoned him to Poona to give him secret instructions; but his good neighbour Govind Bundela, at the first news of invasion, marched with 40,000 men who surrounded our eight thousand Englishmen. The latter fought a battle which they lost and leaving there two thousand dead, they sought shelter in Kalpi. It is to be hoped they are safe, for, besides the forty thousand (263) troops of Govind Bundela who at once blocked them there, 15,000 other cavalry troops of Mahadji Shinde and of Holkar left Poona to strengthen the blockade. The place has, it is reported, few provisions and it is believed that at the present moment they have either politely surrendered themselves or valiantly died of starvation. This is the story of our friends from Bengal. [34] Those of Bombay disconcerted, but cherishing hopes of receiving troops from Madras by sea, are, in the meantime, busy constructing ladders to make a grand raid against Bassein. Vissajipant (Lele) is awaiting them with a garrison of 8,000 men, and 1,30,000 troops, encamped in the plains of Poona, are beguiling their time in sharpening their swords on the rocks of the river in view of prospective action.

From this ministerial gazette, you will see how everyone ridicules the English and one cannot but be surprised at the rage which provokes them against me, for what have I done to them so that they should want to kidnap me during the rebellion, twice instigate an attack during the night on the guard at my mansion who simply repulsed them, propose to my Negro cook, a slave whom I set at liberty, a handsome reward if he only consented to serve me a dish from their kitchen, dispatch to Kalyan against me five assassins who were arrested but were ordered by me to be set at liberty; have me closely followed by their emissaries on my route from Kalyan to this place ? Luckily I was escorted from place to place by the commandants themselves whom the King held responsible for my head at the cost of theirs. And even on my arrival here the kind Portuguese Governor dissuded me from my plan to live outside the town in an old Jesuit garden, frankly declaring that during the night all cats are tipsy and that he could not answer for my person in such circumstances. The same solicitude on his part urged him to tell me that he would very much wish that I ate no other food but from his kitchen. Therefore, the hatred that is borne against me must have burst very publicly, unbridled, shamelessly, without human respect, so that a judicious man, a man in high position, should talk to me in such an extraordinary fashion. I am,

therefore, every moment waiting for the martyr's crown and in this belief it is no more a question of saving one's life but of making others' useful. [28] Consequently, I came here to salve the King's corvette la Curieuse and send it with M. LeRoi to a destination known to you. It happens that its wreckage is sold to the English. Well, this is a disappointment which I did not expect. Patience ! I shall perhaps find here something else. I should like to have M. Le Roi here to guide me in my search and Bernard to help him in his task.

Friend Joachim Lopez did his utmost to help me at Dahanu. The noble Governor of Daman showers honours and attentions on me. Everywhere I noticed traces of your friendship which has so kindly prepared the way for me.

Please send me copies of your lost letters of 19th June and 2nd July. I do not wish to miss any information that you had meant for me. The description of your situation which you gave me in your letter of the 15th August struck me all the more deeply as mine is identical. M. Picot has just sent me, with all expedition, a letter of credit to draw on him at sight a sum of Rs. 4,000, and on this point, displaying his zeal for my person at least as much as he must have shown in investing my money for his own person for a year that it has been in his hands. I shall .eek some means to meet my needs and yours if I am lucky enough to succeed therein.

Although it is three months, Sir, that we have not spoken to each other about Mrs. Briancourt, by simply inquiring about her health on the way from all the echoes of the Ghats and of the woods, they replied to me that she has perfectly recovered her health. I received its sweet confirmation on my arrival here and I beseech you to accept my sincere congratulations thereon. How I wish I could go and declare to her personally and in your presence, Sir, the tender sentiments with which her kindness has filled my heart. But let not such a just and passionate zeal make me forget the proverb from Athens. In this position, kindly substitute me in laying at the feet of your beloved consort, so happily restored to her health, the long list of prayers which I offer for her perfect happiness. This single phrase includes yours and that of your whole family of which I have the honour to be so sincerely and so completely the very humble and very obedient servant.

(Signed) Le Chev. de St. Lubin

(263 v°)

*P.S.* : While reading over again my Poona gazette, I noticed that I forgot to speak to you about the imprisonment and total ruin of all the adherents, supporters, well-wishers, etc., of Morobadada and of his accomplices. Seventy four of the principal ones were chained and their estates were confiscated. A few others who had not so openly declared themselves, were treated more leniently, but they obtained their liberty only by paying lacks of rupees. Among others, one whom you ought to know, Savdachi Ramsander (Sadashiv Ramchandra), ex-subhedar of Gujarat, was let off with three lakhs. All these confiscations and alms constitute a huge treasure. That of Morobadada alone amounts to twelve crores. That of Janoba to six. Others are not so rich. [34] Thus, this faction whose leaders are dead and whose members are crippled, is henceforth reduced to impotency, and our hopes resting on the continuation of the present Government appear as stable as ever before.

I had also forgotten to tell you that ambassador Mostyn, pursued in his flight, escaped by a margin of four hours from the cavalry which was at his heels. But the men of his retinue were most of them arrested and imprisoned in the various forts which are on the way. Mr. Lewis, his deputy, is detained in Poona; a close watch is kept on him and all persons are forbidden from communicating with him under the most rigorous penalty. The English sipahees who guarded his house were disarmed. It is a general rout.

Nana writes to me that Haiderali is dead and I advise him to make quite sure of the fact before pronouncing a judgement on this hypothesis, for it would perhaps be the third time that I would have seen Haiderali himself spread the report of his death to find out the dispositions of his subjects, of his generals and of his neighbours on the succession which he has prepared for his son Tipu Sahib. If, however, the news is true, it is undoubtedly a tear in our canvas, for this power is bound to be dismembered. I am sure that Mukhdam Sahib will keep Mysore, Ibrahim Sahib Baramahal, Madura and Coimbatoor. Ali Raja will become independent at Cannanore, the King of Travancore will reestablish the Zamorin's heir at Calicut. The Portuguese will once again place the King of Sonda in possession of his kingdom. Muhammad Ali Khan would like to receive Carrur and Dindigal and the Marathas, to cap it all, will secure Sira and Canara, recover the Jahgir of Murarrao and lay the rest under contribution.

I shall not be surprised if the English of Bombay capture Mangalore either because since long they have been coveting this place, or because they fear that this port might serve us as a base of operations in Malabar. The same motive urges them to fortify Berrabus (Versova ?) opposite Bassein in order to make the entrance of the port difficult for us, if they cannot completely forbid it to us by capturing Bassein. This is indeed what I can write, the rest is secret. With all the sentiments which attach me to you and to your family.

True Copy ANQUETIL

---

C²-144

(108)

M. Chevreau, Surat, 20th June 1777

Chief Accounts' Officer for the
Navy and Pay-Master,
Pondicherry.
Sir,

I had the honour to congratulate you by *Le Fits-james* on your happy return to India, and I think I would be wanting in my respect for you if I allowed M. LeRoi, who is carrying my dispatches to M. de Bellecombes to leave without giving him a letter for you. I hope my previous letters found you in good health. This one will be delivered to you by a sailor whom I strongly recommend to you. He is a thorough gentleman, but who is out of favour with fortune, and whose family you know. He has married one of the sisters of Mrs. Droueau at Lorient. I found him at M. Demoncrif's on my return to Surat. Since then he stays with me. I had given him some employment, but fortune willed that it should neither profit him nor I who have not yet recovered from the loss his shipwreck has made me suffer. If you can oblige him, you will be rendering service to a thorough gentleman and you will do me a great favour. With your good offices, you could appoint him a harbour-master at Chaul or Gogha if our nation sets up an establishment there.

M. LeRoy will talk to you about Surat as long as you like and I refer you to all the information he will furnish you about it. I shall not dwell much on this subject so as not to fall into useless repetitions. And in order

that you should not miss anything (108 v°) that concerns this town and my present position. I am requesting M. de Bellecombes to communicate to you all the papers which I am sending him and which constitute a volume. You will find therein treated at length, if you have the patience to read them, all that concerns the establishment of the Consulate of Surat : my appointment to the said Consulate, my return to this town, my negotiations with Bombay in connection with the flag, the last war of the English with the Marathas, the treaty of peace, my differences with the Nawab and the English of Surat, different extracts of letters, especially those which I have recently written to M. de St. Lubin concerning the affairs at Surat and finally my correspondence with the Minister. I hope your leisure will permit you to read the whole cooly.

If you want to consider the future of the Surat Consulate, please discuss it, Sir, with M. Bellecombes. As there is no doubt that the new establishment at Chaul, very important to the nation, may really affect the interests of the Consulate of Surat, I request you to provide, in consultation with M. Bellecombes, for the means to compensate me for this substantial loss, either by sending me my subsistence from Pondicherry by deducting it in advance from the revenues of Chaul or even by giving me an interest in it, or by contriving so that M. de St. Lubin obtains for me the Jahgir of Dumas from Poona, or finally in such manner as you think most fit. If the ships stop at Chaul, they will perhaps not come to Surat. If war is declared, the merchant ships will not come here too; thus in either case, no more customs. If this revenue fails, this Consulate can subsist only by means which you would indeed devise with M. Bellecombes. Surat can (109) become a very important place for the nation. The privileges we enjoy there, though with many difficulties, are rights which we should not abandon. They can furnish us during the next war what those of the English, which were the same, have procured for them. Thus, Sir, I am awaiting your decision, yours as well as that of M. Bellecombes on this point.

I have no news from Europe to communicate to you. The last one we received goes back to December. There will be, I think, more fresh news at Pondicherry when M. LeRoy arrives there. The loss of New York which the Americans have sustained, does not seem to bother them much, since from the camp which they occupy 8 to 12 kilometres from the town, they have allowed 14,000 men to go and plough their fields, the rest being sufficient to oppose the Royalists. As the last gazettes of December indicate

great preparations of war everywhere in Europe, the English of Bombay are in continuous apprehension of the French who, as they believe, may any moment arrive from Mauritius. And to crown all, almost the whole population of Bombay is suffering from sickness. An epidemic has spread there for the last three months which has already taken a heavy toll. But what grieves them and worries them most, is M. de St. Lubin's unexpected mission to the Court of Poona and the new establishment of the French at Chaul. These two sudden blows have put them in such bad temper that it often recoils on me. But patience. I hope Providence will also open the road for me to enter the lists against them.

I hope, Sir, you will send me (109 v°) precious news about you, availing yourself of the return of M. LeRoy and communicate your ideas on the advantages which my present position at Surat could procure for the nation, in case my services are deemed useful. If M. LeRoy needs some hundred rupees for his return, I request you to pay him the amount which I shall repay you. My wife and my daughter present you their compliments, and they and I request you to convey them also to Mme. Chevreau whom we wish as well as you the best of health.

I have the honour to be very devotedly,

Sir,

Your very humble and obedient servant,

Anquetil

P.S. : My packet to Mr. Bellecombes closed, I found that I forgot to insert in the big collection of papers I am sending him, the one which can serve you as a guide for the expenses of the Consulate of Surat. It is enclosed herewith. It is a copy of the statement I sent to the Minister in April. The subsistence being fixed, as you will see it from the collection, at 15,300 france only provisionally, I had to furnish a statement of the expenses which would include the pay of the servants and other petty salaries. We could not reduce it and have fixed it at a sum of Rs. 908 per month. I request you to take a note of it, Sir, when you discuss the Consulate of Surat with M. Bellecombes.

(111)

*M. Chevreau's reply to M. Briancourt*

M. Anquetil, Monday, 28th October 1777.
Surat.

M. LeRoy delivered to me, Sir, the letter which you had the honour to write to me on June 20, and M. Bellecombes has already communicated to me in a great measure all the memorandums, notes and particulars you have sent him on all that concerns the Surat Consulate and your present position. The little I have read therefrom appears to me very interesting and I am eager to find some leisure to enable me to read the whole; I shall then more or less be conversant with what concerns you. But at the present moment allow me to refer entirely to your correspondence with M. de Bellecombes. In our common instructions and in those, given to me individually, no mention has been made of your Consulate and I shall wait till the Minister gives me orders on this point to enter into details with you about all that concerns you. Until then I cannot assume any responsibility nor say anything positive to you about your expenses for the past and future.

The dispatches of M. de St. Lubin will probably and slowly unfold the object of his mission. Therefore I once again defer entering with you into any political discussion on this point. All that I know, all that I see is that the shippers from Europe, so far as trade in India is concerned, are more and more reluctant to engage in fresh ventures and you are entirely convinced of it by the fall in the receipts of your customs. What will be the result of all this uncertain state of things? Shall we have peace, shall we have war? These are the major themes which would decide the fate and the position of the French nation in India in ten years at the latest.

I thank you, Sir, for all the news you have been kind enough to communicate to me. We received the news from Europe *via* Suez in the month of June. (111 v°) At this epoch, everything appeared to tend to a state of pacification and tranquility, but the events in America will decide everything. In the meantime we ought to distrust the intentions and the activities of our real enemies, the English. We have learnt to understand, at our expense, their character, ambitions, pride and the

excesses of injustice to men they are capable of indulging in. I think that if ever we can take our revenge, we shall immensely enjoy the sweetness of a vengeance rightly sought by every good Frenchman and very desirable for our nterests.

I have delivered to M. LeRoy Rs. 100 which you instructed me to pay him if he needed them. This perfect gentleman returns to you. We have been unable to do anything for him. For the rest, M. de Bellecombes will surely write to you in greater detail about him.

I request you, Sir, to avail youself of the first opportunity to send me by sea some nice material for my wife. I repeat the request I had already made to you for the material worth 200 francs only. In my return, I shall send you by the ship *Le Brillant* whatever you would like to have from here, provided, however, your reply is received here before the 10th or the 15th January.

I request you to convey my respects and compliments to Mrs. and Miss Anquetil. I hope very much that some occasion would procure me the pleasure of making their acquaintance. We would recall at the same time our old times at the school. I wish you good health and good prosperity.

I have the honour to be with my very sincere attachment, Sir, your, etc.

CHEVREAU

---

(102) Surat, 21st February 1778

M. Chevreau,
Pay-Master, Pondicherry.

Sir,

For want of time, the precaution I had taken to request M. Picot to send you copies of my letters of the 6th and the 16th instant sets my mind at rest about the little news which this letter contains. I believe that by the time you receive this letter, my dispatches mentioned above, will have already apprised you of everything about Mr. Bolts and his

transactions, which have all but failed at Poona and Gogha, as well as of the fresh preparations of war of the English. In case you desire fuller information, M. Soderfleyche, bearer of the present letter, will furnish it to you. This gentleman is a supercargo of the Portuguese ship *La Mariana Victoria*. I recommend him to you as a very amiable person and whose company (102 v⁰) and conversation will give you much delight. We were very friendly with each other while he was at Surat. If you speak to him especially about Bombay and Surat, Raghoba, etc., he will put on, it is true, the English buskin. But never mind! You will know many things from him. With this information, you can form a proper estimate of the man. We have often waged together the little war in which he believes he has won and me too. Whatever it may be, he is a good friend and tolerably, I was going to say, a machiavellian, but non-epicurian, and I believe you will thank me for having sent him to you. Confident of the good reception you will give him, I assured him that you would help him in everything with all the good offices which may lie in your power at Pondicherry and I am sure I am not mistaken. While I am writing this letter to you, I see passing from my study the English white troops which embark and join those from Bhadoch on their way to Bombay. What are they going to do there? To accompany Raghoba to Poona and install him there, the English say openly. In fact, I am very much afraid, it is the place where the bomb is going to burst and it is our lethargy in India which is going to serve it as mortar. Because of my apprehension (103) about its consequences, I have just dispatched in all haste a *pattemar* to M. de St. Lubin to give intimation about it, so that he should endeavour to avert the storm and prevent the cloud from bursting over Poona. But what can a negotiator achieve without force and without money against well-armed soldiers for whom, moreover, the golden key opens the gates of the town. I suppress here all my reflections, and in my heart, wish that these preparations of war rather concern the defence of Bombay than the attack on Poona. We shall get more information about this event in 10 to 12 days' time at the latest, and Mr. Soderfleyche will certainly talk to you about it. If this expedition, aimed at installing Raghoba on the throne of Poona, succeeds, all the vast plans of the English in India are fulfilled and the other nations, ours the first, have only to pack up their kit. Our Swede, full of English patriotism, otherwise a perfect and a very kind gentleman, will relate to you the misfortune that befell the corvette *La Curieuse* in the Daman

harbour. It is said that it is broken. It was to set sail on the 18th instant to be at Mahé on February 1. On the 16th I sent my dispatches and I now learn (103 v⁰) that it dashed against the rocks. I am any moment, expecting the sad news from M. de Salvert. M. LeRoy is also expected to arrive here soon. M. de Salvert landed him at Chaul, whence he proceeded to Poona. As he carries all the dispatches which are addressed to me, I am impatiently awaiting his return. I wished you as well as Mme Chevreau a Happy New Year, five or six days back, in a small letter which I handed over to M. Peirère, a Portuguese supercargo of the ship La Notre Dame des Carmes. My wife, myself and my daughter, today repeat to you our sincere greetings.

I have the honour to be with entire devotion,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

ANQUETIL

---

(43 v⁰)

M. Anquetil, Agra, 20th to 25th August 1778

*French Consul at Surat*

Sir,

I would have written to you long back, if I had found safe occasion to send you my letters. But I preferred to keep silent rather than blunder through carelessness. Today when I have almost reached the end of my journey, and when I have obtained information which partly forms the object of my mission, I am in a position to communicate to you some of it, I think, with all possible safety. I am therefore dispatching to you a man who is devoted to me and who will faithfully deliver to you the packet I am sending you. I shall suppress here all the expressions of gratitude which I owe to your friendly services and absolutely confine myself to speak to you about business.

I arrived at Agra on the 1st August after two months of most painful journey. Oppresive heat and continuous rains forced me to travel short distances and make several halts. My men and my animals are worn out

with fatigue. As for me, my courage enables me to face all the incoveniences, and thank God, I am still in a condition to defy adverse weather, and push my journey to Delhi, where I am sure to receive your letter. At Ujjain, I learnt to my grief that M. Madek had left his party and had retired 10 months back to Pondicherry. The hope to find in his place someone to whom it would have............

---

(44)

*Translation of a letter in ciphers from M. Anquetil, Consul for the French Nation at Surat, addressed to M. de Montigny (in reply to his letter from Agra written on August 20, 1778).*

Necessity obliges me to write to you only in ciphers my dear M. de Montigny. A week back I received your letter dated August 13. The difficulties, which had then overtaken me, prevented me from deciphering it earlier. The English instigated the Nawab to do me a violence which has yet no example since the Europeans established themselves at Surat. By robbing me of the jewels of my wife and of my daughter, and by drawing up an inventory of my furniture, they have reduced me to the last extremity. And the Nawab behaved with the utmost savagery by sending against my person more than 400 men. I am going to sue for compensation (Anoberbey is the author of this violence). The report I am sending you and the letter I am addressing you on this subject will acquaint you with all the facts. Let us now pass on to what concerns you. Fear of war which, as you know, has resulted in hostilities already begun at Chandernagore and Pondicherry, made me bury your papers and mine. I took out, in the presence of Messrs LeRoy and Trublet, your portfolio and other papers, and have put them in a place of safety along with mine.

M. Demoncrif, my ex-secretary, has returned to take charge of his post under me. He travelled in July and August from Suez to Bombay on an English ship. What the deuce was he doing there ? All his papers were opened and read. One letter in ciphers meant for you has caused lot of stir in Bombay. What a height of imprudence ! (44 v°) He was perhaps paid by the shippers of *LeDuras* to go to Bombay to drop the thunderbolt on my head. The Minister was of course completely in the dark about this

transaction, much less the person who delivered to him the letter in ciphers. This is how national interest is sacrificed to personal interest ! What has been the result of this unpardonable indiscretion? Here it is. Immediaely, instructions were sent to Surat to seize your person, if you were still there. On a report from the local people that you had left for Delhi, the Nawab at once sent for the parents of your Waquil, to interrogate them on your account and oblige them to write to him to quit your service and return to Surat at once. I do not know what they will do, but I know that the Nawab sent day before yesterday a Pattemar to the place where you are. If the present letter reaches you promptly, then you are warned of this eventuality. Beware of poison for you and the Golden Key for your Waquil. His brothers request me to advise you to ask the Vazir to write to the Nawab of Surat, who is a petty person compared to him, a stiff letter with a threat to demand satisfaction for his meddlesomeness in sending spies in his kingdom on persons who are under his protection. This stiff letter will perhaps frighten the Nawab and you all can remain in tranquility.

Preparations are still going on at Bombay as if they expect any moment our squadron. M. D'Estaing left Toulon on May 13. The letter in cipher, seized at Bombay, would have certainly given you all the information you expected on this point. This sad occurence is no laughing matter for the Minister. As for me, my dear Sir, I (45) do not see any other way to compensate you for it a little than by sending you all that I could find in the political gazette. I am expecting, to send to Europe, in a month's time at the most, your first dispatches and those which you have just sent me. I would have been very much delighted if you had spoken in my favour to the Minister, to M. de Mars, Chief Superintendent, and specially to M. Baudouin. These shippers can deal me some underhand blow by approaching the Minister. They have lost heavily and they want to force me to pay more than 250 thousand francs, amount of the Bill of Exchange drawn on them by me for their account. This has been the cause of the storm which has just brust on my head. They think that the Minister has nothing to do with their private affairs, and that he is not even aware of the blow which they have dealt me and which falls back on the Nation, since he has recently raised to 25,000 francs the emoluments of the Consulate which stood only at 15,000 francs, and has given me the power to draw the whole amount of the Bills of Exchange on the Royal Treasury, independently of this lease of funds. I am afraid the Minister may be

deluded. I request you, therefore, to emphasize in your next dispatches all the services I can render to the nation. My enemies will then no longer be able to triumph over me.

Herewith is enclosed a letter from Cairo addressed to you (it was opened at Bombay), and another from M. de Bellecombe. He has sent me a Bill of Exchange on Bombay for 1,500 rupees, which is not yet paid, in place of the one for 1,200 rupees which you had drawn on me at Mocha. This latter was presented to me yesterday. As I am constantly waiting for the payment of the Bill on Bombay, these men from Mocha are not creating any difficulty in giving me the necessary time to receive the funds from Bombay. As for the Bill of Exchange for 800 rupees which you have asked from me, you will receive it, at the latest, a fortnight from (45 v°) the date of the present letter. Thus, though reduced to the last extremity by the violence of the English and the shameful conduct of the shippers of *Le Duras*, my patriotism has gained fresh strength, in the midst of this tempest. You can, therefore, difinitely count on this sum which you will receive without fail as I have stated.

I have indeed deciphered your letter. I realize your embarrassment. But your expectations and the service you are in a position to render actually to the Nation, if our squadron appears promptly............., but in case it is late in making its appearance by a few months more, in the name of God and in the name of M. de Sartine, don't lose courage, my dear Sir. Have patience. I have much reflected on your letter and I am convinced that success will crown your labours. And then what obligations will the nation not owe you ? I must stop here, I am getting fever again, but that's nothing. It is a strong megrim which is the cause of it. Good-bye. We all, my wife and our young ladies, all my children, and of course, M. Trublet, offer you our love. M. leRoy has gone to Chaul to meet the squadron, if Providence brings it. M. de St. Lubin is at Daman. I know the purpose which has brought him there. The Marathas are anxiously awaiting the arrival of the French at Poona with 120 thousand troops. I have given 35 rupees to your Pattemar. Good-bye, my dear Sir. Best of health. My fever is increasing. Do not forget to write to us.

Surat, October 8, 1778 (Signed) ANQUETIL

To

M. Anquetil,

I have in vain waited for the Bill of Exchange for 800 ru pees which you had announced to me. The delay is more than a blow. I twice sent my man to Delhi at the old Sahukar's shop. He daily (46) receives packets from Surat and yet there is no news from your side. You are driving me to despair, Sir, as I have no resource in this country and have spent all that I had to live decently. I have nothing left. God grant that I soon receive the news of the arrival of the French. The Prince is favourably disposed, and I have won over all those about him. I see that the success of my labours is assured, if the French squadron appears in India.

As for your position, Sir, I can unfortunately only sympathize with you. I very deeply share all your sufferings, but how can I write to the Minister about an affair which appears to me mainly a very complicated commercial operation, and of which I have no experience at all. The King's statutes are so clear on this point that it appears that you should not have got involved in the affairs of *Le Duras* either directly or indirectly. That is what is embodied in the provisions of the ordinance, with which you are furnished, for the commercial operations in Inda. I know the equity of the Minister, but I also know h's strictness in the execution of the King's orders. I think I have already spoken to you about it when I was with you. Therefore, Sir, if your conduct is correct, you don't need any recommendation, and if it is not in proper order, it is useless to write to the Minister. I know all the strictness of the administration.

I also know all the iniquity of the administration of the English Company, and I see very clearly that the Nawab was instigated to put on you the affronts you have suffered, but they have an apparent motive in the hostilities that have begun. Unfortunately you owe money to the shippers who are worried about the payment. That's the true motive, and in this country they use any means to ruin a man. I cannot conceal from you the fact that you are in the wrong and you certainly know it. Without this debt, (46 v°) the English would never have treated you except as a King's subject, and you would not have suffered all the horrible experience which you relate to me. I sympathize with you, but I am sorry to see that your present position will greatly harm the King's

affairs. In the place which I occupy, if I had funds, I would have inflicted immense damage on the enemy (the English); for want of this resource, I see all the advantage disappear, if the squadron does not arrive. I thank you for the important piece of information you have communicated to me concerning the usual politics of our enemies. I have taken antidotes, and I have placed a sentinel on my Waquil. The Prince has been informed of everything. I am not afraid of anything on the part of the enemy, but they cannot say the same thing about me. They are putting utmost pressure on the Nawab to obtain possession of my person. But they will not succeed in their attempts. I have the Prince's word for it and my.............

---

$C^2$-126

(284)

My Lord de Sartine,
Secretary of State and
Minister for the Navy,
Versailles.

Surat, 20th October 1778

My Lord,

I am sending this letter, as a measure of precaution, to Goa to communicate to you all the news from India. A ship should be ready there to leave for Europe. This letter might reach you about May. It's very late, but I *intend* to send in about 20 days' time M. Charlevale d'Anaclet *via* Suez, if possible; my dispatches will thus promptly reach you.

Three months back there came *via* Suez some packets from the English Minister or from the Company addressed to Bengal. Not finding there any ship ready to start for India, the English agent offered a captain of a private ship Rs. 20,000 to carry a letter to Bengal. Tempted by this magnificent reward, this Englishman accepted to do the job. A month later, the duplicate came *via* Basra and it was also dispatched to Madras and Calcutta at a cost of Rs. 20,000. What was the result of spending such enormous amounts, my Lord?

(284v°) Sudden and unexpected attack on all our possessions in India. At the beginning of July, Chandernagore was captured; all the goods were seized and an inventory drawn up as a precaution by the English

who are said to have declared: " We may keep them if war is declared, or return them if it is not ". It is rumoured that M. Chevalier had escaped during the confusion and was captured at the lower end of the Ganges and taken back as prisoner to Calcutta.

M. de Bellecombe, Governor of Pondicherry, in his Letter of July 20, writes to me in these words : " The preparations of the English at Bombay of which you give me details are a sequel of these tidings. Those which they are making at Madras are still more considerable and portend offensive designs. They are mustering a body of troops at Conjeevarum which is only 80 kilometres from Pondicherry, and the Nawab Muhammad Ali Khan has formed a cordon which, for the past 7 or 8 days, intercepts provisions and all communication, even with Madras. You can well imagine, Sir, that in these circumstances I am not neglecting any means to prepare for the most spirited defence while awaiting help with which to achieve better results. If war is declared, we are bound to receive this succour, and I am sure that it will not only enable us to defend ourselves with a glory on the Coromandel Coast, but even put up a good show on the Malabar Coast. My means at the present moment are not very considerable, but they will be employed in an efficient manner, because, in the first instance, (285) I can count on the goodwill and confidence of the troops and the inhabitants, and secondly, I hold the superiority on the sea due to the presence of His Majesty's two ships which I am retaining here and which I can supplement with 3 or 4 merchant-ships with 40 to 60 guns. As for the rest, we have an abundant supply of provisions and all our work on the fortifications is proceeding with the greatest vigour so much so that in less than a fortnight I shall have almost succeeded in taking all the precautionary measures for our defence in the present situation. "

" I shall not fail, Sir, to inform you about the main events that take place here. I am sure, in your turn, you will continue to keep me posted up with all the news that will come to your knowledge, about the movements of the English on the Malabar Coast, the result of their intrigues at the Poona Court and especially the plans of the Marathas, if war is declared between us and the English. "

M. Picot, Governor of Mahé, in his letter of August 22, my Lord, also communicates to me the same information: " I have received, Sir, letters from Pondicherry dated 19th and 24th July. Everything was on the move

on the Coromandel Coast, but no hostilities have started as yet. Every nation is awaiting letters from Europe. The English are cantoning in sufficient force at Conjeevarum, from where they have not yet struck tents. Muhammad Ali Khan alone has brought troops into the field to cut the communication of Pondicherry with our districts. I fail to understand the alleged motive (285 v°) underlying this move. The town is in excellent trim and the fortifications ought to have actually reached such a stage that it would require a regular seige to storm it. M. Bellecombe has the satisfaction to enjoy the full confidence of the population of the town, and the soldiers and the inhabitants are displaying the greatest enthusiasm. There is great harmony and stock of provisions lasting 7 to 8 months. Finally, *Le Brillant, La Pourvoyeuse* and *La Pintade* give us for the time being superiority on the sea, until the arrival of the English squadron. Ours should not henceforth be long in making its appearance and then the fate of India will be finally decided if war is really declared, for there are still some persons who believe that all this is only a false alarm. As for us here, we are prepared to do our best. "

From these extracts, my Lord, you will see what the state of our affairs in India was in the month of July. Since then, the English declare, and the local people confirm the fact, that Pondicherry has been blocked from August 8, after the dispatch of an officer to M. Bellecombe to demand the surrender of the town. From the language of the above mentioned letter of M. Bellecombes, it is easy to presume the sort of reception this haughty demeaneur of the English must have got from Pondicherry. It is reported that a regular siege is actually laid. The English give out every day that it is captured. However, letters supposed to be very reliable, announce a (286) battle on land as well as on the sea, and that we have had the upper hand in both the encounters. The English do not admit it. They declare that there was heavy fighting and that there was a very heavy loss of life on both sides. To win public confidence, they are spreading the report that they have captured two ships, *Le Sartine* which had left Chaul or Goa 4 months ago, and a ship coming from Mauritius called *L'Aimable Nanette* having on board two engineers, and that among their papers was found the plan of Pondicherry in its present position and another showing its future development. This is sad news for us, if it is true. As for Mahé, they are said to be making preparations to reduce it. In fact, they have just sent troops to Tellicherry. But as they constantly fear the arrival of the squadron of M. D'Estaing, they still

refuse to believe that he has definitely gone to America, they could only spare 300 sipahees. They have not more than 2000 Europeans in Bombay including 400 residents, and 4,000 to 5,000 sipahees. What a providential stroke for us, my Lord, if really, as every one thinks and desires, M. D'Estaing were to appear in a fortnight hence on this Coast!

I shall not write to you, my Lord, about Surat. The letters enclosed herein will show you that I am not more secure here from the violence of the English than Chandernagore was in Bengal. As time does not (286 v°) permit me to expatiate on this subject on this occasion, I shall not fail to communicate to you all the details about it *via* Suez, if by that time, the English do not make me a prisoner, which step I do not think they will take. I have the word of the English Chief, Mr. Boddam, as an assurance for it. I showed him the orders which you sent me on May 10, to observe neutrality here. In that case, I shall keep you posted up with all the news by all the routes that will be available to me. If on the contrary, the English, following their practice in India of not directly appearing to break neutrality, oblige the Nawab to force me to leave Surat, I shall proceed to Daman. The Portuguese Governor of this place has offered me a safe residence, for which I am today seeking the approval of the Portuguese Governor-General at Goa. Thus from Daman I shall all the same be in a position to exercise the functions of my post and apprise you of all the interesting events in India, concerning our nation as well as the English and the Indian powers, and also of all the revolutions.

M. Demoncrif has been here for the last 25 days. I do not know what secret motive induced him to travel *via* Bombay rather than coming quite straight to Surat *via* Mocha, since packets for Pondicherry had been left at the latter place, and ships from Mocha, which he met there, came here nearly a month ago. This travel *via* Bombay where all his papers were opened and read still appears to me (287) an enigma. He immediately took charge of his post as Secretary.

I still continue, my Lord, to advance funds for the Consulate. But deprived of everything by the English, I have nothing left except my body which belongs to His Majesty, and my patriotism which is pledged in his service and placed at your disposal. I am actually engaged in exploring means to get funds under powers you had the kindness to invest me by your letter of May 10. But war has tightened the strings of all

the purses. However, I have hopes in my negotiations, and if I am fortunate enough to find them (funds) I shall draw a Bill of Exchange on the Royal Treasury for 25,000 to 30,000 francs maxium. I am much obliged to you for raising the emoluments of this Consulate to 25,000 francs. God grant that peace may reign, or if war is really declared, that M. D'Estaing's squadron appear at Bombay. I hope that, in either case, you will recognize the value of my services and the utility of this Consulate. According to my registers, at the end of this month about Rs. 38,000 will be due to me, including the Law-suit for Rs. 25,099 which I sent to my brother last year to be submitted to you.

Time is too short and conditions too uncertain to talk to you at length about M. de St. Lubin. I think, my Lord, he will write to you through this very channel. He is at present at Daman and continues to carry on a secret correspondence (287 v°) with the Poona Court. There are in Poona, their capital, nearly 1,20,000 men, quite ready to pounce upon the English, as soon as our forces arrive in India and our squadron appears at Bombay. Same preparations on the part of the chiefs from the Mughal Empire. I have to send you dispatches from M. de Montigny whom I furnished 4 months ago all the help according to your orders to enable him to proceed to Delhi. I received a letter from him from Agra last month. His dispatches can only be entrusted to the personal care of M. de Charlevalle. He (Montigny) informs me that his negotiations are making good progress, and that the people there are impatiently awaiting the arrival of our squadron in India to start a revolution. Najaf Khan, who commands at Agra, has 1,50,000 men ready to march to Bengal against the English, as soon as our forces appear in India. M. de Montigny is on very friendly terms with this prince. At the time he wrote to me, he was set for an interview with the Mughal Emperor, of course secretly, for the Potentate has his hand and foot bound by the English. But he too is awaiting the arrival of our squadron on either of the Coasts to shake off the yoke. Haider Ali Khan is dead, it is reported. But his son follows the same policy. He is ready to help the French and join them with all his army. There is a truce between him and the Marathas.

(288) From this description of the conditions now prevailing in India. you will see, my Lord, that if our squadron arrives in a month or two, the English cannot hold their ground against us, since we shall have,

at the time of its appearance, all the Indian powers on our side. Heaven grant that it may arrive promptly! The French nation will then reestablish its power in India, it will sparkle there in a constant, honourable and prosperous form, your Glory will reach its acme, and all our prayers will be granted.

If one Father Gilbert, a shameless, impudent Capucin Monk, appears before you with the poison in his heart and pours it against me, the enclosed letter which I have written to M. Demoncrif about him, should be sufficient testimony for you untill you receive the supporting documents.

I cannot end this letter, my Lord, without commending myself to your protection, and I solicit you to look favourably upon an unfortunate family, an unjust victim of cupidity, which today more than ever needs your help, and whose father is always ready to give his life for his King and for the execution of your smallest orders.

I have the honour to be respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Anquetil.

---

(288 v°)

My Lord de Sartine,
Secretary of State and Minister for
the Navy, at Court.

Surat, 25th October 1778

My Lord,

As I am changing the course of my dispatches which I have the honour to address you today and as I know that M. de St. Lubin cannot take advantage of this channel which is very secret, I am having copied hastily and in small hand the two letters which he sent me in April and September last on the subject of the two revolutions in Poona. They will give you full information about the Marathas, and you will see therein what you can expect from them for the benefit of our nation, if our forces

appear shortly in India. I am sure, my Lord, you will read with great interest the details of these two revolutions, the last of which is quite recent.

I learnt today that the English have stopped in the Ganges 14 French ships or boats, big and small, laden with victuals and other provisions for Pondicherry and the Isle of France (Mauritius). This embargo will inflict (289) a heavy loss on us. Although war is not declared even according to the English reports, they behave as if it was. According to their statement, 30,000 men are actually blockading Pondicherry. But they have less than 2,000 Eruropeans among these troops. This nation continues to enjoy good luck because of the absence of our forces. It is reported that M. de Bellecombe has given orders to M. Picot to seize Tellicherry. A ship of the English Company, which had left Europe in April, has just arrived in Bombay. The Captain declares that four others were following, escorted by 2 warships. The English are said to be at the present moment more reassured about the fate of Bombay, because they assert that the ship *L'Aimable Nanette*, which they have captured, reported that there was neither any warship nor the slightest preparation for war at Mauritius in July. This news, if true, saves Bombay, which M. D'Estaing might have reduced with his squadron and with the help of the Marathas in 20 or 30 days' time at the most.

According to all the reports, the English are shaping very badly in Europe. I am, therefore, confident, my Lord, that you will promptly send us considerable help. But please do not lose sight of Bombay in view of its port. According to my humble conjecture, it is the first conquest our squadron ought to undertake. The English will then have no other place to retire for preparing their ships or provisioning them in India, and will be so non-plussed that Madras, cut off (289 v°) from receiving any succour in time, will fall in no time in our hands. There is a secret talk about M. de Bussy who, it is said, is the unknown person embarked on the squadron of M. D'Estaing. If this great man, feared and adored by the native people, today appeared in India at the head of the troops, all the Mughal Princes, Rajas, Nawabs, would throw their castling at his feet, and the English would not be able to hold their own against us. It is then that the revolution in Bengal will commence, as soon as our forces arrive, by the movements of Najaf Khan, with whom M. de Montigny is on very friendly terms, and will facilitate for us the conquest of Calcutta

without much loss of men. I maintain, my Lord, M. de Montigny in these fond hopes, and also M. de St. Lubin so far as Bombay is concerned, as he still continues to direct the movements of the Maratha Ministry at the Poona Court.

God grant our prayers, my Lord, and we have every reason to expect success from these great revolutions in India which are all being nursed under the guiding hand of a Minister as enlightened as yourself. The owners of *Le Duras* have reduced me, with my wife and children, to the last extremity by the most cruel blow and the most detestable channel they could choose, in a word with the help of the English and the Nawab. But I shall not dilate any more on this subject, my Lord, because all facts being against them, I shall get justice, atonement and compensation (290) and because today I have just time enough to talk to you about the affairs concerning our nation. As a subject of the King, I am sacrificing at the present moment my personal interest to the duties of my post, for the continuation of which I am indebted to you, and I shall always be ready to fulfil my obligations at the very risk of my life.

You will see, my Lord, from the last letter of M. de St. Lubin what fate has befallen the troops which the English summoned from Bengal for the succour of Bombay. If the French delay their appearance, I am very much afraid the English might make the final effort to instal Raghunathrao, alias Raghoba on the throne at Poona, and they might even succeed. That is even today the ambitious project of the English, because none of our ships has made its appearance in India. But M. de St. Lubin continues to do his utmost to frustrate this final attempt.[35].

I have the honour to be respectfully,

My Lord,

Your humble and very obedient servant,

Anquetil.

---

(291) Surat, 30th December 1778

My Lord de Sartine,
Minister for the Navy, at Court.

My Lord,

As soon as my husband was made a prisoner of war, he handed over to me many papers which he had planned to send you *via* Aleppo. But he is confined and observed so closely by the English that it is impossible for him to communicate with you personally on all matters and in the manner he would like to do. To make up for it I have made a copy of his Diary which he had hidden and which continues to this day, and I am dispatching it to you with all the other documents which he had destined for you. I am addressing all these papers to my brothers in Paris by Dutch ships. requesting them to deliver the packet to you immediately. I shall not enter into any details on the public matters. My husband's Diary will supply you information on all these points. Allow me, my Lord, to join my entreaties to his in the form of a small letter which you will find at the head of the Diary. From its perusal, you will see that we are completely ruined, if justice is denied us against the owners (291 v°) of *Le Duras;* and much more so if you do not take into sympathetic consideration the Surat Consulate. The English have shamefully committed an infraction of the law of nations by breaking neutrality and making my husband a prisoner. I do not know, and I am worried about it, what fate the English have in store for us, for never a prisoner of war has been so closely confined as my husband is. But if you take us under your kind protection and if the health of my husband, who has been getting fever for the last three months, returns to normal, I am confident that our lot will be as happy as it is unfortunate since our return to Surat. My husband presents his very humble respects and though a prisoner, he is mindful of our nation's interests for which he is always ready to sacrifice himself. I take the liberty to recommend to your kindness my children who are in Paris as well as those who are at the present moment suffering along with us at Surat, and request you to continue to bestow on us all the favours of your protection.

I have the honour to be respectfully, my Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Jeanne Anquetil de Briancourt

(292) I hope, my Lord, you will excuse my husband for his inability to write to you, but the persual of his Diary will show how closely he is confined by the English, and today I take his place to fulfil the same object with regard to you which is for me a great honour.

---

(293)

Surat, 14th November 1778.
Dispatched to M. Perdriaux
at Aleppo. (Up-to-date)

My Lord de Sartine,
Minister for the Navy, at Court.

My Lord,

The perusal of this Diary, which I am dispatching to M. de Perdriaux, Consul at Al eppo, with instructions to forward it to you, will show you that I am no lo nger in a position to keep you posted with news from India. I can at the present moment only commend to your protection myself as well as my unfortunate but very respectable, family, whom my present condition as a prisoner of war reduces to still greater straits. I supplicate you not to forget the Surat Consulate and the Frenchmen who were on its staff. I am confident that my patriotism is known to you, and I am quite sure that in this respect, M de St. Lubin and M. de Montigny must have also furnished you proofs, which I earnestly solicit you to take i nto consideration. Otherwise I am completely ruined. In spite of the fact t hat I have been at th e helm of affairs of the French nation in Surat for t he last 20 years, my only support in my present state of distress and total despair is my hope in your justice and your kind protection.

I have the honour to be respectfully,

My Lord,
Your very humble and very obedient servant,
ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT

(293 v°)

*Copy of the Extract from my Diary*

3rd November 1778

At 11 o'clock in the morning, Messrs Bourchier, Morley and Crockatt, English Councillors of Surat, came to my house in the French Garden and notified to me on behalf of the Chief and Council that, because of the present state of hostilities which had commenced with our nation, they had come to arrest me as well as all other Frenchmen; that I would have the liberty to take whatever decision I like with regard to my wife and family; that all my personal belongings would not be touched; and that they were empowered to send me and all other Frenchmen to Bombay where I would be allotted a suitable place for my residence and that, with regard to my family, I could take them with me to Bombay, if I wanted.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

**Official Report**

*The year one thousand seven hundred seventy eight, on (294) the 3rd November at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, immediately after the departure of the English Commissioners, we, Anquetil de Briancourt, Consul for the French nation at Surat, proceeded to draw up the present report in the presence of M. Demoncrif, Secretary to the French Consulate and M. de Charlevalle, then present at the French Garden.*

**To Wit**

That at 11 o'clock in the morning, Messrs. Bourchier, Morley and Crockatt, English Councillors of Surat, came to the Consulate in the French Garden, followed by a detachment of 40 to 50 sipahees with three European officers at their head, to notify me on behalf of the Chief and the Council that, because of the present state of hostilities which had commenced with our nation, they had come to arrest me and all the other Frenchmen, that I would have the liberty to act as I liked with regard to my wife and family, and that all my personal belongings would not be touched; that they were empowered to send me and all the Frenchmen to Bombay within 4 days, that a suitable place for my residence was being prepared for me there, that with regard to my wife and family, I could take them with me to Bombay, if I thought it (294 v°) fit; that

we learnt at the same time that the English had also arrested in the French lodge in the town M. La Vary LeRoy, for whom we sought the permission from the Commissioners to come down to the Garden; that likewise M. Quiblier, formerly Deputy Secretary to the Consulate, and Father Gilbert, Vicar at the French mission, had been arrested; that finally, the abovementioned Commissioners asked to be shown all our papers, official as well as personal, which they put in a chest under the seal of their Company for being dispatched to Bombay for examination, and that, after the said orders were executed, they posted several sentinels at all the gates of the Garden and our house to prevent our exit from the French Garden, and left with our person an European Officer as a guard.

In testimony whereof we have signed the present report to be prepared at a fit and a proper time, at whatever place and before whomsoever as shall seem fit, in the presence of the above-mentioned gentlemen who signed with us.

Signed : ANQUETIL de BRIANCOURT, DEMONCRIF de GRANGE, de CHARLEVALLE

---

(295)

*Copy of my letter to Mr. Boddam, English Chief and Council*

3rd November 1778

Gentlemen,

I was extremely surprised to receive this morning in the French Garden a visit from three of your gentlemen who made me as well as M. Demoncrif, Secretary, and all other Frenchmen residing at Surat, prisoners of war. They next put all the papers under the seal to make an inventory of the same tomorrow. *I vainly pointed out to them that it was against the laws of neutrality established and practised at all times in Surat, these gentlemen neither paid any heed to my protests nor took any notice of the Minister's letter dated 10th May which I produced before them and by which I have express orders to observe the strictest neutrality at Surat.* Since this proceeding seems to have been followed against the conventions observed so far, I protest through this letter against this act of hostility which should not have taken place, and shift on whomsoever it shall seem fit all the responsibility and untoward consequences which might result therefrom.

I have the honour to be,

Signed : ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT

(295 v°)

November 4, 1778

Delivered this day into the hands of Messrs. Bourchier, Morley and Crokatt. :

No. 1 General inventory of all State property at Surat.

2 Inventory of the furniture and other belongings of Mr. Anquetil.

3 Inventory of the effects of M. Anquetil in Commission and Trust.

4 Inventory of the effects of M. Demoncrif.

5 Inventory of those of M. de Charlevalle.

6 Inventory of those of M. LeRoy

7 Inventory of those of M. de Montigny.

---

*Copy of my letter to Mr. Boddam, English Chief and Council at Surat.*

5th November 1778

Gentlemen,

Day before yesterday, I had the honour to address you a letter to protest against the act of hostility committed against me by making me, M. Demoncrif and all other Frenchmen at Surat prisoners of war, a piece of conduct which is totally at variance with the neutrality established and practised in the town, of which the Nawab is the Governor. It was strictly adhered to during (296) the last war, since I enjoyed complete freedom here all the while it lasted, and you never thought of breaking it with regard to me. I was then the Chief of the Factory for the French (East) India company, and the title of a Consul of His Very Christian Majesty, with which I am honoured today, has in no way changed the old established laws. But since you have been pleased, Gentlemen, to behave now in a different manner with respect to me, I protested day before yesterday against this act of hostility and I protest again through this letter against the seizures made of all the King's property at Surat.

I have the honour furthermore to point out to you, Gentlemen, that by the order given me verbally to be ready to leave for Bombay within 4 days with M. Demoncrif and all the Frenchmen who are with me, it is almost impossible for me to do so within such a short space of time. My wife and my children are confined to bed and will never consent to

separation from me. Your fair and noble sentiments, even common humanity will make you realize the justice of my representation. Therefore, I request you to fix up a reasonable time to enable me accordingly to make all arrangements and pack up all my furniture and other belongings which I intend (296 v°) to take away to the place you have selected for me. But, Gentlemen, why do you insist on this change of my abode which causes me considerable inconvenience? You have made me a prisoner of war. You have seized all the State property. You have secured my person, that of M. Demoncrif and of all other Frenchmen whom you have kept under your guard. What do you gain actually by removing us from this place? Since we are your prisoners, can you not grant us the French Garden as our prison? Myself, along with M. Demoncrif, shall comply with all the formalities required by your nation to vouch for our persons. You will thereby render me a great service, since my family, almost all the members are confined to bed, will not be obliged to undertake a journey of which I fear the inconvenience and the consequence.

I, therefore, repeat to you my request to grant this favour to me and to those who are staying with me and from whom I would be very much grieved to be separated. In case, permission of the Garden cannot be granted to us, if you so prefer, we shall retire with the same precaution on your part to the French lodge in the town.

I must also point out to you, Gentlemen, that Father Gilbert, Vicar of the French mission (297) cannot be sent to Bombay without stopping the Divine Service which ought to go on without any interruption. I, therefore, request you to permit him to stay in the mission house and exercise all the functions of his office.

Whatever be your decision, Gentlemen, about my present representations, is it not in your power to carry out the examination of the papers which are under your seal, here instead of in Bombay as you have stated it to me.

Yesterday an inventory of the furniture and other movable State property at Surat has been supplied to you; that of the immovable property, documents and papers, which you have also seized, still remains to be furnished. But I think it is only fair to favour us with a receipt for the same.

I have the honour to be....

(Signed) ANQUETIL

November 6, 1778

At 11 o'clock in the morning Messrs. Crockatt and Morley came to take charge of M. Charlevalle's papers which they carried away in a chest to Mr. Boddam's office. They also took away from me M. de Sartine's letter addressed to me on May 10, 1778.

---

(297 v°)

*Copy of my letter to Mr. Boddam, English Chief and Council at Surat.*

7th November 1778

Gentlemen,

Messrs. Morley and Crockatt came here to take away from among the papers placed under the seal the letter addressed to me by the Minister on May 10. It is certainly to have cognizance of the orders which he has given me in the present circumstances. Thus, Gentlemen, you must have seen that in case of war, I had orders to observe neutrality which has always been respected and adhered to in Surat, and you must have realized the wrong you have done in breaking it in regard to this Consulate. But where was the necessity to take away the papers supposedly belonging to M. de Charlevalle ? What have they to do with the King's affairs ? M. de Charlevalle is not in his service. He is a Frenchman who is working in the engineering branch and is travelling for his own instruction. He is a temporary guest in my house and was about to return to France where his family is calling him back. Therefore, his letters and other papers have no connection with the Consulate. Moreover, was it proper to take away these papers *in Globe* without making a detailed note of it, without being examined before us and ackowledged in our (298) presence and that of your Gentlemen by the owner ? Allow me, therefore, Gentlemen, to protest against the illegal procedure of this removal of papers.

I had dispatched Mr. Smith, one of my scribes, to Daman on a personal errand, and to collect some money due to me. It is two days now, Gentlemen, since you are holding him a prisoner, thus stopping him from submitting to me an account of the errand I had entrusted to him. As Mr. Smith is Dutch and not French and he is in my service in a private capacity, I protest against his detention which causes me considerable

inconvenience and I hold you responsible for all the consequences prejudicial to my personal affairs unless you take steps to send him back to me immediately, as I demand it.

I have also to bring to your notice that there are in my wife's family two old widows who are her aunts, Mesdames Monchel et Dugran. Since the time I have been at Surat, I have looked after all their needs. They are today both so aged that they cannot be neglected. As my detention as a prisoner of war deprives me of means to continue my help to them, Gentlemen, (298 v°) your humanity certainly will supply the deficiency. I demand for each of them Rs. 30 per month as subsistence. As for M. Dugras Junior, as he is in the service of M. Bolts and as he receives his salary from him, he has no connection with the affairs of the French. I hope, Gentlemen, that you will comply with my request by granting to the two ladies Monchel and Dugran, in the capacity of widows of Frenchmen and in consideration of their old age and infirmity, Rs. 30 which each one of them needs for their subsistence. This is the third letter I have the honour to address to you. I am awaiting a reply to all the points raised in these three letters.

I have the honour to be....

(Signed) Anquetil

November 7, 1779.

At 11 o'clock Mr. Crockatt came to acknowledge the receipt of the property of the King in the town as well as in the Garden according to the inventory furnished to the commissioners on the 4th.

Copy of my letter to Mr. Boddam, Surat, November 8, 1778.

Sir,

Here is the list of the Frenchmen (299) now in Surat.

M. M. Anquetil de Briancourt, Consul.

Demoncrif de La Grange, Secretary.

La Vary LeRoy, Captain of a ship.

De Charlevalle, a travelling gentleman.

Quiblier, an old first division clerk of the Company.

Father Gilbert, Vicar at the French Mission.

Berger, a 12 year old youngster, son of a commoner from Paris recommended to my favour.

Privon Le Cor, servant.

I hope you will see to it that the above-mentioned gentlemen receive their subsistence according to their status. Messrs. LeRoy, Charlevalle and young Berger have always stayed with me in Surat. I desire that in Bombay, they should also be lodged in the same house allotted to me so that they can continue to live with me.

I have the honour to .........

(Signed) ANQUETIL

November 8, 1778

At 11 o'clock in the morning an inventory of the immovable property belonging to the King at Surat was delivered to Messrs. Crockatt and Bourchier, dated November 8. These gentlemen came to look for it in the Garden and copied it out from the books of the Consulate which are under their seal.

---

(299 v°)

Copy of my letter to Mr. Boddam and the English Council at Surat,

11th November 1778

Gentlemen,

After the favour you have granted me to remain in the French Garden till the 20th instant, date fixed for my departure, permit me to ask you another : I desire that M. LeRoy should not be separated from me. He is an old man who has always stayed with me since the last 4 years and whom I love and esteem much. The delay in his departure ought to be immaterial to you, and refusal to comply with my request will break his heart, and I would see his departure tomorrow along with the others with the greatest sorrow. It is sad enough at his age to be still reduced to suffer misery away from his wife and children, after enduring all sorts of misfortunes. Would you refuse him and us who solicit you for him the only consolation which he needs today? If you have the slightest distrust about him, Gentlemen, I shall not hesitate to stand security for his person. My wife joins her prayers to mine.

(Signed) ANQUETIL

(300)

November 12, 1778

From the 3rd instant to this date, Rs. 20 per day have been delivered for my subsistence or table and for that of the Frenchmen, Messrs. Demoncrif, LeRoy, De Charlevalle, who dine with me and my family, and also Re. 1 per day to each of the Frenchmen, confined in the lodge, M. Quiblier, Fr. Gilbert, M. Smith. The same subsistence is to be continued till our departure for Bombay, fixed for the 20th instant.

November 14, 1778

Today at 9 0'clock in the morning Messrs. LeRoy, de Charlevalle, Quiblier, Smith and Father Gilbert left for Bombay. A boat full of sipahees accompanied the dinghy in which they travellled and another which carried the belongings of our Frenchmen, who are prisoners of war.

November 15, 1778

This day wrote a letter to Mr. Hornby, Governor of Bombay, and one to Mr. Carnac, Deputy Chief at Bombay, in protest against the breach of neutrality at Surat by the English in respect of the French Consulate.

(300 v°)

November 19, 1778

At one o'clock in the afternoon, the English actually received the news of the capture of Pondicherry which surrendered by capitulation on October 18, 1778. M. de Bellecombe, wounded, signed the capitulation in his bed, so say the English. *While speaking of M. de Bellecombes, they express their great amazement at his bravery, and are full of esteem and admiration for him.* His wounds in a sortie during which he thrice rallied his troops, forced him to keep to his bed and perhaps hastened the surrender of the place which capitulated only when all the preparations were ready for a general assault. The honours of the war were accorded to him as well as to the troops, and the houses and the property of the individuals were left intact. The fate of the fortifications and the Royal property was left to the decision of the Supreme Council of Bengal or to the orders from Europe. Two days after the surrender of Pondicherry, there appeared two French frigates full of troops but which arrived too late for its succour; they returned to their base. It is

a mystery why the English squadron of Commodore Vernon, then, blockading Pondicherry, (301) allowed them to escape without an attempt either to seize them or at least fight them. Nor have we any information about the movements of M. de Tronjoly, Captain of the ship *Le Brillant* and commanding the small French squadron which, it is reported, left the harbour of Pondicherry many days before the capture of the place by the English. The appearance of these two French frigates, full of troops, intrigues the English. Were they sent as succour from Mauritius? Or were they detached from M. D'Estaing's squadron which the English still think, might appear at any moment in India, although it is known almost for certain that it is in America? Madras, as the report goes, has already dispatched troops to Anjangao to seize Mahé. Can it be that this succour, which arrived too late at Pondicherry, has proceeded there? That is what we are still in the dark about in Surat. The capture of Pondicherry has just been announced in the town by a salute of 21 guns, fired from the fortress.

November 20, 1778

Mr. Crockatt came in the capacity of Mr. Hornby's attorney to speak to me about the settlement, (301 v°) and assured me that Mr. Hornby's proceedings were not aimed at my ruin. I replied that these kind feelings should have been expressed in deed and not in word much earlier, that, moreover, I was going to settle this affair personally with Mr. Hornby, since it was decided that I should be transferred to Bombay. Thereupon I dismissed him.

November 21, 1778

At 9 o'clock in the morning, Messrs. Crockatt and Bourchier come for a general examination of my papers. But this process was not carried out according to the conventions, since almost all my personal papers, registers, accounts, copies of letters, diary, were placed under the seal along with State papers. This procedure, however, does not bother me, but I object to it, because it supplies information to the English about my private and family affairs which they have no business to know, and because it deprives me of the possibility of settling my private accounts with any one. I am today, in a letter, lodging a protest on this subject with the English Chief.

(302)

November 21, 1778

Mr. Boddam came this evening to inform me that we would not be transferred to Bombay, but shifted to the lodge in the town and would stay there without the permission to move out till our departure for Europe, that he believed that this arrangement would give me great satisfaction, since I could attend, with my wife, who would have full liberty of movement, to the necessary preparations for our journey to Europe.

*I now learn, at least it is so reported, that the English broke the neutrality at Surat in my case, because of my correspondence with M. de St. Lubin, dispatched by the Minister to Poona, capital of the Marathas, and with M. de Montigny, also sent by the Minister to Delhi, capital of the Mughal Empire.*

November 23, 1778

At noon Messrs. Bourchier and Crockatt came for a fresh search of the papers which were all, put under seal in a chest, taken away under an escort of sipahees to the English Chief's office.

(302 v°)

November 24, 1778

At 9 O'clock in the evening, a messenger came to intimate to us that we must be ready to shift to the town on the 26th instant, and to make arrangements for the quick transport of our belongings there.

At the same time the Adjutant of the fortress came on behalf of Mr. Boddam, English Chief, to demand, in connection with my correspondence, my parole of honour in writing, which I gave as follows:—

I, the undersigned, French Consul at Surat, at present prisoner of war of his Britannic Majesty, pledge my word of honour neither to write to anyone nor to receive from anyone any letter or note without prior communication to Mr. Boddam, English Chief or to the officer on guard, at Surat, November 24, 1778.

(Signed) ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT

Same precaution taken in case of M. Demoncrif, Secretary to this Consulate, prisoner of war like me, who also gave the same undertaking.

(303)

November 25, 1778

The subsistence, granted to me for my board at Rs. 20 per day, has been suddenly reduced today, inspite of my protests, to Rs. 13 Annas 6, i.e. to Rs. 400 per month.

November 30, 1778

Since the last five days, I have been continuously getting fever, and the arrangements for my removal from the Garden to the Lodge having been completed, I am now residing here with all my family, but almost shut up, for the English have walled up many doors and windows, and very much embarrassed by the presence of the sentinels who have been installed even inside my house, at the door of the drawing-room and our bed-rooms and on the terrace, and a European officer keeps continuous watch on me. It is impossible for me to go out; my wife and family have full liberty of movement. I sought permission to attend Mass on Sundays, which was granted, the European officer and the Sipahee officer accompanying me.

(303 v°)

November 30, 1778

This day I sent a message to Mr. Crockatt, who was conducting the sale of the property of the late Mr. Dorion, to sell on my behalf two horses, three mules and three carriages, as I am unable to feed either the horses or the mules; and I informed Mr. Boddam, English Chief, that the money should be deposited with him till the settlement of my affairs with Mr. Hornby. He gave his consent.

In spite of repeated demands, Mr. Hornby has neither returned to me till now the Bill of Exchange, nor sent me a copy of the protest for non-payment, documents which he says he has not received from Europe, although, since the 1st of May, he has already received letters from London on three occasions by the sea-route, *via* Suez and Basra.

The arrangement between the shippers and Mr. Hunter and him is a game. But I am sure justice will not play me false. Mr. Hornby could on no account sieze here my property without returning to me my Bill of Exchange and furnishing me a copy of the protest for non-payment

which must have been (304) made in December last. That for non-acceptance is not valid. Since he has received letters from Europe dated May, June and July, he should have by the same channels received the protest for non-payment which, if it exists, I doubt it very much, must have been made in December last. Failure to present to me these important documents which Mr. Hornby ought to have delivered to me before taking action against me, therefore, entitles me to file a suit against him and claim compensation for all the excesses of violence committed in the name of the Nawab and of which I have given full details in my report of September 20. In proceeding against me in this manner he has only misused the power which his title as Governor of Bombay invests him with; but this title will fade before the throne of His Britannic Majesty of whom my capacity as a prisoner of war today gives me the right to demand protection, and claim justice from the laws of England against such an extortion. I am trying to proceed there as promptly as possible, and (304 v°) from there to France to sue the shippers and force them in a court of law to honour the Bill of Exchange and compensate me for my losses of all kinds.

December 1, 1778

Today I received from the English Company Rs. 400 as subsistence for a month, for which I gave a receipt. M. Demoncrif stays with us in the Lodge and is included in this subsistence which is fixed for my whole household, although it is so modest. The prices of articles have gone very high in Surat, especially at the present moment, as Bombay runs out of provisions. A wretched bottle of wine costs here Re. 1.

December 4, 1778

The English have just received the news from Bombay that the troops had left the island on the 27th of last month for the conquest of Poona; that they had already captured a small fort at the foot of the Ghats; that these troops numbering 3,000 to 4,000 sipahees and a few Europeans were preparing to ascend the said Ghats on which they did not meet with any opposition, although it was reported that there were more than 1,20,000 Marathas at Poona ready to fight them. (305) Although it appears that intrigues have a greater share in Raghoba's restoration or installation at Poona than the strength of the English arms, nonetheless,

they fear treachery. But the capture of Pondicherry has dampened the spirit of the native people, and the plans of the English against the Maratha will now succeed, for they have no longer to contend with M. de St. Lubin at Poona. This clever negotiator is not a God. Undoubtedly despairing at the delay in obtaining help from Europe, a situation which today may create a suspicion at the Poona Court about the genuineness of his mission, he feared a storm and left this Maratha capital very opportunely to take shelter in a place of safety i.e. Daman where he has installed himself for the last two months. I am very much afraid the same despair may seize M. de Montigny and he may finally throw the helve after the hatchet, unless our squadron promptly appears in India. The fate of this excellent patriot also deserves great sympathy for he is left without any resources, especially since I have been made a prisoner of war.

December 9, 1778

At 9 O'clock in the morning Mr. Crockatt paid a visit to me as Mr. Hornby's attorney. After the preliminary compliments, he informed me that he had come to take (305 v°) delivery of the articles, which I did not need, on Mr. Hornby's behalf. I replied to him that I was quite ready to meet my obligations in this respect, if he showed me my Bill of Exchange and the protest for non-payment. He said that this condition was not mentioned in my letter to Mr. Boddam at the time of the Chowkey, in which I had consented to deliver all my possessions, jewels silverware, furniture, securities, etc. without any condition. I replied that it was understood, since I had indeed made a mention of it in my letter to him 4 or 5 days after sending him a list of my debts, active and passive. He angrily resumed by asking me in a haughty tone if I wanted to break my word of honour. Yes, I replied equally warmly, in the sense you understand it, if you do not realize this obligation to hand over to me these documents which I need to enable me to proceed against the shippers, but in the sense in which I wrote him this letter, I am not at all breaking my word of honour, since I am ready to meet any obligations if my Bill of Exchange and the protest for non-payment are delivered to me. He said that, that was not his concern, (306) but indeed Mr. Hornby's. When I replied that he must hear my reasons as calmly as I was listening to his, he abruptly got up and without even taking leave of me, left me with a furious threatening glance. He told me that he was going to send his report to Mr. Boddam with whom I was breaking my word of hounor.

I shrugged my shoulders with pity and felt very sorry for Mr. Hornby and myself for being compelled to use as a negotiator a man who goes mad every 4 or 5 years and whose over-heated bile stifles his commonsense almost daily.

After Mr. Crockatt's departure, I deeply reflectd on Mr. Hornby's conduct with me and the mean behaviour of the shippers who were responsible for all Mr. Hornby's acts of violence. On the one hand, a prisoner of war, inspite of the neutrality established and observed at Surat, on the other, my property seized and taken away, although I owe nothing, my eyes full of emotions, the health of my wife and my elder daughter, likewise in prison, who were attending on me, that of my two children, innocent victims of their father's misfortune, my present troubles and my worries about the fate of my four children left in Europe, perhaps also stripped by the shippers, (306 v°) a thousand reflexions more or less melancholy crowded themselves in my mind, further weakened by tertian ague. My heart choked up. It needed an outlet. Tears flowed abundantly from my eyes. But I was alone. My heart thus relieved, I recovered my senses, and I at once coolly considered my pitiable and sad situation..........Mr. Hornby is determined to seize my property by violence and equally determined not to deliver to me either my Bill of Exchange or the protest for non-payment. This obstinate conduct appears to me to be the execution of a plan drawn up by the shippers against me. Perhaps the Bill of Exchange is not returned, perhaps the protest for non-payment is not made; the shippers' intention is perhaps to extract from me through the violence of the despot of Bombay, hidden under the cloak of the Nawab at Surat Rs. 50,000 to 60,000 which might drop in their coffers by this cruel and mean strategem, and which they will afterwards pass on to my account as compensation for the losses which, according to them, they have the right to inflict on me, but which fact I shall certainly contest. I pray to God that he grant me life and take me to France. Therefore, whatever (307) may happen, my decision is taken: perhaps I shall not always be a prisoner of war, or outraged by a despot, or deceived by the shippers. I shall certainly have my turn. When I am restored to my liberty, I can assert my rights in a court of law. I am, therefore, determined to suffer everything, even the worst outrages, rather than consent to deliver the keys of the two desks, containing our jewels and silver plates, which are in my hands, and allow my seal placed on them to be broken and grant replevin for the sale of my furniture and

other belongings unless my Bill of Exchange and the protest for non-payment are delivered to me. My imprisonment may perhaps become harsher, which ought not to be the case, since my capacity of a prisoner of war should protect me against any other suit. But who cares for opinions in India ? If my imprisonment becomes tighter, I shall be sorry only because my wife, my elder daughter and my children, who do not want to leave me, would suffer more and longer from it; this will be an additional obligation on the shippers whose secret agent here is Mr. Hornby. But I am confident that Divine Providence will soon come to our rescue.

(307 v°)

December 10, 1778

It is reported that the English have captured on the way from Bombay to Poona a second fortress which has cost them 4 to 5 European officers and 200 to 300 sipahees. Among the dead is mentioned the name of Mr. Stewart, Raghoba's A.D.C. This news needs confirmation. Mr. Stewart was leading a thousand grenadiers at the time of the attack on the Maratha fort.

December 15, 1778

Wrote a letter this evening to Mr. Hornby with a request to appoint another attorney in place of Mr. Crockatt who had the impudence to spread publicly false reports about the talks he had with me during his last visit in connection with Mr. Hornby's affairs.

---

Mr. Hornby, Surat, 15th December 1778

Governor of Bombay.

Sir,

I do not know what Mr. Crockatt has written to you about me. Not at all satisfied (308) with his conduct towards me, I doubt very much whether his letter would satisfy you. If he had conducted himself in all this unfortunate affair as a good negotiator, it would have already been terminated. But when one refuses to listen to reason, justice loses its rights. This letter has therefore three objects.

The first is to ratify all the promises I have made to deliver all my possessions into your hands, and far from breaking my word of honour in this respect, I am always ready to keep it, as soon as you present to me my Bill of Exchange and the protest for non-payment, or a duly attested copy of it. You are aware, Sir, that no deed can stand as a substitute for it to authorize the bearer to go back to the drawer. The law is categorical on this article, and admits of no exception. Without these documents, it is impossible for me to proceed against the shippers. My claim is very just, but that is what Mr. Crokatt does not want to listen to.

The second object is that if you are willing to grant me replevin for the objects that have been seized, and (308 v°) return to me the jewels of my wife, our silver plate and our other belongings, I undertake to send you, as soon as my private papers are delivered to me, the originals of all the documents which can prove that the shippers must pay the Bill of Exchange. As my capacity of a prisoner of war obliges me to go to England, I shall do my best to settle this affair with Mr. Hunter to your satisfaction.

The third object of this letter is to request you, Sir, to appoint another attorney to whom I should at least be free to explain the reasons which may be in my favour. Mr. Crokatt has no other reply to give to my objections except that " such are his orders " and that " he is not supposed to add anything more". I feel that two or three interviews held in a co-operative spirit, with this new attorney invested with full powers from you, would suffice to terminate this ticklish affair to our mutual satisfaction.

It is needless, Sir, to (309) set forth before you the sad situation in which I am to-day. If you have consideration for my representations, the burden which is weighing on my mind will be half reduced, and I shall be all the more grateful to you. You will have besides the satisfaction of preserving the honour and credit of a father of a family, which has not only its conscience, but the laws in its favour.

I have the honour to be ......................

(Signed) Anquetil

*Note:*

As the second object of the letter proves that our jewels and other belongings have been seized, although the Bill of Exchange and the protest are not yet delivered to me, which fact is against commercial laws, and that my private papers have been taken away from me, although the laws of war permit only the removal of state papers, Mr. Boddam wanted me to expunge all this article, fearing in advance that this letter, if it became public might turn out against the transgressors of laws. But having stated only the truth, I refused to strike out anything and the letter (309 v°) left without any change.

Fortunately, the tertian ague from which I have been suffering for more than a month and a half, gives me respite to think a little about my affairs. Otherwise, locked up like a criminal and not at all like a prisoner of war, my situation is such that grief would soon have taken me to grave, if this obstinate fever had not given me two good days to summon courage and a little vigour.

December 18, 1778

Mr. Vonde Graff, Dutch Director, sent me yesterday a box of tea and 100 Venitiens, which are equivalent to Rs. 400, with a small note requesting me to accept this little present. I kept the tea and this morning returned his small rouleau of gold with a letter of thanks. This gentleman certainly wanted to make me forget by this little present the mistrust he had shown in my credit with respect to the Bills of Exchange which I had orders to draw on the Royal Treasury (310) in pursuance of the powers with which M. de Sartine had invested me by his letter of May 10. Mr. Vande Graff refused to accept my Bills of Exchange, but indeed accepted those of M. Demoncrif. The mistrust, which he showed towards me three months ago, is still too fresh in my mind to accept help from him on this occasion, even if I am in the greatest straints, and besides this help from him is so small, and being given in the presence of the servants so ungracious that it is neither worthy of him to offer it, nor of me to accept it. I have behaved in a very different manner sixteen years ago when I maintained the entire staff of the Dutch establishment, outraged by the English and blockaded by more than 2,000 sipahees of the Nawab.

December 20, 1778.

Here is a fresh news which is very authentic. An English Captain, having learnt at Basra that a Frenchman entrusted with the Minister's dispatches for Pondicherry, had just left the town for Grenne (Bahrein) immediately started to arrest him. Without any consideration for (310 v°) the breach of hospitality with the Arabs, he entered the room of this officer in the early morning with his men. The latter was still in his bed. Not even giving him time to dress up, the English Captain and his men removed him by force and took him to his little boat. He seized all his papers and took him at once to Bombay where he has just arrived. The name of this specimen of filibuster is Sheriff. His action is very much commended at Bombay and his kidnapping is considered as a master-stroke. This French officer, whose name is kept a secret from me, was proceeding to Muscat and from there to Mahé and Pondicherry, entrusted by the Minister with the dispatches dated approximately August 12. This desperate attempt of the Englishman, when he did not find letters from his nation at Basra, enabled them (the English of Bombay) to get the latest news from Europe, since they seized this French officer's papers as well as letters, newspapers, gazettes. Thus, Bombay should now have a rough idea of what they have to fear (from the enemy) or expect (succour) for themselves. As for the operations of the French Ministry concerning help and forces to be dispatched to India, I hear that the letter was in cipher. But they assert they got information about the ship's signals through the papers of this officer. This matter can still be remedied, if M. Perdriaux is promptly informed of this seizure or capture, for I dare not hope that this Diary will reach My Lord de Sartine sufficiently in time.

December 22, 1778

(311) According to the news received today from the Ghats, from the route from Bombay to Poona, the expedition of the English is dragging on because of the difficulty, it is said, of opening out roads for the transport of guns. It is claimed that they have employed more than 3,000 labourers, who are engaged day and night in levelling the road as well as breaking the rocks and blowing them with gunpowder. But the labourers succumb to their toil in some places which are absolutely precipitous and where there is scarcity of water. One is yet at a loss to understand this too ambitious but desperate attempt of the English, which obliges them to cut more than 10 to 15 kilometres of mountain of which the steep and

very narrow roads are full of dreadful precipices both to the right and left to open out a road for their artillery. Their object is to subjugate, in their very capital, the Marathas, people so far unsubdued, and install there Raghoba, their creature and murderer of the heir presumptive of the crown, and place him today on (311 v°) the head of Sawai Madhavrao, his son and grand-nephew of the assassin Raghoba. They might perhaps succeed in their attempt if the French do not soon make their appearance in India. But somehow or the other, their triumph would not last long. The Maratha Empire is not administered like the Mughal Empire. If this daring expedition reveals the indominatable courage of the English, it is nonetheless extremely thoughtless, since in undertaking it, they have stripped Bombay of its garrison at a time when they ought to expect the arrival of the French squadron any moment. But their good luck and continuous success dazzle them; the native people consider them and fear them as invincible. When will the curtain of illusion drop down?

December 24, 1778

I have reason to think that the English have begun to reflect on the fatality of their prosperity in India. The news they have recently received from Europe furnishes them food for it. The papers they have seized from the French officer, kidnapped at Grenne (Bahrein) have supplied them the information and the details of the naval fight (312) between the two big squadrons. They are observing a big silence with me on this point. They only disclosed to me that when the fight was about to commence, a storm arose separating the two squadrons which had to give up their attempt. But the report is current in the town that the fight lasted three days and that the English squadron was finally forced to retire. The present gloomy silence of the English leads one sufficiently to believe that in this naval fight, there has been complete victory on our side. We pray thee, Oh God, if this great news is true.

The English have ceased to speak about Mahé. The report goes that Haider Ali Khan is said to have taken this place under his protection, that he has sent his flag there thus notifying to the English not to disturb the tranquility of this French establishment which stands in his territory. There seems to be some truth in this report, since the English are planning to dispatch an ambassador to Haider Ali Khan. The feigned pretext is to urge upon him not to grant in his provinces any concession to Mr. Bolts,

Captain of a ship and Lieutenant-Colonel of Her Imperial Majesty, (312 v°) who, as the report goes, has already obtained several from him along the coast. But the true reason of this projected embassy is to try to dissuade Haider Ali Khan from extending his protection and succour to the French in general and in particular to the colony of Mahé, for which they have reserved the same fate as for Pondicherry.

Same endeavour, though unsuccessful, in the case of Goa. St. Lubin's stay at Daman gives them much umbrage. They requested the Governor of Goa to expel him from this place, representing him as an imposter. The Governor's reply is thoughtful and unequivocal: that the Portuguese being friends of the French as well as of the English, both would always be welcome in their territory, and could live there not only free from any violence but even in complete safety and with protection against anyone who would attempt to attack them.

December 27, 1778

I received the news today, that the Marquess of Coulens arrived on the Malabar Coast by a boat from Muscat. Undoubtedly, he left Aleppo on August 4, with (313) the dispatches from the Minister, and more fortunate in his journey than the French officer captured at Grenne (Bahrein ?) whose name is still unknown to me, he arrived safe and sound at Mahe, where he resides at the moment. The letters for the Dutch with which he was entrusted have been delivered here; as for mine, I doubt if they will reach me. It is reported that the unfortunate Frenchman who is a prisoner in Bombay, has almost become insane out of grief. The fate of this officer is indeed very sad. On the 4th instant there was yet no ship at Mahé. The English declare that on the 7th the troops from Madras arrived there to capture it. I do not believe the fact. Besides, Haider Ali Khan's army is quite ready to protect this French colony against the English who, in the present circumstances, will not raise on their heads an additional and powerful enemy. The expedition to Poona is still dragging on. To all appearances, the English are attempting the impossible in trying to open out a road for their artillery in the midst of the rocks in which the Ghats abound. There are signs that they have begun to realize the truth of this fact. They are spending vast sums of money, are losing a large number of men and are hardly making any progress. They have still more than 7 to 8 (313 v°) Koss at least of the mountains to cut. If the French

squadron appears just now, Bombay will hardly withstand an attack for a week. They would soon be struck down like the Giants who wanted to scale the skies. Their ambition to conquer the Marathas and scale the Ghats will perhaps invite this punishment which their rash behaviour deserves. They have at Bombay only one ship of the Company. The 4 which they expected two months back have not yet arrived, not either the warships of the squadron of Commodore Vernon who is, according to reports lying sick at Madras and whose ships are still anchored in the roadstead of Trincomalee.

All Surat is still at a loss to understand the advantage the English got by breaking here the neutrality in respect of the French Consulate. They wanted, no doubt, to interrupt my correspondence with M. de St. Lubin and M. de Montigny. They could have achieved this object without thus taking the onus on themselves with respect to the French nation. It appears that they now repent their action. In fact, this rupture of neutrality has set against them all the European nations, who fear for themselves the same fate here, and all the merchants in the town neither wish to nor (314) can transact the least business. That of Mocha, Jidda, Basra, Bengal and China is interrupted. The people in the town are under constant alarm at the descent of the French on this coast, and this act of hostility of the English towards us, they fear, is bound to invite an attack on the town, as an enemy's possession the conquest of which will be as easy for them as profitable. These are advantages too substantial for our nation to be neglected.

## December 30, 1778

Here appears a glimmer of hope, but I am very much afraid it may still prove to be a flash which vanishes as quickly as it sparkles. A letter from Muscat has just been received in the town through a very secret channel. This letter announces the arrival of two French warships there, which are awaiting a dozen more. Could it be that these are the two frigates which appeared too late at Pondicherry to render it any assistance and which might have gone to Muscat as a meeting-place? In spite of all the thorough searches by the English, the letter could not be discovered. But yesterday there arrived a more important letter which confirms the news contained in the last one and revives still further our hopes of receiving prompt succour. The contents of the letter from Diu, written in the

local language, are as follows : 'I have just seen with my own eyes 35 French ships at a distance of 10 to 15 kilometres from this (314 v°) roadstead, one of which came within gun-shot. The captain landed in the harbour, stayed there for a day and again joined the fleet which continued its route.' If the information supplied by this individual is authentic, it is either M. D'Estaing's squadron which went to Muscat, or the small fleet of M. Tronjoly reinforced by ships from Mauritius. It would thus appear that Muscat is the place selected for the preparations for the attack on Bombay. But in this supposition, the French squadron will at least take a fortnight to reach the place, and the winds are already beginning to be adverse. This letter is very confidential. There are hardly 3 to 3 persons in the town who are in the know. But I have not seen it myself. According to this course, the French squadron must have gone to Diu to obtain information about the state of affairs in India and the strength of the garrison of Bombay. It could not choose a more suitable place for that purpose and yet nearer the meeting-place which, to all appearances, is Muscat. If this ray of hope does not turn out to be a flash, a fortnight hence there will be a revolution in India, and liberated and free from the bonds which are detaining me, I shall still be, I hope, in a position to offer my services to my country.

Anquetil de Briancourt

# ANQUETIL DE BRIANCOURT

*Notes*

1 The date of M. Briancourt's arrival at Surat is November, 5, 1774.

2 Sawai Madhavrao was born on April 18, 1774, i.e. he was hardly seven months old at the time of Briancourt's arrival at Surat on November 5, 1774, and six years old on May 4, 1780, the day on which he submitted his Diary to the Minister. The title Peshwa means a Prime Minister but not a king.

3 Bhadoch was captured by the English on November 18, 1772.

4 This ought to be the year 1775 and not 1774.

5 Mir Hafiz-ud-din Ahmad Khan Bahadur.

6 The two armies retired because of the monsoon.

7 This account is not supported by any evidence. The Supreme Government of Calcutta peremptorily ordered the Bombay Government to stop all hostilities against the Marathas, because the Maratha war was 'impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized and unjust'. (G. Duff, *Hist.*, II, p. 49.).

8 The treaty of Purandhar was signed on March 1, 1776.

9 This statement is not borne out by any evidence.

10 The island of Salcette was not to be restored to the Marathas.

11 Olpad is about 15 kms to the north of Surat.

12 This may as well be a precaution against the landing of the French squadron on the Malabar Coast.

13 The treaty was signed on June 18, 1777.

14 These dispatches reached France in August 1778 (AN, $C^4$ 88, p. 59).

15 This account is furnished to Briancourt by St. Lubin himself.

16 Moroba was arrested on June 22. Therefore, the news must have reached Bombay towards the end of June or the beginning of July.

17 There is no evidence to support this statement.

18 At this moment, Haider was a victim of the ruse played upon him by the Maratha general, Haripant Phadke. (G. Duff, *Hist.* II, p. 67).

19 The correct date is September 23, 1778 ?

20 There is no evidence to support this account.

21 It is rather strange that Briancourt should use this expression while talking of the Marathas. It is true that it had become a fashion with the authorities in France to call the Marathas ' pirates '. M. Law, Governor of Pondicherry, tried to remove this wrong impression. He wrote : " They (the Marathas) are the most redoubtable nation, who possess half of India and exercise the right of ' Chauthai ' over the whole country ". (AN, $C^2$ 118, f. 254v°-55.). He further explained that these pirates were not the so-called Marathas but only tributaries of this nation. (AN, $C^2$ 123, f. 106v-107.).

22 Clavouring was one of the four members of the Supreme Council of Calcutta.

23 Briancourt mistakes *La Consolante* for *Le Sartine* which has M. de. St. Lubin on board.

24 This was just a rumour.

25 The fort of Purandhar.

26 Pascal du Santy was the person sent by M. de St. Lubin to Surat to carry his first dispatches to M. de Sartine in France.

27 It was in the interest of the English to spread such a slanderous rumour about Nana Fadnavis.

28 This appears to be just a bragging on the part of St. Lubin. It is very doubtful if the French envoy enjoyed so much influence with the authorities at Poona.

29 Bhimrao Panse.

30 M. Grand-maison was at one time Commissioner for War in France. His plan was to go to Delhi and train the Emperor's troops in the European type of warfare. He was later on persuaded to proceed to Poona. He died near Mocha on his way to Surat.

31 There is no evidence to support this statement.

32 At this time, Sawai Madhavrao was four years old.

33 St. Lubin was in Poona at this time and was a witness of the dramatic episode.

34 There is lot of exaggeration and inaccuracy in this report.

35 An ardent patriot, Briancourt easily swallows the braggings of St. Lubin.

(AN=Archives Nationales, Paris.)

# APPENDIX

## INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY, INDIA OFFICE RECORDS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

### Volume 4

THE FRENCH IN INDIA

*These documents came to our hand when the entire volume had gone through the Press. Hence they had to be placed in the Appendix. These letters should be read after p. 134*

## APPENDIX

Surat, 24th November 1777

M. de St. Lubin

Sir,

I take this opportunity of the Pattamar which Mrs. Bolts sends to her husband, to whom I have no time to write, and whom I beg you will embrace on our behalf, to acquaint you speedily of a mistake I made, which will not affect you, but which may be prejudicial to me. It is this:

The hurry I was in to tell you of the money and remit it to you, was the occasion of my reading M. Picot's letter to me on that subject of the 17th September last with too much precipitation. I understood it, that the Bill of Exchange drawn upon Bombay and which remits me this money for you, was at 60 days after date. Supposing this to be the case, the money should have already reached me, or I should receive it in a few days, counting the 60 days as expired on the 15th instant, but by the Duplicate which I have just received from M. Picot, and in which is enclosed that for you, I perceive that the Bill upon Bombay is at 60 days, without explaining whether after date or after sight, and as the money is not arrived here yet, nor even an answer to my letter to Mr. Scott on the subject, I presume that this Bill drawn upon him is at 60 days after sight and not after date, which produces a delay of more than a month. In my hurry I wrote to you to drawn upon me at 30 days sight. I have in consequence accepted your Bill to pay it the 17th of next month; it appears probable that I shall not receive the money from Bombay before the 1st January. In order therefore to prevent my being taken unprovided, it is necessary you should apprize Pandoba Lacre of this circumstance, and that you give him a common receipt which will be sent to me by his Correspondent, as soon as I shall have paid him the sum which M. Picot tells me will be sent me for you from Bombay, and to cancel the Bill of Exchange for the six thousand. This will not cause any delay to you, because so soon as the money is sent me by Mr. Scott of Bombay, I shall transmit it to you through Pandoba Lacre's Correspondent. If I have committed a fault by acting with too much precipitation in this business, you must attribute it alone to my real for you, but M. Picot was wrong in not having sent me the Bill of Exchange upon Bombay,

because being possessed of that paper, I should have acted on it immediately. Who knows whether his Correspondent at Bombay has taken the proper steps. I shall know however in four or five days in which time I expect an answer to the letter I wrote to Mr. Scott of Bombay on the subject. To inform you more fully I give you the following extract of M. Picot's Letter. " I have just received the sum of 12,000 Rupees intended for M. de St. Lubin, but not knowing how to attend to this business, I have determined to remit six thousand rupees to you, and retain the like sum in my hands, by which means he will find what he may want of it ready for him both here and with you. This sum is remitted to me by a Bill of Exchange at 60 days upon Bombay where I send it to Mr. David Scott, that he may charge himself with the payment of it, and make the division between us, which I have resolved on. You will observe the Rupees are Bombay Rupees. If therefore Mr. Scott sends you the money which indeed you may demand of him if he delays speaking to you about it, pray keep it on account of M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin etc.

(Signed) Picot

You will see by this, Sir, the necessity of transmitting your receipt to Pandoba Lacre's Agent here, as a discharge for the Bill of Exchange for 6,000 rupees, that this man may not again make you pay interest for nothing at all, for I am fully assured that Pandoba Lacre ought not to give you the 6,000 rupees till Jagzivane has received them here of me, and I beg you will trust to my word of honour that I shall not keep this money a single day, but shall transmit it to you through Jagzivane's hands, so soon as I shall have received it. Enclosed is the Bill of Exchange for 4,000 rupees upon M. Picot, and your letter which accompanied it. Respecting that which I received in your dispatches of the 7th instant, I shall seal it and send it to him within ten days. I can write you no more at present, I am so much pressed with writing to Europe. This closes my dispatches, M. Pascal being to set off from hence for Europe in five days at farthest. I shall write to you immediately after his departure.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) Anquetil

*The following letters and extract are not entered in my correspondence sent by M. Boicervoise, that gentleman having been dispatched from Surat for Muscat, the 30th November 1777.*

M. de St. Lubin

Surat, 1st December 1777

Sir,

The present is merely to advise you of M. Pascal's departure for Europe. He embarked yesterday with M. Boicervoise for Muscat, where they will set off for Grain, and perhaps pass Bushire, from which place they will go by the Caravan to Aleppo. They will not pass through Bassrah on account of the war between the Turks and Carem Khan, but if by chance they should go that way, I have given them a letter for M. Rousseau and for all the Persons, Consuls or others, with whom they must stop in their route. I have taken care they should have a good Armenian Servant with them, who understanding the language of the country, and speaking the Arabic very well, has promised me to conduct them to Aleppo in 70 days at farthest. May Heaven watch over them as well in shortening their journey, and consequently their fatigue, as in the speedy delivery of your dispatches and mine to the Minister ! The English have refused me the passage of the Red Sea for their vessel, on account of M. Pascal, but everything considered, they will, by going at this time, get as soon to Europe through the Persian Gulf as if they were to go by the Red Sea, because no opportunity will offer for that passage, either here or at Bombay, in less than 40 days at farthest. This delay of a direct opportunity for Suez, renders the route which these gentlemen will take through the Persian Gulf, absolutely preferable to that of the Red Sea. This has determined me to send them that way, without thinking any more of the other, and I am persuaded you would have acted in the same manner. Enclosed is a letter which M. Pascal left with me for you, I gave him the five hundred Rupees aggreeably to your desire, for which he has given me a receipt. As to the loss of the Pagodas, not having remitted them to me, I could not credit him for them etc.

I hear nothing further of M. Bolts, pray, Sir, inform me how you are with him. Does he succeed in his negotiations with the Court of Poona ? Will he have Goga on which he so entirely depends ? I am however very easy in that respect because you are there, otherwise I should absolutely fear for our precedence, which though of right, is notwithstanding capable

of being made to agree with the pretensions or demands of M. Bolts, but I depend on you entirely in the affair, and must beg you will give me some few satisfactory particulars of his proceedings. I hear nothing further of M. Leroi, no more than of Chaul nor the French Ships. Pray acquaint me with what you know on this subject.

I have the honor to be etc.,

(Signed) Anquetil

Surat, 6th December 1777

M. de St.Lubin

Sir,

The enclosed Packet which I dispatched to you on the 2nd instant was returned to me Yesterday. The Pattamar who had charge of it, fell sick on the Road, and not being able to proceed, sent it back to me. It is fortunately returned safe, and I dispatched it to you again immediately without loss of time, on account of what it contained respecting the Bill of Exchange for 6,000 rupees. I think it will be better in future to send me receipts than to draw Bills of Exchange on me. That will occasion no delay to you, Sir, will save me much uneasiness, seeing what may happen to the Money which M. Picot advises me of for you. As to the six thousand rupees which I shall receive from Bombay not before the end of the month, I think, or perhaps the middle of January, notwithstanding the accident of the Pattamar's falling sick, you have yet time enough by sending back the bearer of this one day after his arrival. I shall pay him for his being only six days going six days returning, and one to rest at Poona. With this speed, your receipt cancelling the Bill of Exchange will be presented to me the 18th instant. If I have the money, I will remit it immediately, if it is detained fifteen or twenty days more or less, I will remit it to Jagzivane as soon as received, and will give you advice of it that moment, but perhaps the Pattamar to M. Bolts by whom I wrote to you on the 26th of last month, will bring me your answer agreeably to this.

I have this instant, Sir, received your letter of the 25th of last Month, but not being able to detain the Pattamar more than two hours, I must reply to it very briefly. I give you a thousand thanks for your obliging attention to M. Bolts, and to the recommendation I gave him to secure

the good reception you have given him. I expected no less from your friendship for me, and from your penetration in discovering the personal merit of M. Bolts. It is a very fortunate circumstance for him to have met you at Poona, he would otherwise have been much embarrassed to negotiate at the Court, especially on account of the King's mourning, and the delays he must have submitted to but for your mediation, which will undoubtedly shorten his work. I have read your letter a second time, I am so charmed with it in every respect. The generosity which reigns in it throughout to M. Bolts as your guest, the preparations you have made for his visit, the measure you take not to. . . . our interests whilst you labour to forward the views of the Empress Queen at the Maratha Court, the success of M. Bolts' first audience, part of his Suite being put in employ; dresses etc. all this gives me the most sensible pleasure. I shall say more on this matter in a future letter.

Your thanks for the two muskets are such that you must pardon me, Sir, for regretting I sent you so little etc.

You perceive by my last that Mess. Pascal and Boicervoise took their departure the 30th of last month. I have without knowing it fulfilled half your wish, having sent to the Minister by M. Boicervoise my correspondence with you, and two extracts of your letters. I reckon to send the duplicate in less than twenty days by the way of Suez; a good friend of mine will charge himself with it. I shall then transmit to M. de Sartine extracts of the essential parts of your letters and mine. Make use of this route, it is very safe and speedy; but your dispatches must be with me by the 25th or 30th instant at farthest.

There is nothing new here. I hear no more of the French ships; and I am spending my own money whilst I wait for them. I know not what is become of M. Leroy. He will certainly come soon upon me by surprize. The Pattamar who conveys this to you cannot return in six days; send me one of yours if the case should require it, for the exchange of a receipt for the Bill. I wrote to M. Picot some days ago, that he might manage matters better another time when he transmits cash to you thro' my hands.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Anquetil

P. S.—I doubted much whether M. Bolts would treat entirely by himself with the Minister; he had taken with him all his people for the purpose, but he reckoned without his host. He has left on board his ship upwards of 15 thousand of Musquets, they say, with cannon and ammunition in proportion. He will undoubtedly have trusted to you to dispose of them at Poona. Apropos of arms, are the three bodies of Maratha troops in the field ?

M. de St. Lubin Surat, 17th December 1777

Sir,

Your letter of the 8th December came to my hands yesterday morning. I am at present put in a way of discharging the 6,000 rupees. I have fortunately found four, which I have immediately sent to Pandoba Lacre's Correspondent, the holder of the Bill of Exchange. As I paid him that sum one day before it was due, he cannot complain if I wait two days longer to send him the other two thousand rupees, which he will certainly have tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. It is your credit, Sir, more than my own, which I have laboured to preserve in this transaction, which the desire of obliging you has made me rather hurry, so that it is neither your fault nor mine, but rather M. Picot's fault who should have sent me the whole negotiation, or have written me more clearly that I might have acted securely, and with a knowledge of the affair. As for my credit I must apprize you that it is lost, and it is the Minister's silence respecting me that has ruined it, as I have not received a letter from him, nor the least order since I have been at Surat; but conducting myself as an honest man, and doing every thing for the Nation which the duties of my place require. I commit all to Providence, and am prepared for every event. What route will your other six thousand rupees take? It was more natural for it to have been sent to me all at the same time, but M. P. thought to do for the best, for I know his intentions are good. So soon as I hear of this second sum being sent, I shall advise you of it. Annexed is copy of the letter I have this day written to Bombay, relative to the advance I have just made for you. Be assured of the regularity of my conduct in whatever may concern you.

I am obliged to you for what you tell me as to M. Bolts's transaction at Poona, and I felicitate myself on having apprized you of everything which I think may have been of service to you. Pray do me the favour of letting me know soon, how far your mediation has contributed (and

which it must have done without doubt) to the success of his affairs. I shall learn nothing from him, because he is too reserved to those who wish him well, and who are in a situation to serve him, not for their interests but for his own. I have besides another point of delicacy. I would not appear to sell him hospitality, and that is the opinion he might form of me were I to show myself too curious.

I am under a thousand obligations to you for M. Bolts's work in French, it will be here in ten or twelve days, and I shall acknowledge the receipt of it.

I hear no talk of the three armies; pray acquaint me whether the Marathas are still of the same mind. There is nothing new here. A Frenchman at Bohonajore near Goga, and in the service of the Rajah of that place, writes me word that the said Rajah is sold to the English, and that the merchants are so far intimidated by the Nabob of Surat's menaces, that he believes Mr. Bolts will be able to do nothing on that side. You will take notice it is the Rajah's Chief Cannoneer, who writes me this. There is nothing further said here about any French ships, they only say they are gone to glut Bengal and the Choromandel Coast with the large quantity of their merchandize. Do you expect any ships at Chaul ? M. Le Roy has not made his appearance. Perhaps the ships of war will come as far as here. Do not forget Goga. Domous will have its day beyond a doubt. The obstinate silence of the Minister does not slacken my zeal for the Nation, but vexes me very much. It does not signify, let us always use our endeavours, and we shall have nothing to reproach ourselves with.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) Anquetil

P. S.—On the 2nd instant I advised you of M. Pascal's departure with M. Boicervoise, who embarked for Muscat the 30th of last Month. The Pattamar falling sick on the road, fortunately returned me my dispatches, which I sent to you a second time the 5th instant. I am much obliged to you, Sir, for the care you take of him who is also arrived with you sick.

M. de St. Lubin Surat, 27th December 1777

Sir,

My letter of the 17th instant gave you advice that I had paid 4,000 rupees one day before they were due, out of the 6,000 which are to come through M. Picot's negotiation, and at present I am to acquaint you that six days after they were due, I paid the remaining two thousand. I need tell you that I was obliged to sell effects to complete this sum, therefore there is no interest to pay, as I immediately replaced the sum I had borrowed for you, with the produce of my sale; but I cannot conceal it from you, that I am a little uneasy as to the Bombay transaction which is what I must trust to. As the Bill of Exchange sent by M. Picot has been protested, and will only be paid by M. for the honour of the endorsers, I much fear any delay which may lead me into a state of embarrassment, for I am subsisting, at present merely by the produce of my effects, as no vessel arrives, this blank of 6,000 rupees, if not filled up shortly, may prejudice me very much; and all this arises from the negotiation not being directly sent to me, and from my having acted too precipitately. However it may be, I am much pleased that your six thousand rupees are come to hand, for you must have received them before the receipt of this. As to myself, don't be uneasy about me; for seventeen years that I have lived at Surat, I have been accustomed to live by my shifts; it is true the service suffers from it; for if I had money to subsist myself and provide for the settlement, there would not perhaps, without flattering myself, be a more extensive and interesting correspondence in India than mine. I have neither a taste for play, the table, or parties of pleasure. I love a small society composed partly of ourselves and partly of strangers, and above all my own closet; but as I am anxious to see the French Nation make as great a figure in India as Foreigners, this cannot be done without money, and that ruins me. If, on the contrary, the means of providing for this settlement were sent me either from Europe or from Pondicherry much less uneasiness would be occasioned to me, and consequently I should have more ability to exert for the service; not being embarrassed how I should subsist this year and next, whether ships arrive or not, all my correspondence is then in motion. I know what passes among the Marathas, at Bombay, in the Red Sea, in the Persian Gulf, at Delhi and even in Bengal, without speaking of the Malabar and Choromandel Coasts and China; my closet which suits my natural taste, becomes my only delight, and the center, where, by

means of my well supported correspondence, all the Political and Commercial News of the above places meet; I then digest the whole, and the Minister sees at one view all that passes in India, which is interesting and relating to public and private affairs; but when one must be continually contriving how to make the pot boil, which by the bye is a very material object, whatever Philosophers may say, it enervates the imagination and makes all correspondence languish; and that you may once more note my proverbial stile, I cannot help telling you as a proof of what I advance, that *an empty stomach has no ears.* This is the situation in which I unfortunately find myself; but I should find it the reverse, and which would be most advantageous to the Nation, if the Minister would take into consideration the Consulate of Surat, which, from its local situation, should be considered as the point where all India affairs center, and as the source of all the news which he may receive. If the settlement of Surat were considered in this point of view, my writers would not be employed in drawing up papers, in order to make the private adventurers, who declare me the cause of their losses, hearken to reason, and to make them pay my Bills of Exchange drawn in conformity to their powers to provide the proper cargo for their ship, which but for my trouble and care would have been entirely destroyed. On the contrary, my writers would be employed in writing from my dictating whatever the Minister should be acquainted with; but since I see that notwithstanding all my efforts, and all my zeal for the Service, it is not possible for me to procure it those advantages which should naturally result from my situation at Surat in quality of Consul from France, I have requested M. de Sartine to honor me with his protection in some other Post, or to assure to me some emoluments in this, without reckoning on duties which may yield one year, and produce nothing the next. I have further requested him to allow the Nation to enjoy the privilege it has from the Nabob of hoisting a Flag. I have sent him all the papers which prove that right. It is carried before me in the streets of Surat, the least word from the Minister to the English Ambassador, would be sufficient to terminate the quarrel which the English have with me on this subject, and that it may be placed on the French Ground as it was formerly. Besides this right is an appendage to the status of Consul from France, wherever he may happen to reside; but there are much stronger reasons for it at Surat where this privilege subsists; and where it is necessary that the French Flag should be hoisted, as well for the honour of the Nation as for its credit among the people of the Country. I have not yet received any answer from the Minister on the subject, but I hope

to have his orders on this head in reply to my letters which he has undoubtedly received by the Duras, together with those which I have sent him by M. Boicervoise. My requests were that he would please to recall me, and to continue his protection to me in another Post, if he did not think proper to take into consideration the affairs of the settlement, the ruinous consequences of which could not be viewed by a father of a family as I am, without casting a look of despair on the future. I have had a large sum due to me for these ten months. No ship has appeared in this road, and according to M. Picot's letter of the 6th November last I am not to expect any. What shifts can I make ? I know of none but patience when affairs appear to be at the worst. Providence often brings us the most effectual help. As this idea has some consolatory in it, I will finish my hasty letter with it, in which you would find neither head nor tail, nor point nor connection. Its only end was to tell you I paid the Bill of Exchange for 6,000 rupees, that at the receipt of this, that sum should be in your hands, and that I expect daily to be reimbursed from Bombay. How many words you will say for this piece of intelligence, which might have been contained in two lines ! I agree with you, but indeed I supposed you to be with me in my closet, the conversation was prolonged without my thinking of it, and I spoke to you from the fullness of my heart. Being come to myself I seek you but no longer see you. My letter shall however be sent away since it is written. As I was in an ecstasy whilst I wrote it, I have read it again and find nothing but truth in it. Why then suppress it ? On the contrary, Sir, I refer you to it entirely, and shall only add that Mr. Bolts is not yet arrived at Bombay, that as soon as he returns here I shall employ all my rhetorick to induce him to adopt the plan you have proposed to him for his cargo. If he accepts it, which I doubt, I shall receive at least 15,000 rupees in duties for the King. Good Heaven ! How well the affairs of the closet would go on for about 12 or 15 months, but if he does not accept it, what a dreadful reverse at this time when we miss our ships so much. This sinister affliction affects me etc.

I have the honor to be etc.

(Signed) Anquetil

Supplement to my correspondence containing various extracts of letters from M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin, Minister from France at the Court of the Marathas, written to M. Anquetil, Consul at Surat.

Poona, 15th October 1777

Sir,

I now give you the news I had promised you, and you will say it is pretty good work for a dead man, if my friends still make me pass for such.

The army commanded by Aripendet, composed of 60 thousand horse and 20 thousand foot will continue its operations against Hyder Aly. It has two objects in view, the one is to make him pay the Chout, the other to prevent his meddling in Ragoba's affairs. It has remained in cantonments on the banks of the river Tungbadra on Hyder Aly's frontiers, during the rainy season, in order to open the campaign early by an immediate irruption. In eleven days they are to be in action.

Another army commanded by Brimrow, composed of 40,000 horsemen and 10,000 foot soldiers, with a considerable train of artillery, march strait into Guzzerat, where it is to be joined near Brodera by Fateh Sing's forces to go and fight Govinrao as far as Amadabad. He is another friend of Ragoba's, put in play by those who dare do nothing themselves. We are not the dupes of their artifice; and therefore........

Another army commanded by Ramsandy Gonef, composed of 20,000 men, are gone to be on the watch in the Concan from Bombay to Surat.

At the same time the Maratha fleet will cruize along the whole of the Coast between these two places.

You now see one of the best concerted plans for a campaign that has been seen for a long while. Judge whether the fever will not become epidemic from Bombay to Baroche. These are the outlines of the picture of 1767 which I gave you in my last. You are very fortunate, Sir, in having it in your power to serve such a man as Mr. Bolts, whose heart and head do honour to human nature. He has defended its cause against tyranny with that vigour which can alone proceed from virtue. His work is one of the chief ornaments of my library. I carried to the Minister as soon as it made its appearance. Its similarity with my writings on the same subject struck him so forcibly, that if mine had not been anterior, it might have been taxed with either collusion or plagiarism. If he remains only three years longer in India, he will see all his predictions fulfilled. As to his commerce, it is sufficient that the Empress Queen has entrusted one of her ships to him, for every Frenchman to favor it. Therefore, Sir, let you and I act in concert to procure M. de Sartine the satisfaction of

paying his Court to the Queen. The following is the plan which my regard for that Minister suggests to me.

If the Nabob of Surat, who is always tormented by apprehensions, and by the English, should refuse your demand in favour of the ship Theresa, the resource of the Marathas is open to him; but not to affect your personal interests, I would take the following course.Pandaba Lacré shall buy his cargo which is in your hands at Surat. Your duties will be paid there, and the ship shall go from thence to unload at Chaoul. By this expedient I shall serve you all. I wish for nothing but glory. Pandaba is this instant set off for Surat to know the nature, quality, quantity and price of the goods. Yoy may, if you think proper, send me an account of those particulars etc.

I have the honor to be very sincerely etc.

(Signed) Le Chevr. de St. Lubin

M. Anquetil de Briancourt — Poona, 25th November 1777

Sir,

Mr. Bolts arrived here the 18th of this month, and after your recommendation you may easily imagine the reception he met with. I immediately went to the Prime Minister Nana Fernis, to acquaint him of the affair. I requested him to receive my guest as an officer belonging to a Queen, who was the mother of ours, a Power who formed a common cause with us, and I asked for a favourable hearing of the propositions he had to make, if they had nothing in them contrary to Maratha and French interests.

In consequence of this he had his audience yesterday afternoon, and returned from it much pleased. In his conversation with Nana, he perceived the English had already injured him by representing him as a fugitive from the Company, an Adventurer etc. He defended himself successfully against these odious imputations, and the Minister appeared to be satisfied with his apology. In reply to what Mr. Bolts alleged in not having brought any presents, because he had not been permitted to unlade any thing at Danou, he said it was sufficient that he brought a letter from his sovereign, whose Union with the King of France he was acquainted with. You must allow, Sir, this may be called a well-turned compliment and highly flattering to the family compact, the tenor of which I had explained to this Minister, who conversed with Mr. Bolts on the subject with great attention.

Mr. Bolts cannot see the King, because his mourning keeps him from all affairs of State for a year. As to his business, Nana has sent him to Krichenrow, the Counsellor of State, who, as you know, reports French affairs to the Council. It is a very delicate attention on the part of Nana towards France, and I owe him my acknowledgement for Mr. Bolts on his arrival, replied to the proposition I made to him to make use of the channel of Krichenrow to treat on his affairs, that he did not need any body, as he would do every thing by himself and his Secretary. Thus you may make yourself perfectly easy as to your speculations. I have them at heart for two reasons, because they belong to you, and because they will belong to us.

As to the rest, I shall exert my endeavours to render my guest's life agreeable. As he showed a desire of mortifying the English by an air of parade at his visit to Nana, I gave him my elephant, my guards, my horses, all my train except my colours. He lodges with me, and I have told him I shall consider the least expense he may be at during his stay here, even for his servants, as a breach of hospitality. His palanquin bearers having quitted him to return to Danou, I have hired ten more at my own expense for his use. I have done the same thing respecting the peons, mausliges, camaties etc. and my soldiers mount guard at his apartments in the same manner as at mine. I have brought the principal merchants to him, in order to instruct him in the trade. My Divan having told me that he was uneasy for his Bills of Exchange upon Bombay, I offered him my purse for any money he might have occasion for. In fine I study continually to seek for what may give him pleasure, and prevent not only his demands but even his wishes. I think he will leave me very well satisfied, and I thank you for having offered me the opportunity of showing you the power your recommendation will always have over me, and must desire you will consider it as absolute.

I received from Mr. Bolts the handsome arms which you committed to his charge for me. I accept with gratitude this present, magnificent as it is; but when I think of the engagement formed in my last letter, I must appear like a lazy sort of a gentleman, a lawyer without a cause, for ladies such as yours can have no enemies. I request you to lay my respectful homage at their feet etc.

I have the honor to be etc.

(Signed) Le Chevr. de St. Lubin.

Another extract of a letter

M. Anquetil de Briancourt — Poona, 8th December 1777

Sir,

I have received your packet of the 24th November. The Pattamar came in seven days and is dying here, though I have taken all possible care of him.

Mr. Bolts after having met with the reception from Nana which I mentioned to you in my dispatches of the 25th November had an audience of Sataram Bapore. He has tried every manoevre for these fifteen days past to treat in the matter himself, but at last having received a positive answer from Government that he could not do better than employ the mediation of the Minister from France, he resolved to desire I would charge myself with his negotiation, he had his audience of leave of the Minister yesterday. To day he sets out for Bombay, from whence he will return to Surat. I charged him with the French translation of his work against the Company for you, and a housing for your amiable amazon's horse etc.

I have the honor to be etc.

(Signed) Le. Chevr. de St. Lubin

An other extract of a letter from M. le Chevr. de St. Lubin to M. Anquetil

Poona, 13th December 1777

Sir,

You have done all for the best respecting M. Pascal's journey, and I hope he will arrive safe at the place of his destination. Pray accept my sincerest and warmest thanks for the kindness you have shown him during his stay at Surat. I like to think that his behaviour has evinced his gratitude to you, mine is extreme.

Why do you take the trouble, Sir, of sending me copy of your correspondence with Bombay and Myhie (Mahé), as to that Bill of Exchange ? One word from you would have been sufficient. I know *you,* but I see it is necessary that you should know *me* better. I earnestly wish to be on a footing with you in that respect.

If you agree with me in the remark I made in my letter of the 8th of this month on the injury which would accrue to your credit and mine in case of the least evasion respecting the Bill of Exchange drawn by me and accepted by you, I think you will not have had any difficulty in procuring the money at interest; your credit is a safeguard for me. I beg you will place the interest to my account, and that you may have no scruple upon that head. I declare to you that the same interest is paid to me here by Pandoba from the day my money is in the hands of his Correspondent. You see this expedient will accommodate every one.

If the questions you ask me, respecting Mr. Bolts in your letters of the 1st and 6th December still remained questions with you, after reading my dispatches of the 8th, I should believe you have not perfectly understood me. You have every reason to be satisfied. He has been referred to me, and I am, as I have told you, charged with managing his business. He set off for Bombay the 9th.

I am much hurt at finding you so little visited by our ships and when they arrive, the passage from Myhie will have deprived you of the best of their cargoes. You will only have what remains unsold and nearly unsaleable. I had entertained hopes of rectifying this ill luck a little, by proposing to you for Mr. Bolts the settlement offered by Pandoba Lacre of buying his cargo in your hands at Surat, paying you the duties. That was the sense of my letter of the 15th October; but when at his arrival here, I showed him that letter in my book, so far from finding him disposed towards you as I expected, he talked of nothing but selling at Goga, and of the steps he had taken with the Chief of that place as to his commerce. I suffered him to proceed, till after the most vigourous efforts he found out that his arrangements amounted to nothing at all. If on his return to Surat he appears to be more tractable, you can write me upon it, and I will settle the matter immediately. I find your words 'he reckoned without his host' not only strictly true, but perhaps the Proverb was never better applied.

I hear no more than you do of M. Leroy. I expect him in October. We must have patience.

The three armies are in motion, and in expectation of your sending me news from the North, I give you the following from the South.

The 4th of this month a courier arrived from the army commanded by Aripandet. That General has passed the river Tungebadra in safety

notwithstanding the resistance of Mahmut Ally who retreated to his master Hyder Ally with the loss of six hundred horses taken, with three pieces of cannon, 5,000 musquets and an elephant. Aripundet pursued him      coss beyond the river. The fruits of this first victory has been the junction of the two Rajahs of Raidunjums and Checkeldurgum with the Marathas. The Nabob Bapalasing (Bassalat Jang?) offers to join them or to act on his side on their part against the common enemy. This is bad news for the English, who kindle the fire of this war to destroy the two powers by means of each other and, then to rise upon the double ruin. I labour very hard to extinguish the flame, but Hyder must pay, and the quantum is the point on which both parties must hearken to reason. I shall effect it.

I have the honour to be etc.

(Signed) Le Chevr. de St. Lubin

Postcript of my letter of the 27th sent to M. de St. Lubin and omitted to be copied in its proper place, containing the last news from the Coasts of Malabar and Choromandel.

On reflection I doubt, Sir, whether my letter will please you. There is too much moralizing and too many complaints in it. This has fortunately something to render it more interesting. I received this morning a letter from M. Picot of the 21st November, and he gives me the following news.

It is M. Picot who speaks.

"It is a long time, Sir, since we received news from Pondicherry. We expect some every day, as well by M. Duplessis, who proceeds overland, second in command at that place, as by the King's ship Le Curieux, which brings us some supplies. When they are both arrived, I will apprize you of what I can learn. M. Law is constantly at Pondicherry busied in his private affairs, which his zeal for the public has caused him to leave too much behind hand. M. de Courcy who sailed in June (July) on the Consolante, and arrived in April in the Isle of France, found M. Foucaud

in possession of the command. We should have the Brillant now but she is gone to the Acheen and will not be with us till January. I do not know whether she will go to the Northward, perhaps we may have the advantage of seeing our General here by that Ship. She has visited Karrikal, as I told you. There are no news of any trading ships for that Coast.

Hyder Ali Khan is very successful in his enterprises, he has just subjected Chittel Drouk to a contribution of 13 lacks of pagodas and is at present on the banks of the river Tongebadra, to face the Maratha army. By the first mission of M. Coutenceau, and that at present entrusted to M. Duplessix you will judge of the terms we are on with this conqueror ".

Your last news of the operations of the Marathas towards the South and this last sentence of M. Picot's letter give me much reason to fear a battle, which will not hurt Hyder Ally much, because one affair balances the other, but which may do an essential injury to our Nation, and on the contrary, be very useful to the English, at least if good harmony does not direct our operations as well on the Choromandel as on the Malabar Coast, but your abilities in negotiation, the knowledge you have of Asiatic Politics, and above all your patriotism, make me easy on the subject. M. Picot concludes his letter thus " The Plutarch, belonging to M. Monneron, commanded by M. Huchy, and fitted out at Nantz, respecting which we have been very uneasy in India for this year past, is wrecked at Mombasa from whence the Captain and crew are gone to Cochy. Some of the officers and sailors, are just arrived, but the Captain remains at Cochy to settle his accounts etc. ".

This extract of M. Picot's letter, Sir, will make up for mine being so dry and uninterseting. I have no great things to tell you from the North except that we are assured here that Futty Sing has by his address, and at the instigation of the English, decoyed Apaganesse Governor of Amdabad into his camp near Brodera, and cut off his head, in order as it is said to put Ragoba in his place; Govindrao and Kanderow are actually encamped near Amadavat; They wait for supplies from Poona to enter that city, and in pursuance of orders from the Maratha Court, to place there as Governor, the son of Apaganesse of 14 years old, who shut himself up there in that hope. The English troops sent from Surat into the neighbourhood of Baroche are on their return. They have

only lost a few blacks and one European officer. They give out that they have brought two Coolie Chiefs to reason who refused to pay the revenues of their jaghires. I forgot to thank you, Sir, for your good wishes towards the settlement of Surat, which I see by the commercial scheme you have engaged for Mr. Bolts to adopt. I think he will do nothing in it, and so much the worse for him and for me respecting the duties. I am moreover much obliged to you, and the Minister cannot but be highly pleased with the address with which you have turned into your own hands, Mr. Bolt's negotiations with the Court of Poona, and especially his pretensions respecting Goga. I have this moment received news from Bombay that the 6,000 Rupees have been paid under protest, and they will be sent to me, so that I reckon upon being reimbursed in 15 or 20 days.

Surat, 30th December 1777
a Duplicate

Anquetil de Briancourt
Copy

*(The names—Nawab of Surat, Bombay, Surat, Raghunathrao (Raghoba) and Briancourt occur almost throughout the volume and have therefore not been included in the Index.)*

# FRENCH RECORDS

(Relating to the History of the Marathas)

**Volume II**

# INTRODUCTION

St. Lubin was not a stranger to this country. He had visited India in 1757 as an honorary volunteer in the army, commanded by General Lally. Soon his aptitude for languages and politics of the country attracted the attention of the General. In 1759 he was sent by Lally on a secret mission to Bengal. There he lived with the Dutch under the name of Winlow and posed as an illegitimate son of the Marquis of Maffei by some German countess. He claimed to have seized the plans of the fortifications of Calcutta and to have kidnapped the engineer, thus, causing a delay in the construction of the fort. He returned to France in 1762 and submitted an account of his operations to Lally who advised him to submit the same to the East India Company and to the Ministry. When in 1764 Jean Law de Lauriston was appointed Royal Commissioner to take possession of the Indian settlements restored to France by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, St. Lubin expressed a desire to form part of his suite. But having met him in Bengal and known him as an intriguer, Law refused to comply with his request. Thereafter, he frequented the antechambers of the Minister and the Company's offices, and succeeded in gaining the confidence of the authorities in France. He was allowed to return to India, at his own expense, to cultivate his knowledge of the political situation in that country so as to be in a position to render maximum service to his nation at the first signal of war between France and England. He left by the overland route in a caravan and was in Persia sometime towards the end of 1764. He spent a year there in studying the Persian language. He arrived in India *via* the passes of Kandahar in 1766. After spending some time in Delhi, he left for the south, collecting on the way very useful information about the political situation then prevailing in India. His destination was Mysore. He claimed to be a generallissimo for some time in the army of Haider Ali and a person who framed the treaty between that ruler and the Marathas for which he received two lakhs of rupees.

Then, suddenly on the outbreak of war between Haider and the English, he deserted to the latter, as he asserts, with the object of helping that prince by sowing seeds of dissension among his enemies at Madras. After peace was signed between the ruler of Mysore and the English in April 1769, St. Lubin, if we are to believe his statement, had entered into negotiations with the Maratha chiefs and the Peshwa Madhavrao himself for a Franco-Maratha alliance. In 1770 St. Lubin appears to have left India for the Isle of Bourbon, now Rèunion. M. Law de Lauriston had bitterly complained about his misbehaviour—his treacherous conduct in seducing the garrison of Pondicherry and desertion from Haider's army to the English—to M. le Duc de Praslin, Minister for the Navy, with the remarks that if he had got hold of him at that time, he would have sent him to Europe bound in chains. It is perhaps relying on this report that the Minister, by his dispatch of November 5, 1771, sent orders to M. le Chevalier de Ternay, Governor-General of the Isles of France and Bourbon, to arrest St. Lubin and him to France. Accordingly, he was arrested and sent to France on the ship *l'Indien* in October 1772. On his arrival at Brest in France, he was transferred to the prison of Bastille, but as there was no incriminating evidence against him, he was set at liberty in December 1773.

It was about this time that the proposals made in the beginning of 1772 by the Peshwa Madhavrao to Law, Governor of Pondicherry, for a Franco-Maratha alliance, must have reached France. The Peshwa proposed that the French should bring into India and pass into the service of the Marathas 10,000 men who were (supposed) to be stationed at the Isle of France, with the arms, munitions and artillery necessary for the conduct of the different campaigns in which they would partake. The Marathas promised to cede to the French all the territory that belonged to Haider Ali beyond the (Eastern) Ghats and fetching an annual revenue of 30 to 40 lakhs; to exempt the province of Arcot from the levy of Chauthai; to pay in cash all the expenses of the French troops and also of those stationed at Pondicherry until the French became undisturbed

possessors of the said territory. In addition, the Marathas would cede to the French Bassein and its dependencies on the Konkan Coast. They would also help them to re-establish themselves in Bengal and in other parts of India as they liked. The Marathas would consider the enemies of the French as their own and as such would render them assistance whenever they needed it. So long as the French were at peace with the English, the Marathas would not force the former either to attack the latter or disturb them in any manner; but in the eventuality of a war being declared between the French and the English, the Marathas from this moment, would consider the latter as their own enemies. Finally, as soon as the treaty was concluded, the Marathas would compel Nizam Ali to engage French troops in his service and to cede to the French districts in the neighbourhood of Masulipatam, fetching an annual revenue of 20 lakhs for the maintenance of these troops. Madhavrao had inflicted crushing defeats upon Haider Ali, but he wanted to destroy him completely. The Peshwa was fully aware that the English, now a dominant power in India, would not fail to play the 'divide and rule' policy in this country, which was so much in their interest. To forestall the English, in case they decided to support Haider Ali, Madhavrao would have recourse to the French, who, he felt sure, would not decline such tempting offers which, at the same time, were so reasonable. The presence of 10,000 French troops in India would certainly neutralize the activity of the English, whose settlements in India would be in danger of an attack by the French. The cession of the fort of Bassein was intended to prevent the Government of Bombay from doing any mischief to the Maratha territory, whereas the French troops to be stationed with Nizam Ali, would act as a check upon the English in Bengal. Finally, after the destruction of Haider Ali, as soon as war broke out between France and England, Madhavrao would not lose the occasion to drive out the English from India. The proposed treaty with the French was thus a masterstroke of Madhavrao's statesmanship. The Council of Pondicherry examined the proposals very carefully and came to the unanimous conclusion that the acceptance of

these proposals was the only means of re-establishing French influence in India and humbling the power of the English in that country.

St. Lubin had definitely come to know of these proposals, as he was now entrusted with the study of the administration in India in the Ministry for the Navy. Perhaps spurred by these proposals and also those made by Mahadji Shinde to Chevalier, Director at Chandernagore, in the beginning of the year 1773, for the expulsion of the English from Bengal, he addressed to the Minister for the Navy several memorials, on the political situation in India and on the means of destroying the power of the English in that country. On January 10, 1775, he submitted to the Minister a plan for concluding a treaty of alliance with the Marathas. It consisted of a treaty with the King of the Marathas, by which the French would furnish him a corps of artillery troops, 2,400 strong. These troops were to be divided into two regiments, one of them composed of 1,200 men and called the Regiment of Alliance, would serve the Marathas and would always maintain its full strength; the other would be stationed at Pondicherry and utilised for recruiting the Regiment of Alliance. The Marathas would meet all the expenses of this corps, for its levy in Europe, transport to India, maintenance, pay, etc. The Marathas, said St. Lubin, possessed a decided superiority over the English in the open field (St. Lubin seems to refer to the guerilla warfare and the Maratha cavalry). The French artillery troops would give the Marathas an additional advantage over the English in siege operations. The latter would thus, argued St. Lubin, be forced to confine themselves to their fortresses and come to terms with the French, if they wanted to avoid complete ruin. But if, due to the fear of hostility with the English, circumspection was required, St. Lubin suggested that the troops could be dispatched to the Marathas secretly, or under the pretext of desertion.

In a letter, dated April 7, 1775, he urged upon the Minister to execute the plan which, as he assured, would not involve any great expenditure or need much preparation.

St. Lubin was ready to undertake the responsibility of concluding an alliance with the Marathas under the pretext of signing with them a treaty of commerce and securing admission for French ships into their ports. He appealed to the Minister to rely on his skill in negotiating with men with whose interests, language and principles he was well conversant. The measure of the success, he warned, would depend on the celerity of the French in executing this plan.

As if to strengthen St. Lubin's hands, the Marathas made fresh proposals to the French for an alliance to wage war on the English. They offered to the French all the establishments occupied by the English on the Malabar Coast; in addition they would pay thirty to forty lakhs of rupees as expenses to undertake this war. Law, Governor of Pondicherry, entrusted these proposals to M. Beylié, a French Officer who was proceeding to France on leave (June 1775), with instructions to deliver them personally to the Minister. These proposals must have reached France in the beginning of 1776. War had just broken out between England and her American colonies. Thus, at long last, the opportunity had come for France to avenge the humiliations of the Treaty of Paris of 1763. Although the Court of Versailles had not yet made up its mind to declare war against England, Vergennes, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, advised Sartine, the Minister for the Navy, to establish contact with the Government of Poona. Sartine, no doubt, in consideration of the several memorials and plans addressed to his Ministry by St. Lubin on this subject, decided to entrust him with the mission.

His instructions were to sign with the Maratha Government a permanent treaty of commerce in four articles and a provisional treaty of an offensive and defensive alliance against any nation which would start hostilities against France.

St. Lubin left France on September 19, 1776, on the ship *Le Sartine* and reached Mahé on February 12, 1777, in a record time of four months and twenty three days without making a single halt on the way. The Minister had enjoined

upon him prudence and secrecy and as such had not given him a large retinue which would attract attention. But St. Lubin had sufficient experience of Indian Court life to realise the importance of pomp and ostentation. He had, therefore, made up his mind to have a guard of 100 men which he picked up from the crew of the ship. At Mahé, he secretly got uniforms prepared for this guard : blue dress, red facings, golden buttons stamped with the fleur-de-lis enclosed in a crescent. St. Lubin arrived at Chaul on March 16, and openly disregarding the instructions of the Minister to observe prudence and secrecy, declared to the commandant of the port that he had come as the envoy of the King of France to the Court of the Marathas, and prevailed upon him to give him a salute of 21 guns. After receiving the necessary conveyance for his journey, on April 11, he proceeded to the Maratha Court held at Purandhar because of the hot season. On May 4, he had an interview with the ministers Sakharam Bapu and Nana Phadnavis. The audience with the Peshwa took place on May 8. The French envoy was received with great honours and ceremony. He put into the tiny hands of Sawai Madhavrao the letter from His Most Christian Majesty and made his presents. After the ceremony, the Peshwa retired and the two ministers conducted the French envoy to an antechamber where he explained to them the contents of the King's letter and gave detailed answers to all the questions put to him by the two ministers. It was clear that the King of France was not at war with England, nor did he propose to declare one in the near future; but that if he were forced to declare it, he would unite his forces to those of the Marathas to punish the common enemy. This explanation must have caused bitter disappointment to the Maratha leaders who urgently sought French troops to punish the English for their wanton aggression against Thana. But in the hope of prospective assistance, they decided to accept the provisional treaty. Accordingly, three days later, St. Lubin was informed that the alliance had been accepted unanimously by the Maratha Council and that the liberty of trade was likewise granted on the terms of the articles of the proposed treaty.

The Maratha Court soon retired to Poona for the monsoon. Here the treaty was signed on June 18, 1777, and on the 23rd the alliance was solemnly sworn. On this occasion, too, in spite of the French Minister's warning, St. Lubin gave as much publicity as he could to this event. Naturally, as Sartine had perhaps expected, it raised a great storm on the part of the English. It is also possible that the Maratha leaders encouraged this publicity, for thereby they wanted to warn the English that in future no interference on their part in Maratha affairs would be tolerated. The fact cannot be overlooked that in spite of the Treaty of Purandhar, the English had continued to give asylum to Raghoba, the greatest enemy of the Poona Regency. The Bombay Government, encouraged by their superiors in England to take every advantage of the dissensions among the Marathas and even foment them, and completely forgetting that they had first infringed that Treaty of Purandhar, now strongly remonstrated with the Poona Darbar " against the impropriety of their giving encouragement to their natural enemies, after the peace so lately concluded by Col. Upton ". Finding that their expotulations and protests had failed to effect the dismissal of the French envoy, the English thought of forcing a change in the Maratha Government. Friend Mostyn who, because of his long stay in Poona, had come into contact with every personage in the Maratha Capital, was actively stirring up discord among the Maratha leaders. Thanks to his efforts, an easy instrument for achieving their goal was found in the person of Moroba Phadnavis, cousin of Nana, who was enticed with the post of the Chief Minister in the Government. The absence of the Maratha armies from the capital was a favourable occasion to assemble more than 40,000 men under Tukoji Holkar, who was won over to Raghoba's cause. This army, as if sprung from underground, took Poona by surprise on March 25, 1778, and proclaimed Raghoba as Peshwa through the whole town. Nana had just time enough to escape, with his guard, to the fort of Purandhar where the infant Sawai Madhavrao resided. But ably and faithfully supported by Mahadji Shinde and Haripant Phadke, Nana once more assumed the reigns

of the government; Moroba and his accomplices were arrested and thrown into prison and their properties confiscated.

St. Lubin, during this interval, resided in Poona. Either to pacify the English who were leaving no stone unturned to disturb the tranquility and peace in the Maratha Government, or perhaps to expedite the arrival of French troops to help them against the English, it was decided that St. Lubin should himself proceed to France with the proposals from the Poona Ministry. War against the English would commence as soon as France furnished her contingent of 2,500 infantry men. The Marathas undertook to pay all the expenses of the French troops. St Lubin was entrusted with a letter from the Peshwa to the King of France and another from Sakharam Bapu to the Minister for the Navy. The Peshwa requested the King of France to send him his reply as early as possible.

St. Lubin left Poona on July 12, 1778, for Daman where he arrived in the beginning of August. He left Daman in the beginning of the year 1779 and arrived at Mocha on a Portuguese corvette towards June. After a year of all sorts of difficulties, he reached Malta on July 1, 1780. He arrived at Versailles towards the end of October. For a whole week, he visited the admiralty without securing an audience of the Minister. Three months later, he was arrested.

His arrest need not come as a surprise to us. The Minister's reply, dated October 13, 1778, to St. Lubin's first dispatch of July 15, 1777, is full of reproach: (1) for non-compliance with his instructions to observe prudence and secrecy, (2) for the pompous style used in his dispatch, (3) for failure to have some of the terms of the treaty of commerce put into execution and (4) finally, for interference in the selling operations of the ship *Le Sartine*. The Minister was so disgusted with St. Lubin's behaviour that finally he gave orders for his arrest. Fortunately for the latter, when Sartine's letter arrived at the Isle of France, Pondicherry had been captured and St. Lubin had left India by way of Suez. If he had been arrested in India, the English,

who had all along declared him as an imposter, would have triumphed and the Marathas would have become a butt of ridicule for their stupidity in dealing with a man of such character, with the result that they would have resolved never to have any dealings with any Frenchman in future. The arrest would also have affected the reputation of the French nation for the choice it had made of such a man as its envoy to the Maratha Court.

The Minister, however, cannot be blamed for his choice. St. Lubin, no doubt, was a capable man. Even Law, Governor of Pondicherry, who had a great grudge against him because of the vicious role he had played during the Anglo-Mysore War of 1767-69, had testified that he was educated, had talents and much intelligence. Another Frenchman, Chevalier de Mouhy, who had served under Bussy and had considerable experience of the political life in India, said that he was an 'enterprising man whose intelligence and experience qualified him for some delicate mission, but whose character and conduct perhaps render him more dangerous than useful'. Mr. William Gamul Farmer of the Bombay Civil Service, who, at this time happened to be in Poona for health reasons, pays St. Lubin a compliment when he says: "There certainly could not be so fit a man in France to send out to sound the ground here to form an alliance with the Maratha State, if circumstances should prove favourable". The Minister certainly did not expect that when entrusted with such an important and responsible mission, St. Lubin would allow his character and conduct to come in the way while executing the job. But it turned out exactly as Mouhy had predicted. St. Lubin could not control his egregious vanity and excessive irritability of temper. The pomp he displayed at the time of his landing at Chaul and on the occasion of the signing of the treaty with the Marathas, almost brought about the failure of his mission and involved the Marathas in a war with the English because the latter were convinced that very advantageous offers had been made by the Poona Government to the Court of Versailles. Secondly, in his vanity, St. Lubin considered himself superior to and even independent

of the Governor of Pondicherry with whom he was supposed to work in complete collaboration. He had the audacity to ask Bellecombe to address all his correspondence to the Maratha Court not directly but only through him. But on this point, we feel that the Minister cannot absolve himself of all responsibility. Since he had been warned about the character of St. Lubin, he should have given him explicit instructions to conduct his mission only in close co-operation with the Governor of Pondicherry. This would have put a considerable check on his unbecoming behaviour and all the ill effects resulting therefrom could have been avoided.

As for the style employed by St. Lubin in his dispatch, the Minister observed : " From the pompous style in which it (the dispatch) is written and which rather betokens the ecstasy of an excited imagination than the reserve and prudence of a negotiator, I doubt very much if I can congratulate myself on the choice I made of you for a mission which demanded as much caution as devotion to the King's interests ".

As for the failure to have some of the terms of the treaty of commerce put into execution, St. Lubin cannot be blamed. For the Marathas were in no mood to grant any of these concessions—cession of ports on the Konkan Coast—to the French, until their troops landed on the Maratha soil to help them against the aggressive designs of the English.

Lastly, St. Lubin unnecessarily got entangled into the selling operations of the ship *Le Sartine*. Notwithstanding attractive offers at Mahé and Mangalore, he had not allowed the Captain to sell goods but reserved them for sale with the Marathas. The latter, unfortunately were not interested in the purchase of these goods, perhaps because St. Lubin had demanded a fancy price with a view to swallowing the extra profits. The Captain was thus delayed unnecessarily at Chaul and in his attempt to dispatch the ship to China, he was obliged to have recourse to a loan of about 400,000 francs at 12 per cent interest. St. Lubin

did not allow the Captain to lift the cargo which was thus left behind as a deposit against the loan. The owner of the ship, having incurred a heavy loss, lodged a complaint with the Minister. Moreover, in his arrogance, St. Lubin had harrassed the Captain, the passengers and the crew. He had also disposed of a part of the ship's funds for his personal use. The Minister was, therefore, left with no other alternative but to issue orders for St. Lubin's arrest.

He was thrown into the prison of Bastille in January 1781. After a year, he was transferred to the hospice of Charenton, for reasons of health. Later, he was exiled and stayed at Cléves in Germany, not far from the French frontier. Towards the end of 1783, he was promised that he would be allowed to return to France.

What is most astonishing, even in prison, St. Lubin kept himself regularly posted about the political situation in India and persistently pointed out to the Minister the advantages of an alliance with the Marathas and the disadvantages of a union with Haider Ali. The Minister had by now dispatched an expeditionary force on the Coromandel Coast to co-operate with the ruler of Mysore.

But St. Lubin had now lost all credit at the French Court. The would-be diplomat ended his career as a wig-maker and died in poverty.

In this volume, all the documents relating to St. Lubin have been put together.

The first is a letter from M. Law de Lauriston, Governor of Pondicherry, to M. le Chevalier Desroches, Governor of the Isle of France, now Mauritius. It gives us some information about the antecedents of St. Lubin and briefly narrates St. Lubin's activities in India during 1767-69. It is quite natural that Law should be enraged at the mischievous behaviour of St. Lubin, as it placed him in a very embarrassing situation *vis-a-vis* the English and Haider Ali, by first of all, inciting a few young and very sensitive Frenchmen of the garrison of Pondicherry to join Haider Ali against the English, the natural enemies of the French,

and then to desert to the English against Haider Ali. St. Lubin claimed that he had brought about the second desertion deliberately to help the cause of the ruler of Mysore and damage the interests of the English. Law is justified in his complaint against St. Lubin, for the desertion of the French to Haider Ali's camp was reported by the Government of Madras to Whilehall which, in its turn, lodged a protest with the Court of Versaillers, even attributing Haider Ali's success against the English in this war to the succours which the French had secretly passed on to the ruler of Mysore. But there is reason to believe St. Lubin's statement that he, along with the other French, had deserted to the English to serve the cause of Haider Ali, for, the ruler of Mysore, known for his querulous nature, never protested to Law against this desertion.

The second document is a small memorial in which St. Lubin urges the Minister to dispatch him to the Court of the Marathas to conclude with them a Treaty of Alliance under the pretext of a commercial treaty and admission of French ships into Maratha ports. The Maratha proposals referred to in this document are those made by the agents of the Peshwa Madhavrao to Law in the beginning of 1772 and a treaty concluded between Mahadji Shinde and Chevalier, Director of Chandernagore, towards the end of the same year

The third document is a long memorial which is the result of St. Lubin's journey in India from Delhi to the south in 1766. In it St. Lubin exposes the political situation then prevailing in India, gives the computation of the English power in this country, sets forth the consequences resulting therefrom and finally, suggests the means to destroy that power. The description of the political situation is fairly faithful, but St. Lubin, occupied with his activities in the south, seems to be ignorant of the events that took place in the north after 1766. The computation of the English power in India is also fairly accurate, the consequences resulting therefrom are correctly assessed, while the means suggested to destroy the English power in India are practical if efficiently and boldly carried out.

The author of the fourth document appears to be Chevalier de Mouhy. This Frenchman had served in India under Bussy. He was the same person whom the authorities at the Isle of France had dispatched to India in August 1761 with the mission of securing supplies of food of all kinds and obtaining definite information regarding the general situation in the country with a view to starting an operation against the English there. The political situation in India since the departure of St. Lubin in 1770 had changed out of recognition and more so in the case of Chevalier de Mouhy who had left the shores of this country in 1763. Since that date, the Marathas had almost recovered their past glory and power which they had lost at Panipat, and Madhavrao had inflicted the first of his crushing defeats upon Haider Ali. St. Lubin was, therefore, not wrong in proposing an alliance between the Marāthas and the French.

There are a number of contradictions inherent in Mouhy's observations. The Mughal Emperor was now reduced to a state of impotency and all the privileges granted by him formerly to whomsoever were no longer tenable. The position of other Muslim rulers, including the Nizam, was not much different. The Mughal Emperor was not the rightful master of India; he had usurped that right. The Muslim rulers who had suffered at the hands of the English were unlikely to assist them against the Marathas. The position of the English in India had reached such a state that they would refuse to placate the Marathas by ceding to them the right of Chauthai in Bengal. The Portuguese could not perpetually enjoy the exclusive right of trade in this country because of their inability to enforce this right. The siege of Bassein was prolonged for two years because of the peculiar mode of warfare in this country, in which the idea was to cut off the communications of the place, including supplies of food, so as to force the enemy to surrender. Dupleix in 1751-54 tried the same method at Trichinopoly. Moreover, at Bassein the Marathas lacked trained artillery men and not valour. Of course, the Maratha navy after 1756 did not count for much. As for Haider Ali, he alone among the Indian powers, was capable of resisting

the Marathas. But he had by now realised the ambitious designs of the English in India and would have been the last man to join hands with the English, because he was wise enough to understand that if the English succeeded in subjugating the Marathas, his own end would not be far off. What he was seeking at this moment was to derive utmost advantage out of the troubles of the Poona Government. Once that objective was achieved, he was willing to join hands with the Marathas against the English.

The experiment of desertion, though on a small scale, had already been tried in the case of Haider Ali in 1770. But for 1,200 soldiers to desert and pass over to Poona was an impossible task. Since there was an English Resident at Poona, which fact perhaps escaped the notice of St. Lubin, their presence would have been at once detected, and that would have meant a declaration of war between France and England. But if efficiency was the order of the day, these 1,200 soldiers and even more could have been dispatched to Poona as soon as war between France and England was declared in March 1778. In fact, even a smaller force, numbering 250 or 300, would have sufficed for the Marathas to dictate terms to the English. But that was not to be.

It is a pity that Mouhy, in spite of his experience of Indian political life, cannot distinguish between the Central Maratha authority and Maratha chiefs like Murarrao Ghorpade who were only tributaries of the Maratha Goverment and sought their own means to continue their existence. Mouhy quotes the example of Murarrao, 'shrewdest and the bravest' of the Maratha chiefs as he says, to support his statement that on several occasions a simple detachment of 50 Englishmen sought and attacked bodies of 400 to 500 of Murarrao's Marathas and drove them away like sheep. Mouhy ignored the fact that the salary of Murarrao's troops had not been paid for some time and that the Maratha chief was not putting his heart and soul in the campaigns, for it was in his interest to prolong the war as long as he could,

otherwise he would lose his subsidy. Mouhy also blunders when he refers to the incident in 1756 in which 500 Europeans, of which he formed part, went to the rescue of M. de Bussy, besieged and pressed at Golkonda, and in which 20,000 Marathas, joined by other troops of the Nizam, could not penetrate them during the entire six days of continuous march and skirmishes and prevent them from joining M. de Bussy. First of all, these Marathas were in the service of the Nizam and did not at all belong to the Maratha nation, and secondly, there is every reason to believe that their chief, Ramchandra Jadhav, was friendly towards Bussy.

As regards the observation that " a simple colonel of mediocre capacity, possessing valour, at the head of a regiment of 2,000 good soldiers, with his canon, will put to rout all the Marathas in Hindustan ", Mouhy would eat his own words if he were to hear about the discomfiture of a skilful general like Goddard at the hands of the Marathas in April 1781, unaided by French troops. Therefore, St. Lubin's contention that 1,200 French troops, trained in artillery, would give the Marathas a decided superiority over the English in siege operations, was not far off the mark. Even Bellecombe, when he heard of the English defeat, urged upon the French Minister to send prompt succour to the Marathas, who, as he said, could then easily prevail over the English.

Lastly, the predatory habits of the Marathas was a mode of warfare however, unpalatable it is to us and to the foreigners, to reduce the enemy to submission as quickly as possible and how did it differ from that of Alauddin Khilji, the Muslim Sultanates of the Deccan that defeated Ram Raja at Talikota in 1565, Nadirshah, Ahmedshah Abdali, and as a matter of fact, from that of Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan?

Mouhy is on surer grounds when he says that the French should first of all restore their navy, fortify Pondicherry and have sufficient troops in India, and that only then would the Indian princes be convinced that they could profit by an alliance with the French.

The fifth document is the report of St. Lubin's embassy to the Maratha Court from the time of his departure from France on September 19, 1776 till his return to that country towards the end of October 1780. It includes a letter from the King of France entrusting St. Lubin with the mission at the Court of the King of the Marathas as also the detailed instructions which he was strictly to adhere to while concluding the permanent Commercial Treaty and the provisional Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance with the Marathas. The report is so full of exaggerations that it is extremely difficult to sift truth out of this maze of bombast. The only facts that are corroborated by other evidence are: that St. Lubin got uniforms prepared at Mahé for his guard of 100 men picked for this purpose from the crew of the ship *Le Sartine*; that he prevailed upon the commandant of the port of Chaul to give him a salute of 21 guns; that he was provided with an escort, not on the scale he had demanded, to proceed to the Maratha Court at Purandhar; that as he approached his destination, he was met by Bhivrao Panse; that on May 4, he had an interview with the ministers Sakharam Bapu and Nana Fadnavis; that he was received with great honours and ceremony on the occasion of the audience with the Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao on May 8, 1777; that after the ceremony, he was closely questioned on the object of his mission by the two ministers; that the Treaty of Commerce was signed publicly in Poona on June 18; that Pascal de Santy carried St. Lubin's first dispatch to France *via*, Surat, Basra, Haifa and Suez; that an agreement embodying the proposals for the French assistance against the English was signed at Purandhar on May 13, 1778; that St. Lubin left Poona on July 12, for Daman, personally carrying the proposals to France; that he was given an escort to accompany him to the Portuguese port as a precaution against a possible attack on his person by the English; that the Frenchman left Daman on a Portuguese Corvette in the beginning of 1779 and arrived at Mocha towards June and that after many vicissitudes he reached France towards the end of October 1780.

The next is a collection of letters, the most important being the letter from Bellecombe, Governor of Pondicherry, to the Minister for the Navy, dated October 15, 1777. It

expresses his reaction to the appointment of St. Lubin as an envoy to the Maratha Court to negotiate a treaty of alliance. He felt that as Governor General, he was the only plenipotentiary of the King of France with powers to enter into negotiations with the Indian princes. He was, therefore, hurt that another Frenchman should have been sent, directly and independently of him, to Poona to do the job. Unfortunately, St. Lubin, who was expected to work in co-operation with the Governor of Pondicherry, had the presumptuousness to think that he was, if not superior at least equal, to him. Bellecombe had come to the conclusion that the French would derive greater advantage from an alliance with Haider Ali. He was, therefore, worried that the presence of St. Lubin at Poona might come in the way of his own negotiations at Shrirangapatan But these fears were unfounded. And Bellecombe himself was conscious of this fact, for in his letter to Picot dated March 16, 1777, he says: " Whatever may be this mission, it ought not to cause you any anxiety, nor to Haider Ali Khan. It is not possible that St. Lubin has been charged with anything that will conflict with the interests of this Nawab ". Haider, moreover, was too astute a statesman not to understand that the French move at Poona was directed against the English and not against him. He was fully aware of the ambitious designs of the English in this country and was equally aware of the fact that if the English triumphed over the Marathas, he would be their next victim. It would not be in his interest, therefore, to join hands with the English against the Marathas. It is, however, amusing that Bellecombe should imagine a number of factions among the Maratha nation and more so as he thinks that one of these factions, either the Gaikawad of Baroda or the Bhonsle of Nagpur would join Haider Ali against the parent government. The French Governor was perfectly right when he said that if the French hoped to succeed in their goal of expelling the English from India, they must have both the Marathas and Haider Ali on their side. The French Minister was quite aware of this fact and encouraged Bellecombe to pursue his efforts in this direction. The French Governor was also trying to bring about a reconciliation between the

two belligerents and unite them against their common enemy, the English. It is a great pity that Bellecombe should have failed in this task when the right moment came on the flimsy ground that the spot selected by Haider for an interview was far removed from Mahé.

The correspondence between Bellecombe and Picot, French chief at Mahé, reveals their jealousy against St. Lubin and complete indifference towards his mission at the Poona Court. It is surprising that Bellecombe should plead ignorance about St. Lubin's errand at Poona. The Minister in his letter, dated May 13, 1778, emphatically states that he had apprised him of it before his departure from France. Both Bellecombe and Picot appear to be impatiently waiting to hear the news about St. Lubin's failure at the Maratha Court.

The correspondence between Picot and St. Lubin is full of complaints on both sides, and the bitterness between the two seems to be growing with every letter. It is possible that Picot bears a grudge against St. Lubin for the latter's failure to take the former into confidence about the mission at Poona. But St. Lubin cannot be blamed for this. Picot also appears to be unduly strict in dispatching the remittances to St. Lubin. He should have, on the other hand, like Briancourt at Surat, gone out of his way to help his fellow countryman for the national cause.

The small letter written by St. Lubin from Daman to Nana Fadnavis at Poona corroborates the fact that the Frenchman had been provided with a Maratha escort to accompany him to the Portuguese port as a precaution against a possible attack on his person by the English.

As regards the letters written by M. de Sartine, Minister for the Navy, to various persons, the Minister in the letter addressed to St. Lubin, dated October 13, 1778, severely reprimands him for having disregarded his instructions to observe prudence and secrecy, for the pompous style used in his dispatch, for his failure to have some of the terms of the treaty of commerce put into execution and for his interference in the selling operations of the ship *Le Sartine*.

Finally, he orders him to proceed immediately to Pondicherry and give an account of his negotiation to M. de Bellecombe. The letter addressed to M. le Chevalier de Ternay, dated February 7, 1779, contains an order for the arrest of St. Lubin. " You can put him into fetters if you think that this precaution is necessary .... he is the most dexterous and most cunning person I have come across ". These words betray the Minister's exasperation at the misbehaviour of St. Lubin. This was certainly a very tragic end in the case of a man who was entrusted with such an important mission. But St. Lubin had only himself to blame for his disgrace.

The first part of the dispatch from Malta, dated July 15, 1780, is the account of the English expedition against Poona from November 22, 1778 to January 13, 1779. St. Lubin was not, of course, a witness to this episode. As usual, there are mistatements and exaggeration. It is not the Marathas who had declared the war against the English but it is the latter who had done so; Col Key was not killed in action but severely wounded and later on died from his wounds; none of the Councillors from Bombay hid themselves in a pagoda; no army from Poona attacked the detachment from Bengal which was coming to the succour of Bombay and which reached Surat after a heavy loss on February 26, 1779, and not on March 28, 1779, as St. Lubin says, without canon and without equipment. It is not necessary to offer any comments on the second part of this dispatch which is an account of what happened outside the roadstead and within sight of the city of Mocha, as there is no corroborative evidence to establish the truth of the incident.

The memorial of February, 1781, is an appeal for protection and justice from M. de Vergennes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at whose instance St. Lubin had been dispatched to the Maratha Government to sign the treaty of commerce.

It is to be admired that even in prison and in his exile, St. Lubin has not lost his interest in the political affairs of his country and keeps himself informed of the latest developments in that respect. In the letter written from the hospice

of Charenton, dated May 15, 1781, St. Lubin suggests to the Minister to also dispatch assistance in French troops to the Marathas who had been most anxiously waiting to hear the news of such a dispatch. By now, the French authorities had already sent an expeditionary force to India to support Haider Ali. Unfortunately, the convoy carrying these troops had been intercepted by the English squadron and badly crippled. St. Lubin fears that the English would not lose this opportunity to loudly announce the news of the French disaster to the Marathas in an effort to force them to conclude peace. He, therefore, advises the Minister to dispatch to Poona a trustworthy person by the quickest route to inform the Marathas of a fresh dispatch. To facilitate the success of this mission, he was willing to deliver to the Minister two firmans sealed with the big and the small seals of the Maratha Court. The one was an order addressed to all the officers of the Maratha Navy to receive on the sea and escort to the nearest port any person presenting it, while the other was an order to all the commandants of the ports to furnish to the bearer all the means to proceed to Poona with safety and dispatch. St. Lubin would also add thereto the sign of recognition agreed between the Maratha ministry and himself to prevent any surprise on the part of the English. This was the half of a bracelet of precious stones broken by the Regent and him during his last interview. The other half remained with the Regent and the joining of the two was to serve as letters of credentials to him who would present the portion carried by St. Lubin.

The memorial accompanying this letter is autobiographical i.e. a record of the services rendered by St. Lubin to his nation. He has been suffering from a vicious rheumatism likely to lead to paralysis. He, therefore, supplicates the Minister to set him at liberty to enable him to restore his health. This request was granted, but he was exiled to the hospice at Cléves.

In the letter, dated August 1, 1783, his predictions do not come true, for Tipu Sultan realised that it was not advisable to continue the war against the English, single-handed and concluded a treaty with them by which he

had to renounce all the conquests which his father had made in the province of Arcot. It is, however, not true that by the Treaty of Salbai, the Marathas and the English had agreed to unite against Haider Ali to force him to sign a treaty of peace with the English. It is also not true that by the treaty of peace of Madras of 1769, the English tried to persuade Haider Ali to serve them as a barrier against the Marathas, but it was Haider who had forced the English to enter with him into a defensive alliance aimed directly at the Marathas. St. Lubin's advice that France should tilt the balance in favour of the Marathas is not sound, for that would force Tipu to unite with the English, and in that case the outcome of the conflict would always be doubtful. The best plan for France was to unite both the Marathas and Tipu against their common enemy, the English.

The earlier part of the letter, dated October 24, 1783, is devoted to a subtle analysis of the terms of the treaty of Salbai, while the latter part is an exercise in wishful thinking. We are, however, intrigued to know 'the thread which leads to a view-point in which St. Lubin distinctly sees the total ruin of the English and a resource which will not bring France into conflict with England', even if, we suppose, the French support the cause of the Marathas. Be that as it may, St. Lubin had now lost all credit at the French Court and had perforce to renounce the game of politics in future.

VINAYAK GAJANAN HATALKAR

had to renounce all the conquests which his father had made in the Carnatic of Arcot. It is, however, not true that by the Treaty of Salbai the Marathas and the English had agreed to unite against Haider Ali to force him to sign a treaty of peace with the English. It is also not true that by the treaty of peace of Madras of 1769, the English tried to persuade Haider Ali to serve them as a barrier against the Marathas. But it was Haider who had forced the English to enter with him into a defensive alliance directed against the Marathas. Mr. Lubin's advice that France should turn the balance in favour of the Marathas [illegible] sound, for that would force Tipu to unite with the English, and in that case the outcome of the conflict would always be doubtful. The best plan for France was to unite with the Marathas and Tipu against their common enemy, the British.

The other part of the letter, dated October 24, 1786, is devoted to a subtle analysis of the terms of the treaty of Salbai, which the latter part [illegible]. We need, however, not go into [illegible] the details which leads to its conclusion, in which St. Lubin then urges [illegible] total ruin of the English and a guarantee which would not bring France into conflict with England, even if, for example, the French support the cause of the Marathas. However that may be, St. Lubin had [illegible] the French Court and had no longer any influence on the course of politics in future.

C4 28

# CORRESPONDENCE

OF

# M. LE CHEV DE ST. LUBIN

## Copy of the Letter Written by M. Law to M. le Chev Desroches from Pondicherry on August 20, 1770

*To accompany the dispatch of M. le Chev Desroches*

No. 18 of the year.

(1) * I have come to know, Sir, that a man named le Chev de St. Lubin was either at Bourbon or at the Isle of France. I even learn that you, as well as M. de Bellecombe [2] would be very glad to know what I think about him. It would be a very long story, but I hav'nt got the time to enter into certain details. But I assure you that he is an adventurer who has as many strings to his bow as he has names. I know of three and perhaps he has three more in reserve. His real name is Pallebot or something like that. I knew him for the first time in Bengal in 1761, by the name of Winlow. He lived with the Dutch, posed as an illegitimate son of the Marquis de Maffai by some German Countess. He is a man who is educated, who has talents, much intelligence and above all he is an intriguer. He began his career in India as 3rd surgeon on a European ship, after which he served in the last war as a volunteer.

I know very positively that, stung by my refusal to take him with me when I left France, he came to India in a caravan as much with the intention to harm me as to do his own business. He did not conceal this fact and spoke openly about it at Madras to all and sundry. It is to M. de St. Lubin that we owe the desertion of the whole European unit in the service of Haiderali Khan in 1767; this unit, but for him, would never have joined the English. It was because of him too that Zéphir [3] and his unit were almost on the point of taking service with the English. To achieve his objective (2) M. de St. Lubin went as far as to say that that was my intention, expressed in a letter to M. Bourchier [4]. I must confess to you that if I could get hold of him at that time, I would have sent him to Europe bound in chains. Finally, it was because of him that in 1767 and 1768, I lost many men through desertion. His emissaries

* The figures in bracket indicate the folio numbers of the original documents in the National Archives of Paris.

were spread all over to entice away our soldiers. Was his plan thereby to serve us and harm the English? As I know that that is how he wants his conduct to be interpreted. I leave it to you to be the judge of it. I can furnish very strong evidence in support of my statements. Messrs. Laumur and Pitoys, who met him at Madras, can also enlighten you on this subject.

It is he who is responsible for the ruin of poor Aumont, brother of Mrs. Dampière.

It is true that M. le Chev de St. Lubin can show you my letters. They were written in my own hand-writing but they are very brief, and they were, moreover, written towards the end of 1768. At that time the situation of the English *vis-a-vis* Haiderali Khan was far from happy. The first idea of our adventurer was to make his fortune by taking service with the English. This plan having misfired by the failure of the military operations, St. Lubin thought it wise to turn round and try to make it up. He had made some money; he saw that people in Madras were enraged with him, because a part of the failure was indeed attributed to the advice he had given to his patron Mr. Call.[5] It was, therefore, in the interest of St. Lubin to beat a retreat. But to avoid the reproach that might be levelled against him by us for his conduct, he had to set moving some springs in order to convince others that his plan in going (3) over to the English had only been to put them into difficulties. He has certainly done it, and I am quite sure that he must have consequently sent memorials to the Minister on this subject. In January or February 1769, St. Lubin learnt that one Nottin, who happened to be in the English settlement, offered to Mr. Bourchier to entice away a part of our garrison (you should note that at this juncture, Haiderali Khan was ravaging the whole territory with his cavalry and was in the vicinity of this place). St Lubin, I assert, who, from the attempts already made, was fully aware that it was a vain project, but who, as well as Mr. Bourchier, at the same time feared that a part of our garrison might go over to Haiderali Khan, induced this Governor to warn me about Nottin's design. The Governor informed me in a very polite letter that he was not only being offered our garrison but even the town, and added that he knew for certain that a party had been formed at Pondicherry to deliver the place to Haiderali Khan, if he (Law) refused the offer that was being made to him. Mr. Bourchier's and St. Lubin's object was thereby to nettle me with generosity and persuade me to take all the possible precautions to prevent our men from joining Haiderali Khan. But the truth was that there was never such a plan. Nottin had indeed made the proposal to Mr. Bourchier with a view to

hooking a few pagodas. But this man, as he confessed it, and as it is known from all the proceedings, had not the slightest communication with the garrison. The whole thing was a game on the part of this Nottin and one Marlin, a surgeon at Madras and a protégé of M. de St. Lubin. This is the so-called (4) service he (St. Lubin) has rendered us, and this is mainly the subject of my letters written to him.

I think, Sir, that you ought to be on your guard against this man. I do not indeed understand the reason for which he has been allowed to land at Bourbon. I believe that he has funds invested with the English, that he is very well patronized by Mr. Bourchier, particularly by Mr. Cal and a few others. This quarrel between the English Captain and him might just be only a stratagem. I must also inform you that I wrote quite a long time back to M. le Duc de Praslin about this St. Lubin. If I were to relate to you all the stories about him, there would be no end to it. I shall stop here.

I have the honour to remain most affectionately, Sir, your very humble and your very obedient servant.

(Signed) LAW

*P. S.*—From what I have related to you here, Sir, you might tender such advice as you deem fit to M. de Bellecombe.

St. Lubin has requested me to give him a certificate that he did not serve the English. I might in fact certify that he has done them harm by his wrong advice, because, in fact, in spite of all his intelligence, he is incapable of conducting major operations, such as those in which the English were engaged. But at the same time I can certify that that was not St. Lubin's intention, and that his plan was really to serve them well, as I have already stated. He is a gentleman who knows how to turn round, and he has at least three strings to his bow.

(True Copy) (Signed) LE CHEV DESROCHES

[illegible] that the plan, as he confessed it [illegible] from all the proceedings, had not the slightest communication with the [illegible]. The whole thing was a [illegible] on the part of [illegible] and one [illegible] of Madras and a [illegible] of M. de St. Lubin, [illegible] called [illegible] service in the [illegible] and [illegible] the [illegible] letters written to him.

I think, Sir, that you ought to be on your guard against this man. [illegible] indeed understand the reason for which he has been allowed [illegible]. I believe that he [illegible] invested with the [illegible] very well [illegible] by Mr. [illegible], particularly by M. [illegible] a few others. This quarrel between one [illegible] Captain and him [illegible] I must [illegible] inform you that I wrote [illegible] back to M. le [illegible] about the St. Lubin [illegible] to relate to you all the stories [illegible] there would be no end [illegible] here.

I have the honour to remain, [illegible] Sir, your very humble [illegible] servant.

(Signed) [illegible]

[illegible] what I have [illegible] you [illegible] as you [illegible].

M. [illegible] had requested me to give him a certificate that he did not [illegible] the English, I might [illegible] that he has done there [illegible] everywhere [illegible] all [illegible] of conduct [illegible] who [illegible] were engaged [illegible] St. Lubin's [illegible] and that [illegible] I have [illegible] who knows how to turn round, and [illegible].

True Copy. [illegible] Le Gay [illegible]

FONDS ASIE

Vol. 7

ARCHIVES OF THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(123)

My Lord,

I have the honour to submit to you the memorial concerning the map of Hindustan which I have delivered into your hands.

If, in your opinion, the proposals[6] of the Marathas and mine are worth adopting, I think that the Ministry should, without further delay, execute this plan which, far from entailing any expense or requiring display which can give publicity to it, is, on the other hand, extremely simple. The only question is to dispatch me to the Marathas to conclude with them, under the pretext of a Commercial Treaty and admission (of French ships) into their ports, the Treaty of alliance of which I had the honour (123v°) to submit to you the draft. My Lord, you can count on my dexterity to negotiate with men whose interests, language and principles I am familiar with. It is needless to point out to you that the measure of our success depends on our celerity. You know the Easterners too well not to seize the moment when they themselves are making offers to us. If, after neglecting them, our turn came to make proposals to them, they are sure to dictate to us the terms which at present we can dictate to them.

I am respectfully,
My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

Paris, April 7, 1775

Hotel de Strasbourg,

Rue Neuve St. Eustache.

**FONDS ANGLETERRE**

**Vol. 18**

ARCHIVES OF THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(133)

## POLITICAL MEMOIR ON HINDUSTAN

April 1775

The supreme power, which England has acquired in Hindustan, is, in spite of its enormity, not so amazing as the indifference with which we look upon this prodigious mass. Is our national genius then under a spell! What! Disputes for the ownership of a small frontier-town in Flanders, Germany, Italy, must have more than once set Europe on fire, proclaiming its liberty or shouting against the ambition of such and such a prince for universal monarchy! But today that the English are invading the kingdoms of Asia, the report of these happenings does not in the least stir up our indolence and its importance does not make any impression on us! With an abnegation unworthy of our character, we are allowing our rivals to pursue freely a career, which will terminate in our ruin which is the prize that awaits them. Will a century marked by revolutions of such great magnitude pass and we fail to take notice of events which will render it momentous in the eyes of posterity?

Let us discard this disgraceful and dangerous inertia. Under a new reign, a new Ministry can still repair the harm already done, and punish the ambition of the English for having abused the policy of moderation of the late King and taken advantage of the patience of his Ministers.

But our Counsellors, because of their love of peace, always so desirable for the good of humanity, discountenance the application of violent remedies which, in the body politic as in the human body, can alone sometimes promptly restore the equilibrium. Let us at least employ stratagems which, operating in an imperceptible manner and by indirect means, might impart vigour to its constitution without shaking it by troublesome shocks. In short, without disturbing the tranquility of Europe, let us exploit (133v°) the agitations in Asia which, if wisely directed by our efforts, would suffice to destroy in this part of the world the iron fabric which the English are forging to crush ours with it.

Pray examine carefully the political scene which I am exposing before you, My Lord. I shall, first of all, show you therein the actual condition in Hindustan. I shall give you the computation of the English power in this country, explain the consequences resulting therefrom and finally offer you the means to ruin it without causing rupture between our two crowns.

## The actual condition in Hindustan

Cast your eyes, My Lord, on the big map which I have drawn for you of the present anarchy in Hindustan. The Mughal Empire is dismembered, and on its ruins have been established various independent Kingdoms which previously were only its Provinces.

The Pathans, under their King Abdulla (Abdalli) have formed a kingdom in the northern provinces of Kandahar, Kabul, Gazni, Peshawar, and a part of Multan and Sind.

The rest of Multan and Sind, the two banks of the Indus from Tatta as far as Kashmir and the whole neighbourhood of Delhi from Lahore to Sirhind are in the hands of the Seiks (Sikhs). It is a formidable Republic composed of various states, independent of each other for their internal administration but confederated against their common enemy, like the Swiss Republic.

To the east of the Republic of the Sikhs are the territories occupied by the Rohillas under their Chief Nagib-el-daulat (Nazib-ud-doulah) who, being in possession of the province of Delhi, claims to preserve it in (134) the name of the family of Tamerlan (Taimurlang), through a representative of this family Gehan-boct (Jehan Bakht), son of Emperor Allumcha (Allamshah), whom he maintains at Delhi with some semblance of Royalty. But this policy is only a thin veil to cover his real usurpation in the eyes of the people who still retain some veneration for the Royal blood.

The province of Agra, with the addition of a large territory along the river Yamuna as far as Gwalior and Barampola (Bharatpur) is in the hands of the Jats, a Hindu race which had escaped from the Mughal yoke and were governed by a Raja under the principles of a primitive government in Hindustan. The name of the present Raja is Tahir Zing (Jawahir Singh).

Achmet-can-Banguis (Ahmedshah Bangash), an independent chief of a horde of Pathans is in possession of the principality of Firozabad (Farrukhabad) between the territory of the Jats and the province of Oudh.

Souja-el-daulat (Shuja-ud-daulah), Soubhedar of the Province of Oudh has become independent of the Mughal Emperor, but he is under the yoke of the English of Bengal.

A little to the south towards the Deccan, Raja Bija-Zing (Vijaysingh), a Hindu Raja, controls the province of Marwar.

Another Raja has seized the Province of Odipour (Udaipur).

Another has established himself at Jainagar.

Another at Sambalpur.

The Provinces of Bengal and Bihar belong to the English who began by usurping them and have just finally obtained their grant with claims to Orissa which is occupied by the Marathas.

The Soubhedar of Golconda (the Nizam, Nizam Ali) has long back shaken the yoke of obedience.

(134v°) His brother Bassalat Jang, Soubhedar of Adoni and Condavir, has done likewise.

The Carnatic is also in the hands of the English in the name of their fantom Muhammad Ali Khan.

The Kingdom of Tanjore has been annexed to the Carnatic by a conquest which the English made last year in the name of Muhammad Ali Khan.

The King of Travancore, formerly a tributary of the Mughal, has shaken off this bondage.

Haider Ali Khan has made himself master of Malabar, Canara, Mysore and Sonda.

Lastly, the Marathas have seized the rest of the provinces, except that of Goira (Kora), where the unfortunate Allam Shah, titular Emperor of Hindustan, lives in the shadow of his eclipsed Majesty on the revenue of this province and on a moderate pension which the English pay him at their sweet will for the grant of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.

### Computation of the English Power

Bengal and Bihar, a Kingdom eight hundred kilometres long by four hundred kilometres wide, brings them ninety-two million francs (37 million rupees). Their military establishment there consists of 55,000 men, of whom, 5,000 are Europeans and the rest Asians.

The provinces of Masulipatnam, Mustafanagar, Elour, Rajmahendry, Chicacole and the Carnatic furnish them with a revenue of 27 million francs. They maintain there 23,500 men, of whom 3,500 are Europeans.

(135)

On the Malabar Coast, where the Marathas prevent them from extending their territory, they are not so powerful. But the possessions of Surat and Bombay and the dependent factories raise their revenues in this part to 5½ million (francs). Their forces there consist of 1,500 Europeans and 6,000 sipahees, with a fleet of five warships.

The result from this computation, of which I have given elsewhere the details, which in this memorial would be tiresome and distracting, is that the English possess in Hindustan an annual revenue of 124½ millions (francs), and a military power, consisting of 10,000 European soldiers and 76,000 sipahees with 5 warships, without counting here either 22 million Indian subjects of every station, or the number of employees and European inhabitants in their factories, or the number of their merchantmen with their crew who, however, add up to the mass of their power.

### Consequences resulting from this power

This power, already superior to each one of those that have been established like it on the ruins of the Mughal Empire, except that of the Marathas about whom I shall speak later on, is more than sufficient by itself to bring under its yoke, one after the other and at the hands of each other, all these sovereigns of recent date, whom I have mentioned above. Hindustan has been during all the centuries a vast field open to the ambition of the Princes, even to that of mere private individuals, who, guided by their genius and sustained by their success, erected on its soil more than once bloody thrones which they boldly ascended by all depths of crime. In this country where patriotism and fidelity to the Prince are unknown virtues, the people, indifferent about the choice of the (135 v° ) despots, pass without a murmur from one yoke to another with the same resignation, and there is no doubt that they will gladly submit to that of England, milder, without any comparison, than Oriental despotism. Such are the plans and hopes of the English. You must closely follow their progress in order to notice that this is the goal they want to reach and that they are not far from it. As soon as they reach it, they will weigh Asia in the scale of Europe.

The revenues of Hindustan are entered in the registers of the Imperial Chancery at a sum equal to that of 754,492,302 francs (tournois[7]). The eye gets lost in this ocean of wealth which in the hands of the

English would suffice to buy Europe or subjugate it. And how can this acquisition made in Asia by the English of 60 million subjects—cultivators, craftsmen, soldiers and sailors—not have any effect on Europe and the entire world ?

Without establishing this vast assumption which in the present circumstances is nonetheless not difficult to hazard, let us only admit that the English are employing the actual resources of their power only to double their size. Would it not still be a dreadful monster for Europe ? Lastly, leaving aside the hypothetical, I shall confine myself to the amount of power they actually possess, and ask if the possession of this treasure, the augmentation in their military strength, the increase in their mercantile marine and the usurpation they have made in their commerce are not too heavy a weight in our political balance ? This fact, I dare say, will have to be admitted and also the necessity to restore the balance.

(136)

But in the hypothesis of peace (that exists) between the two crowns, what shall we use as a counter balance ? On the Coromandel Coast, our miserable town of Pondicherry with its (single) battalion ? On the Malabar Coast, our factory at Mahé, guarded by a company ? In Bengal, our lodge at Chandernagore, supported by a squad of 15 men ?

That is all the *vis inertiae* (Power of inertia) we possess to oppose the active force which the English employ to stir Hindustan. And these English, watchful of all our movements, are very particular to repress by all the weight of their power the slightest incentive which, in their opinion, is likely to set our machine into motion again. We must not close our eyes to this fact. We cannot attempt anything by our own efforts against these haughty rivals. But the hatred of the princes whom they are oppressing and the jealousy of those whom their insatiable ambition is always threatening are weapons in our hands fatal to this nation if we can cleverly handle them.

### Means of destroying the power of the English

The perusal of my historical memorials on the recent revolutions in Hindustan, in which I had such a big and strange hand, must have, My Lord, revealed to you the politics of this country. You could have noticed with what ease and success, I had become, singlehanded, the source of all the hatred against the English; how at the very moment when the English, with a view to crushing Nawab Haider Ali Khan and adding his

dominions to their conquests, had forcibly drawn into their operations the Subhedar of the Deccan, Nizam Ali, his brother Bassalat Jang, Subhedar of Adoni, Muhammad Ali Khan, Nawab of (136v°) the Carnatic and other confederates, at this very moment when they thought they could invade the kingdom of this brave Prince whom I was serving, I suddenly had the tables turned and the catastrophe fallen on the English by weaning away from them all their allies and uniting them with Haider Ali Khan against them (the English) in a war which cost them 57 millions (francs), lot of territory and all their reputation as invincible; how peace, of which I was the negotiator after having lighted the flames of war, was imposed upon them on harsh and humiliating conditions in which I sew the seeds of their destruction—it is for you, my Lord, to see that they are germinated—and I returned to France only to see that the fruits are gathered for my country. You have simply to will and at once, from one end of Hindustan to the other, the English, attacked at the same time by several enemies in all their possessions, will be compelled to cede half of them to you or lose all. Either eventuality will restore the equilibrium.

In Bengal, restless Shuja-ud-daulah is only waiting for a signal to recommence hostilities. Nizam Ali, Subhedar of the Deccan, and his brother Bassalat Jang, will at once recover possession of the Four Circars. In the Carnatic, Muhammad Ali Khan will renew with Haider Ali Khan the plan which they had hatched but which was interrupted, to betray the English to him. On the Malabar Coast and in Gujarat, the Marathas will destroy them. Of all the enemies they have raised, the most powerful are the Marathas.

This brave military race of Indians, so far so ill known to us who represent them as brigands whilst they were better justified to consider us as such, is especially the power whom we ought to fortify against the English. I shall not reproduce here their description (137) which I have given in my introduction to the history of the revolutions in Hindustan. I have therein for the first time cleared up their origin, explained their constitution, established their rights, studied their projects, followed their progress, and announced their impending greatness. We have now only to reckon their actual power.

Raghunathrao, son of Bajirao, Maharaja of the Marathas, possessed half of Gujarat and all the territory between this province and the Deccan. He conquered the whole province of Malwa with a part of that of

Allahabad, the principalities of Gwalior, Beder, Chanderi, Datiá, Orchha, Elichpur, Banda and Jhansi. He is also in possession of the province of Orissa, formerly annexed to the Subhedary of Bengal and to which the English claimed the rights at the time of the cession of Bengal, made to them by the titutlar Emperor. Thus, the Maratha domination extends all across Hindustan from the Gulf of Cambay to that of Bengal.

Their revenue, from all the provinces of the Mughal Empire which pay them the tribute known as the *Chauth*, amounts to nearly 200 millions (francs or 80 million rupees). That of the provinces which belong to them in full rights rises at least to the same figure, so that they have annually about 400 millions at their disposal. Their dominions teem with money which has been amassed by means of plunder which they have been practising for several centuries in the whole of Hindustan from provinces which refuse or defer the payment of the *Chauth*. The largest part of the treasure which the trade of the whole world has sunk into Hindustan is accumulated with the Marathas.

**(137v°)**

Their militia consists of their whole race, since they are all born soldiers. It is a very common thing to witness two or three armies of 100,000 men each starting simultaneously on two or three different expeditions. These armies, instead of being reduced like others in the course of a campaign, go on augmenting just as torrents swell with the waters which they meet on their way. Thousands of adventurers of all tribes, attracted by the hope of getting a share in the booty, which is always assured, join the smallest detachment, so that a body of 12,000 men sometimes rises to 50,000 before reaching the territory which they want to lay under contribution, or conquer. At the first report of their march, there is a stampede in the woods, in the mountains, under the protection of the fortresses. Nothing can resist them in the open country. Even the English are forced to shut themselves up in their strongholds. To deprive them of these strongholds, the Marathas need only engineers and artillerymen capable of conducting their sieges. This is all the secret of their destruction.

And that is what the Marathas demand from you, my Lord, with earnest representations already repeated several times. You have in your hands their proposals[8] in two authentic documents sent from India to the Ministry which has not been able to take advantage of them.

The first is a treaty offered by Mahadji Shinde, General of the Maratha armies, dated January 29, 1773[4].

The second is an extract of the secret deliberations of the Supreme Council of Pondicherry on the proposals made by the agents of the Maharaja.[6]

**(138)**

The Ministry owes them a reply, and the best that can be given to them is the treaty of which I have delivered to you the plan, My Lord. It is the quintessence of all the conferences I had with them in the course of my negotiations in India. You seemed to be extremely satisfied with it. It only remains to be concluded.

(Signed)—LE CHEVALIER DE St. LUBIN

C[2] 164

## CRITICISM OF THE MEMOIRS OF M. de St. LUBIN*

### Political observations

The political views of M. de. St. Lubin, as contained in his memorials, revolve round two points. The first: the restoration of the equilibrium of power between us and the English. The second: their total destruction by the union of the forces and the interests of the Asian powers. These two objects are often confounded and the means suggested are still more often contradictory. I shall, however, clarify them.

### Memorial of January 10, 1776: No. 3

The restoration of equilibrium, according to M. de St. Lubin, consists in a treaty of alliance with the King of the Marathas, from sovereign to sovereign, by which we shall furnish him a body of troops 2,400 strong, trained in artillery service and forming two regiments, of which the one, called the Regiment of Alliance, will be composed of 1200 men, would be employed in the service of the Marathas and would always be complete, and the other, called the Regiment of Pondicherry, will remain in this capital to recruit that of Alliance.

### Economic and political Memorial: No. 5

*Memorial of December 8, 1774, No. 1 as well as the preceding one, No. 5*

The Marathas will pay all the expenses of this corps for the levy in Europe, transport to India, maintenance, salary, etc. As these troops, observes M. de St. Lubin, will give them a decided superiority over the English in siege operations as they incontestably have it in field operations, the latter will be forced to shut themselves up in their fortresses, and share with us their possessions to avoid their total ruin.

### Memorial: No. 4

But if the fear of compromising ourselves with the English still demands circumspection, these troops can be sent to the Marathas, through a collusion with them, by making them desert.

M. de St. Lubin has rightly perceived that a treaty, such as the one he proposes, means a declaration of war, and he vainly believes that a collusion would pull him out of the difficulty. In fact, after the striking example, which I have cited above, of the conduct of the English exactly in a similar case, can we reasonably feel sure, as I have already observed, that they would wink at the connections which would be prejudicial

*The pages are not given folio numbers.

to them? The position of the Dutch entitled them to behave as they did, a conduct much less questionable than ours. Established, like all other Europeans in Bengal, at the sweet will of the prince of this province, their treaties with him obliged them to run to his succour whenever he ordered them to do so. Whereas, as we have not the same obligation in relation to the Marathas, it is out of our free will that we would furnish it to the enemies of the English, and we ought indeed to expect that they would treat us as such and would even bring matters to a head and forcibly expel us from our establishments in spite of peace. Now if, what their national pride and their power in India hardly permits us to hope, they dared not infringe it in an open manner to such an extent, have they not at their disposal Muhammad Ali Khan, Nawab of the Carnatic, where Pondicherry and Karikal are situated? They will call him into action to ruin both the factories, for which purpose he has only to make his appearance, since Pondicherry, this head-quarters of our establishments in India is not even safe from a surprise attack after twelve years of peace.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEMORIAL: No. 3
*Memorial of December 8,1774, No. 1*

And then how do we reconcile the success which St. Lubin expects from such a secret collusion with what he himself says that the English, watchful of all our movements, will constantly strive to repress by the weight of their power the smallest incentive which, in their opinion, is likely to set our machine into motion again? Isn't there a very palpable contradiction? And in what he says in another place in clear terms " Until a rupture between the two crowns takes place, there is nothing that we can do at Pondicherry, except reduce the expenditure and remove the defects of its administration "?

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEMORIAL No. 3

Does that fit in better than his earlier reasoning with the measures which he considers as necessary to force the English to share (their possessions) with us? By this expression " there is nothing that we can do at Pondicherry ", it can only be presumed that it means that it must be left without fortifications. That would be absurd, and that cannot be his idea, since he says in article 8 of his treaty that the surplus from the sum furnished by the Marathas would serve to improve the fortifications of Pondicherry. Moreover, to wage war in any country, it is necessary to have at least one base of operations to receive the reinforcements coming from Europe and to preserve the munitions of war etc., and consequently a place in a state of defence. Thus, M. de St. Lubin has simultaneously expressed himself for and against on this subject:

that, on the one hand, we must remain quiet in India and proclaim a general abandonment of all claims; that the Indians fear us, hate us, and are not at all disposed to help us either to rise again or change masters, that the English were very suspicious and very watchful of all our movements which they would stop with all their might; and that, on the other hand, we must stir up in all directions and that the Indians are only waiting for our intervention and that finally, to allay the distrust of the English, we must arm the former, and specially the Marathas, against them.

My Lord, in politics as well as in ethics, when a person does not start from a fixed point and when he gives way to his imagination alone, he can only lead himself into an error. That is what is being constantly done by M. de St. Lubin who is as unsuccessful in his assertions about the character and the military talents of the Marathas as in the political combinations which concern them. What makes him assume that the Marathas have always had in the flat open country a decided superiority over the English? Not only is there a single example which can warrant such a strange assertion, but I would be in a position, without fear of stretching my observations, to cite, on the contrary, twenty actions, big as well as small skirmishes, in which the Marathas have never held their ground against a handful of Europeans. I do not claim either to be born a General like M. de St. Lubin or to possess multifarious talents such as he arrogates to himself, but I have certainly seen the Marathas fight more than him, and I can definitely prove, as much by their military constitution which I know well enough, as by facts, that they are, I repeat it, incapable of sustaining the shock of European troops, much less of defeating them, and I boldly assert without fear of being contradicted by a professionable man, who has fought against them in India, that a simple colonel of mediocre capacity, possessing valour, at the head of a regiment of 2000 good soldiers, with his canon, will put to rout all the Marathas in Hindustan. I beg pardon of M. de St. Lubin, but that is very true. These militia troops are, however, the most redoutable and the most dreaded in India, I admit it. But how are they so? By their atrocious brigandage and by the cruelties they inflict, irrespective of age or sex, in all the territories they pass through, and by setting fire everywhere. That is how, to avoid devastation of their territory, the Indian princes prefer to cede to them a part of the revenues, rather than fight with these pillagers a war which would cost them much more than what they cede to them. And the English themselves, for

these reasons, and for others attributable to the vicinity of the Marathas to Bombay, humour them, because war is always onerous with them. Their defeat neither brings in any compensation or any profit to the victor. The Marathas are also redoutable because of their multitude and the celerity of their movements; they burst from the clouds at the moment least expected, and escape with the same speed. But they are never to be feared in an action except when you are unco-ordinated, and a corps, in close order, however mediocre it may be, will always successfully resist them.

When, in 1756, we went to the succour of M. de Bussy, besieged and pressed at Golkonda, 20,000 Marathas, joined by other troops of Salabat Jang, Subhedar of the Deccan, could not penetrate us during the entire six days of continuous march and skirmishes. We were but 500 Europeans; they only succeeded in retarding our march, but they could not prevent us from joining M. de Bussy in their face. We had Murarrao, the shrewdest and the bravest of the Maratha chiefs, with us against the English during three campaigns. Never during the frequent combats we had with them, he could resist them with his Marathas. I could cite so many specific examples of simple detachments of 50 men who sought and attacked bodies of 400 to 500 Marathas and drove them away like sheep? Therefore, it is the height of impertinence to dare to assert that the English cannot resist them in the open country and that they only need canon to get a superiority over the English in siege operations, of which they have but the crudest idea. M. St. Lubin ought not to ignore the account of that of Bassein which has remained famous in Portuguese history, but which will be so for professional men only because of its duration, because of the small number of the besieged who were forsaken and because of their resolve to endure all the hardships of famine, whereas the vast army of the Marathas who, however, had many canons and a large quantity of munitions, which, incidentally, the English had sold them, kicked its heels for two years before a place which might have been taken in a week's time. Yes, it can be asserted without the slightest temerity that all the Marathas in India, assembled before Madras, can no more take this place than we ourselves can overthrow the English power in India, by the only means indicated by M. de St. Lubin.

The second project of M. de St. Lubin to bring about the complete destruction of the English, without compromising ourselves with them, is a sequel to, and almost a repetition of, the first. It mainly consists, like the latter, in a treaty to be concluded with the King of the Marathas,

to which he adds special treaties with all the Asian princes who are sworn enemies of the English. Let us examine the terms of this treaty and the conclusions he draws from them.

### Memorial of January 10, 1775: No. 3

The first article is considered as the basis of our joint success because by this reciprocal engagement with the Marathas, the English will lose the auxiliary resources of this nation, which they have so much employed against the Mughals and against us.

The treaties which this nation (the English) has concluded with the Marathas have been certainly useful to it to hold the native people in check on various occasions, but they have not at all contributed or have contributed very little against us; our losses and our expulsion from India have indeed another origin.

On the second article of the treaty, my observation is that the naval power of the Marathas is so insignificant *vis-à-vis* the Europeans that it hardly deserves this denomination. The English would destroy it completely in a single combat with 4 warships. As for the future expulsion of the Mughals by the Marathas who would assure us the sole trade of all Hindustan, it is not a thing already achieved; thus the seed contained in this article is, in my opinion, very insignificant.

The passion of projectors must be very great to make them always bring forward gratuitously suggestions even obviously erronous in support of their ideas. The third article leads me to this harsh reflexion. In fact, isn't there something to laugh at out of pity when you read that the ports of the Marathas are well provided with all sorts of naval goods which will furnish us in the Indian seas resources which we always need, they who absolutely lack those which are most essential at sea, like anchors ? Their cables and even their running riggings are of coir. This rope is made with the thread of the cocoanut; this short and dried up thread forms a cable which does not easily roll in the sheaves of the pulleys. I have seen Maratha pals and galivats, equipped for war. In fact, their equipment arouses pity; with the reservation of their big ships called pals, of which the strongest carries 24 eight-pounders and which have iron anchors, purchased in the European ports, almost all others have wooden anchors, at the end of which they put cannon-balls and even sandbags to make them heavier. Therefore, these poor navigators dare put to sea only during the good season when the sea they scour is as calm as a pond, for, they cannot endure a simple gale without a certain risk of perishing.

The fourth article assures to our ships in times of war during the bad season a shelter which we have always lacked; that of the Isle of France is too far from the scene of action, that is true. In fact, it would be very desirable that we should have one, especially on the Coromandel Coast where the big blows are always struck, which would assuredly give us a more real superiority than a port on the Malabar Coast, in which we would be infallibly blocked by the English who keep all their naval forces there, unless ours preponderate. That does not, however, prevent us from ardently wishing that we had a port there, and I do not see any other than Gheria which entirely fulfils this objective.

Article 5 deals with the raising of an artillery regiment of 2400 men in order to give the Marathas in siege operations the superiority which they have, says the author, in the open country. I have expressed above my opinion on this subject; thus, I shall confine myself to a general observation on the treaty, i.e. to speak of the measures which its conclusion would force the English to take and of the consequences which will result from it.

Articles 7 and 8 deal with the pay ot the body of troops; Rs. 80 per person i. e. for the regiment which will serve with the Marathas, and Rs. 40 per person for the one which will stay at Pondicherry, destined to recruit it. That appears to me too high, even including the salary of the officers in it. Usually, that of the best paid European soldiers does not exceed Rs. 20, which comes to 50 francs per month. But nontheless, if the Marathas could be persuaded to pay our soldiers on this footing, that would be dexterous.

Article 9, the last one, stipulates that the King of the Marathas should promise to deliver into our hands all the places, materials and men *i. e.* Christians who, in the course of the success of our combined operations, might have fallen in their hands. The author observes on this article that he will obtain possession for us of all the factories of the Europeans which, he says, will not fail to fall into the power of the Marathas. However, in the same observation, he says that our unique object being trade exclusive of any other nation, we shall not keep for ourselves any conquest. That is contradictory, for, since the King of the Marathas is obliged by the treaty to deliver to us those (conquests) which he will have won from the Europeans (English), what shall we do of these, if we do not keep them ? And if we keep them as a matter of course, we have then managed to replace the English in their authority and consequently into hatred which it instils in the Indians against them. I quite understand that St. Lubin

meant to say that we would renounce only to meddle with the internal affairs (of the Indian princes) and that as the price of this sacrifice, the Marathas, having become, through our succour, absolute masters of Hindustan, would leave to us the entire exploitation of its commerce to the exclusion of other Europeans. But honestly, would it not be chimera to suppose that the English, the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Danes, would see themselves excluded from it silently ? In that case, what forces would we need to prevent them from setting foot again in India and from regaining their rights ? The Portuguese, the earliest navigators and the earliest conquerors of India, in spite of their treaties with the powers of this country, which always contained the formal exclusion of other Europeans, could they ever prevent them from sharing its commerce with them and finally, from succeeding in even completely snatching it from them (from the Portuguese) ? However, being the first comers, the right which the Indian princes, their own masters, gave them, was not contestable, whereas the one which we would acquire by a treaty with the Marathas would not have, nowhere near, the same sanction.

### Observations on the necessary consequences of the treaty

Supposing that the treaty with the Marathas was concluded, let us see the consequences which would result from it for us by the measures which the English would certainly take, either to wreck it or to make it worthless. Firstly, if the English considered the Marathas as the only ones capable of assuring them the entire trade and an assured preponderance, they will employ the same means to put them on their side, either by tempting them with promise, or by intimidating them with threats, or else they would endeavour to sow among them a misunderstanding likely to delay their operations, a contingency not without example. And supposing that these means do not meet with success, which the inconstant character of the Indian powers gives reason to hope for, they would oppose to them the Subhedar of the Deccan and all the Pathan princes who, as Musalmans, are interested in holding the Marathas in check and in preventing their aggrandisement which would cause their ruin. These princes, supported by a part of the English forces, would soon bring the Marathas to their senses. During this time, opposing collusion to collusion, if they condescend to make use of this arm of the weak party, they would not fail, as I have said it, to set Muhammad Ali Khan into action, who, as the Master of the Carnatic, in which part are situated our factories, would soon seize them, and by finally destroying the hope of our restoration in India, would force our Frenchmen, who are established there, to curse

the Marathas and the author of the treaty with them. Haideralikhan himself, this conqueror of Malabar, on whom St. Lubin sets such grand hopes, would he not see himself, by our tactless and hasty conduct, forced to unite with the English for his own interests ? Who of all the chiefs of Hindustan, has more to fear from the aggrandisement of the Maratha power than himself, of whom all the conquests, without exception, have been made at their expense, and at the expense of the Hindu princes who are their relatives and their allies ? He, a Musalman, and who can maintain himself only by the succours of the Musalmans! What fate does the author, who has been his general, his confidant, his negotiator, his friend, reserve for him in the hypothesis of the unique power of the Marathas in Hindustan, established on the destruction of all the others ? Besides, we must not overlook this very noteworthy point and which gives the English a great handle, as a measure of precaution, to ward off the impending storm on the part of the Marathas. It is the fact that all their conquests, all their territorial possessions have been made at the expense of the Mughals who, for that very reason, are justified in their enmity against them, whereas the Marathas have no real cause for it except that of being deprived of the right of *Chauthai* which they levy on all the provinces of Hindustan, and it matters to them very little whether they draw it from the Mughals or from the English, provided they collect it. Thus, if worst comes to the worst, the latter (the English) have only to pay it to them for the provinces of which they are masters. In that case, all pretext of war between them tumbles down at once, and the English would certainly employ this last resource if they were hard pressed, rather than deliver into the hands of the Mughals, still less into ours, the territories which the favours of fortune, success of their arms and the agreement of the Great Mughal, have put in their possession. The Marathas, satisfied, will return home, and we alone shall be victims of this eventuality. Thus, I conclude that our present situation in India makes a treaty with the Marathas from sovereign to sovereign, not even collusion with them, unsuitable for us, because we are not in a position to profit by it. We must first of all restore our navy, fortify Pondicherry and have sufficient troops in India, in order not to fail ignominiously when we shall create for the English enough troubles to feel sure at least of reestablishing equilibrium, if their total expulsion is too difficult. Then, a treaty with the Marathas could only be very advantageous, but without these preliminaries, any step towards this end would be as false as prejudicial, since, as I think I have sufficiently proved it, it will only serve to accelerate our ruin (and terminate) in sheer loss.

## Proof of their fidelity in the Revolutions of the Deccan: No. 8

*Economical and political Memoir : No. 8*

M. de St. Lubin takes his stand further to support the necessity of considering the Marathas as the only allies worthy of us, for the purpose of commerce as well as for war, on several reasons which it is worth-while examining. The Mughals, he says, are cowardly and perfidious, but the Maratha nation, which no one knew before him, is virtuous and abides by its treaties. I do not know what idea M. de St. Lubin forms of the virtue of a people, but to laud that of the Marathas is a thing as novel and amusing for those who know in what excesses of horrors and atrocities they indulge in all the territories through which they pass. M. de St. Lubin himself sketches its picture, to which I shall add the main point which undoubtedly he has omitted only not to revolt us against this nation so virtuous, and whose religion and customs are so gentle and pure.

## Memoir of January 27, 1775

" At the first report of their march, there is a stampede in the woods in the mountains, under the protection of the fortresses ". But he does not mention that this general terror is chiefly due to their ferocious cruelty which distinguishes neither age nor sex and which pitilessly bathes in the blood of those who cannot resist them. Besides, as in political matters, specially Asian, it is not virtue and customs which are sought in one's allies but advantages which can be obtained from them and principally fidelity to the reciprocal engagements. I shall say, according to the historical memorials of St Lubin himself, that the Marathas have in this respect no advantage over the Mughals; they change sides quite as easily when their interest is involved in it

## Economical and political Memorial: No. 6

Finally, M. de St. Lubin adds, to give a finishing touch to his argument, that the alliance with the Marathas is the only one that suits us, for the purpose of commerce as well as for politics, announces as essential truth that our commerce can no longer be maintained in India on the privileges granted formerly by the Mughal Emperors, and similarly our politics can no longer be established on their authority, as it had been proposed in a ridiculous project the goal of which is to make, at our expense and risks, an Emperor.

When a person announces as essential truth what he himself formally contradicts, what influence can you hope to create in the minds of sensible persons? The remarks which I am going to make are all the more necessary as it is on this point equally fundamental that M. de St. Lubin says more formally the pros and the cons.

REVOLUTIONS OF BENGAL: NO. 2

The historical account of Hindustan and of the Deccan, the revolutions of Gujarat, those of Bengal, the political and historical memorials on this kingdom, No. I, generally all the writings of M. de St. Lubin which speak of the Mughal Emperor, constantly represent him as the only legitimate master, the only one who has the right to grant either provinces or titles or privileges whatsoever in Hindustan. If that is so, why should those (privileges) which he could grant us not suffice us? Why should his authority be insufficient for us, whilst it is on this authority that the English founded the ownership of their vast concessions? Why does M. St. Lubin praise so often the advantages which the agreement passed between them (the English) and the present Emperor has made them acquire? Why does he say, to quote his own words, "The security and permanence which the English Company appears to acquire by this agreement are not small advantages, since it proceeds from it that it (the Company) is considered as part of the Empire, depended on the Mughal whose interest is to support it (the Company) with all his might against any power which might wish to disturb it. This is so far as the right is concerned!".

Thus, since the English have real rights to the ownership of Bengal and of their other Council in India only because of the cession which has been made to them by the Emperor, the plan of M. Chevalier to put him in our interests and to profit by his good will for us, is not, therefore, as rediculous as M. St. Lubin has advanced it through his hatred for its author, who did not want to receive him at Chandernagore. It is as unfortunate as humiliating that personalities should influence the projects wherein the welfare of the nation ought alone to be considered. As for me, who am not more friendly with M. Chevalier whom I do not know at all, than inimical to M. de St. Lubin, I say what I think on their political views according to my conscience and my understanding. I, however, insist that, in the situation in which we are in India, we would as ill serve our interests by negotiating openly with the Mughal Emperor as with the King of the Marathas, but it is always advisable to maintain his good will for us by

secret assurances of ours for him when circumstances will permit us to show him all its extent. We must be true and consistent and should not delude ourselves inopportunely. The Emperor is neither more friendly with the English for having ceded to them many of his provinces than the ex-Nawab whom they have deprived of his or than the Marathas to whom they refuse to pay the *Chauth*, are our friends. If to-day we were in a position to break the run of bed luck, the Emperor would grant us quite as easily the same rights as he had given to our rivals, provided we were in a better state than them (the English) to protect them (his rights) against his enemies. Thus, all these wonderful springs of the politics of the Indian princes come down to this point, i.e. to be sufficiently strong to convince them that they can only profit by our alliance. We shall then be masters to choose that (alliance) among them which will appear to us most advantageous.

I have analysed the projects of M. de St. Lubin with all the exactitude of which I am capable, and if I have treated him with a severity which has grieved me, the welfare of the nation could alone induce me to it. I have paid justice to his talents and to his knowledge. I would have very much liked to carry a judgment as favourable over his person (character?), but my attachment for the worthy Minister to whom I consecrate the first writing that I have done in my life of this unpleasant nature, demanded from me quite naked truth. And the more I reflect on the mental impossibility in which are his colleagues by the nature and multiplicity of their occupations to always unravel it by themselves, the more I feel how important it is for a Minister jealous of his glory and who, like M. de Sartine, does not at all separate his own interest from that of the nation, to have in his service trustworthy persons who have the courage to unmask before him the intriguers, coxcombs, inept and vicious protégés whom the grandees often recommend, importunately and almost always without thorough knowledge, or out of selfish motives; in short, who know how to expose all the traps which are ceaselessly laid before him. The task of the Minister would then be much less laborious and he would have the necessary time to attend to his great projects and to put them into execution.

FONDS ASIE

Vol. 4

ARCHIVES OF THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(163)

To

My Lord,

Monseigneur le Marquis de Castries,

Minister and Secretary of State for the Navy.

My Lord,

Immediately on my return to this country, I hastened to Versailles to lay at your feet the homage of my respect, my gratitude and my success in the career opened to my zeal by your beneficent hands. Every day, during one whole week, I waited upon you without being admitted to the honour of paying my court to you. But soon, informed of the machinations employed by my enemies to deprive me of your esteem, I resolved not to reappear in your presence unless my face were cleansed of all the stains with which they have endeavoured to besmear it. I, therefore, spent six weeks on the work of which I have the honour to address you the copy, and I have no doubt that the judgement you will pass on my conduct will completely restore me to the good opinion which you were formerly kind enough to hold of me. The esteem of a man like you is the most flattering reward I can receive for my labours and the desire to appear worthy of it in your eyes has constantly guided me (163v°) in all my proceedings in the whole course of my embassy.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

CH. DE ST. LUBIN

Paris, 18th December 1780.

Hotel de Strasbourg, Rue Neuve, St. Eustache.

(165)

REPORT OF MY EMBASSY AT THE COURT OF THE MAHARAJA OF HINDUSTAN

My Lord,
Marquis de Castries,
Minister for the Navy.

My Lord,

On the 26th March 1776, Monsieur de Sartine delivered into my hands a letter from the King addressed to me by His Majesty. Here is the copy:

THE KING'S LETTER

" Mons. Pallebot de St. Lubin, I address you this letter to inform you that I have chosen you to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Maharaja of Hindustan in accordance with the instructions which will be delivered to you by my Secretary of State, in charge of the Department of the Navy: and this letter having no other object, I pray God, Mons. Pallebot de St. Lubin, that He may take you under his holy and worthy protection ".

Versailles, 26th March, One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Six

(Signed) LOUIS
and a little lower: de Sartine: with a seal

The same day Monsieur de Sartine delivered to me a letter addressed by His Majesty to the Maharaja of Hindustan. Here is the copy:

" Greetings from Louis of France to the Maharaja of the Marathas. Happy will be the day on which this letter, testimony of my affection, will be delivered to you! Happier still the one on which our two nations will be united together for their interests and the glory of their sovereigns! From the day I ascended the throne, my mind has been occupied with this alliance, and after seeking the blessings of God thereon, I have sent my faithful and beloved subject Pallebot de St. Lubin to your Court to reveal to your heart these dispositions of mine. I have no intention to acquire territories in Hindustan. (165v°) I know that Hindustan belongs to the Maharaja just as France belongs to none but me. Justice is the most precious jewel of my crown. All that I desire is the establishment of reciprocal trade between your subjects and mine, because it will be equally advantageous to both. I pray God to shower on you as many favours as I solicit for myself."

Versailles, 26th March 1776.

(Signed) LOUIS,
and a little lower: Le Comte de Sartine

On the same day, Monsieur de Sartine delivered to me a letter addressed by him to Nana or Prime Minister of the Maratha Empire. Here is the copy:

THE MINISTER'S LETTER

" Greetings from the Minister of the King of France to the Vazir of the Maharaja of Hindustan. When the wisdom of the Kings promotes the happiness of the nations, the glory of the sovereigns is reflected on their ministers. That is why I congratulate Your Excellency as I congratulate myself on the share we shall have in the alliance between our two masters for the advantage of our two nations. M. Pallebot de St. Lubin, sent by the King to your Court to execute this union, will reveal to you the dispositions of my heart, convinced that he will find yours equally disposed to the common welfare. I solicit your friendship and offer you mine. I pray that God may shower on Your Excellency and your Vazirat as many favours as I solicit them for my person and for my Ministership."

Versailles, 26th March 1776 (Signed) LE COMTE DE SARTINE

On the 22nd April of the same year, I received from M. de Sartine the following letter and instruction:

Versailles, 22nd April 1776

I am addressing you herewith, Sir, a memorandum which sets forth the instructions by which you must abide while fulfilling the mission (166) which His Majesty has entrusted to you. I am also enclosing the letters to enable you to get the necessary help from the French authorities in India. You will receive an annual sum of Rs. 12,000 (Arcot Rupees) as your salary. I wish you a happy journey and am anxiously waiting for the result of your undertaking.

I have the honour to be entirely

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

(Signed) DE SARTINE,

## Instructions

His Majesty, having decided upon the choice of M. Pallebot de St. Lubin as his envoy to the Court of the Maharaja of Hindustan to conclude a commercial treaty with this sovereign, orders him to follow the following instruction:

" As soon as he arrives at the Court of the Maharaja the envoy will deliver to Nana, his Vazir, the letter from the Secretary of State, holding the portfolio of the Navy, and promptly seek the audience of the Maharaja.

Introduced into the presence of the Maharaja, dressed in the French fashion, with the sword at the side and the hat on his head, he will place in the hands of the Maharaja himself the letter from the King to this sovereign and he will explain to him the import, taking good care to employ only affectionate expressions in the Maratha language, from one crown to the other, without indulging in any of those Oriental expressions which, under the semblance of civility, however, admit of some idea of subjection.

## Permanent treaty

After nobly explaining the estimable motives which led His Majesty to enter into an alliance with this sovereign for the common welfare (166 v°) of their people, he will sign and have signed the commercial treaty between the two nations in 4 articles, namely:

*Article 1*

There will be an inviolable friendship between the French and the Marathas. The French will always render all possible good offices to the Marathas.

The Marathas will always be friends of the French and the enemies of the French will be the enemies of the Marathas. The Marathas will always protect the French possessions in India by all the means in their power against any enemy whatever.

*Article 2*

The Marathas will have the privilege of freedom of trade in all the states, present and future, under French domination, in preference to all other Asiatic powers in Hindustan.

The French will have the privilege of freedom of trade in all the states, present and future, under Maratha domination, in preference to all other European nations.

*Article 3*

Maratha ships will have access into all the French ports without paying any import or export duties either for themselves or their goods.

French vessels will have access into all the Maratha ports without paying any import or export duties either for themselves or for their goods.

*Article 4*

In all the French ports, Maratha ships, during their stay, will remain under the protection of the Government at all times of the year.

In all the Maratha ports, French ships, during their stay, will remain under the protection of the Government at all times of the year.

**(167)**

The envoy must not on any ground deviate from the letter of these articles in the drawing up of the treaty in writing, but in the verbal interpretation of the articles, he will give them an amplification most favourable to the respective interests of the two crowns; especially while explaining Article 1, he will lay down as a principle that His Majesty being at present at peace with all the nations of the world, the sacred fidelity to his engagements which he will never forsake, will not permit him to enter into any alliance hostile to any of these powers, unless he is forced to do so by the violation of the treaties; but that, if by any infraction of these treaties, any power forced him to obtain justice by force of arms, he will then readily unite his forces to those of the Maharaja to punish the common enemy.

CONDITIONAL TREATY

Proceeding from this principle, he will negotiate a conditional treaty of an offensive and defensive alliance between the two crowns against any power which might break off with France. He will receive proposals for the raising of the respective contingents of the King and of the Maharaja, and he will send them to the Secretary of State, in charge of the department of the Navy. Pending the ratification by the King, he will impress upon the Maharaja the necessity to provisionally protect the French possessions against attacks from any enemy and he will induce him to sign an agreement to this effect, within the full scope of Article 1.

To match a good turn with this agreement, the envoy will not lose the opportunity to emphasize as a very great mark of friendship and confidence on the part of the King towards the Maharaja, the value of the

permission granted to his shippers to carry on traffic in arms, a step which prudence authorizes only between nations united by bonds of friendship and by the interest of common success.

### Warehouses and ship-building yards

Always following this method, he will demand the grant or use of suitable territory in the Maratha ports not only for the setting up of store-houses for trade but also for the construction of ships. He will obtain exact information on the price of wood and manual labour, and he will prepare an estimate of the cost of all ships of the line constructed in cedar and teak wood in the Maratha ship-yards. He will join to it a list of the materials and ship-wrights that would have to be sent there (167 v°) from Europe for being employed in their construction, and the estimate of the number of ships which could be constructed there in a certain space of given time. He will have the bearings taken of the ports, roadsteads, anchorages, channels, mouths of rivers, and will draw up plans with observations on all matters which can facilitate navigation in them.

### Consulate

As it is of the utmost importance to put the commercial treaty promptly into execution, in order to establish precedents for the future, the envoy will obtain an admission into the port for the ship in which he travels, in enjoyment of the prerogatives stipulated in the treaty. He will provisionally appoint in the port of Chaul or Gheria or Rajapur, a Consul, a Secretary and an interpreter, for whom he will obtain recognition from the Maratha Government. He will draw up official deeds which will establish the legality of the establishment for perpetuity in favour of the French nation. These deeds signed by the Maratha Government will be prepared in duplicate; one copy will remain with the Consul; the other will be sent to the Secretary of State, holding the port-folio of the Navy.

Correspondence will be carried on by the land as well as by the sea route in cipher prescribed by the Minister, either for commercial or political matters.

(Signed) de Sartine

On the 5th June of the same year I left Paris to board the ship at Bordeaux and when everything was ready there to set sail, I wrote a letter to Monsieur de Sartine on 3rd August to seek final orders. The Minister sent me his reply as follows :

Versailles, 10th August 1976

According to your information, Sir, by your letter of the 3rd instant, you are only awaiting my final orders to set sail. I can do nothing but repeat what I have already said to you during all my conversations with you : " prudence and secrecy." Let not the idea and love of glory, which I see burning in you, lead you to take measures which I can neither acknowledge nor (168) support and which will destroy the edifice, the establishment of which I have entrusted to your care. Alliance and trade ought to be your sole occupation. I know the resources of your talents and of your local knowledge. I am convinced that no one else can achieve what you cannot achieve. But you will have to negotiate with men on whom you cannot rely, because the enemy is always sure to entice them with money. Impress upon them and persuade them, if you can do so, how detrimental is this effect of gold to healthy politics and to their real interests; that it can only disparage their alliance and give their enemy time to gain stability which they will soon no longer be in a position to resist. Everything is contributing to it according to the reports of the month of February which I have recently received.

Finally, concentrate only on fulfilling my object efficaciously. Fear not your enemies. I have proved to you that they cannot have any influence with me. I never carry impressions except with full knowledge of the facts. You can count on the pleasure which your success will give me and which I shall have in obtaining for you the reward for your labours.

From the report you have given me, Sir, of the latest transaction you have entered into, I find it very advantageous for the shipowners, but my share in it appears to me superfluous. I must watch over everything which can protect and augment maritime trade, but it admits of details into which I can neither enter nor appear.

I have the honour to be very respectfully, Sir, your very humble and very obedient servant.

(Signed) DE SARTINE

*P.S.*—From the latest letters received from India, the Marathas were blockading the English in the Island of Salsette and at Bassein. The Council of Calcutta, worried about the outcome of this war, had dispatched six million (francs) to Bombay to create divisions among the Maratha Chiefs and buy peace.

Your are too prudent to carry with you papers which are secret.

(168v°)

On 19th September 1776 I set sail and arrived on 12th February 1777 at Mahé. From this place I dispatched to Monsieur de Sartine the following letter which left by the private ship *l'Aigle*.

My Lord,

Four months and 23 days after my departure from France, I arrived at Mahé on 12th February without either having a dead or a sick person during the voyage. I attach the greatest price to this satisfaction, because I feel that I deserve it. Resolved not to make a single call at any port to gain as much time as possible, I took the precaution to make up for the deficiency of fresh supplies by taking on board musicians who made the sailors dance during the voyage, and today I am enjoying the happiness of having kept them all hale and hearty through merriment, an inspiring balm more salutary than all those extracted from the vegetable kingdom. Thus, the ship *Le Sartine* already deserves to be cited for the brevity of its voyage and the safety of all its crew. I hope to furnish it soon other titles to celebrity.

Tomorrow I proceed to my destination in spite of the obstacle I met with here on the part of M. Picot. He disposed of the Bill of Exchange for Rs. 6,250 which you had sent him for me, in favour of the King's frigate, *La Consolante*. He gave me only Rs. 2,000 and for the rest he indefinitely refers me to M. Anquetil, Consul at Surat, alleging that he has no money in the King's treasury. However, *La Consolante* has just brought him Rs. 15,000 and he expects as much any moment by the ship *Le Brillant*. Even if I went to Surat, where I am resolved not to go because I ought to be more concerned with the success of your projects than with the collection of my salary, M. Anquetil, who owes me nothing and on whom I have neither a Bill of Exchange nor a Bill to bearer, would not pay me and you can just imagine what would then be my embarrassment. But I shall be (169) scrupulous in sparing you all anxiety about the decision I am

going to take. Here it is : to the last farthing in my purse, to the last resource of my wit and to the last breath of my life, the King will be served, you will be obeyed, I shall be devoted.

The Marathas are at peace with the English since the month of May last. They are content with forcing them to restore the kingdom of Tanjore to its legitimate master. As soon as this English usurpation was relinquished, they ceased their hostilities. By the same treaty of peace, the English had agreed to restore to the Marathas the Island of Salsette. But as soon as the latter withdrew their forces, the perfidious people violated their agreements by retaining this Island—a fresh ground for quarrel between them. It is fortunate for the English that the Marathas are at present engaged with their war with Haiderali Khan. You know, my Lord, that the English politics is to set, as far as possible, these powers against each other so as to weaken them at each other's hands and rise on their ruins. Would to God, I succeed for the second time in patching up peace between them as I had the good luck to do so ten years ago! So permit me to recall that after reconciling them, I led Haiderali Khan from victory to victory as far as the gates of Madras where he imposed on the English the harshest and the most humiliating terms: that would make a pendant.

Haider Ali Khan is considering a plan to expel the Dutch from the Malabar Coast and invade the Kingdom of Travancore with a view to extending his domination as far as Cape Comorin. The Dutch are bound, by their treaty of commerce and alliance (with the King of Travancore), to protect his dominions from any foreign invasion. Consequently, Haider Ali Khan has found them as an obstacle in his way whenever he tried to cross his frontier. Two months back, he captured from them an important post near Cochin and he would definitely have pushed forward if he had not been forced to lose his hold on this side to face the Marathas on the other, but he continues to make preparations, at Mangalore and Calicut which can have no other destination than against the King of Travancore and his allies the Dutch.

You must have certainly been apprised, *via* England, of the frantic (169v°) disorder into which the English at Madras have fallen. They have dared to arrest Lord Pigot, the Governor, dispatched by the Court of London to Madras. They have elected another one in the person of

Mr. Stratton who, as I know him too well, is the most incompetent member of the Council. I think this spirit of vertigo, dizziness, impudence and blunder, this spirit which is the forerunner of the fall of kingdoms, has seized this nation in all the parts of the world. Amen!

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and obedient servant,

PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

After a week's halt at Mahé the ship *Le Sartine* sailed up the Malabar Coast to Chaul, a Maratha port, where we arrived on 16th March. I landed there and proceeded by land to the Court of the Maharaja to fulfil the mission which the King had entrusted to me. I rendered an account of the same to the Minister by three different dispatches sent at different periods.

My first dispatch, dated 15th July 1777, was brought by M. Pascal du Santy, Captain of my guards.

The second dispatch, dated 1st May 1778, was brought by M. Franzois du Santy, his brother, Captain of a private ship.

The third, dated June last (1780) was sent from Malta by M. le Chevalier de Caumon, the King's minister at Malta.

These three memoranda together constitute the complete account (170) which I had to and have to submit of my mission. I found during a conversation with Monsieur de Mars that only the documents, of which I am now furnishing copies, are missing in his files. The King's letter cannot be found; but this document, by its very nature, must be in the possession of M. de Sartine who, in my presence put it in his writing desk along with a copy of the instructions which he had delivered to me. This document can be sought from this Minister. If, however, it is mislaid I can supply a copy of a rough draft which I have preserved. But as this copy does not bear the King's seal, it can become authentic after it has been legalized by the examination and testimony of M. de Sartine.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Yours very humble and obedient servant,

PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

(171)

## First Dispatch to Monsieur de Sartine

(172)

My Lord,

This is the day which you promised to His Majesty and because of these two reasons, it is the greatest in my life. All your projects on Hindustan are fulfilled and you have thereby contributed to the prosperity of the mother country.

Our nation, ruined in all India by the misfortunes of the last war and humiliated by the conditions of the treaty of peace, had not yet recovered from the fall, and the Indian powers, as amazed at the haughty bearing of our rivals as disgusted by our inactivity which they attributed to our weakness, would not lend us a hand to set ourselves up again on our feet. Thus, lacking sufficient strength in themselves and without auxiliary support from outside, our establishments were exposed to invasion, and from the very first day of a fresh war, Pondicherry, Chandernagore and Mahé whose fortifications had hardly been restored during the thirteen years of peace, risked becoming again a heap of ruins. Pending this impending day, French trade was languishing because of the innumerable obstacles which the English could so easily place in its way by their influence on the Governments of Bengal, Coromandel and Surat, where our factories are situated. Due to the same influence, our squadrons always lacked facilities for victualling in a country completely subservient to them. And the French flag, which never possessed in Hindustan any port which could serve it as a shelter, found refuge only in the Isle of France, a refuge (172v°) ruinous to the affairs of the King in times of war, because it is too distant from the scene in which the English have two harbours, Bombay and the Ganges, which are principal source of their superiority.

Such was the gloomy picture of our miserable situation in India when you took over the portfolio for the Navy. You diagnosed the malady and discovered the remedy: it has been applied.

The alliance of the Marathas which you have secured for France places our establishments under the protection of the foremost power in Hindustan. By whatsoever enemy they are attacked, we are assured, according to the exigency of the case, either of direct assistance, or of a decisive diversion, or of both at the same time. Free trade, which you

have now opened for the French nation in all the territory under Maratha domination, is protected against molestations which it experiences in the rest of India. And Maratha ports, open at all times to our ships, offer them the resources that can be expected from a nation, martial, seafaring, agricultural and commercial, which makes common cause with us.

These are, My Lord, the miracles which you have wrought. Allow me to offer you my thanks for associating me in some way with the glory of your projects by charging me with their execution. I shall now render you a detailed account of my transactions.

(173)

## Diary of my Embassy

I left France on 19th September 1776. After 4 months and twenty three days of navigation, I arrived at Mahé on 12th February 1777, as I had the honour to inform you by the private ship *L'Aigle*. From there I reached on 16th March the Maratha port called Chaul on our maps and Janjira Revdanda by the local people.

During the whole voyage, my mind, revelling, in the most flattering hopes, had imagined that Great Madhavrao was still occupying the throne, that he would receive me again with joy, shower on me all his favour and hasten to carry out the promises he had made to my nation. Full of ideas so sweet for a patriotic heart, I arrive. Madhavrao is dead; he died of dropsy*. Narayanrao, his brother, succeeded him, but Raghunathrao *alias* Raghoba, their uncle, had him soon assassinated with a view to seizing the throne. Queen Gangabai, his widow, escaped with her son to the fortress of Purandhar and there collected the chiefs who recognized this child as their King under the name of (Sawai) Madhavrao. Raghoba, proscribded, fugitive, pursued, takes refuge in Bombay where he buys the protection of the English not only at the cost of all his treasures, but also by the cession of the Islands of Salsette and Bassein which formed part of his apanage. On this condition, the English promise to support his claims and provisionally seize the Island of Salsette which is surrendered to them by the governor who commands the place on behalf of Raghoba. They meditate the same operation against Bassein, but the Marathas hasten to its succour and repulse them: war was declared (173 v°) between the two nations. The English Governor of Bengal offers his mediation and re-establishes peace. The conditions are that the

English should recognize Madhavrao as King[9] and that they should retain (I was wrongly informed at Mahé that the English had promised to evacuate Salsette) Salsette but abandon their claims on Bassein and those of Raghoba to the throne. Thus, a minor King, a young dowager Queen, a Regent, a Prime Minister and a Council of Regency: this constitutes the Maratha Government. To this Government is accreditted an English ambassador who, on behalf of the Bombay Council, solicits the re-establishment of Raghoba in his apanage. This move has a double purpose. In the first place, they are tired of maintaining him at their expense. Secondly, they hope that this ambitious prince, as soon as he re-enters his country, might effect a revolution or at least provoke some trouble which they might turn to account for their own aggrandisement.

Such was the state of things at the time of my arrival before the port of Chaul. I immediately informed the commandant of the place about my mission by a letter as follows:

"Greetings from le Chevalier de St. Lubin, Envoy of the King of France to the King of the Marathas, to the honourable Governor of the town and the port of Chaul. Six months ago the King, my master, dispatched me from his Court to convey to the King of the Marathas an important and pleasant message. By the grace of God, I have arrived at the famous port of Chaul where I wish to land in order to proceed to the Court as early as possible."

The Governor being absent, his son who commanded in his place, sent me his compliments and informed me that I was welcome, but that before landing, he requested me to await orders from the Court about the reception to be given to me. He received them on the ninth day and consequently the ship greeted the shore with a salute of 21 guns which the shore returned shot for shot. The commandant of Chaul came to meet me in his galley accompanied by three war-galliots to receive me on his ship; but I (174) had simultaneously left in my boat to meet him half way. He greeted me with his canon and passed on my boat on which we embraced each other. The fort of Moro which defends the roadstead and the entrance to the port greated me with its artillery and on my landing, the citadel of Chaul gave me a salute of 21 guns. Through this citadel and the garrison under arms, the commandant led me to the lodging which was fixed for me in the town, and left there for me a guard of 100 men. It is a convent of the Portuguese Capucins whose kind monks handed over to me the possession of their house and I stayed there during the whole of my stay at Chaul.

The elephant, horses, camels, palanquins and other carriages for the transport of my retinue and my luggage being furnished by the Government[10], I left Chaul on 11th April for Poona, capital of the kingdom. I reached it on the 22nd and on the 24th proceeded to the fort of Purandhar where the King has his residence. Bhimrao, minister for war and Grand Master of the artillery, who, with a big retinue, marched a distance of 12 kilometres to meet me, accompanied me and installed me in the house prepared for me.

On 4th May, I paid my visit to Sakharam Bapu, Regent of the Kingdom and Balaji Pant Nana or Prime Minister. The former is a venerable old man whose benign appearance is the image of candour. The latter is, a man of 40, with a firm demeanour and resolute look. We embraced each other. To Nana I delivered the letter which you had entrusted to me for him with the necessary explanations, My Lord, and requested Bapu to arrange for the audience of the King to hand over to him His Majesty's letter.

On the 8th I was led to the King's audience by the Regent and the Prime Minister, each one holding my hand, with the hat on, sword by the side and dressed in the French fashion in accordance with my instructions.

(174v°)

Seated on a throne of green velvet, embroidered and fringed with gold, under a canopy of golden cloth, surrounded by a reverential court, wearing pearls and precious stones, the King received me and seated me in front of him with a dignity incredible in a child. But what a child! It is the most handsome that I have seen in my life: white like a lily and vermilion like a rose, his face is a combination of most charming features; a graceful smile illumines this pretty picture. Yes, my Lord, I shall confess it to you, either the presence of Kings has a divine character arousing emotion in our hearts (an effect which I have always felt at Versailles) or my emotion arose from the memory of Madhavrao and Narayanrao whose death had left in such tender hands a sceptre, assuredly most ancient in the world and one of the most powerful in Asia[11], I could not control my tears........

" And so here is, I exclaimed to myself, the heir of the family of the Great Madhavrao! This august descendant of so many kings would not have survived but for the heroism of the Queen, his mother and the fidelity of Sakharam and Nana who fortunately saved his life and valiantly

defended his crown! Heaven grant that all his enemies and theirs be confounded! That is the wish of the King, my master, of his Vazir and of his envoy ! "

Next I kissed the King on his forehead according to the custom and offered him my presents:

To wit

A magnificent musket, saying: let the fire consume your enemies!

A very beautiful sword, adding: let the steel eliminate them!

Six big paintings representing all the mysteries of his religion, which I had had executed in Paris according to my designs by M. Boumien, the King's painter, in the studio of M. Pierre. I then said to him: let the Master of Heaven and all the celestial powers continue to protect you!

A splendid clock, giving to the allegoric figures, with which it is decorated, an explanation relating to (175) him and to the Queen, his mother.

A covered bowl and its plate with a cup, the whole in engraved gilt bronze.

Two golden caskets with portraits of the King and the Queen and finally two boxes of artificial flowers for the Queen, his mother.[12]

When these articles were examined, admired and praised, I said to the King: " These presents which you have graciously accepted from my hand are nothing in comparison to the one which I am going to offer you on behalf of my master. This is the richest gjft you might ever receive: it is the friendship of the King of France, expressed in this letter which he has addressed to you." With these words I placed into his little hands His Majesty's letter, he kissed it and gave it to the Regent. This ceremony over, the King retired and the Regent with Nana led me into a chamber where I offered them explanations on the King's letter. Here began the negotiation.

" Perpetual alliance and free trade between our two nations : this is, Gentlemen, in brief what the King, my master, offers and demands from yours. By perpetual alliance, he means a sacred agreement made on oath to always love each other like brothers, never to support the enemies of one another and to help each other with all the might at their disposal against these enemies. By free trade he means the admission of ships of the two nations in all their ports, to sell and buy therein all sorts of goods without paying any import and export duties, everything being established

on a footing of the greatest equality. Thus, supposing that in your armies you intend to employ French soldiers, you have merely to ask for them from the King and they would be dispatched to you on conditions of a salary which will be amicably decided; and likewise if the French establishments in India are attacked by any power, (175v°) at the first call for help, you will take up arms in their defence on conditions likewise decided for the expenses of their dispatch. In all times all your ports will be opened to French ships for taking shelter during the monsoon season, repairing their damages, revictualling, in short, for any need to enter them and remain there. Ours will likewise be at your disposal. This, Gentlemen, is the general import of my two proposals. If I were to speak to ministers less enlightened on the interest of their Government, I would enumerate to them at length the advantages which your sovereign will reap from such an excellent union, but two persons, so wise, can at once appreciate all the soundness of such a plan, and two hearts so zealous can at once embrace it in all its extent. At the first glance, you see the enemies of your King confounded by his union with the most powerful monarch in Europe. You see our soldiers infuse into your armies, I don't say lessons of courage (we know that the brave Maratha nation does not need them) but make you appreciate the advantages of European discipline and improve your artillery on our model. You see our ships pour into your ports all the arms and munitions which you will require, guarantee by their presence the security of your shores and serve as a bridge of communication on the sea between the two kingdoms. You see like me all your advantages and even more than I can perceive them, because you know better whan concerns you. As for me, incapable of trying to lead you astray as also convinced that no one would succeed in doing so, I shall frankly admit to you the advantages which the King, my master, expects from an alliance with your King. Your country produces commodities which do not grow at all in ours which, nevertheless, consumes them. Your factories manufacture cloths different from ours and we use them. You are in the same position with regard to Europe so far as its metals, cloths, arms and other products of its soil and of its arts. The merchants of the two nations give some articles in exchange of (176) others; this mutual intercourse of wants and supplies will unite the two peoples with the strongest bond of society. I shall confess everything : our establishments in India, limited by the justice of our King to what belongs to us by right, not only because of the interdiction to expand our territory at the expense of any one, but also because of the impossibility of doing it with the small number of troops which he permits us to

maintain therein, are surrounded and envied by the English who can crush them in no time with all the power they have usurped from the Mughal Government. It is to protect us against this surprise attack that the King, my master, relies on the faith, on the Maratha valour until, informed of the insult, he sends his fleets to avenge it. Then he expects that they will find in your ports all the succours which friendship demands. He expects them with all the greater confidence as by punishing the English ambition he will protect you from its effects, already spread all over Mughal India, effects which you yourself, quite powerful as you are, have just felt by the usurpation of Salsette. It is true that it is the first piece of territory they have ever captured from you. They have acquired it by treachery. They were not strong enough to seize it from you and nothing was easier for you than to recapture it. Therefore, realising the futility of their arms, they have had recourse to negotiation. But by what magic did they induce you to accept an Englishman as an arbitrator between you and the English? I am no longer surprised that Salsette has been allocated to them. I am only astonished that they have not further abused your moderation. What shall I say ? Oh ! Heaven ! Can a more odious outrage be done to a righteous nation than to ask it for grace for the murderer of its King ? I have no words to describe such a behaviour, and besides it is not for me to interfere with your domestic affairs. I know that your love for your Kings is like ours, proof against seduction. as much as against arrogance. I know that Narayanrao's assassin will never breathe the air of the Kingdoms which you have preserved for his son; (176v°) that your honour does not, therefore, take offence at what has just escaped from my mouth. A Frenchman and a soldier as I am, I speak frankly and zealously, and it is with us a natural movement, which we cannot repress, to be always enraged at an insult, although we are not personally concerned with it."

" Here is my hand, said the Regent (while offering it to me with a noble and frank look, and I took it and shook it with both my hands), I accept in the name of Madhavrao the alliance of your King. I understand all your mission, it will soon be terminated. It is only customary with us to place such important matters before the Council. You can choose among the ministers the person to whom you would like to entrust this business. "

" My choice is already made, I replied promptly, I am still holding your hand, it is the one from which I would like to receive the reply. "

" Very well, he said, in that case I offer you the first person in the Council after Nana and me. This minister's name is Krishnaro; he is absent today, but tomorrow he will pay you a visit and receive your instructions. Now, only tell me if you are at war with the English. "

" No. "

" You then propose to declare it soon, for we have heard that seven French warships have already arrived in India and that you have replaced the Civil Governor by a Military Governor at Pondicherry where you expect a large reinforcement of troops. "

" No, I tell you, the King, my master, aspires only after peace, because it is the greatest blessing for humanity. Possessing the finest kingdom in Europe, he concentrates upon governing it without any ambition to expand it. His paternal love for his people makes him detest conquests which a king, howevér victorious he may be, never buys but at the price of the blood of his subjects, and his just conduct towards his neighbours is the surest frontier of their kingdoms, so long as they will contain themselves (177) within the bounds of treaties. Yes ! Without these two virtues which distinguish our monarch, these Englishmen, of whom you speak to me, would today be anihilated ? Their kingdom, tormented by factions which tear it, consumed by civil war against its own American subjects who have shaken the yoke of its tyranny, worn out by public debts which it can discharge only by declaring a general bankruptcy, would it not be crushed in a moment by the weight of my master's power, if he were not the most peaceful King ? It is, therefore, as I have told you, his love for humanity which induces him to cherish peace, but in order to guarantee this hapiness to people, he is always prepared to declare war, either to defend his subjects or to assist his allies. Therefore, his strongholds are always abundantly furnished and his treasures therein are well guarded. He constantly orders his armies to stay in camps which are a perpetual school of discipline and military operations. He dispatches his warships on all the seas to see that his flag is respected there and to ensure the trade of the nations. It is out of this same desire for universal peace that, irrespective of all these forces, not only does he carefully preserve the old alliances of his crown, but he also forms new ones with the righteous nations which appear to him worthy of his friendship. It is his esteem for you which has brought me here. Noble Marathas, this is enough. I know you too well not to understand how much you appreciate these things and with what zeal you will respond to his friendship. "

(177)

At these words, I got up and we embraced each other, but more warmly than on the first occasion. Sakharam and Nana, after showering essence and rose-water on me, according to the custom, led me by hand outside the chamber.

On the next day morning, I was presented with a basket of fruits on behalf of the King and two bags each containing one thousand Rupees. That is what is known as the banquet or feast which the prince customarily offers to a foreign envoy and to his retinue on the day of presentation.

(177v°)

On the same day in the afternoon, I received a visit from Krishnarao (Kale), and after the preliminary compliments, we entered into a discussion. I shall spare you, my Lord, the details of our conversation which is in substance only the commentary on my discourse at the audience on the previous day, except that this Minister, to whom His Majesty's letter and yours had been passed on, asked me for their translation in writing which I had done only orally.

To this proposal I objected in vain that it would be more appropriate to get these letters translated by an interpreter of the Government, but he constantly insisted on it. " Our European interpreters, he said to me, are vagabonds who serve us today and perhaps tomorrow will serve our enemies. We have, therefore, to employ them only for unimportant affairs and not entrust important matters in such unsafe hands. But even if we had in our Council a Minister well-versed in your language, as we would not have more confidence in him than in you, we would have all the same requested you to translate for us your King's letter and that of his Vazir."

Moved by an argument as just as obliging, I thought, my Lord, that I must yield before reason and courtesy. I delivered the two translations and joined to them that of the four articles of the permanent treaty.

On the next day, I sent a messenger to Krishnarao to request him to fix the day for my visit to his residence. He replied that he could receive my visit only after the Regent and the Prime Minister had paid their visits to me. He assured me that nevertheless the negotiations would not suffer any delay, because he would come to see me whenever I had something to communicate to him. Finally, he requested me not to stand on ceremony, and consider him solely as a State Councillor who, as he was appointed as a Rapporteur of the affairs of the King of France, ought to be night and day at the disposal of his envoy.

(178)

In fact, he returned two days later to assure me that the alliance had been accepted unanimously in the Council and that the liberty of trade was likewise granted on the terms of the articles of the proposed treaty. Not only were these matters completely terminated but that it had even been resolved, to show to the King of France that no pressing motive of interest had influenced the resolution of the Marathas, to put off to another occasion the demand for some good officers and soldiers to train their troops, so that they could be more useful to him, when they would act in concert with the French armies. Nevertheless, he said, the Council was eager to know the basis on which their salary would be regulated.

I replied to him: " The King limits it to Rs. 100 per person, officers and soldiers included."

He pointed out that the pay of the Europeans in the Maratha Service was fixed at Rs. 40."

I replied: " You are aware that the Europeans, whom you have in your service uptil now, are deserters from all the nations, dishonoured in their country which they have betrayed and where they would be punished with death if they dared to enter it. You have yourself confessed to me that you could not trust these vagabonds. Courage, which is natural to them, can indeed sometimes be useful to you, but the treachery to which they are accustomed can also be injurious to you. That is what you must constantly expect from a troop of criminals of all countries, who all of them strangers to one another as to you, are neither bound among themselves nor with you by any sentiment of honour or attachment. You are too judicious to make the smallest comparison between such a contemptible band of brigands and the respectable service of a regular corps which, full of love for its King for whom it is always ready to sacrifice itself, would serve yours with the same zeal, considering itself as the defender of the common cause of one and the same family. This moral difference has great (178v°) consequence in politics, and the disparity in salary even loses its financial aspect if you consider that yout forty rupees per head furnish you only a simple soldier, isolated, withour an officer and consequently without a brake and without an incentive. The King assigns to his soldiers, besides their pay, officers of high birth and valour not only to maintain discipline among them by their authority but also lead them against the enemy by their example; experienced

doctors to treat their sickness and heal their wounds; venerable priests whose exhortations inspire in them a noble contempt for their life by pointing out to them that heaven is always open to them if they lose it in the service of the country or its allies. Besides the maintenance of all these officers whom the King pays very high salaries in keeping with the dignity of their position, I could enumerate to you many other expenses, such as those for billets, transport, commissariats, hospitals, invalids, gratifications, compensations and hundred other items which would raise the salary to double the amount which I am proposing to you, if I hadn't an express order from the King to limit it in your favour to Rs. 100, because the King would very much like to consider the salary which you would furnish only as a supplement to that which he pays in France, a supplement very reasonable and absolutely necessary in a country so distant from ours that the provisions which constitute our subsistence cost us double and triple when our merchantships bring them from Europe into India. A longer discussion on this point would be superfluous, because such is the King's wish: I can neither add nor deduct anything from it."

I shall place, said Krishnarao, these just considerations before the Council and I have no doubt that it will appreciate them as much as I do, but I have already told you that the Council, out of considerations of delicacy in the reply of our master to yours, will not deal with (179) this matter in detail on this occasion, and we shall wait for its finalization until our Government makes a formal demand to yours.

You can well imagine, my Lord, if I showed great appreciation at this considerate behaviour of theirs and I assured him that it was bound to redound to their honour, and we left each other immensely satisfied.

What could I indeed desire more conformable to your intentions, my Lord? To let France enjoy advantages without compromising her and that this should come naturally, without suggestion, without discussion! These are events which are stamped with the seal of your good fortune, as you had stamped my instructions with the seal of your judgement in case I had met with unfavourable conditions. I frankly confess to you that in all this negotiation I have not the slightest credit. All is your work and I have served you only as a mouth-piece.

A few days later, the Regent paid me a visit with a big retinue and I made him my presents.

*To wit*

A double-barrelled musket fitted with silver and inlaid with gold.

A watch with golden chain.

A clock with allegorical decorations about which I gave him an explanation which related to his person and to that of his King.

Two rolls of scarlet and blue coloured cloth.

Finally, a bouquet of artificial flowers for the princess his wife.[13]

This last article introduced a digression on the fair sex about whose dignity the old man seemed to cherish a high opinion, and as he asked me what we in France think of women and how we treat them, I replied to him: " They are dear to us (179v°) at all times: as children we respect them as mothers, as adolescents we idolize them as lovers, as men we cherish them as wives and as old men we love them as companions."

" And when you die, do they burn themselves with you? "

" No, quite to the contrary. Our wives burn with genuine passion for their husbands whilst they live; but as soon as they are struck by the hand of death, the wives also cease to live for all other men. They bury themselves alive in convents where they are shut off from the sight of men and spend the rest of their lives in prayers for the souls of their husbands. However, no law forces them to thus renounce the world. They even remain in it if family interest demands their presence; and the latter are not less honoured than the former on account of their decision, because we know that it is always an honourable sentiment which decides their choice. "

The Regent found this manner of thinking all the more just as the question is not wholly decided by the Brahmins as to which of the two women has greater merit, the one who burns herself alive to join her husband or the other who condemns herself to a self-exile to live for the sake of her children. Thereupon, he launched into commentaries similar to those of Nestor in the Iliad. Now as I saw that he liked to expatiate, I took the liberty to modestly propose to him doubts, questions, cases which he was kind enough to answer by most copious explanations. But as this casuistry hardly interests you, my Lord, I shall spare you the rest of this colloquy which is irrelevant to your project. There was, however, quite a good ramble on Europe, its productions, animals, plants, minerals, but I shall also spare you all that and return to the point. The benign Regent, quite satisfied with his day, went into ecstasies over the marriage,

as he expressed it, of our two nations and finally exhorted them to conjugal fidelity. I replied that (180) it was one of the virtues on which the Frenchmen prided themselves the most. And the kindly prince returned fully convinced.

Two days later, I left the Court to proceed to the capital where the Ministry was to retire for the monsoons. Nana had already established his residence there since a fortnight. He paid me a visit immediately on my arrival, and I made him presents exactly similar to those of the Regent. The conversation, although general during this visit, ranged over subjects which the Prime Minister treated in such a manner that I realized that he was well versed in more than one branch of knowledge, astronomy, geometry, but that especially he possessed a thorough knowledge of the art of Government. His questions on the form of the French Government and his observations on my replies betoken an intuitive genius which takes a broad view of things; but he is also said to have likewise the genius for detail, a rate combination in a Minister, but of which I already had a test. When I shall know him better, I shall give you more details about his character. All that I can state positively is that he is delighted with our alliance, which, as I notice it very well, his clever politics wants to turn to account to force the English to be more modest. This is the clue to the riddle, my Lord, this is the instrument which has smoothed everything on the route you have traced for me and which has so easily led me to your goal that in six weeks my mission was completely fulfilled. The treaty in 4 articles was signed on 18th June and on the 23rd the alliance was solemnly sworn.

To give all possible authenticity to this act, I thought it appropriate to summon all the Frenchmen, then resident in Poona, to the Palace. In this assembly, after asking my chaplain to read the opening words of the Gospel of St. John, I put my right hand on the book and holding my powers in the left, I took the following oath in a loud voice:

(180v°) "On this sacred Gospel of which the divine words are the rule of our faith in this life and the promise of our bliss in the other, in virtue of the powers with which the King, my master, has invested me and in pursuance of the orders of His Majesty, I swear in the name of the King of France a perpetual alliance between His Very Christian Majesty and the King of the Marathas on the terms of the treaty concluded between the two powers."

Next placing the book of the Gospel on my bosom and my head as a sign of love and respect, I delivered it into the hands of Nana to be kept in a safe custody in the Archives of the Crown. This Minister, in his turn, after a moment's composure, delivered to me the King's oath, pronounced on the altar of his God and written on a paper containing the sacred powder of his offertory: here is its translation.

" In the presence of God in Heaven, I swear on this earth, which is as his altar, a perpetual alliance with the King of the French, for myself and my successors and the whole Maratha people to the last man, in accordance with the words of our treaty from which I shall never deviate in the least! God protect me! "

The ceremony over, Nana offered me his hand with a contented look and shaking mine with a gaze, intent and full of expression: " So, this is done, he said to me, and we shall see. " He uttered this last expression with a backward movement of the head and with a threatening gesture, indicative of some resolution taken. I returned with a smile and a wink of understanding: however, I am in the dark about his secret and shall wait until he communicates it to me. At the time of taking leave, he accompanied me to the staircase where he had received me as I entered; Krishnarao and his son accompanied me to my elephant.

Two days later, Krishnarao brought me the King's reply to His Majesty's letter and that of the Minister to yours, my Lord, and requested me to translate them into French so that (181) they could join the translation to the original. The same reason which he had advanced before still existed and therefore, I condescended to the demand and gave him the two translations. He took them away to be inserted, he said to me, in the two packets which he was carrying to the Court to be sealed there before delivering them to me. He has told me since that they were enclosed in the packets and very probably you will find them therein, my Lord, but in any case, here is a copy of the same.

*Literal translation of the letter of the King of the Marathas to the King of France*

" Greetings from Madhavrao Narain, Pant Pradhan, to Louis Padshah, King of France, high in glory and power, light of France, earthly paradise which the dew from heaven should always water.

Monsieur Pallebot de St. Lubin safely arrived at the port of Chaul. I sent him elephants, horses, camels, palanquins to bring him to my Court where I met him and embraced him with great joy. He delivered to me your letter and explained to me the dispositions of your heart. It gave me such satisfaction that I cannot express it to you fully in the reply which I am giving to your letter.

You write to me that from the moment you ascended the throne, you have been thinking of forming an alliance with me and for this reason you dispatched to my Court Monsieur Pallebot de St. Lubin to place your heart in mine. The friendship you offer me is a great gift and I accept it with pleasure. I assure you of the same sentiments on my part. Let us be united from this moment never to part.

I learnt with very great joy about your accession to the throne and the good fortune of your subjects. You write to me that you do not desire any territory in my country. Your disinterestedness proceeds from your greatness. But as friendship shares everything, my (181v°) country, like my heart, is yours. It is quite appropriate that allies should help each other. You will receive from my Government all the assistance you need and I shall confidently ask you for the same whenever I shall need it. Alliance is contracted between us. Rest assured I shall never change my mind.

I have induced Monsieur Pallebot de St. Lubin to continue to stay at my Court as our common Minister. Keep me informed about every happy news concerning you so that I can rejoice in it.

This is my reply to your letter. We are united never to part. Monsieur Le Chevalier de St. Lubin swore by it on your behalf and I did likewise in the presence of God. Nothing more remains to be done. It is for a lifetime."
27th June 1777

*Literal translation of the letter from the Maratha Vazirs to His Lordship, the Count df Sartine, French Minister for the Navy*

(181v°) " Greetings from Sakharam Bapu, Balaji Pant Nana, Maratha Vazirs, to the Count of Sartine, Minister for the Navy of the King of France, pillar of the Empire, high in dignity, in his great name.

We say like you: when the Kings become allies it is a great achievement for their Vazirs. Monsieur le Chevalier de St. Lubin, envoy of the King of France to form an alliance with the King of the Marathas, has apprised us of the dispositions of your heart. When he arrived at Chaul, the King sent him all the transport to enable him to proceed to the Court. On his arrival, we (182) embraced him with pleasure. He delivered to us your letter, and gave your King's letter to our King. He explained to us the different particulars, which gave us great satisfaction. This alliance is an important affair which will shine with lustre, if it is conducted in a manner decided between us and Monsieur de St. Lubin. The two kingdoms are united and the two Ministries too. We have persuaded the envoy to stay on with us to deal with our common affairs. Do write to us often and inform us of everything that concerns you, whether it be war or peace or expedition so that we should know in what manner we can help you.

This is our reply to your letter: We are united never to part. Monsieur le Chevalier de St. Lubin swore by it on behalf of the King of France and our master did likewise in the presence of God. There remains nothing more to be done, this is forever."
27th June 1777

During the whole negotiation I had not paid any visit to Krishnarao. For, although I asked him everyday to fix up an appointment, he evaded the issue, under one pretext or the other. At last he fixed the 6th of July as the day of appointment, a day declared auspicious by his astrologer. His son received me at the gate and on the staircase I met the father, who led me by the hand into his appartment, saying to me: " This is forever your house and that of all the Frenchmen. I have just got it entirely repainted so that you should (182v°) like it all the more. It is partly for this reason that I deferred to this day receiving the honour which you are doing me, but my principal motive was to fully deserve the favour by the complete success of the mission which your King had entrusted to you and of which I was the rapporteur. Fortunately, my work is completed. I request you to receive these two packets which crown it. In the golden packet is enclosed my sovereign's reply to yours. In the silver packet is the reply from the Maratha Ministry to the French Ministry. You can send them when you like, but what you should not forget in your dispatches is to lay Krishnarao's head at the threshold of the palace of His Majesty and place his heart in that of his Vazir."

" Here is, I replied, introducing M. Pascal du Santy, Captain of my guards, the officer who will convey to the King and to the Minister these dispatches which will do you all the honour which you deserve, and when he returns he will bring you tangible marks of the satisfaction which they will have felt at your good offices. In the meantime, I shall request you to accept from my hand a present quite similar to those which Sakharam and Nana have received from me. Tomorrow, I shall send it to you and I shall add to it two Busts of the King and the Queen which you saw and saluted at my residence on the Dais. However, I shall present them to you only on one condition that I should be permitted to come often to your house to pay them my homage. This sacrifice costs me more than I can express to you, but I thought I could not show you the esteem which my masters will profess for your person in a better manner than by making their presence prevail in your house by means of their august figures.

" I would not accept, he replied to me, anything in the world of which my enjoyment was your loss, but this treasure is so precious that I do not hesitate at all to enrich myself with it at your expense, since you promise me to come and often share it with me. I shall have prepared at the upper end of the gallery a throne on which I shall salute them everyday whilst my wife and my daughters will cover them with flowers."

**(183)**

The next day he sent the passports and carriages necessary for M. Pascal to proceed to Surat. He joined to it a present of Rs. 1,000 on behalf of the King.

This is, my Lord, the diary of my embassy. I cannot close it without apprising you of an event which afflicts me immensely. It is the death of Queen Gangabai, the King's mother, whom a malignant fever has just carried away in three days last week at the age of 20. I cannot sufficiently deplore the death of this Princess who honoured me with so many kind acts that the report of it had already spread in the whole of India. She had first of all recommended my negotiation to the Ministry, even going to the extent of warning Krishnarao that she would lay the blame at his door if everything did not turn up to my satisfaction, and she daily enquired about all the details that concerned me. Every day my table was covered with delicious fruits which she sent me from her own stock.

Among other distinctions she insisted that I should always ride her own elephant harnessed with her own Chirole. This honour was confirmed in my favour by her last will. Her mother Parvatibai[14] who succeeded her in the guardianship of the King has assured me of her kindness which I shall scrupulously cultivate. But it will be difficult for me to get over this loss. I went into mourning on behalf of the King of France and asked my whole household and retinue to follow me. I wanted first of all to wear it for 21 days but as the Court observes it only for 12 days, I shall fall in line, although that which I carry in my heart will certainly last longer.

**(183 v°)**

My Lord, I would now request you to cast a glance at the instruction you gave me and examine what I have accomplished and what remains to be accomplished.

| *Terms of Instruction* | *Transactions* |
|---|---|
| His Majesty, having decided upon the choice of M. Pallebot de St. Lubin as his envoy to the Court of the Maharaja of Hindustan to conclude a commercial treaty with this sovereign, orders him to follow the following instructions: | |
| " As soon as he arrives at the Court of the Maharaja, the envoy will deliver to Nana, his Vazir, the letter from the Secretary of State, holding the portfolio of the Navy, and promptly seek the audience of the Maharaja. | This article was carried out during my visit of 4th May, mentioned in the Diary. |
| Introduced into the presence of the Maharaja, dressed in the French fashion, with the sword at the side and the hat on his head, he will place into the hands of the Maharaja himself the letter from the King to this sovereign, and he will explain to him the import, taking good care to employ only affectionate expressions in the Maratha Language, from one crown to the other, without indulging in any of those Oriental expressions which, under the semblance of civility, however, admit of some idea of subjection. | This article was scrupulously observed for the ceremonial during my audience of the King on 8th May, and as for the interpretation, you can judge, My Lord, if the style of my talks with the Regent and Nana corresponds with your orders to me. At least I did my best to display therein all the dignity of a Roman ambassador. |

*Terms of Instruction*

After nobly explaining the estimable motives which led His Majesty to enter into an alliance with this sovereign for the common welfare of their people, he will sign and have signed the commercial treaty between the two nations in articles, namely :

*Article 1*

There will be an inviolable friendship between the French and the Marathas. The French will always render all possible good offices to the Marathas.

The Marathas will always be friends of the French and the enemies of the French will be the enemies of the Marathas. The Marathas will always protect the French possessions in India by all the means in their power against any enemy whatsoever.

*Article 2*

The Marathas will have the privilege of freedom of trade in all the states, present and future, under French domination, in preference to all other Asiatic powers in Hindustan.

The French will have the privilege of freedom of trade in all the states, present and future, under Maratha domination, in preference to all other European nations.

*Article 3*

Maratha ships will have access to all the French ports without paying any import or export duties either for themselves or their goods.

French vessels will have access to all the Maratha ports without paying any import or export duties either for themselves or for their goods.

*Transactions*

**(184)**

The treaty of commerce in 4 articles was signed on 18th June. I would request you, my Lord, to inform all the chiefs of the French Establishments in India about this event. I did not want to do it on my own. I think you will deem it advisable to order them to refer to me for their demands to the Maratha Government. M. de Bellecombe addressed a letter to this Court and it was surprised that he had not addressed it to me. I warded off the query by a reply which is nonetheless very true. I said that as M. de Bellecombe had arrived in India before me and did not know that I was to be posted here, he could not address his letter to me. I asked for the letter to find out if there was any demand which I might turn to account, but it was only a complimentary letter by which he informed (the Maratha Court) of his arrival in India in the capacity of the Governor-General of the French establishments. By the way, a thought occurs to me on this point.

I do not know, my Lord, if it is your intention to include the Consulates with the Marathas under the Government of Pondicherry. You are the Master, but in your place, I would subordinate them exclusively to the authority of the King's envoy at this Court, just as the Consulates of the Levant are to the French (184v°) Ambassador at Contantinople. Your Machinery will run much smoother. Moreover, Chaul, Bassein, Gheria, Vijaydurg, these 4 first-rate Maratha ports are going to become the centre of all your naval operations in India. The Coromandel Coast does not possess a single cove where your ships can take shelter. It is essential that the jurisdiction of these places should vest directly

*Terms of Instruction*

*Article 4*

In all the French ports, Maratha ships, during their stay, will remain under the protection of the Government, at all times of the year.

In all the Maratha ports, French ships, during their stay, will remain under the protection of the Government at all times of the year.

(185)

The envoy must not on any ground deviate from the letter of these 4 articles in the drawing up of the treaty in writing but in the verbal interpretation of the articles, he will give them an amplification most favourable to the respective interests of the two crowns; especially while explaining Article 1, he will lay down as a principle that His Majesty being at present at peace with all the nations of the world, the sacred fidelity to his engagements which he will never forsake, will not permit him to enter into any alliance hostile to any of these powers, unless he is forced to do so by the violation of the treaties; but that if by any infraction of these treaties, any power forced him to obtain justice by force of arm, he will then readily unite his forces to those of the Maharaja to punish the common enemy.

*Transactions*

in the Minister of the King at this Court, as that of the commandants of these ports do in the Maratha Ministry.

In addition to this consideration, can it not happen that the Minister of the King with the Marathas may have to get things executed by them, for which Pondicherry may not be answerable at all. The English have turned such a policy to the best account. Their Governments of Malabar, Coromandel, Bengal, Sumatra are absolutely independent of each other. This apparent division of authority furnishes, according to the circumstance, either opportunities for the evasion of neutrality or for mediation. The incident of the war of Salsette can be cited as one instance and I could add 20 others.

You have seen, my Lord, this article well commented in the last part of my talks with the Regent. I have not at all compromised France on this point as on that of the verbal explanation I gave to the exact terms of the treaty. It is on this principle that I scrupulously avoided making the slightest reference to the present war of the Marathas with Haider Ali. For, as says Viquefort who serves me as catechism " It is not the business of a novice to negotiate a treaty of alliance with a prince who is already at war, on behalf of another Prince, whose principal interest lies in the enjoyment of peace and benefits of neutrality". That is what would nevertheless have been my position, my Lord, if the war between the Marathas and the English had not been terminated before my arrival. But I also pride myself upon the fact that I would not have been the novice.

*Terms of Instructions*

Proceeding from this principle, he will negotiate a conditional treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between the two crowns against any power which might break off with France. He will receive proposals for the raising of respective contingents of the King and of the Maharaja, and he will send them to the Secretary of State, in charge of the department of the Navy. Pending the ratification by the King, he will impress upon the Maharaja the necessity to provisionally protect the French possessions against attacks from any enemy and he will induce him to sign an agreement to this effect within the full scope of Article 1.

To match a good turn with this agreement the envoy will make it a point to emphasize as a very great mark of friendship and confidence on the part of the King towards the Maharaja, the value of the permission granted to his shippers to carry on traffic in arms, a step which prudence authorizes only between nations united by bonds of friendship and by the interest of common success.

(186)

Always following this method, he will demand the grant or use of suitable territory in the Maratha ports not only for the setting up of storehouses for trade but also for the construction of ships. He will obtain exact information on the price of wood and manual labour, and he will prepare an estimate of the cost of all ships of the line constructed in cedar and teak wood in the Maratha ship-yards. He will join to it a list of the materials and ship-wrights that would have to be sent there from Europe for being employed in their

*Transactions*

This engagement contained in the first article of the actual treaty is so well explained to the Maratha Government that at the first (185v°) demand of assistance made by our establishments, I shall rush to their aid at the head of 25,000 men. Moreover, my Lord, you have seen that the Maratha Government, out of delicacy in contracting its alliance with France on the noblest terms, has avoided any selfish proposal, and Madhavrao in his letter to the King confines himself to these words: " You will receive from my Government all the assistance you will need and I shall confidently ask for the succours which will be necessary for me."

This trait of noble simplicity marks all their talks, so much so that, when I wanted to refer to the permission for ra*d*e in arms and ammunition, I promptly received the rejoinder that it is a conduct so natural among brothers that it was not worth mentioning.

The use of territory suitable for these two objects is granted, but to explore this suitability and indicate it in my demands to the Government, I must visit the ports, a journey which I cannot undertake before the month of October because of innundations. In the meantime, I have already got the ship *Le Sartine* admitted in the port of Chaul in enjoyment of the appropriate prerogative, as you will see it, my Lord, by this copy of the King's order to Anandrao (Shinde), Commandant of this place.

*Terms of Instructions*

construction, and the estimate of the number of ships which could be constructed there in a certain space of given time. He will have the bearings taken of the ports, roadsteads, anchorages, channels, mouths of rivers and will draw up plans with observations on all matters which can facilitate navigation in them.

*Transactions*

*King's order to Anandrao, Commandant of Chaul*

The French envoy having represented to the Government that his ship, which is at Janjira Revdanda, is in need of repairs, and that for that purpose, it has to be emptied and the cargo put under shelter on land, you are ordered to furnish to the French all the help they will need for their repairs: smiths, carpenters, etc. The necessary materials should also be furnished, but they will pay for the workers. As for the goods on the ship, a place should be found to house them and it be given to them. This order should suffice.

(186v°) 7 June 1777

For want of suitable storehouses in the territory specified the Commandant of Chaul ordered the construction of hangars which can be transformed into storehouses when the necessary expenses for them will be sanctioned. Wood for the longitudinal pieces and the rims, which had only to be cut from the forest, was supplied free. The workers were paid at a quarter of a Rupee per day, that is to say 2 Sous.

I can obtain exact information about the cost of wood and labour only on the spot, i.e. in the forests and the yards. That will be one of the main objects of my tour. I can only assure you in advance, my Lord, that the King can have constructed there as many ships as he likes, that they will cost him half as dear as in France, and all the sailors who know teak wood will guarantee you its life for a hundred years. You have only to send me two ship-wrights and steel; I shall get here more than enough wood and labour. You can ask any experienced sailor about the ship-wrights of this country;

they will tell you that they are much better than ours. They are slower but their plankings are so accurate that a ship could easily last 30 to 40 years, without the use (187) of any mechanical rivetting device. As for wood, I am revolving in my mind a plan to obtain it free.

I shall not fail to have the bearings taken of the ports, roadsteads, anchorages, navigable channels, etc. as I did at Chaul of which my surveyor has drawn a large scale map which you will receive, my Lord, by the first ship. In the meantime, I am inserting in this packet an abridgd plan which will give you an idea of it (Chaul harbour).

A roadstead with a very good anchorage, protected in the north by the fort of Kolaba and in the south by half of the fort of Mores of which the other half defends the entrance to the port by a fire crossed with that of the citadel; a port so much land-locked that *Le Sartine* is as quiet in it as in a pond during the season when the tempests convulse the (Konkan) Coast and the roadstead; a basin so vast that 60 warships could be comfortably accommodated there and could still sail up the river for a distance of 12 kilometres. This is, my Lord, the present you have made to the French Navy, merchant as well as combatant. That is what I wanted to express by the allegory of the cartouche.

To a column topped by a lighthouse is attached the shield of your arms; below gushes forth a spring which falls in a basin; the overflowing waters (187v°) water the roots of a cornucopia from which rises a tuft of different Indian flowers each of which will produce their fruit in its season.

*Terms of Instruction*

As it is of the utmost importance to put the commercial treaty promptly into execution, in order to establish precedents for the future, the envoy will obtain an admission into the port for the ship in which he travels, in enjoyment of the prerogatives stipulated in the treaty.

*Transactions*

The ship *Le Sartine* has not only enjoyed all the prerogatives stipulated in the treaty, but I have also obtained for it many other special favours. How I wish I could announce to you also that these have not been abused ! Sordid cupidity of the merchants, so nothing can appease you ! What ! Is it not sufficient for you that a generous nation opens to you its ports and grants you there the liberty of trade free from all duties. The first use you make of this unique favour in the world is to think of the means to defraud the Government of the taxes which its laws impose on its own subjects.

Yes, my Lord, the Ministry has lodged complaints to me against the vile conduct of M. Couronat, Captain of *Le Sartine* who, instead of selling publicly and competitively his cargo with the declaration of the Indian buyers in order to make them pay the duties, secretly compounded (188) with a single merchant to share with him the duties pilfered from the Treasury under the cloak of French immunity.

Roused to indignation at this outrage, I gave my word of honour to the Government that satisfaction would be given to it. In vain, did the fraudulent Couronat try to represent to me his transaction as a deposit of all his cargo entrusted to the charge of this merchant for a sum of 3 lakhs of Rupees lent at interest for the China voyage. I exposed him, confounded him and forced him to give a written promise that he could not deliver any goods to any party without the declaration made to the Government.

**(188)**

| *Terms of Instruction* | *Transactions* |
| --- | --- |
| | As Couronat is dishonest, shameless, a tissue of guiles, glorying in their inventions and beaming with their success, no trust can be reposed in his promise except by forcing him to fulfil it. That is what I promised to the Government to watch over, and I promise it to you my Lord, who, certainly, are shocked at a conduct tending so rudely to tarnish your masterpiece with the odious reproach of contravention. |
| He will provisionally appoint in the port of Chaul or Gheria or Rajapur, a Consul, a Secretary and an interpreter, for whom he will obtain recognition from the Maratha Government. He will draw up authentic deeds which will establish the legality of the establishment for perpetuity in favour of the French nation. These deeds signed by the Maratha Government will be prepared in duplicate, one copy will remain with the Consul, the other will be sent to the Secretary of State, holding the portfolio of the Navy. | When the Consulate of Chaul will be regularly set up, I hope to prevent effectively all similar ( 188 v° ) causes of complaints. I have already obtained the consent of the Maratha Government for this kind of establishment in perpetuity, in Chaul as well as in all the ports which the King of France will select, but for want of persons fit to hold an office of such trust, it is not yet filled up. To confer it I am awaiting the reply of a gentleman, very honest and very capable who would be so perfectly suitable to the post, that the only question is to see whether the post suits him. |
| Correspondence will be carried on by the land as well as by the sea route in cipher prescribed by the Minister either for commercial or political matters. | M. Pascal Du Santy, Captain of my guards, will bring you, my Lord, this dispatch overland. You will receive by our ships its duplicate which I am dispatching to M. de Bellecombe through M. Le Roi. This dispatch is not in cipher because you forgot to give me the key to the cipher. If you want to write to me in cipher, kindly use the word' 'fortune' instead of the word 'bonheur' printed in the book of ciphers. |

**(189)**

Here ends my instruction and I shall terminate my report with a reply to the letter you kindly wrote to me at Bordeaux on August 10th, 1776, a reply which I deferred because I really thought I could do it in a stisfactory manner only from here.

| *Versailles, August 10, 1776* | *My reply* |
| --- | --- |
| According to your information, Sir, by your letter of the 3rd instant you are only awaiting my final orders to set sail. I can do nothing but repeat what I have already said to you during all my conversations with you " prudence and secrecy. " Let not the idea and love of glory, which I see burning in you, lead you to take measures which I can neither acknowledge nor support and which will destroy the edifice, the establishment of which I have entrusted to your care. Alliance and trade ought to be your sole occupation. I know the resources of your talents and of your local knowledge. I am convinced that no one else can achieve what you cannot achieve. But you have to negotiate with men on whom you cannot rely, because the enemy is always sure to entice them with money. Impress upon them and persuade them, if you can do so, how detrimental is this effect of gold to healthy politics and to their real interests; that it can only disparage their alliance and give their enemy time to gain stability which they will soon no longer be in a position to resist. Everything is contributing to it according to the reports of the month of February which I have recently received. | As for secrecy, you know, my Lord, that I can hold my tongue through prudence, if this virtue consists in following the surest road to reach a laudable goal. You can judge me. My goal is to serve my King and the road is his Minister's instructions. Indeed I must then attain this glory burning in me, and I think I can achieve it only by erecting, according to the plan prescribed, the edifice of which you have entrusted me the establishment. You can rest assured, my Lord, that in all that I have done, you will have nothing to disown. Alliance and trade is all you wanted; it is all that I have accomplished. You owe its success neither to the resources of a genius nor to the local knowledge which you have the kindness to attribute to me, for, I frankly confess to you that any one in my place wth the roll in his hand, would have played his part quite as well. I had to deal with people well-disposed by their (189 v°) natural character as well as by the peculiar circumstances, and your policy, blending and assimilating with theirs, has easily produced this union the fruits of which will reveal its value. In the meantime, I can assure you that gold never disarms the Maratha Government except when it is brought to them in payment of the tribute which all the Indian powers owe it, but that they are sometimes forced to demand it by force of arms. It is the cause of their present war with Haider Ali Khan who thought that he could profit by the King's minority to evade the dues. It is for the fourth time that he has tried this course and he has always finally paid the |

tribute. Rest assured that it will be likewise elsewhere when they will either demand the invaded territories or the tribute due from them.

Finally, concentrate only on fulfilling my object efficaciously. Fear not your enemies. I have proved to you that they cannot have any influence with me. I never carry impressions except with full knowledge of the facts. You can count on the pleasure which your success will give me and which I shall have in obtaining for you the reward for your labours.

I have therefore fulfilled your object, my Lord, and confirmed all your hopes. The day when you honoured me with your choice, I was avenged in advance for the envy and jealousy which my success is going to arouse, and the pleasure which, as you say, it will give you, is a sufficient reward for my labours.

**(190)**

However, since you have kindly promised me other rewards, please permit my honour and my zeal to indicate to you the rewards to which they dare to aspire.

I solicit the Cross of St. Louis for 23 years of service in India, extraordinary service, graven on my person by nine wounds, registered in your portfolio in letters stamped with the seal of your esteem and sanctified in this country by the hatred with which the English honour me. M. Anquetil, Consul at Surat, writes: " The English know you; they are, therefore, trembling with fear."

Besides this decoration, I desire a Colonel's Commission to throw into greater relief my military character with this Government and enable me to render more signal services. You will remember, my Lord, that when your plan was to associate me with M. Dumas[16], he solicited you for these two favours for me by way of a start. You will also recollect that when you resolved to employ me alone, I did not make any of these demands, although under the Ministry of M. de Boynes, I had received from him the promise to obtain them. I left without any conditions, but also without any anxieties, convinced that by deserving well of my sovereign, I would receive from your hands visible marks of his commendation. Here the Government offered to recommend me to His Majesty for whatever favours I would desire. I gratefully thanked it for such a kindly disposition towards me; but at the same time I rejected the proposal as it offended the King's beneficence and his Minister's equity. It is to the report alone which you will present to the King that I wish

to owe this Ribbon which will allow me to quit the Ribbon of the Order of the Christ, a foreign and venal decoration which, in my eyes, is not worth more than the money it cost me. Therefore, I never wear it except in India where the Portuguese have given it, among the inhabitants of the country, an importance which confers prestige on the person. I aspire to the honour of imbibing in them a higher opinion about French Knighthood, if you judge me worthy of it and capable of (190v°) inspiring a high opinion in them.

I take the liberty to recommend to your favour three persons who, by their good conduct with me, deserve that I should make a favourable report to you about them.

M. Pascal du Santy, Captain of my guards, whom I have entrusted with this dispatch is a person full of honour and zeal for whom I solicit from you a Captain's Commission.

M. Robert de Courcelle, my surveyor, is a young man full of talent for whom I request a Lieutenant's Commission.

M. Joseph Barbier, Surgeon, whom the Maratha Government requested me to bring ashore for attending to the needs of the Court. He is very popular there, is very well versed in his profession to which he is deeply attached. For him I ask the Commission of a Surgeon-Officer of the French Establishments with the Marathas.

I also request you, my Lord, to fix for these three persons the salaries attached to their grade. Till now they have drawn them from my purse and that will continue until you send me your orders. This would indeed be the place to set forth before you the pitiable condition of my purse from which I have drawn up to now all my expenses, for I have not yet received a single farthing from the Bill of Exchange for Rs. 6,000 which M. Picot sent to Bombay. Since the moment of my departure from Paris when you gave me 12,000 francs, I have spent 63,000. It is true that a part of it has been employed in presents which, on my arrival, I gave to the King, the Queen and the Ministers. You are aware that an envoy cannot present himself at the Asian Courts with empty hands, and as the custom is to make a present to the ambassadors only when they take leave, all that I have received here is limited to a present of Rs. 2,000 sent by the King (Maratha) for the banquet on the day of my audience. I wrote to you from Mahé, my Lord, that to the last penny in my purse, to the last (191) resource of my wits, to the last breath of my life, the King would

be obeyed, you would be served, I would be devoted. But these three things have a limit: the first is very near its end, the second will reduce me to have recourse to loans as onerous as injurious to our Government; and the third would soon be embittered with grief at seeing the edifice raised by a genius perish, due to abandonment. Certainly, my Lord, you will not at all abandon your work, work which had not been conceived by any of the Ministers, who were your predecessors, since the time we know India! work which, among other wonders, assures a station to our squadron in Hindustan, 16 Kilometres away from those of our rivals! Let it only be remembered that during the whole course of the last war, the King maintained a large squadron at huge expense and with such little effect that it fought only battles, because immediately after a battle it went to the Isle of France for shelter during the monsoon season, for want of a port on the scene of action. In future, we shall have to fight every day until the ships are reduced to rigging battens. It is in this way that a war lasts for a shorter duration, and that the courage and the skill of a sailor are better exercised. If you cast a glance on the map, you can congratulate yourself on having blocked Bombay by Chaul and Bassein. There is, therefore, no doubt that you will sustain your work and if you will believe me, my Lord, here are the means you will employ towards that end.

Dispatch a frigate directly to the port of Chaul, with presents on behalf of the King to Madhavrao, Parvatibai, his grandparent, Sakharam Bapu, the Regent, Nana, Prime Minister, and Krishnarao, Second Minister and rapporteur of French affairs in the State Council. These presents, which might consist of gold and silver embroidered cloth velvet cloth, scarlet cloth, carpets, firearms, mirrors, chandeliers, golden caskets, will be addressed to me to be distributed and I shall send back this frigate laden with presents from this Court to that of France. It will bring me the two Ship-wrights (191v°) that I ask you, my Lord, with the sums which you will think it fit to repay me and advance me for the State service. Please do not forget these needs which are yours as well as mine.

It would indeed be proper if you think early of replacing me here by some intelligent person who, zealous for his master and attached to your glory, would acquire a training on the lines which my experience can furnish him. This precaution is all the more urgent as I am suffering from a deadly disease which can spread out at any moment. I was poisoned on board the ship by verdigris of a copper pan. Being at my last gasp,

I asked to live only as long as it was necessary for me to carry out your plans. Having escaped death, I spent two months in convalescence, but I was not cured; and I shall perhaps never be, for the moment I eat anything acid, the poison becomes active again. I fall back into langour from which I recover only by taking milk which does not agree with me. On another occasion, a horse-kick in the middle of the leg nearly sent me into the next world. Oedema, erysipelas, inflammation, gangrene, all had a share in it; my sweetest hope was to serve you with one leg less. Howevei, cinchona has completely cured me. But at any moment, my Lord, consider me as a dying man who has a vast heritage to bequeath to him whom you will appoint as my heir.

Finally, my Lord, whoever my be the person whom His Majesty would like to maintain at this Court hereafter, it is absolutely necessary that he should be invested with a representative character and holds the title of ambassador, because the English agent who is decorated with it, would score over the French agent if he is only a Vakil, that is to say agent, or farishta, as I am: it is important for the King's interests that his Minister here should be Elchi, that is to say, Ambassador.

Poona, Capital of the Maratha Empire,
July 15, 1777

**(192)**

*P. S.*—The English ambassador, Mr. Mostyn, a Member of the Bombay Council, who could get some information about my negotiation only after it had been terminated by the public act of the oath, was so confounded that he offered to the Marathas to sell Salsette and deliver Raghoba if they would renounce our alliance. The offei was disdainfully rejected. " When we shall need Salsette," said Nana, " we shall take it. As for Raghoba, we have forbidden you to speak about him. And our alliance with France is a sacred act of faith."

Bombay is in a state of alarm, my Lord, it is being fortified; troops are being raised, and no Frenchman is allowed to enter. The position of this port, situated between the Maratha ports of Chaul and Bassein is a terrifying image for the English. This port, so far the principal source of their superiority in the Indian Ocean during the war, would in future be hard pressed by the two others in the North and South within a short distance of 72 Kilometres. It would be denied any resources from the land for the repairs of the ships and subsistance, whilst our squadrons would have on their rear the whole Maratha Empire pledged to furnish us what would be denied to the enemy. The sensation which this news

must have created in England will no doubt make her very cautious in her relations with us. For she can well appreciate what a loss a rupture with us would certainly entail on her in this country.

This is the great Axiom........................

Poona, July 26, 1777.

PALLEBAOT DE ST. LUBIN

(193)

SECOND AND THIRD DISPATCH TO MONSIEUR DE SARTINE

(194)

My Lord,

Your work is accomplished. Since the moment your clever policy formed an alliance between France and the Marathas, the English, alarmed at the possible consequences of such a union, left no stone unturned to destroy it. Misrepresentations, offers, threats, all was in vain in the case of the Ministry which firmly adhered to its engagements. Another plan, that of attempting a revolution in the Government, had to be followed. Morobadada, ex-divan of the late King Madhavrao, and first cousin of Nana, was the man they chose to incite the people and prepare them to accept their (of the English) *protégé* Raghoba as King. The absence of the armies occupied on the frontiers was the favourable occassion seized to assemble more than 40,000 men under the leadership of Holkar, a reputed general who supported Morobadada.

March 25, 1778

This army, which appeared suddenly as if sprung up from underground, surprised Poona on 25th March at 10 O'clock in the morning. A body of 10,000 men, drawn up in battle-array, came and took up a position under my windows. Ready to die if necessary, but resolved to defend myself to the last breath and force my way to join the King at Purandhar, I put my guard in a fighting posture in front of my door. A party of 500 men was detached and came to reconnoitre it. I forced them to halt and warned them that this was the guard of the Envoy of the King of France. Whereupon the commandant saluted me in the name of Raghoba and requested me on behalf of this King to remain tranquil in my house which and the person living in it would always be safe against attacks.

Raghoba was proclaimed King through the whole town in less than an hour and everything passed off most peacefully. Nana (194v°) had just time enough to withdraw to Purandhar with his guard; it was soon swollen to 10,000 cavalry by his friends and his adherents. Sakharam Bapu and Nana asked for the King's orders and his standard to fight the rebels. " It is my person which will serve you as a standard," replied majestically this august child. " I want to come down to your camp and see with what face they will dare to approach it. "

At this moment, the King received a letter from me by which I informed him that " during the night I would proceed to Saswad, a post 8 kilometres from Purandhar, where I requested him to send me an escort to facilitate my junction with him; that I wanted to give an everlasting proof of the attachment of the King, my master, to His Majesty by defending his crown and his life to the last drop of my blood; that, really speaking, I had only my guard of 100 men as my whole army, but that even if I had only my body and a single arm, they would serve him as a shield and sword to the last breath of my life. "

The King at once sent me a reply that " he earnestly solicited me not to leave my place; that he sincerely thanked me for my devotion; but that he had powerful reasons to forbid me this course; that besides, neither his life nor his crown was at stake; that only the ambition of a few chiefs, fanned by the English, to control the administration was the root-cause of this trouble; that shortly everything would be restored to order. "

In fact, Sakharam Bapu, the Regent, and Krishnarao, Minister for State, had already an interview with Morobadada and Holkar. This single conference had apparently reconciled everything and these two rebels, having submitted, went to offer their presents and their homage to the King. While receiving them, the King placed a small note in the hands of Holkar who hid it in his bosom and since then constantly kept it a secret from Morobadada, a conduct which, thenceforward, always made him look distrustfully at his colleague. However, the King retained Morobadada in the office of the Divan and it was even publicly agreed to grant Raghoba only the Regency. All that was only a stratagem to gain time.

After this agreement, Mr. Mostyn, the English ambassador, who had returned to Poona immediately after the revolt, was sent for. He proceeded to Purandhar; there he was told that complete reconciliation had taken place, that it only remained to restore Raghoba to his place, and

that three persons of rank had been selected to accompany Mr. Mostyn and receive him (Raghoba) from the hands of the English on the Maratha frontier.

(195)

The Englishman replied that he was ready to comply on condition that all the pledges given by Raghoba to the Council of Bombay were fulfilled; namely (1) the payment of hundred lakhs of Rupees for the expenses incurred by the English on his account and (2) the cession of Chaul and Bassein with all their dependencies in return for their services.

In the meantime, I had once again written to the King to say "that I was delighted to learn that order had been restored and that war had taken the form of a negotiation, but that not having had the opportunity to serve him on the first occasion, I solicited him to allow me to render him assistance on the second, that consequently I was addressing him a memorial which I requested him to communicate to the Council."

It reads as follows:

MEMORANDUM TO THE KING IN HIS COUNCIL

*The Envoy of the King of France to the King of the Marathas*

Sire,

"The functions with which the King, my master, has entrusted me at the Court of Your Majesty are such that it is my bounden duty to enlighten you on the perils with which your childhood is surrounded. I have been discharging it since the last ten months by placing before you and your Council the projects of the English and the measures they are taking to execute them. This power, too feeble to dare attempt anything against the Marathas when they are united among themselves, is trying to destroy them by their own hands by sowing seeds of division, jealousy, discord in these people of brothers. Thus, in the name of Raghoba they promise you, Morobadada, the office of the Prime Minister, to you Holkar, the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies, and they are persuading you to take up arms to place Raghoba on the throne. Blind as you are, you are not aware that at the same time they are assuring Sakharam Bapu and Nana not to make any change in the Government if they undertake to renounce the alliance with France and recognize Raghoba as King. Open your eyes, noble Marathas, and be as prudent as you are brave. The plan is to massacre you by your own hands and next plunder the dead bodies. Watch the vultures which are hovering in the air

between your two camps. They have their eyes fixed on the havoc which you will play among yourselves in order to fatten themselves on your corpses. This is the true picture of the English. It is from the same motive that they foment your wars with Haider Ali Khan by furnishing him the means to resist you and evade the tribute he owes you. So then the English have stirred up two wars at the same time, one (195v°) civil, another foreign. But I see already that you have no longer any intention to destroy yourselves for their benefit. Give a finishing touch to your fortune by ceasing your war with Haider Ali, at least temporarily. What he owes you this year, he will still owe you next year. Thus, his debt will increase and you will receive more money at the same time. At present reassemble all your forces to pounce on your real enemies. Recover from them the territories which they have usurped from you by taking advantage of your troubles. Reduce them forever to impotence. Once this is achieved, Hindustan is yours."

Poona, April 2, 1778 (Signed) PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

The reply given to my memorandum is concise and is as follows:—

The Seal.

Madhavrao Narain, Pant Pradhan, to the Envoy of the King of France.

THE KING'S REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM

Mr. Envoy,

"Your suggestions concur with my resolutions. I have decided to conclude peace with Haider Ali and I am ready to declare war against the English. I now seek assistance from the King, your master, to reduce jointly Bombay, Salsette, Surat and Bhadoch. Bombay and Surat will be allotted to the King of France, as his share. Salsette and Bhadoch will return to my domination. The remaining days of this moon are very inauspicious to negotiate this matter finally, but at the start of the next moon, I invite you to Purandhar and we shall conclude this matter."

At the same time, news of a rupture between France and England began to spread and I seized this opportunity to reply thus:

The Envoy of the King of France to the King of the Marathas.

LETTER TO THE KING

Sire,

"If war is declared, as it is reported, between the King, my master, and the King of England, we have strong grounds to expect an early visit by a squadron to India and we shall certainly join hands with you. But if there is still no rupture between the two crowns, I must send your proposals to France and we must await the reply. In both the cases, employ carefully all your time and all your resources to prepare for the common success."

Poona, April 9, 1778 (Signed) PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

(196)

Two days later I received the following reply:

The Seal

THE KING'S REPLY

Madhavrao Narain, Pant Pradhan, to the Envoy of France

Mr. Envoy,

"You are right. Let us not lose time. Make all possible haste on your side to play your part. Mine is all ready."

It was then, my Lord, that I took the decision to dispatch to you M. Francois du Santy, Captain of a private ship and brother of M. Pascal du Santy, who had carried my first dispatch to you. I sent him overland from Poona to Goa, whence he must have continued his journey to present himself before you. I have instructed him to collect at Goa all possible information about the reports of a rupture between France and England and pass it on to me. He supplied me information as follows:

Goa, May 22, 1778

COPY OF THE FIRST LETTER OF M. FRANCOIS DU SANTY, MAY 22, 1778

Sir,

I arrived here yesterday at 3 O'clock in the afternoon and immediately went to see the Viceroy to whom I delivered your letter and from whom I received extreme courtesy and offeres of service. After usual compliments,

I made inquiries about the news of war between the French and the English. He assured me that he had no definite news about this event, but that the movement of three English ships and the frequent inquiries they made here in the month of April about the ships *le Brillant* and *le Sartine* had given him some suspicion about it, but the fact that though these three ships were strong enough and were within reach of capturing *le Sartine* and yet had not done it, made him think otherwise.

At this time when the report was current here that war was declared between France and England, Nawab Abdulla Quincana, one of the fugitive sons of Muhammad Ali Khan, Nawab of the Carnatic, whom you know and whom you met casually at Mahé, received a letter from his brother at Bombay in which he informed him that a ship which had arrived from Suez with packets from Europe announced that war was declared, but that they had no definite news on this count.

I have just read a letter from M. Picot to Cumotiers Bros., French brokers, dated April 12, in (196v°) which he thanked them for the trouble they had taken to inform him about the report of war which was current at Goa. But this report is false. You will find, Sir, that it is not possible to rely on this news, since the three English ships were in a position to capture *le Sartine* and yet did not do it. If war had been declared, they would certainly not have failed to do so. But there is good reason to suspect that if *le Brillant* and *le Sartine* had caused them so much concern, it was because they had learnt that the two ships were detached for Chaul. This was the epoch when the revolution was taking place at Poona. They were naturally afraid that these two ships might bring you troops at this juncture, an eventuality which would no doubt have ruined their plans at the Court of the Marathas. As they were very definite about this movement, they had disposed these three ships so as to stop ours from entering Chaul until the two Courts took their decisions. This move would have given them time to strengthen their position at the Maratha Court.

Nawab Abdulla Quincana sends you his compliments. He did not know that you were the person who was ambassador at Poona. He was very happy to hear this news, but added that it had not given the English the same delight. He expects to write to you by the first available opportunity.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) DU SANTY

Goa, May 27, 1778

COPY OF A LETTER FROM M. DU SANTY, MAY 27, 1778

Sir,

I have been unable till now to procure any means to start for Mahé because of the approach of the rains. I have decided to purchase a small boat, which will cost me very dear, to achieve my objective. But to get out of this place, I am forced to put up with great inconvenience. I expect to start tomorrow at day-break and reach my destination in 4 or 5 days.

I wanted to write to you on the 24th instant, but as there was nothing interesting that had taken place between me and the Viceroy except a lot of information about the events during the revolution and about the situation of things at the time of my departure from Poona, I postponed writing to you till today. I have no fresh news about the war except what I have already communicated to you. You will find (197) herewith a letter from the Nawab Abdulla Quincana. He is expecting here his brother from Bombay.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) DU SANTY

As, upto this moment I had no news about M. du Santy and as I still do not know whether he reached his destination, my Lord, I thought it necessary to repeat to you here this part of the dispatch which I had entrusted to him. What you have already learnt will serve as introduction to the narration of the great events which were the result of the earlier ones. You will see how with a single stroke of the pen, by your alliance with the Marathas, you have forever ruined the English in Hindustan and moreover, established on their ruins the solid foundations of the most advantageous trade that has ever been transacted in this part of the world. However brilliant may be the other operations of your Ministry, the lustre of this one ought to make it rank with the independence of the United States of America. Please accept my thanks for having in some way associated me with the glory of your plans by entrusting me with their execution. I shall submit to you a detailed account of my transactions.

Whilst I was making preparations to proceed to Purandhar at the King's invitation, I received a very important piece of information from one of the spies I had engaged at Bombay. The latter was a Portuguese copyist in the office of the Secretary of the Secret Committee. Since five months that I had won over this man, he had sent me several copies, of the deliberations of the Committee and of the correspondence of the Council of Bombay with that of Bengal. I had always communicated them to the Maratha Government through memoranda addressed merely to the King in his Council, but since the admission of Morobadada in this Council, it would not have been prudent to follow the same method. I, therefore, wrote to the King that pending the day which he had fixed for my meeting with him, I wanted to meet Krishnarao very urgently as I had to communicate to him a piece of information of the greatest importance. This minister came to see me at once and I showed him (197v°) the copy of a letter from Morobadada to the Governor of Bombay in which he had expressed his regret at his inability to arrest the King, the Regent, Nana and Krishnarao on the occasion of the interview at Purandhar. He had pleaded that the only motive which had prevented him from doing so, was the suspicion that Holkar would not support him in this crucial sudden attack; that the cause of suspicion was a note slipped by the King in the hand of Holkar and which the latter had kept secret from him; that he was very much afraid that this General may be secretly in league with the Court party and that for this reason he had deferred striking the big blows till the arrival of the troops of Haripant Phadke and Mahadji Shinde which he had summoned and which he shortly expected. He (Moroba) assured him (the Governor of Bombay) that these two Generals could be relied upon and that the only question was to order the English troops promised by the Governor of Bengal to march in order to keep engaged on this side (on the northern frontier) Visaji Pant Biniwale, a General very avowedly loyal to the Court; and that the troops from Bombay should keep themselves ready to march at the first warning.

You can imagine, my Lord, my surprise when, to the legitimate horror with which I was seized while revealing to Krishnarao this heinous plot, this minister replied with a smile, but at once noticing the expression of shock on my face: " The King", he said to me, "owes you confidence for confidence. The small note, which he slipped in the hand of Holkar, contained these few words : *Tukoji Holkar will be righteous like his father. He will detest the assassin Raghoba, serve Madhavrao and receive 100 lakhs of Rupees.*" On the day after the interview, Morobadada sought

communication of the note from Holkar who pretended to have lost it and added in an ironical tone that it contained a request from Madhavrao to renounce the cause of Raghoba, but that he was not in any way influenced by it, being determined to bring the venture to a close. Morobadada, certainly not so pleased with this reply, must have, however, outwardly expressed his satisfaction with it. But henceforth distrusting Holkar, he bribed Haripant Phadke and Mahadji Shinde who pledged their support to him in favour of Raghoba as King, as soon as he appeared on Maratha territory, but not so long as he was in the hands of the English. It is a trap laid to pull him (Raghoba) out of Bombay. You need not have any anxieties about these two Generals. They are the most faithful servants of Madhavrao. As for (198) the English troops promised by the Governor of Bengal, it is a fact. It is a body of 12,000 infantry commanded by Colonels Leslie and Goddard. It is at present marching through the Moghal provinces along our northern frontiers, because we have refused it as you know permission to pass through our territory to Bombay for the defence of this town threatened with an impending attack by the French. General Visaji Pant Biniwale guarding this frontier has been summoned to this Court only to receive special instructions on this subject, and in a few days, he will leave Poona to rejoin his post and prevent any possible irruption on that side. Thus, you will see that we are not at all worried about the pranks of Morobadada. Like him, we are also awaiting the arrival of Hari Pant Phadke with his army recalled from the territory of Haider Ali Khan and that of Mahadji Shinde who is returning from his campaign in Upper Hindustan.[18] You will then watch some interesting developments."

"Here is", I replied to him, "a plan which, in my opinion, is very well thought out, but would it not be more prudent to stop even now this wretched Morobadada? If you are quite reassured on the side of Holkar, this action ought not to present any difficulties for you."

"No," he replied to me, "Morobadada has under his immediate orders as many troops as Holkar has in the combined army. You, who advise us so rightly not to kill each other to feed the English vultures with our corpses, would you suggest that Holkar or Nana or any other person should attack Morobadada in his camp which would certainly defend him? A little patience, and everything will terminate without any Maratha blood-shed. Pending this pre-arranged moment, let Morobadada delight in his vain projects and when you come to Purandhar, imitate our conduct towards him, meet him, flatter him."

"Oh! As for that, no, I promptly interrupted him, I shall never condescend to salute him."

"That is, however," he repeated, "what the King expects from your friendship. He desires this token of your friendship without which you will spoil our plans."

"I must certainly comply," I replied, "with everything which the King will deem conducive to his interests. But I must on this occasion play a role to which we Frenchmen are not at all accustomed, and if I happened to utter the slightest lie, I am convinced that my face will betray me. I must needs study (198v°) my role more than once between now and my departure to be able to play it to the satisfaction of the King and the ruin of his enemies."

Thereupon we took leave of each other and on the appointed day, I went to Purandhar. Immediately, visits were paid and returned between the envoy of France and Morobadada, and in spite of the horror which the sight of this monster aroused in me, I succeeded in concealing it and made him my presents similar to those which I had made to other ministers on my arrival at the Maratha Court last year. He received them with dignity and assured me that he would always contribute, to the utmost of his power, to the preservation of the treaty of alliance between the two crowns. I replied to him that I shall not fail to apprise you, my Lord, of his friendly intentions and that he would soon receive marks of your pleasure. Old Krishnarao, who accompanied me, was pleased with me, and paid me compliments for my bearing. I replied to him in a bitter tone that till then I had not noticed this talent in me, that it was apparently a state of grace which heaven had wished to confer on me in such a critical circumstance, or perhaps a simple influence of the atmosphere of the country.

The cunning old man once again smiled and immediately opened negotiations with me on the succour demanded by Madhavrao from the King of France to succeed in permanently expelling the English from all their possessions in India. Next I had special conferences with the Regent and Nana on the same subject, of which I shall give you the results, my Lord, when the negotiation is terminated. It was interrupted for a few days by the arrival of Haripant Phadke with the army which I had recalled from the territory of Haider Ali Khan. At the same time Mahadji Shinde brought back his army from the north and I witnessed the amazing spectacle, for the first time, of 2,00,000 cavalry camping and subsisting on a plain 40 kilometres wide.

Morobadada firmly believed that all these forces had come to support him and his face was beaming with pride, when the King ordered him to return the seals and the royal standard which he had seized from the Poona palace. At this order, he realized that he had been duped; he tore the standard, rolled it round his head instead of the turban which he threw on the ground, tied the seals around his chest with the ribbon of his order, jumped on his horse, summoned his army and, resolved to win or die, marched in a disorderly manner against the King's troops. (199) Holkar accompanied him with his troops. The two armies faced each other. Morobadada wanted to attack, but no one obeyed; all the leaders, all the soldiers, cried: "These are our parents, our brothers, our children; are we then going to perish at the hands of each other? Show us the enemy with whom we are prepared to fight. As for these, we can only embrace them". Morobadada, as if struck by lightning, fell from his horse in a swoon; they ran to his aid and he recovered consciousness. Then, pocketing his earlier pride, he delivered the standard and the seals into the hands of Holkar, and entrusted him with carrying them to Nana and soliciting him (Nana) to obtain the King's pardon for him.

Generous hearted Nana did not allow himself to be carried away by his good luck; he obtained the grace for his cousin who was let off with exile in his estate at Rohol (Bahul) where he was dispatched under an escort. The ungrateful man, however, soon formed a fresh conspiracy with the English ambassador who urged him not to get disheartened, only to wait for the arrival of the English troops from Bengal to Bombay, and no longer to trust any one but himself and the English. The plot was discovered and Morobadada was brought back to Poona as a prisoner. Ambassador Mostyn, when summoned to Purandhar, pretended to proceed there, but suddenly fled away, running at full speed by circuitous routes to Salsette and from there to Bombay where he died of fatigue and dispair. Pursued in his flight, he escaped only by a margin of 4 hours from the cavalry which was at his heels. But the men of his retinue were most of them arrested and imprisoned in the various forts which are on the way. Mr. Lewis, his deputy, whom he had left at Poona to screen his escape, was detained there. A close watch was kept on him and all persons were forbidden from communicating with him under the most rigorous penalty. The English sipahees who guarded his house were disarmed, expelled from the town and forbidden from entering it under pain of death.

Immediately after this incident, the State Council decided upon war with the English till their total expulsion from India, and by order of the King, this resolution was notified to me by Krishnarao with an invitation to take a seat in the Council in the capacity of a member, under the title of Samet-Panas which signifies prince of laws. I accepted this honour without any hesitation, entreating (199v°) the King that it should not only be confined to me but attached permanently to the functions of any Minister from France who would be resident at his court. This substitution was at once promised to me and since confirmed by a decree. Consequently on May 25, I took my seat in the State Council, immediately after Nana, which is the fourth place. There are twelve members in all and it is from this number that the Council takes its name of *Bara Bhai* which signifies 12 brothers. The King himself occupies the first, the Regent, Sakharam Bapu, second, Nana, Prime Minister, third; Morobadada had previously occupied the fourth, Bhimrao, Minister for War, fifth; Krishnarao, sixth; Jadhavrao, seventh; Janoji Bhosale, eighth; Mahadji Shinde, ninth; Tukoji Holkar tenth; Haripant Phadke, eleventh and Visajipant Biniwale, the twelfth.

In this assembly of princes, I was invested by their hands with the marks of my new dignity; it consists of a dress which is peculiar to it and in four ornaments of diamonds, rubies, emeralds and pearls, set in gold. Two of which, in the form of an aigrette are placed on the turban, the third is hung on the chest and the fourth is tied to a red-silk ribbon worn over the shoulder. The elephant, the camels, horses and servants, always maintained at the King's expense for the service of each member of the Council, were afterwards presented to me and I returned to my residence with all this retinue in the midst of sounds of trumpets and drums.

On this occasion, I received and paid visits, during one of which I learnt about M. Chevalier, Director at Chandernagore, a very astonishing detail which, however, did not surprise me. Mahadji Shinde, asked in the course of a conversation if Nana had communicated to me the contents of a letter from M. Chevalier. I replied to him in the negative and said that I did not even know that this gentleman was in correspondence with Nana. " You have not rightly understood me," he replied," it is to me and not to Nana that M. Chevalier had written this letter months back concerning our alliance with France. I was then in Upper Hindustan and I sent the letter to Nana. Therein he offered his congratulations on this alliance, but at the same time, informed me that you were not dispatched by the King but only by one of his (200) scribes, who were always insecure in their

office, since in less than ten years the King had changed them five or six times; this treaty could not have any stability, unless it was contracted by persons of a solidly established character; that the new Governor of Pondicherry, although he was much superior to you in authority, did not possess it sufficiently to guarantee the duration of such a union; that finally, in the whole of India, he was the only one capable of giving it durability, having constantly remained in office for nearly twelve years in spite of all the changes that had occurred in the Ministry of France and even in spite of the change of the King, with whom he was in favour, being well supported by the Prime Minister whose relative he had married. He terminated his letter by inviting me to resume this negotiation between him and me which we had planned five years ago, because it was the only way to consolidate this great piece of work."[17]

Indignant at this extreme audacity, I hastened to meet Nana, and protested to him for not having apprised me of this shameful behaviour. I wanted to see this letter which he assured me he had returned to Mahadji Shinde with the contempt it deserved. Mahadji admits this fact, but as he could not remember where he had kept it, he promised to search for it among his papers. I would have paid a couple of thousand francs for this interesting document, worthy because of its rare nature, to be submitted before the King. All my efforts proved unfruitful. A mass of papers had been left in Upper India among which it was certainly misplaced as of little importance. Nevertheless, what would have been its effect if my character had not been so well established and if all my proceedings had not won for me the entire confidence of the Court. This confidence still increased because of the negotiation which I conducted with Bapu Krishna, Vakil of Nizamali, Subhedar of the Deccan. This minister had proposed to me an alliance between France and the Deccan on the lines of the one which I had contracted with the Marathas. I expressed my great approval of the plan by telling him that it would be desirable for the tranquility of India that all its powers adopted it, but at the same time I declared to him that not being furnished with any powers to negotiate with his master the only means of remedying this defect, in my opinion, was that Nizamali (200v°) should become an accessory to our alliance with the Marathas by himself negotiating with them for a union for their common interest. I assured him that this mediate confederation would produce the same effect until the King of France, informed of the dispositions of Nizamali, could send me his orders on this subject. I then submitted my report to the (Maratha) Council on the

proposal that had been made to me along with my reply which was unanimously approved. It was at once adopted as a basis for an agreement by which the Subhedar of the Deccan undertook to attack the English in the districts of Ellore, Mustafanagar, Rajmahendry and Chicacole, i.e., from Masulipatnam to Ganjam, to the north of the Coromandel Coast, while the Marathas would attack them in the rest of the British establishments. This war would begin when all the preparations were ready to make it short and a merry one, that is to say, when France would furnish its contingent.

Thus ended the negotiation, my Lord, and to spare you the boredom of the details of the deliberations, I shall confine myself to give you its result in the following resolutions adopted by the King in his Council.

Madhavrao Narain, Pant Pradhan to the Barabhais:

Observed (1) that the English nation by its usurpations and its outrages during the last forty years has proved itself as an enemy of all the powers interested in the tranquility of Hindustan.

Resolved (1) that war will be declared against the English nation and that it will be continued to the last man in my Kingdom so long as the English possess an inch of ground in India.

Observed (2) that the war, resolved against the English, had no other object than to recover from them the provinces which they have been occupying in Hindustan. My invincible cavalry would suffice to sweep them like dust on the surface of these lands up tc the walls of their fortresses in which they would be forced to shut themselves up, like the tiger in his den when he is chased by the hunters, but it is a question of exterminating them in these very walls and throwing them in this sea which has cast them on the shores of Hindustan. Thus, war in the plains will lead me to a war of sieges before places fortified according to the European warcraft and I lack the means necessary to attack them according to the methods of this warfare.

Resolved (2) that the King of France, my beloved brother and perpetual ally (201) will be invited to assist me from the beginning to the end of the war by offering me 2500 men of his invincible infantry, divided into 25 companies to serve on the canon, mortars, mines and trenches with all the apparatus of their war-craft, or at least with craftsmen who could teach the art of their manufacture to the craftsmen of my country.

Observed (3) that this corps of French troops, exposed by the change of climate and effects of war to reductions which cannot always be timely restored because of the distance which unfortunately separates France from Hindustan, should be nursed and relieved in their functions by a sufficient number of auxiliaries who will acquire experience from its lessons and examples in the duties of this service.

Resolved (3) that a corps of 25,000 auxiliaries be selected from the best infantrymen of my armies, and this corps, divided into 25 batallions, will always serve, with the 25 French companies, and not on any other duties for relieving them in their functions and replacing them according to the needs.

Observed (4) that it is essential for the efficiency of the service to which these two corps are assigned that they should be subjected to a uniform discipline, maintained by a single category of officers under a single general and that the best way to achieve this objective is their complete incorporation.

Resolved (4) that the 25,000 infantrymen will have in their formation only the state and pay of a simple soldier, that all the posts of officers of lower and higher ranks will be filled from the time of incorporation by all the individuals of the corps of French troops in the ratio of one company per battalion, and that this joint corps, constituted henceforth into a single one, will always be under the entire command of the Samet-Panas, Minister of the King of France at my Court; I reserve to myself alone the reviews and inspections necessary for the discipline and maintenance of this invincible corps which will be named the Corps of the Royal Alliance.

Observed (5) that the King of France having expressly declared to me (201v⁰) by a letter in his own hand that his intention is not to acquire territories in Hindustan, because his just mind recognizes that all the territories situated between the Indus and the Ganges are, since the origin of the world, the patrimony of the Maharajas, it is but proper that the sums which will be spent from his Royal treasury to meet the expenses of the levy, armament, equipment, maintenance, transport and salary of the corps of French troops should be repaid in kind, so that his interests do not suffer by this act of his friendship.

Resolved (5) that the sum, spent by the Royal Treasury of France for the levy, armament, equipment, maintenance, transport and salary of the corps of the French troops till the moment of its arrival in my empire,

will be entirely paid from my treasury in the course of the early part of the moon, according to the statements of expenses presented to me by the Samet-Panas, Minister of the King of France at my Court; and that from this moment, the entire salary of the combined corps, in the ratio of 100 rupees per month for each European and 10 rupees per month for each infantry man, shall be paid on the first day of every moon into the hands of the said Samet-Panas.

Observed (6) that the upkeep of the corps of French troops, accustomed to European diet, depends on the permanent establishment of a continuous communication between France and Hindustan for the import of all articles of consumption which it will require, like provisions, clothes, armaments, medicines, equipment as well as for the transport of recruits, discharged men, invalids; that to establish this kind of a line of communication between the two Empires, it would be imprudent to rely solely on the expeditions of French merchant ships, which are always arbitrary, uncertain and uncoordinated even in times of peace and which in times of war are almost suspended or exposed to interception; that, as for French warships, a circumstance may arise in which they cannot be diverted from their primary objective, which is the defence of the Kingdom of France, for being employed on such distant expeditions; that for all these reasons it is advisable to set up a fleet adequate and employed solely to fulfil this important object, and that to impart greater efficiency to its operations, this fleet should be stationed at an intermediary point equally convenient for Europe and Asia.

**(202)**

Resolved (6) that wood will be furnished from all my forests in the Konkan for the construction in my ports of a fleet composed of one ship of 64 guns, 4 frigates of 32 and 16 corvettes of 16 guns, with all the launches, dinghies and other boats necessary for its service. Wood will be furnished free to the French ship-wrights who will be responsible for the expenses for the cutting of the wood for the construction and for all other expenses. This fleet attached to the corps of French troops, armed, equipped and maintained at the expense of the King of France, who will be the master of these 21 warships, will be stationed at the Isle of France under the orders of the Samet-Panas, Minister of the King of France at my Court and General of all the land and naval forces of the alliance. Wood for refitting and other repairs will be likewise furnished from my forests in the Konkan at all times and free.

Observed (7) that at the end of the war, the King of France may wish to recall to France the corps of troops which he has sent to me.

Resolved (7) that if, after the war, the corps of French troops is recalled by the King of France, it will be at once disbanded with a whole year's salary, to be counted from the day of its reembarkation to meet the expenses of its return, without prejudice to other gifts which I might deem fit to confer upon the corps as a whole and in particular upon the men who will have rendered distinguished service.[18]

Thus, you have succeeded, my Lord, in furnishing an army to France in India at no cost and which, however, will expel the English from that country. The expenses of the squadron, which will transport the succour sought for, will be paid, and this squadron can, immediately after the landing, devote itself to other useful operations in India or return to Europe. Finally, we shall permanently have at the Isle of France a fleet of 21 warships which, during peace time, freighted by the merchants, will carry on trade in India and, at the first news of rupture, they will be armed for going out to destroy the enemy's trade. None of your predecessors had sufficiently well known India to husband similar resources there. Your genius alone has created them, it is for it alone to (202v°) apply them to its political system.

The Maratha Court thought that it was necessary that I should undertake the journey to France to furnish detailed explanations on all these matters. I shall place them before you, my Lord, with the authentic documents at the time, so cherished, which will bring me back to your presence. I am entrusted with a letter for you from the Regent Sakharam Bapu and another from the Maharaja Madhavrao for His Majesty. Here is the purport:

*The original was written by Trimbak Mahipatrao,*
*Chitnis to the Maharaja*

LITERAL TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER FROM THE KING OF THE MARATHAS TO THE KING OF FRANCE

Madhavrao Narain, Pant Pradhan, to the King of France: " Greetings to Louis, Padashah, high in glory and power, light of France, garden of delights which the dew from heaven should always blossom. When I received the letter of friendship which you had the honour to address me through your beloved subject, your envoy Samet-Panas, the Chevalier Pallebot de St. Lubin, I replied to you in a similar letter of friendship that the alliance formed between us will never terminate. On the contrary, it will strike more roots in the course of time. I replied to you that I was retaining with me your envoy to work here as a common

minister and regulate all things for the benefit of our alliance. After a whole year of counsels between us, I am sending him back to you indeed as our common minister to declare and explain to you all the plans which we have discussed during this year and which, in my opinion, we must carry out at the earliest moment for the benefit of our alliance. All that he will tell you comes from my mouth, but what he cannot tell you is how much I love him and how much you have enriched me by his official capacity (of an ambassador), I have appointed him Samet-Panas and given him the highest honours in my Empire. I request you to allow him to wear its insignia in your Court as in mine, so that everyone should know that he is our common minister. After he has conveyed to you in detail all the matters which we had discussed, I request you to send him back to accomplish your goal. If you desire anything more from me, (203) write to me and I shall satisfy you. I do not add anything more, but what more can I write? I wish you good health (24th May 1778).

LITERAL TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER FROM SAKHARAM BAPU, REGENT OF THE MARATHA EMPIRE, TO THE MINISTER FOR THE NAVY OF FRANCE

"Greetings from Sakharam Bapu, Maratha Vazir, to the Count of Sartine, Minister for the Navy of France, pillar of the Empire, high in dignity, in his great name. We have only one heart and one desire with you; you have read it in the letter by which we replied to yours. Since then, we have employed one whole year in consultation with the envoy of the King of France, Samet-Panas, le Chevalier de St. Lubin, on all matters concerning our alliance. At present, the King, our sovereign, has given him leave to go and discuss with you all the matters over which we had had consultations. What he will tell you, is from our mouth and if you want to add to it anything, we shall do as you please. The King has appointed him Samet-Panas. By this title of honour, he is equal to me in rank. He (the Maratha King) also wanted to ask from the King of France his highest favours for Samet-Panas, Chevalier de St. Lubin; but the envoy represented to him that the King, his master, was just and liberal and that it was only fitting to say that Madhavrao was content, without asking for any other reward; but I, your friend, I recommend him as my friend to you, who are my greatest friend. After he has discussed with you in detail all the plans, send him back to execute them and if you desire something more, write to me, and I shall do it. I do not write anything more, for what more can I write? I wish you good health (24th May 1778).

Now, my Lord, you are going to witness the tragic end of Morobadada and his accomplices. Their case was very rigorously examined in the Council of the Bara Bhais, but when they came down to the (203v°) final judgement, I found that the majority of votes were only in favour of imprisonment for life. So I refused to give my opinion in the capacity of a member of the Council, but in the name of the King of France and as his minister, I dared to demand death for Morobadada and his accomplices as the only satisfactory atonement for the crime committed against His Very Christian Majesty in the sacred person of his very beloved ally Madhavrao.

This happy distinction between my two capacities necessarily changed the whole aspect of the case and they had to reconsider their opinions. Each one still held to his, either through moderation which is natural to the Brahmins who hardly ever inflict capital punishment in their judgements, or because the judges and the accused being almost all relatives, the voice of blood heavily preponderated. Particularly, Nana defended the life of his cousin, because, he said, his cousin had made an attempt on his life. I no doubt admired him, but arguing in the French manner against this Brahmin clemency as inapplicable to crimes of High Treason, and firmly insisting on the satisfaction due to the affection of the King, my master, for Madhavrao, I proposed an expedient which conciliated irremissible punishment to criminals with the respects due to their respectable families for whom it was proper to spare the ignominy of public execution. Thereupon the Regent Sakharam Bapu strongly supporting my demand brought all the members one after the other over to his opinion. This expedient which Cicero had furnished me in the case of Catilina was to get them excuted in prison, and I shall confine myself to repeat to you, my Lord, the report which the Roman Consul made in a single word to the assembled Senate which was waiting for the end of this tragedy: 'fuere'. However, I shall add to it the details. The executions were not carried out in Poona. Morobadada was sent a prisoner to Andanagar (Ahmednagar), near Aurangabad; Bajouba (Bajaba) and Govimba (Govinda), his brother, to Sanda Nandam (Chandan Vandan), near Satara; Gopalrao Enmbeea (Tambwekar) to Rajemancy (Rajmachi), near Cossour Ghat; Naropant to Logar (Lohgarh) and Damberia to Mohol. All died of apoplexy on their arrival in prison. The only execution which was public was that of Jadhav, prince of the royal blood and one of the generals who served under Haripant Phadke in the war against Haider Ali. He was blown up

at the mouth (204) of a cannon for having betrayed Haripant Phadke by the orders of Raghoba who had instructed him to favour Haiderali against the Marathas.[19]

It would be useless, my Lord, to give you the details of the imprisonment and total ruin of all the adherents, supporters, well-wishers, etc., of Morobadada and of his accomplices. Seventy four of the principal ones were chained for life and their estates confiscated. A larger number of lesser ones were treated more leniently but they obtained their liberty only at the cost of their entire estates. Finally, this faction, whose leaders are dead and whose members are crippled, is henceforth reduced to impotency and our hopes resting on the continuation of the present Government which appears to me as stable as ever before, I had my audience of leave and left Poona to proceed to Daman, a Portuguese town situated on the Maratha Coast.

I had proposed to return to France from that place on the King's corvette *la Curieuse* which M. de Salvert had beached and abandoned in the port of Daman in the beginning of this year. The Portuguese shipwrights demanded 6,000 rupees to refloat it. I offered the amount but it was preferred to sell the wreckage to the English for 3,000 rupees rather than permit me to return this ship to the King. The motives for this preference were explained to me by M. de Charleval whom I had dispatched in advance to Daman to negotiate this transaction. He wrote to me: " It is impossible to purchase the ship for which purpose I had come to Daman. The honour of the Captain and the jealousy of the subalterns had a hand in it. It would have been burnt, it is said, rather than being allowed to refloat ".

In support of this statement, here is a complete letter from M. de Salvert to M. Trublet, one of his officers, appointed by him to arrange for the sale of this corvette. " I write to you, my friend, on the off chance. I see at a cursory glance that you will spend the monsoon at Daman or at Surat. I would advise you to sell (the frigate) if you need money; it would be a folly not to do so. Tell M. Anquetil and the Governor (of Daman?) that I have entrusted you with the recovery of the price of the mangosteens and the sale of wine. The first must have been sold at Mozambique and the money from all the sales will be recovered in September. (204v°) If you can engage a few negroes and take them with you at half profit and bring them to me to Europe, where I shall probably precede you, you will oblige me. I would have very much liked to have everything sold

before leaving Daman and spared you a loss of such a lot of time. I am leaving this evening and have just time to tell you that no one is a more sincere friend of yours that P. de Salvert ".

The perusal of this letter, of which the original is in my hand, is not at all edifying, since, in defiance of the laws, it furnishes a novel example of the loss of the King's ship because of the commercial dealings of their commandants. I am in possession of an order written in the own handwriting of M. de Salvert to M. LeRoy for the sale of its cargo. This writing clearly proves that the greed for gain alone was responsible for this ship's visit to Daman where it was lost. A report was at once drawn up to attribute its loss to its rottenness and lest the dishonesty of this act might be discovered, it was thought more prudent to sell the corvette to the English for a mere song than to allow me to refloat it at my expense. This disappointment forced me to arrange with the Governor of Daman for a corvette of 16 guns which he then had in the yards and which could be ready for sailing only in December. It is in this circumstance, my Lord, that I must admire the ascendancy of your star or rather the designs of providence which so visibly favours the execution of those which it inspires in you, for, if I could have embarked immediately on my arrival in Daman at the end of September, I could not have brought about before my departure from India the great explosion which you had prepared by your treaty with the Marathas, I mean their declaration of war against the English immediately the first hostilities were committed by them against us in India.

This would indeed be the place to ask a question to M. de Bellecombe. I had written to him as early as August 10, 1777: " By whatever enemy you are attacked, if you need succour, write to me; if you want it directly, I shall be by your side in 40 days; if a diversion is enough, in 4 days I shall be on the spot. " M. de. Bellecombe had replied to me on October 12: " I congratulate you on the success of your negotiations with the Marathas. It is certain that your treaty of alliance and commerce with them should be epoch-making under the Ministry of M. de Sartine and I am waiting for him to inform me about it as well as about his views on this subject to express to him all my satisfaction thereon. I cannot foresee at this moment what will be the outcome of the present state of things in Europe; but if there follow from it disturbances which reach (205) us, I shall see, if circumstances permit, what advantage I can take of your offers, and if I can reconcile them with the actual policy in India and the plan of conduct His Majesty has traced for me. "

This being granted, why did M. Bellecombe, threatened and attacked by the English, not have recourse to me? I forbear any other reflection on this subject. As for M. Picot, his decision had already been taken to send his capitulation to the enemy before a single shot was fired; he always affected not to ask any help from me, although he complimented me on my success and on the declaration of war by the Marathas. I learnt about the attack on Pondichery only from the rejoicings of the English at Surat at its capture on November 3 and on the same day they made M. Anquetil, King's Consul in this place, prisoner of war; the latter infor-ed me of these two events by a letter written on November 5, by his daughter. I immediately informed the Maratha Court that war was declared between France and England. I must say to the glory of these brave and faithful allies that they only took time to ascertain the fact about the hostilities to declare war; it was announced 18 days later at Poona. The English did likewise at Bombay by proclaiming Raghoba as King of the Marathas who publicly paid homage of his future crown to the King of England by sending him an ambassador, by name Arginache Rao (Avinashrao?) whom I since got arrested at Jidda.

As early as November 26, a Maratha army, 20,000 strong marched towards Surat, another 40,000 strong, descended into the Konkan to proceed to Salsette and Bombay. The English of Bombay also brought into the field an army of 20,000 men of which their troops formed only half the number, the rest were composed of the adherents of Raghoba. This army was to join the 12,000 English troops which, since long, were marching from Bengal to Bombay; but we had the good luck to destroy these two armies separately before they could effect their junction.

On December 19, the advanced guard of the Bombay army, commanded by Major Stuart and composed of 4,000 men was surprised by the Maratha advanced guard, consisting of 10,000 cavalry. It was surrounded and 3,700 men were cut to pieces; a few died on the spot: no quarter given: Major Stuart was among the killed.

On December 27, the English lost only 50 men in a skirmish with the Marathas who were trying to draw them out (205v°) of their entrenched position in the village of Talegaon: of this number was Colonel Key, killed by a (cast) iron gun.

On January 3, the English having made a forward movement to occupy the pond of Talegaon, the Marathas allowed them to camp there and immediately after attacked them so vigorously that they

were forced to abandon their camp which was all spread out and flee in disorder to the entrenched position which they had left on the previous evening.

In this entrenched camp, having endured for 17 days hunger, thirst, scarcity of food and water and the night and day watch against the Maratha detachments which ceaselessly followed each other to keep the enemy continuously on their feet, they were finally forced out of their camp by a general attack of the Maratha army. Their army, exhausted by drought and fatigue, was cut into pieces in its own camp. Not a single soldier escaped; the only persons spared were the sick who were sheltered in a pagoda with a guard of 200 men. During this slaughter the three Bombay Councillors who accompanied Raghoba hid themselves in this hospital. They were captured and taken prisoners to Poona. Raghoba was captured fighting on his elephant and immediately put under chains. All the artillery and ammunition fell into the hands of the Marathas. Finally, the defeat was complete, since, out of the whole army, there returned to Bombay only the sick from the hospital numbering 280 men whom the Marathas sent back under an escort of 500 cavalry.

At the same time, another army of 40,000 Marathas had destroyed in two pitched battles 7,000 men of the English army from Bengal which, reduced to 5,000, took refuge under the cannon of Surat where it arrived through the woods on March 28, without cannon and without equipment.

On the sea, the Maratha fleet captured two merchant fleets from Bombay, the armed ships which conveyed them escaped with great difficulty. The ship *Britannia* of 40 guns with Captain Moore, was captured shortly afterwards after the most dogged resistance and all his crew massacred.

After this start, the Maratha armies quartered themselves in the neighbourhood of Surat and Salsette to resume their operations in the month of November after the rains.

I had then to depart to present myself before you, my Lord, and receive your orders on the subsequent operations for which the Marathas demand your assistance. The English, who honour me by imputing to me their disasters, have chased me with sword, fire, (206) poison. I would be preparing for you an Odyssey if I were to relate to you all the sufferings I had to endure during the voyage: for, besides my fight before Mocha against the English corvette, of which I have the honour to give you an

account, I met with four shipwrecks on various reefs in the Red Sea. All my crew fell ill; I was without water and wood; I lost my luggage; I was ransomed in Arabia and in Egypt by the Pashas and the Beys. But finally, through so many perils, losses and fatigues, I arrived at Malta on a Ragurais ship freighted at Alexandria. I am in a quarantine since July 1st. It will end on the 18th and immediately after I intend to leave for Marseilles, on an Eperenaro which is only a jolly-boat with four oars, but if I were to wait for a more comfortable transport, I would risk losing time which I think is precious. Accompanying me is Don Azevedo Britto, Lieutenant-Commander of the ships of the King of Portugal and commander of the corvette which carried me. The Governor of Daman, his father, wanted that he should accompany me to France. This brave fidalgo laconically gave him leave like a Spartan father who sends his son to war. " You will accompany," he said to him, " M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin to France; the only instruction I give you is an order and an interdiction, order to obey all those he will give you, interdiction not to appear before me if the slightest accident happens to him by your mistake." This worthy man spoke thus to his only son because of the friendly feelings which bound us as also because he had received from the Portuguese Viceroy of India Don Josephe Pedro da Camera the following order: " I recommend to you M. de. St. Lubin not only as a Minister of France, but as a man precious to all the nations interested in the ruin of the English in India. They would burn him alive perhaps if he fell into their hands. That is what you should beware of and I hold you responsible for it ".

I ought to testify to you, my Lord, that this generous nation rendered me every kind of good service in the course and for the success of my mission in India. Particularly, I have nothing but praise for a Portuguese priest who very effectively helped me in your plans during all my sojourn at the Maratha Court and it wanted me to take him with me for motives which will certainly please you.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

(207) Malta, July 15, 1780

Account of what happened outside the roadstead and within sight of the city of Mocha in the Red Sea on June 8, 1779, between the Portuguese corvette, La Nossa Senhora das Augustius è Almas, belonging to Signor Sebastial Azevedo è Britto, Governor of Daman, and commanded by Signor Joan Manoel Azevedo è Britto, his son, Lieutenant-Commander of the ships of the King of Portugal, of 16 guns and 75 men, including crew and passengers, and the English corvette the Morning Star, commanded by Capt. Robinson, of 16 guns and 80 men of the crew.

The Portuguese corvette having got up steam at noon to proceed to Jidda was followed two hours later by the English corvette. The Portuguese commander, judging from the manoeuvering of the English commander that he wanted to speak to him, cast anchor and waited; two hours later the English corvette also came and anchored within half gun-shot of the Portuguese corvette. The English commander sent his dinghy and an officer on board the Portuguese ship with a message that as he had learnt that M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin was travelling on his ship, he had come to take charge of him with all his papers and belongings. The Portuguese commander replied to the English officer that he had neither any French goods on his ship, nor any specie, but only its ballast and its ammunition; that, as for persons who were on board, all were under the protection of his flag and that he would not surrender any one.

The English officer returned with the reply to his commander who at once sent back his dinghy with two other officers with an order to inspect the whole ship including the powder magazine, which the Portuguese commander refused to do, and the two English officer returned.

Then there ensued between the two commanders a conversation in the following terms:

The English commander: Corvette Ahoy!

The Portuguese commander: Ahoy!

(207v°)

The English commander: You must allow the search of your ship and deliver M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin with all his belongings and papers.

The Portuguese commander: I have no French goods and I shall not allow any search of my ship, and all the persons in it are under the protection of my flag.

The English commander: If you refuse to obey, your corvette will be attacked.

The Portuguese commander: The corvette flies the flag of the King of Portugal and if the peace existing between the two crowns is not sufficient for its safety, its cannon will supply the deficiency.

The English commander: I will force you to obey.

The Portuguese commander: If you attempt any insult to the Portuguese flag, rest assured I shall avenge it.

Thus ended the conversation and the English captain immediately let fly a volley of all his cannon and muskets at the Portuguese corvette which replied in the same manner. The Englishman let fly a second volley to which the Portuguese replied in a similar manner. Thereupon the Englishman cut his cable and set sail to place himself athward the bows of the Portuguese ship which fired the two guns of its bow with such accuracy that the Englishman was obliged to fall off. Then the Portuguese corvette let fly the volley of all its larboard which again forced him to place himself behind its poop; but the discharge of the cannon from the poop was so vigorous that the Englishman moved away to a very long distance and set sail to enter the port of Mocha. The Portuguese corvette took the same route, and the two corvettes dropped anchors in the port within a cannon shot of each other.

The Arab Government having forbidden the two (208) commanders any hostilities in his port, the Englishman went ashore to bury the two dead persons which are his wife and son. 18 others were thrown into the sea and 12 were fatally wounded. The Portuguese corvette suffered damage to its masts and its tackle, but there was neither any one killed nor wounded except an Arab who had been taken aboard as an interpreter and who was blown up by a cannon-shot. This is a very remarkable proof of the special protection with which divine providence was pleased to favour the most just cause!

The Englishman having obtained from the Government of Mocha, the order that the Portuguese corvette should not pursue him, sailed for Bengal two days later. Thus, all this affair terminated to the glory of the Portuguese flag, to the honour of the commander Joan Manoel Azevedo è Britto, and to the disgrace of the English commander.

PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

C² 148

(79)

COPY OF A LETTER FROM THE WAQUIL VENKATRAO, MAINTAINED BY THE FRENCH WITH MUHAMMAD ALI KHAN AT MADRAS, WRITTEN TO THE SECRETARY OF M. DE BELLECOMBE, DATED 31ST MAY 1977 RECEIVED ON 2ND JUNE

" M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin arrived, riding an elephant and accompanied by seven or eight officers in palanquins, as I have already informed you. His luggage was delayed by about ten days and it arrived only about a month ago. Bhimrao was sent to receive them. Sakharam Bapu and Nana, ministers of Madhavrao, were present in the Prince's Shamiana where they sent for the French leader. After the reception ceremony, they, the two ministers mentioned above, Madhavrao Sadashiv (a person highly esteemed), Krishnarao Ballal, and Bhonsle's Waquil with the Chevalier and his interpreter retired in private. He delivered to them a letter from the Minister of France. It was in French; no one could read it. It was handed over to the Chevalier to make a translation of it. These are its contents : " Solid friendship has existed between us for a long time; we must try (79v°) to improve it further. M. le Chevalier is charged to speak to you of many things." They made inquiries about M. de Bussy and he replied that he (Bussy) enjoyed great credit with the Minister and that he (Bussy) had requested him to offer his compliments to Ramchandrarao. He was next questioned on the relations of the French with the English, whether there was peace or war between them. Everything is at peace, he replied. After which he took his leave. He was furnished all the provisions necessary for the subsistance of 200 men. Ten harkaras and a government writer were placed at his disposal. He was then summoned to pay his homage to Madhavrao who was accompanied only by Sakharam Bapu and Nana. After paying his respects to Madhavrao, he presented him with five painted mirrors, a sword, a musket, a pair of pistols and a vase which had the property to destroy the effect of the poison. After a friendly conversation, he delivered a letter from the King. Its contents are not known. My friend's brother has promised to inform him, as soon as he comes to know about them. Madhavrao retired and his two Ministers remained with the Chevalier. Sakharam Bapu (80) asked him if he had anything to disclose. Much, he replied, but we must be at ease and we must have a faithful interpreter.[20] None has as yet been given, and as Sakharam Bapu has a marriage in his family which he is obliged to attend, there will be some delay. They are in a state of

uncertainty at Poona about this Chevalier. They do not know if he has come from France, from Pondicherry or from some other place. *I think that he is an imposter,* says my friend's brother, *since you did not speak to me about him. If you tell me that he is acknowledged, I shall accept him as such.* If you *tell me that he is a liar, I shall inform Sakharam Bapu about it and he will be sent back. How could he have forged letters from the King and his Minister? Send here a letter from the General to clear up the position.*" These are the contents of a letter from my friend's brother, which he has communicated to me. I thought I ought to inform you about it. The letter from the General, with which I am charged, should be sent to me; it will soon have a reply. The letter from the General must say that those from the King and the Minister are not at all (80v°) forged. As soon as this letter arrives, it will be dispatched by express messengers. As the Chevalier declared that he was French, he had a very good reception.

Ibrahim Khan Dhousa[21] is in the neighbourhood of Adomi. About a fortnight ago, a skirmish took place between his troops and those of the Nawab Haider Ali Khan; it is a trifle. The two armies are 64 kilometres distant.

Recently Nazam Ali sent a letter and Sarpech to Mr. Stratton.[22]

**(159)**

Colonies
Department of India
M. de Bellecombe
No. 130

Pondicherry, 15th October 1777

(for M. de Mars)

*Copy of a letter from M. St. Lubin and M. de Bellecombe's reply; reflexions on the mission with which he is charged at the Court of the Marathas.*

My Lord,

I have the honour to send you herewith the copy of a letter I received from M. de St. Lubin and that of the reply I gave him. I congratulate him on the success of his negotiation. That is what he looks to me to be most deeply interested in. But as I have no better information about the orders he may have received nor about the details of his negotiation, I shall not yet venture, my Lord, to pay you my compliments, especially as I do not see up to the present moment anything very solid in what he tells me he has accomplished.

(159v°)

*Alliance and trade with the Marathas, the leading power of Hindustan* are big words which it was easy to emphasize ten years ago, if circumstances had permitted it, and that too at very little expense. Since more than ten years there is not a power in India, great or small, which does not want to join us to humble that of the English. We can, therefore, make treaties of alliance and trade on all sides. But what will be the result ? I am afraid it may turn out to be a mountain which drops a mouse, because of the incompatibility of respective interests among the powers with whom we are negotiating, and especially because of the internal divisions noticed since a long time in the Maratha nation whose support M. de St. Lubin vaunts so much. It is today so much divided into different factions that we cannot rely on the succour on that side, without our enemies being able to do as much. And in that case, where is the advantage which this so-called alliance procures us ? In six months, there will perhaps be no more question about it. You ought to rest assured, my Lord, (160) that any alliance here can last only as long as it will be supported on our part with forces actual and present in India. Unfortunately, we havn't got them and those who can any day become our enemies possess formidable ones. We are at the present moment, on the one hand, in alliance with Haider Ali Khan, on the other, with the Marathas. These alliances are based on conditions to help each other in case of need. If within a year we havn't got forces to put in the field, it would be as if these alliances did not exist at all to all intents and purposes. There may even result much damage from that:

Firstly, because these powers cannot remain idle. They are enemies and even at war actually against each other. They both have, therefore, a right to expect from us prompt succour which we are not in a position to give them.

Secondly, because the English who foresee the trouble which may result for them from an alliance between us and such other power must (160v°) necessarily employ most efficacious means to prevent it, by proving to this power the futility of our alliance. Now the best way is to act on one's own initiative. Their (of the English) movements in India appear, really speaking, suspended for some time, which may partly be attributed to the happenings in Europe and America. The strongest reason, however, is the uncertainty in which they may indeed be, first because of what we want to do ourselves, secondly because of my arrival and finally, because of our various negotiations in India. But soon they will find out what the position is.

Of the two powers which I have just mentioned, that which the English must consider as most inclined to truly unite with us is undoubtedly the Regency of Poona, because of the concessions which they have recently usurped from it by force of arms. We must, therefore, consider that it is against this part of the Maratha nation that the English will soon (161) move by favouring either openly or secretly the expeditions of Haider Ali Khan, so as to prevent it completely from helping us at the commencement of a European war. The Regency of Poona will demand succour from us. If we cannot give it, the result will be that, either this Regency will be completely destroyed to make place for a Government favourable to the English, or else this very Regency, realising the futility of our alliance, will enter into engagements with the English which it will be difficult to break.

On the other hand, it will be very easy for the English to induce Haider Ali Khan to act still more vigorously than he has done so far against the Marathas of Poona. This Prince is fully informed of what is happening at the Darbar of the Regency. Supposing it to be true what M. de St. Lubin says about *the alliance concluded, signed and sworn between us and this part of the Maratha nation* with which he is at war, it will be easy for the English to (161v°) impress upon him (Haider Ali) that this alliance is as much against him as against them. We have, it is true, agreements with him to act only in concert with him. But can it alone reassure him against an alliance made with his enemy? This man is a conqueror. He must continually be in action. The English will offer him succour to extend his conquests. Before accepting it, he would perhaps like to sound us. He will demand from us troops and munitions which we shall not be in a position to give him, or which we would not wish to furnish him, considering that they would be used against the Marathas. Can it be fancied that such a refusal will not lead him to take his decision against our interests, especially when he sees actual offers from the English and recalls all that happened at Mahé in 1773, 1774 and 1775? In order that an alliance should endure, we must, therefore, have forces (162) present and ready to act according to the circumstances. Without forces at a distance of 6000 leagues from the mother country, we cannot count on anything *vis-à-vis* Indian powers whose movements we cannot stop to direct them against the common enemy and who, having each one of them their own (selfish) plans to be fulfilled, are likely to demand from us at any moment succour promised in virtue of an alliance. If we are in default, the alliance ceases. That is the position in which we shall

probably be with respect to Haider Ali Khan as well as to the Marathas of Poona. From that moment all our credit will be lost in the mind of the native people. The result will be that the English will be more dreaded and more respected.

I suppose at present that war will take place and that we shall receive forces to take the field. That is indeed the charitable supposition I can (162v°) make, for, if unfortunately a declaration of war takes us by surprise, in our present state, within a fortnight, there will be no more any French establishment left in India, unless it is Mahé, and yet I shall not answer for it today. Really speaking I admire M. de St. Lubin's presumptuousness with his guarantee for all our establishments in India in the name of the Marathas. These will be invaded even before they receive the news of a rupture, and even if they get news of the declaration of war simultaneously with the English, Pondicherry and the other establishments will be captured before the Marathas have sharpened their swords and saddled their horses to run to our succour. *In forty days I shall be with you,* says M. de St. Lubin. Well! I wish the English have the complaisance to wait for him, or that we are sufficiently lucky to offer a resistance which gives him time to join us. Our establishments in Bengal, Yanam, (163) Masulipatnam and Karikal and perhaps Mahé will nonetheless be stormed. But what will he do on his arrival? Does he think that with a body of twenty-five to thirty thousand Marathas, he is capable of saving Pondicherry? These Marathas will come and ask me for money, will ravage the country and will return without rendering any service. The English will win over their chief or bring another body of Marathas to oppose it. Really speaking, my Lord, there is nothing like being at a distance of 6,000 leagues to speak with impudence to most respectable persons, for I have no doubt that M. de St. Lubin has written to you the same thing as to me. It costs nothing to intriguers, who have not anything to lose and who, by their impostures, know how to take cover under events. I would not advance what I have the honour to tell you, my Lord, if I hadn't the proof of it from the precedents of M. de St. Lubin, which have passed through my hands. I had to come to India to know him well.

I come back to my supposition that war will take place and that we shall receive here (163v°) forces to enable us to take the field. Here are two powers, enemies of each other, with which we are in alliance. We shall have to choose. I suppose we shall give preference to the Marathas. It is the nation which is considered as the most powerful and which is

most capable of giving us succour. What will be the position of Haider Ali Khan ? Can it be fancied that he will remain quiet and that the English will not instigate him, not perhaps directly against us but against these very Marathas, our allies? It will certainly be a mistake. He will act all the more vigorously as he will see his ruin inevitable in the aggrandizement of the Marathas of Poona, and as he will be encouraged to act not only by the English, but also by several Maratha parties who will join him. In that case, what great help can we derive on this Coast from the Marathas of Poona who themselves will find it very difficult to hold their own? What will these Marathas of Poona do for the expeditions on the Orissa Coast (164) and in Bengal? M. de St. Lubin is greatly mistaken, if he imagines that, because the Marathas of Poona will be our friends, those of Berar and of Orissa Coast will take up arms in our favour. The house of Janoji and Raghuji which is truly of the Maratha Royal blood, is completely independent of the Poona Regency and often behaves on different principles. It is rather with this house that we should have begun our negotiations, because we never had anything to fear from the Marathas of Poona and because we were already very much assured about their dispositions to help us against the English. On the other hand, we do not yet know too well how we stand with respect to the Marathas of Berar.

As for me, My Lord, I have always thought that we must have the Marathas as well as Haider Ali Khan on our side. With these two powers supporting us, we are assured of success. If one of them is against us and is on the side of the English, we shall achieve nothing, considering the prodigious advantage which the English already have over us, with respect to the effective strength, the number of their sipahees and the resources they possess of all kinds (164v°) and which we completely lack. Moreover, the union of these two powers will so to say entail that of the other powers......*

(165)

I should have wished that the principal aim of a negotiation with the Marathas of Poona had been a perfect reconciliation between them and Haider Ali Khan. That is what I proposed to work for and I had great hopes of succeeding therein by clearly pointing out to them the advantage which would accrue to both from it. In fact, (165v°) once amicable relations were restored between Haider Ali Khan and the Marathas, the former, having nothing to fear for his domains, could at the first invitation appear in the Carnatic and Tanjaour with all his forces which would

*The missing portion is in ciphers.

be joined by ours. Certainly, Muhammad Ali Khan and the English would have no chance. Haider Ali khan had always the great aspiration to seize this territory. As for the Marathas, relieved of all anxiety from the side of Haider Ali Khan, they could easily, with the help of a body of troops which we would maintain with them, not only recapture all that the English have snatched away from them, expel them from Surat and finally reduce them to their old possessions on the Malabar Coast (even supposing that we are unable to capture them), but also initiate the great enterprise on the side of Delhi and from there, through a negotiation with the Marathas of Berar, fall upon Bengal, where our main forces (166) would appear from the other side, either through Chittagong, Dacca, or through the Houghly river, or *via* Cuttack. This open negotiation, you are well aware, my Lord, could take place only on the assumption of a very impending declaration of war, or at least on the arrival of three or four thousand men on this coast, which fact would announce to the Marathas and to Haider Ali Khan that I am in a position to fulfil my engagements with them, for I always come back to the same conclusion that if we do not wish to move, it is useless to think at this moment of alliances which will not have the slightest durability.

When I arrived in India, I at once recognized that we had nothing to fear from the Marathas, that we were on the best of terms with them as much because they had suffered greatly at the hands of the English, which circumstance has induced them for many years past to seek our alliance. These are facts known all over India. I was, therefore, least bothered on that side. The very interest (166v°) of the Marathas forces them to be in our favour, and I would always have had sufficient time to ininitiate a negotiation with them. It was not so with Haider Ali Khan. I saw in him a conqueror whose power was increasing from day to day and who was decidedly prejudiced against our nation by a chain of events into which we had plunged quite inopportunely. I thought that my first care ought to be directed to remove from the mind of this Prince ideas which had been suggested to him by the English, by cleverly taking advantage of our false moves. I felt sure I would succeed therein all the more because the whole thing, after all, was only a misunderstanding on both sides, and indeed, I can say that the mission of M. de Coutanceau has had its full and complete effect. The proof of it can be seen in the conduct which Haider Ali Khan has shown, since my arrival, regarding the affairs (167) of the establishment of Mahé which were in the most critical position. I am going to write to you a special letter on the result of M. de Coutanceau's mission.

Today, I confess to you, my Lord, I hardly know what Haider Ali Khan is thinking about the arrival of M. de St. Lubin in the capacity of an envoy of France, the King's agent at the Court of the Marathas. I hope he has all the talents required for such a negotiation. It can only constitute for Haider Ali Khan one more reason to doubt our sincerity towards him, after the tricks M. de St. Lubin played on him in 1768 in favour of the English, tricks which would have led this Nawab to have him trampled by his elephants, if he could lay his hands on him. He is now appointed in the capacity of an envoy at the Court of his enemies with whom he has just concluded a treaty of alliance in the name of France. If this fact is true, certainly Haider Ali Khan knows it. What unpleasant inferences must he have drawn from the proposals I notified to him (167v°) through M. de Coutanceau ? His silence gives me just cause for fears on this subject. It is already too long a time since I heard from him. It does not even appear that Haider Ali Khan has made the slightest reference about it to M. Russel, who commands a French party in his service. The letters written by this officer here and those of our Waquil do not say a word about it, which conduct is just in keeping with the character of Haider Ali Khan who wants to see what we are at and who is waiting only for the favourable moment to burst out. I am thus hindered in my principal operations, the only ones to which I had to pay particular attention in the beginning.

In the course of my negotiations with Haider Ali Khan, should I speak to him about M. St. Lubin, or should I not speak to him? Silence on my part on such a delicate point, which touches him so closely, can only augment his suspicions. If I speak to him about it, what shall I say to him that the treaty of alliance made (168) by M. St. Lubin concerns only the English and is not at all against him? But if this treaty has been concluded, signed and sworn, the odds are that Haider Ali Khan has a copy of it. It states, according to the letter of M. de St. Lubin, that the condition ought to be reciprocal. Besides, either this alliance is a mere chimera or that it must be followed by a dispatch of French troops in the service of the Marathas in case they are attacked by the English. *It is precisely where I catch you out,* will say Haider Ali Khan. What ! We have agreed that we should act in concert in all our operations; you already knew that I was at war with the Marathas; in spite of that, without informing me, you make a treaty of alliance with them which enables them to have a body of French troops to act against me, for even supposing that your troops in their service are employed (168v°) only against the English, is it not still acting indirectly against my interests, since the Marathas are my enemies ?

That would indeed be an opportunity to start the negotiation, the success of which is such a pressing need, namely restoration of peace between the Marathas and Haider Ali Khan. But when I would offer myself as a mediator to Haider Ali Khan, how shall I conduct this affair in the present circumstances? Your intention is certainly not, my Lord, that I should be at the disposal of M. de St. Lubin. On the other hand, it is also quite clear from the way he writes to me that he considers himself as absolutely independent and at least as my equal. He claims that I must communicate with the Marathas through him alone. In that case, that is an end of it; I shall never undertake a negotiation which I shall not be entirely free to conduct to success. You will admit, my Lord, that my position is very awkward. I thought that in coming to India in the capacity of Commandant General (169) I would not find in my way any Frenchman who could thwart me. Here is, however, one who, although denuded of reputation among us as well as among the foreigners, European or Indian, can, if he thinks it fit, stop and upset all my operations, and that because he knew how to utilize to his advantage the knowledge he acquired in India by means of different roles which he played and which are anything but to his advantage. But never mind that, it is the freedom to act that I demand. I thought that for the success of the affairs of the nation in a country as distant, every transaction should be conducted by a single person. All that I observe increasingly confirms me in this belief. If it is otherwise, I am no more Commandant General, and you will permit me, my Lord, to point out to you that I cannot be responsible for events.

As for what M. de St. Lubin (169v°) says about trade opened at Chaul, it can certainly be an advantage, but I find very little inclination among the traders here to take advantage of this opening, all the less as some individuals have had intimation from Goa that goods sold at Chaul this year have not brought more profits than similar goods sold at Surat or at Bombay. I have communicated to M. Chevalier of Bengal what M. de St. Lubin writes to me on this subject.

I am most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

BELLECOMBE

(170)

COPY OF A LETTER FROM M. LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN TO M. DE BELLECOMBE, COMMANDANT GENERAL OF THE FRENCH ESTABLISHMENTS IN INDIA

Poona, Capital of the Maratha Empire,
10th August 1777

Sir,

I wrote to you from Mahé that I would soon give you news about me and today I give you that of complete success which the policy of M. de Sartine has just secured at the Court of the Marathas. Such a glorious event for him is certainly the most pleasant news that you could have received from here, as much because of your love for the King's service.

A treaty of alliance and commerce is concluded, signed and sworn between His Majesty and the King of the Marathas.

In virtue of the alliance, all our establishments are guaranteed by this leading power of Hindustan, so that by whatever enemy you are attacked, if you need succour, write to me; if you want it directly, I shall be with you in forty days; if a diversion suffices you, in four days (170v°) I am on the spot. That is so far as the alliance is concerned.

As for trade, it is free between the two nations all the ports of which are reciprocally open for all times. But it needs immediate and very active exploitation, if we want to supplant our rivals. The local merchants have already expressed great satisfaction at having a market for European goods in a port of their own and at no more being obliged to get them from Bombay where the English dictated to them. But necessity would force them to go there if we neglected to furnish them with goods. Our shippers will certainly vie with each other in rushing there, when they come to know of this golden mine, but it must be shown to them. I attach herewith a schedule of the requirements (in goods) which I obtained from one of the merchanst of the Court. If there is at Pondicherry some merchant to whose fortune you would like to contribute, you have only to give it to him to fill it up. He will find here in return, gold, silver, precious stones, pearls, spices, cotton cloth, waste cotton, yarn, cotton, wheat, rice, medicinal drugs and wood of (171) every kind.

The distance from Poona to the port of Chaul is only 120 Kms. The river of Chaul carries goods at a single tide up to Astenic (Ashtami) which is mid-way. They are unloaded there to be transported overland to the capital where they arrive in two days.

What a commercial town is this Capital! A petty trader worth five to six lakhs of rupees is met at every turn. The traders here are estimated by the millions (they possess) and several can be mentioned, Commercial magnates who are worth ten to twelve million rupees. If this account sounds romantic, I would not be surprised. Accustomed to judge everything by comparison with us, this mortifying disparity in self-love and sordid love of the European traders can indeed appear to them as chimerical, but two other disparities prove it. Asian trade, especiall y that of India, is most ancient, that of Europe is only recent, and as Indian laws, the origin of which is lost in that of the world, do not permit the sons any other profession than that of the father, the fortune and the experience of the merchant being passed on from the father to the son (171v°) for centuries together, in which they grow, like the acceleration of movement in the system of attraction of gravity, in inverse ratio to the square of the masses, the times and the distances, are not, as with us, lost for the trade and diverted to other classes by cross-breed.

Alliance and trade! these are, Sir, the two primary objects of my mission, in the capacity of the envoy from France, the King's agent at this Court. I can assure you that one of the most pleasant functions that I can fulfil here in this capacity will be to support your claims here when they will be addressed to me. It (Maratha Court) expressed surprise to me that you did not send me the letter which you wrote to it to announce your arrival at Pondicherry. I replied that since you had arrived in India before me, you could not address me this letter. It requests you to employ in future this channel alone and especially not to risk your dispatches by passing them through Madras. It has very good reasons for this.

**(172)**

I shall be very much obliged if you will kindly forward to France by the first available ship the duplicate, inserted herewith, of the dispatch which I am sending overland. You can, Sir, count on me to render you the good offices I can, and it will be the best you will render me if you offer me an occasion for it.

I have the honour to be most respectfully,

Sir,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

True Copy:

(Signed) LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

Bellecombe

(172v°)

COPY OF THE REPLY OF M. DE BELLECOMBE TO THE LETTER OF M. LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

Pondicherry, 12th October 1777

I received, Sir, your letter of the 10th August, but before I reply to it, I beg to point out to you that the one, which you say you wrote to me from Mahé, did not reach me, and I learnt about your arrival on the Malabar Coast only from M. Picot and through the public channel.

I begin, Sir, by congratulating you on the success of your negotiation at the Court of the Marathas. It is certain that your treaty of Alliance and Commerce with them ought to be a red-letter day under the Ministry of M. de Sartine, and I am waiting for him to communicate it to me, along with his views on this subject, to express to him all my satisfaction.

I cannot foresee at the present moment what will be the sequel of the actual state of affairs in Europe, but if there follow from it troubles which can affect us, I shall see, according to the circumstances, what use I can make (173) of your offers and if I can reconcile them with the actual policy in India and the plan of conduct which His Majesty has traced for me.

In order not be at variance with you, Sir, in the negotiations with which you are charged with the Maratha power, I confined myself, as you know, to write to it only one letter to announce my arrival at Pondicherry. It has not yet replied to it. Thus, this silence on its part supports the disposition in which I am not to disturb at all your negotiations and your mission.

I assembled in my office the leading merchants and shippers of this town to inform them of the new channel of trade which you have opened to our nation through the port of Chaul. I have also communicated to them the schedule of requirements attached to your letter. They were, like me, surprised not to find therein the approximate estimate of the selling price of goods which will be transported there. Whatever it may be, I still do not know what they will decide, but I think that to utilize on all sides the means to (173v°) encourage such an opening, you should have better written about it to the heads of the administration of the Isle of France. There are actually in this Isle several millions worth of

goods from Europe unsold and the owners of these goods would perhaps make up their mind to seize the opportunity of the opening which you offer.

I shall forward to France by the earliest opportunity the dispatches which you have addressed to me for M. de. Sartine, Vergennes and Bastard.

I am very truly,
Sir,
Yours, etc.,

True Copy: Bellecombe.

Colonies, (Duplicate)
India Office,
M. de. Bellecombe (for M. de Mars)

Pondicherry, 12th November 1777
No. 160

(273)

ABOUT THE COPY OF THE LETTER FROM THE MARATHA CHIEF IN REPLY TO THE INTIMATION ABOUT HIS ARRIVAL IN INDIA AND OF THAT OF ONE OF HIS CONFIDANTS MADHAVRAO SADASHIV: ANXIETY CAUSED BY THE STRANGE CONTRAST BETWEEN THESE TWO LETTERS AND THAT OF M. DE ST. LUBIN

My Lord,

I have at last received the reply from the Maratha Chief to the letter I had written to him to announce my arrival. It reached me two days after the departure of *l'Arcangel* by the same channel which I had used to write to him.

It will appear to you, My Lord, as strange as to me that this letter, (273v°) of which I attach herewith a copy, does not make any mention of St. Lubin. It does not say a word of it. It is only in the letter of one by name Madhavrac Sadashiv, one of the persons in the confidence of the Maratha Chief, that I get news casually of his arrival at the Court of Poona with the letters from the King and the Minister. This reticence about a man who appears in such a public capacity surprises me and causes me anxiety. It contrasts in the most striking manner with what M. St. Lubin has written to me about the importance of the treaty which, as he says, he has concluded with the Marathas and of which the Chief should have quite naturally spoken to me. Another obvious contradiction is that this letter has been sent to me by men who, according to M. St. Lubin, are not trusted at the Court of Poona, the same, however, who served us in the negotiations which were initiated (274) by M. Law and of which M. Beylié has given you an account. I admit to you, my Lord, I am overwhelmed with doubts which I cannot throw off. There is every reason to believe that I am imposed upon either by this letter or by that of M. St. Lubin; I cannot say by which of the two. Granting that that of the Marathas was a forged letter, it is not worded as it ought to be, if it were dictated by the English. They would not have failed to speak of M. St. Lubin therein to contrive to leave me in the lurch about the reply which I would have had to give it. It is not less unusual admitting it to be genuine. It is indeed an enigma which can be solved only on the arrival of the envoys who are announced to me. You can imagine, my Lord, that after such a conjunction of unusualness, (274v°) I shall be very reserved with them until I am assured about the genuineness of their mission, for at the present moment I am at a loss what to think of it.*

I am most respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

BELLECOMBE

---

*The letter from Madhavrao Sadashiv is missing.

**$C^2$-158**
**(03)**

(*Enclosed with letter No. 31*)

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MESSRS. PICOT AND DE BELLECOMBE, RELATING TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

*M. Picot's letter to M. de Bellecombe*

Mahé, 14th February 1977
No. 8

The private ship *Le Sartine,* which left Bordeaux on 19th September last year, arrived here on the 12th instant and landed M. de St. Lubin, entrusted with a mission on behalf of the (French) Court to Hindustan, about which I have no other intimation than the Minister's letter dated 22nd April of the last year. I attach herewith a copy of it. M. de St. Lubin has not yet disclosed to me his plans. All that I can guess is that he will proceed as far as Surat where *le Sartine* will carry him. He tells me that he intends to write to you, but simply a letter intimating his arrival.

M. Couronat, Captain of this ship, delivered to me five letters from the Minister addressed to Messrs. Law and de Courcy. I am dispatching them to you along with this letter.

M. de Sartine's letter to me will reveal to you the Ministry's intentions about the annual salary of Rs. 12,000 (Arocot rupees), granted to M. de St. Lubin, which will no doubt be drawn on our meagre funds. However, it appears that M. de Sartine is taking steps to supply the deficiencies. He has sent me a Bill of Exchange, dated 25th May, thirty days after sight on Bombay for Rs. 6,250 (Arocot rupees). It is not, as you will see, (03v°) Sir, cash. I shall pay here only two to three thousand rupees to M. de St. Lubin and shall send the bill to Bombay so that the amount is forwarded to Surat where M. de St. Lubin will receive it. I am entrusting this mission to M. Bertrand, writer on the King's frigate *La Consolante.* This way M. de St. Lubin will receive money in advance to start his work. But I am afraid lest he may unexpectedly burden me with Bills of Exchange at a time when our treasury will not be in a position to honour them.

I request you, Sir, to give me your orders on this subject, of which, so far as the accounts are concerned, I advise M. Chevreau.

The Captain of *Le Sartine*, on his arrival, committed a breach of the discipline of the harbour. M. le Chevalier de la Motte Vauvert is reporting the incident to the Minister.

I am very respectfully, etc.
(Signed) PICOT

## M. Picot's letter to M. de Bellecombe

21st February, 1777
No. 10

I had the honour to send you the copy of the Minister's letter regarding the mission of M. de St. Lubin. Since I informed you about his arrival here, he has not confided to me anything about his plans. But his talks, those of the officers of the ship, certain secret proceedings and a conduct quite contrary to the interests of a merchant ship seem to suggest that there is a question of some operation of consequence of which my duty does not permit me (04) to remain silent.

The ship *le Sartine* is a real gem, and it is considered as the finest ship that any nation has ever brought to India. It is decorated from the outside as well as from the inside; its rooms are spacious; its woodwork is superb: its panels, mirrors, paintings and statues are gilded. In short, it is comparable to a pleasure yacht. Certain decorations represent a crescent enclosing a fleur-de-lis. The rig of the ship is elegant and its lightness and cleanliness is admirable. Artillery is new and of the latest model, well mounted and set as in the best equipped frigates.

This ship, which is known to be loaded to capacity, has neither sold nor even tried to sell anything here. It has left, it is said, for Surat, but declaring that it would not touch any port. It is said to be destined for China, but did not want to secure goods required for this voyage. Some said that there were a hundred guns in the hold, others added a number of muskets. Persons, who made favourable offers, were replied that the cargo was either sold or could not be sold.

The Captain did not conceal the fact that he was under the command of M. de St. Lubin. He was not aware of it when he left Europe, but the Minister's orders were notified to him by the latter in the tropics. M. de St. Lubin definitely commands and the Captain will carry him wherever he orders him. It was given out that M. de St. Lubin held a very high rank in the military order, and (4v°) decorations, and all the officers believe that they are sure to enter the navy on their return. When the ship committed a breach of the harbour discipline and when M. de la Motte said that he had reported the matter to the Minister, M. de St. Lubin undertook to answer for it personally and reassured the Captain on this subject. Uniforms—blue dress, red facings, golden buttons stamped with a fleur-de-lis enclosed in a crescent—were secretly prepared here.

The ship is very deficient in crew. When attention was drawn to the danger from the Maratha attacks, the reply given was thet M. de. St. Lubin was aboard. The talks and the indiscreet remarks have been

very public. There has been far too much talk, if there is no secret operation involved, but a thousand times too much, if it is really a question of some important plans. All our neighbours have been witnesses and are certainly going to keep a watch.

I mention here a circumstance of some significance. When the Nawab, about whom I speak in my letter No. 11, went on board, a blue flag cut in the Muslim fashion and bearing a white crescent was hoisted. This flag was just in proportion to the mast and was not at all made expressly for this unexpected occasion.

I could mention, Sir, a number of circumstances which give me food for thought. Not being let into the secret, I am afraid I may be wrong in my conclusions, but I cannot dispense with communicating them to you.

It is certain that if these armaments have an objective as is surmised, they are not (05) at all meant for Haider Ali Khan, in whose presence M. de St. Lubin has a thousand reasons never to appear again. If the destination is simply Persia, where M. de St. Lubin has previously played a role, it cannot interest us here so much. If it concerns the execution of the plan of M. Chevalier, which event can interest us a little more closely, we need not yet bother ourselves about it, and from some explanations about the location which I had with M. de St. Lubin, I am inclined to believe that that is really his mission. But if it concerns the Marathas with whom the person, whom we ought to treat with consideration, is in open rupture, we have every reason to feel worried here. And how could our present negotiations be brought to a happy end? However, Sir, this is actually the precious and the only occasion when this conqueror can declare himself in our favour. And I would not be surprised if the reports spread, even if they are without foundation, do us an irreparable damage. I request you, Sir, to give me your instructions on a subject of such consequence for this colony, and prescribe for me a line of conduct, especially in what concerns our warships, whose movements might be in conflict with the probable activities of M. de St. Lubin.

I am very respectfully, etc.

(Signed) Picot

*P. S.*—23rd February

I have communicated the contents of this letter to M. de Coutanceau to whom I have related everything that has been reported to me, and who himself had heard about the reports spread here. He is of the same opinion

as myself on the fatal consequences of this mission(5v°) if it concerns the Marathas. He intends to write to you and give you our reflexions on a circumstance which perhaps causes me worries unseasonably. However, nothing will stop us and we shall broach the subject as if there was no obstacle to be surmounted. I am increasingly convinced that this mission relates to the Bengal project. But then what is being done is too much or too little. It is to reveal our plans and invite our rivals to forestall us, or at least thwart us by negotiations in which they will have the advantage because of their proximity and their resources.

### M. de Bellecombe's reply to M. Picot

Pondicherry, 16th March 1777

No. 18

I cannot express to you, Sir, my surprise when I learnt about the arrival of M. de St. Lubin at Mahé by your letter No. 10. The loss of your previous letter puzzles me all the more, since I miss the copy of the letter which you received from the Minister on this subject and that which you had written to me on the arrival of the ship *Le Sartine*. I do not know if M. de St. Lubin had written to me. I would not have perhaps been better informed about the goal of his voyage, about which, it appears, you yourself are in the dark in spite of the Minister's letter, and the sojourn at Mahé of this shipper, negotiator or ambassador as you would like to call him. Your reflections, Sir, on these armaments and on M. St. Lubin are very justified. From certain reports which were spread (06) at Lorient at the time of my departure for this country, I communicated to the Minister all my thoughts about the man in question. They (the authorities in France) wanted to try his ability. His mission so far appears to me a mystery. I do not think it worthwhile wasting my energies in conjectures which would not lead to anything definite. Besides, whatever may be this mission, it ought not to cause you any anxiety, as well as to Haider Ali Khan. It is not possible that M. St. Lubin has been charged with anything that will conflict with the interests of this Nawab, supposing even that the armaments were meant for the Marathas. I am writing to M. de Coutanceau that he can reassure the Nawab about it and negotiate with him on the same plan which I had drawn for him in my instructions. I have no reason to make any changes in them, not even in those of the Captains of *La Consolante* and of *Le Brillant* because of the voyage of M. St. Lubin of which I am not supposed to take cognizance and which

I can but refuse to acknowledge, since his powers, if he has any, have not been communicated to me at all. I am sure our negotiations will not at all suffer from it.

You should have better written to Surat to find out what M. St. Lubin has been doing there, if it is true that he went there. The ship *le Brillant* is quite likely to meet him there; you must not have failed to instruct M. de Tronjoly to follow the operations of *Le Sartine* at Surat and seek information about its activities there before his arrival.

I availed myself of the ship *la Bretagne*, which set sail on the 13th instant, to send to the Minister (6v°) the copy of your letter No. 10 and of that of M. de Coutanceau along with my observations on their contents in the margin. You have also certainly written about it by the ship l'*Aigle* which was dispatched from Mahé for France on 21st February.

I should have liked to know when and from what port of France *le Sartine* left, whether it is a private ship or whether it belongs to the King. You did not say anything about it to me. Perhaps you must have spoken to me about it in your previous letters which did not reach me. Please do not forget to send me the duplicates of these letters.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) BELLECOMBE

EXTRACT OF M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 25th March 1777

No. 19

I have also communicated to him (to M. de Coutanceau) your observations on the subject of M. St. Lubin whose mission continues to puzzle me very much.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 20th April, 1777

No. 26

I received in duplicate the letter which you had the honour to write to me on the 16th of the last month, No. 18, relating to M. St. Lubin. The loss of my letter of 14th February along with the copy of the Minister's letter to me on this subject, must have thrown you into confusion which my letter of 21st of the same month could not have cleared up. I am sending you, (07) Sir, the duplicate of my last letter and of that of the Minister. That is all I am aware of.

The ship *le Sartine,* after declaring that it would go straight from here to Surat, nevertheless made a halt at Goa where it lost much time needlessly. M. de. St. Lubin did not go ashore, but his agents glorified him a good deal there on his ranks as well as on his powers. Suddenly, on an order from him everyone re-embarked and they set sail to the north. The Governor of Goa is very much puzzled by this mission as well as by that of M. de Coutanceau, and spoke about it to our men.

M. de Tronjoly tells me that he heard from this Governor that the ship *le Sartine* had laid anchor at Chaul and landed there a distinguished person, decorated with a ribbon of which the colour is not indicated and that he (the Governor of Goa) next assured him that he had definite news that M. de St. Lubin had arrived at Poona where a Portuguese messenger saw him and recognized him. In spite of the assertion of M. Da Camara, I doubt this circumstance all the more as the English are absolutely silent on this point. However, what is quite certain is that at the time of the departure of *le Brillant* from Surat, M. de St. Lubin had not yet arrived there and that our ship did not meet him while sailing down the coast again.

If M. de St. Lubin is really at the Court of the Marathas in the name of the nation, what is our situation here? What is going to become of all the negotiations of M. de Coutanceau? Haider Ali Khan is on the war-path with those whose friendship we seem to seek ostentatiously. I have to apprehend all sorts of dangers here. I ask from you, Sir, (7v°) instructions and orders. Until they reach me, I shall openly refuse to acknowledge M. de St. Lubin in the name of the (French) Government of India.

As soon as I received your letter of 16th March, I sent a messenger to M. de Contanceau on the 4th instant, forwarding to him the letter you had addressed him and communicating to him your observations to me. I have not yet received his replies.

M. Bertrand, writer on *la Consolante*, fulfilled at Bombay the mission I had entrusted to him for the payment and dispatch to Surat of the amount of the Bill of Exchange which the Minister had delivered to me. The negotiation produced Rs. 6021 which M. Anquetil reports to me he has received and is keeping at the disposal of M. de St. Lubin when he goes there.

I realise that the miscarriage of my letter must have led you to lose the thread of the affair of M. de St. Lubin, but I cannot imagine how M. Chevreau, when in a state of uncertainty, could have written, as he did, to M. Marin. This account's officer asked for approval for making the payment I demanded, and M. Chevreau replied to him that instead of authorizing him to make the payment, he was expressly forbidding him to do so. Now, Sir, when I am bearer of an order from the Minister which I notify in a proper original letter, has M. Chevreau the power to raise an objection to it? I solicit you to clarify this matter and give orders which would in future protect me from similar contradictions, which lead to nothing and harm the state service, especially in a small place like Mahé where one has to take the decision on the spot on the events that occur.

(08)

Before this decision of M. Chevreau, I had received from our treasury Rs. 2,000 which I have advanced to M. de St. Lubin. Without that, I would have still been, very unjustly, deprived of this sum. I think that that will be approximately the amount our treasury will have to disburse. These Rs. 2,000 plus Rs. 6,000, already dispatched to Surat, make two thirds of the annual salary. It appears that the Minister is taking steps to reimburse us for the sum, and perhaps I shall shortly receive another Bill of Exchange. In that case, I shall pay back to the treasury Rs. 2,000, but if this new Bill of Exchange is delayed and if M. de St. Lubin asked me for money, what must I then do, if I am refused claim on the Royal treasury? I ask you, Sir, as a favour to give your decision on such matters, for the present and for the future.

Herewith is attached, Sir, the copy of the letter I wrote to the Minister concerning M. de St. Lubin. As the object of his mission is not as yet confided to me, and as he has said nothing to me, I could only report his arrival and discuss the question of the funds which I had orders to pay him.

The duplicate of my letter No. 8, which is lost, answers, Sir, your questions on the ship *le Sartine* which belongs to the shippers from

Bordeaux, the port from which the ship left. All that I can add is that the more we make headway, the less we realise that it can be a commercial operation.

I am, etc.

(Signed) Picot

*P. S.*—This afternoon there arrived a Carmelite missionary, (8v°) who left Bombay a week ago and who assures me that we have a ship at Chaul and that it is public that we have been granted a site for a factory in the neighbourhood of this place. He added that we are forming an alliance with the Marathas and that for this purpose we are getting three ships, eight hundred soldiers and 60 guns. If this confirmation of the earlier news is true, all the mystery is solved. It remains to be seen what will be our position here.

Extract from M. Picot's letter to M. de Bellecombe

Mahé, 13th May 1777

No. 37

According to reports, M. de St. Lubin continues to be at the place where, as I pointed out to you, he had arrived. I have not received any letter from him.

I am, etc.

(Signed) Picot

(15v°)

Extract from M. de Bellecombe's letter to M. Picot

Pondicherry, 22nd May 1777

No. 26

As for what concerns M. St. Lubin, I have no other orders to give you, Sir, than to exactly follow those of the Minister, contained in his letter of which you have sent me a copy. If M. St. Lubin wants to draw a Bill of Exchange on Mahé for the sum due to him as salary and if M. Marin raises any difficulty in making the payment, you should give him an order in writing as a command which he would be obliged to execute. I have given to M. Chevreau a copy of the two letters from the Minister. He

told me that he was writing to M. Marin to comply with the instructions (contained in the Minister's letters) for the payment of the annual salary granted to M. St. Lubin.

I have the honour to be, etc.

True copy: (Signed) BELLECOMBE

Picot.

(8v°)

EXTRACT FROM M. DE BELLECOMBE'S LETTER TO M. PICOT

Pondicherry, 22nd May 1777

No. 29

I had learnt from my secret correspondent that M. St. Lubin had landed in a Maratha port and proceeded to Poona with two officers and two caffres.[23] His mission is still a mystery to me. I can, therefore, prescribe to you nothing on the protests which Haider Ali Khan may make to you on this subject. The Minister's letter announces M. de St. Lubin only as a sight-seer (09) whom he has permitted to travel in Hindustan. You can assure the Nawab that you are not aware that he has any powers to negotiate, and that, moreover, the Court of France will never form any projects which will be in conflict with his interests so long as he remains our friend and gives us proofs of it.

While replying to your letter No. 8, I have pointed out to you that you could give to M. Marin an instruction in the form of a command for the expenses, in connection with the mission of M. de St. Lubin, not exceeding the sum which the Minister has ordered you to pay him annually from the funds at the disposal of your administration. It is thus that you ought to conduct yourself whenever there will be a question of executing the orders of the King or of his minister, and M. Marin cannot refuse to comply with them barring physical impossibility. I do not presume that you would give them without being quite sure that there is no insuperable obstacle in their execution.

Up to the present moment, it is not possible to make any definite conjecture on the voyage of M. St. Lubin. It is certain that he is at Poona, but what he is doing there, I do not know. He will be watched by our rivals who will not spare anything to thwart him in his projects, if ever they perceive that these are likely to get a good response. If they find that there is nothing serious, they will leave him alone and enjoy the pleasure of holding us up to ridicule.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) BELLECOMBE

(9v°)

EXTRACT OF M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 22nd June 1777

No. 44

I shall punctually follow your orders relating to M. St. Lubin. None from our neighbourhood either speaks or appears to bother about him or about what he does. I have neither received any news from him, nor any definite information about what he is doing or planning to do. I have received on this subject only one letter from M. Anquetil written towards the end of April, of which I am sending you the extract.

I am, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

EXTRACT OF M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 29th July 1777

No. 48

I have received no news about M. St. Lubin, nor have I received any letters from the North.

I am very respectfully, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 10th September 1777

No. 66

By the last ship which came from Bombay, we received, only very indirectly, news about M. de St. Lubin. The English say that the ship is still at Chaul where M. de St. Lubin returned and from where he left, according to reports, overland for Pondicherry. If that is so, you will now have exact information.

The English also tell us that a boat (10) from the ship came to Bombay with the Captain, but that it was refused admission and forced to return without allowing any one to land.

I am very respectfully, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 19th September 1777
No. 68

I received by the last patmar a letter from the Minister, dated 1st March, forwarding to me a Bill of Exchange for Rs. 12,000 on Bombay. I have charged a merchant of this town to arrange for its payment. Half of the amount will be sent to Surat, and the other half here, in consideration of which I shall always be in a position to satisfy the demands which will be made to me for it. I have dispatched to M. Anquetil an advice note for this person.

He is reported to have returned to the port without concluding anything. He was questioned on his powers, but he could not furnish them: not even a single letter, it is said, from the Minister. The parties interested in finding out the secret have duly watched and confirm that nothing could be done. A number of persons from the crew of the ship have deserted. The flag hoisted does not signify possession. It is a simple mark placed on a hut, where the landing was made on arrival. This is, Sir, what I could learn.

Herewith is attached a copy of the Minister's letter, and (10v°) of my reply with a flying seal. I am sure that you will kindly read the same before dispatching it, for I assure you that I have no one to help me in my correspondence which overwhelms me. I can so little cope with it that I do not know as yet when I shall be in a position to send you the accounts of our administrative expenses.

I am, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

EXTRACT OF M. DE BELLECOMBE'S LETTER TO M. PICOT

Pondicherry, 29th October 1777
No. 46

I indirectly learnt that the ship of M. St. Lubin had left Chaul for China in August. M. St. Lubin has not left Poona.

I have not at all heard of the incident of the boat. It would appear to me quite probable.

I am very happy, Sir, that the Minister has forwarded to you the money to pay the salary of M. St. Lubin. I received a letter from him, written in August from Poona, by which he informs me that he has

concluded a treaty of alliance and trade with the Maratha Power, but he does not write to me anything about the reciprocal conditions of this treaty. His letter reached me through one M. LeRoy whom M. Anquetil dispatched to Chaul and then to Poona. I have embarked him on the ship *le Curieux* which will land him on the way at Chaul from where he will probably return to M. St. Lubin.

I have lately dispatched by the ship *l'Archangel* your reply to the Minister on the subject of the Bill of Exchange which he has sent you.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) BELLECOMBE

(11)

EXTRACT OF M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 25th November 1777
No. 70

Some time back I received several letters which seem to throw light on the operation of the ship *le Sartine*. I am forwarding you copies or extracts of the same.

One is from M. Ladebat, the shipper. He has written to me in a very straightforward manner. It was about the usual voyage to China from this Coast, but instead of selling the goods at Bombay and Surat, Chaul was no doubt preferred because of the insistence of M. de St. Lubin. It was considered more advantageous to sell directly to the Marathas than to pass the goods through the hands of the English. Moreover, it was expected that the ship could return here sufficiently early. The results have not answered the expectations. The sale has been poor, the ship delayed, and these armaments are in a very bad way. The Captain stayed at Chaul and borrowed money from the Marathas at such an exhorbitant rate of interest that the ship could as well remain with them on its return from China. This untoward event has sown discontent among the Frenchmen. Those who belonged to the ship have left M. de St. Lubin, another took refuge at Bombay. I forward to you, Sir, a copy of a letter from Couronat to our broker at Goa, of another from the same Captain to that of the ship *l' Aimable Victoire,* of different letters written to me by our brokers at Goa and of two received from Bombay, of which the last is worded in such a manner that it is impossible to make any sense out of it. That is all I could know concerning the ship *le Sartine*. I give you the detail, because it (11v°) helps to know that the ship is

private and does not belong to the King and that the beauty of the decorations, etc., which had given rise to conjectures, is perhaps only a flight of fancy.

From a letter from M. de St. Lubin himself to our brokers at Goa, of which I also attach herewith a copy, you will see, Sir, that M. St. Lubin announces his success at Chaul by inviting all our merchant ships to go there with full confidence. In one of those written to me by the brokers of Goa, you will see, Sir, that one of these brokers is being asked to fulfil the same functions at Poona. But all these fine appearances do not at all fit in with the sentence which I have underlined in the letter of M. Couronat, dated 19th September.

I am also forwarding you, Sir, copies of three letters of M. Anquetil. In the first two, he appeared to have little confidence in the operations of M. de St. Lubin, but in the third, he changes his opinion and declares himself his supporter to such a point that he thought it fit to associate him with M. Bolts so as to work in concert at Poona and even for the establishment of the factory at Gogha. I could not help pointing out to M. Anquetil that I considered his step hasty and that I apprehended danger from the co-operation between these two negotiators of opposite interests. But as he has certainly written to you, Sir, about it, and as he has charged me to forward you a copy of his letter written to me, which I am doing today, it will be for you to give approval or not to M. Anquetil's plan.

As for the result of the operations of M. de St. Lubin so far at the Court of the Marathas, the English seem to bother very little about it. They refer to it with unconcern, (12) and they even affect to hold everything up to ridicule. I cannot tell you anything definite. M. de St. Lubin does not write to me at all, although I have addressed him a number of letters in connection with the money which I am instructed to send him. It is, therefore, only on the latter point that I can submit to you a full account.

M. de St. Lubin received from Surat Rs. 6,021, proceeds of the first Bill of Exchange. I have not yet been able to obtain an acknowledgment for my records. His expenses are, it appears, excessive, for hardly had he reached his destination than he already drew upon me Rs. 4,000 which M. Anquetil did well not to pay. I had informed you, Sir, of the second Bill of Exchange for Rs. 12,000 which the Minister had sent me. It was protested at Bombay and I ran the risk of throwing the Royal treasury at Mahé in the greatest difficulty, if from England this protest had not

been anticipated and if provision had not been made for it by designating another person to compensate for the non-payment. I shall, therefore, shortly receive this money, half here and half at Surat. This latter amount will be entirely paid to M. de St. Lubin, which will make for him more than 14 months' salary. And from the amount which will be sent to me, I shall pay back to the King's treasury Rs. 2,000 which it had advanced last year, in consideration of which I shall have no more than Rs. 4,000 left with me to be paid to M. de St. Lubin. The unseemly silence of this envoy, the risks I am running in remitting his money, the correspondence and the worries it causes me, and especially the impossibility to obtain in time the receipts for my records, make me feel that there was here a person to receive (12v°) every month the amounts due to him. I have written to him in this connection, a step to which I hope you will kindly give your approval.

I am very respectfully, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

*P. S.*—I met M. Le Roy. His journey to Chaul will give you all the satisfaction you desire on the activities of M. de St. Lubin. I have not yet learnt anything definite. There is much talk about a treaty, but it does not appear that its conclusion has created a sensation among our neighbours.

My letter which you were kind enough to send to the Minister and the one which I shall address him as soon as the payment of the second Bill of Exchange is obtained, will apprise him in advance about the risks incurred in these remittances and about the consequences resulting from it, if in these circumstances the King's treasury at Mahé were not indeed sufficiently furnished to suddenly provide for such a large sum. Herewith is attached the duplicate of my letter to the Minister on these remittances.

EXTRACT OF M. DE BELLECOMBE'S LETTER TO M. PICOT

Pondicherry, 14th January 1778
No. 50

From all that you write to me about the affairs of M. St. Lubin, I find that they are not taking too good a turn. This first attempt of M. Ladebat will not encourage the shippers. Perhaps the political endeavours will have better success than the commercial ones. I wish so for the sake of the general interest. I am still absolutely in the dark about the whole affair.

(Signed) BELLECOMBE

(13)

EXTRACT OF M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 31st December 1777
No. 82
(Dispatched on 14th January 1778)

I have just received dispatches form M. Anquetil of Surat, which contain a packet addressed to you. I am forwarding it to you along with this letter

I have also received through the same channel a letter from M. St. Lubin which is the only one that has reached me from him. I am inserting a copy of it herewith, although I am sure that you are apprised of everything that he has communicated to me, but to form a link with the reply which I thought I ought to give him concerning the naval forces of the nation with which he is negotiating to such advantage, as he says.

The Maratha fleet, pirate by profession, and often their allies, indulge in brigandage, always ruinous for private shipping-business. I, therefore, thought it fit to clarify this point essential for the prosperity of the French trade on this Coast. We have ships sailing here which are not at all provided with guns, and some day misfortune will doubtless befall the ships from the Isles which so thoughtlessly visit dangerous regions. Even our big ships, although in full force, are very much troubled in their operations. These considerations appeared to me very important, but if I discussed them with M. St. Lubin, it is only on the express condition, Sir, that he should refer the result of his negotiation to you, if he undertakes it. I am afraid M. de St. Lubin may propose to me Maratha passports or his own. As for the former, I do not know whether it would be quite honourable to accept them : it would be throwing a bad varnish on our position, especially as we have warships in India (13v°) to enforce respect for the King's flag. As for the second, I think that we ought to straight reject them. At least, Sir, that is my way of looking at things, until your orders prescribe for me a conduct which would lay down the law to me.

I am very respectfully, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

*P. S.*—14th January 1778. As this letter could not yet be dispatched for want of an occasion, I avail myself of this delay to insert therein a copy of the letter which I have just received from M. Couronat, Captain of the ship *le Sartine*. It contains details which may be exaggerated, but none the less we have reason to feel worried about the consequences of the isolated negotiation entrusted to M. de St. Lubin. When M. de Salvert returns, we shall have better information.

### Extract of M. Picot's letter to M. de Bellecombe at Cochin

Mahé, 20th February 1778
No. 89

M. de Salvert went into the Chaül harbour, laid anchor there and stayed only for a couple of days for want of time. He met the Captain of *Le Sartine* and an A. D. C. of M. St. Lubin. He obtained from them all the possible information and will give the detail of it on your arrival here. It is certain that a treaty has been concluded, but of which the main condition is that France will furnish 2,000 soldiers who will land at Chaul. The English Resident Mr. Mostyn, whom M. de Lubin boasted he had expelled straight off, has returned to Poona. He actively opposes our negotiator, whose credit and respect seem to have fallen considerably. M. de St. Lubin has addressed me a letter for you, which I dare not risk. He has also written to me, but in a tone which he should certainly not have (14) adopted, and which is not at all befitting. I think I am above such behaviour.

I am very respectfully, etc.

(Signed) Picot

### M. Picot's letter to M. de Bellecombe at Pondicherry

Mahé, 12th August 1778
No. 112

I did not have an occasion to talk to you about M. de St. Lubin since your departure from this place. None of his letters have reached me, but I knew indirectly and from our brokers at Goa that he continues to be at Poona. I do not know on what footing.

Charged by the Minister to forward to M. de St. Lubin money which I received on his account, I fulfilled my job assiduously. In March last I had left with me Rs. 3,954 which, as you know, I tried to send him by the King's ship *le Brillant*. This ship, as it missed the voyage, brought me back this sum, and I immediately wrote to several persons at Goa to furnish this amount to M. de St. Lubin and draw on me at sight for repayment. At the same time, I wrote to M. de St. Lubin that he should himself draw on me, if he found someone to accept his Bill of Exchange. These steps succeeded only partly and in the long run, but finally they enabled me to pay off entirely this sum.

As M. de St. Lubin wanted to dispatch M. Du Santy to France, he directed him to proceed to Mahé and consequently furnished him with a Bill of Exchange for Rs. 1,000 on me. But as the season was unsuitable,

M. Du Santy stayed in Goa, (14v°) and obtained the payment of Rs. 1,000 from our brokers at this place whom I had authorized for this purpose. The latter, moreover, remitted Rs. 2,450 to Poona. Thus, I have not more than Rs. 504 left to be paid to M. de St. Lubin, from which have to be deducted the discount for the negotiation, the loss on the exchange and all the expenses of the transaction. I am writing to the brokers at Goa to at once settle these points and remit without any delay to M. de St. Lubin the meagre balance due to him. In my turn, I paid back the brokers, and thus, this affair is finally closed.

Although I do not correspond at all with M. de St. Lubin except for money matters, I thought it my duty not to leave him in the dark about the reports, which are prevalent, i.e. of rupture between France and England. I apprise him of this fact by my letter of this date.

If M. Warnet, (deputy) commandant of the ship *le Sartine*, is at Pondicherry, he must have informed you about the affairs of Messrs. Couronat and Warnet, Captain and supercargo of this ship who are in the north of this coast. In your absence, M. Lagrené must have fulfilled this mission. If my patmars have reached you, you will see, Sir, that these gentlemen, the persons who accompany them and the position of their business are in the most critical and most unfortunate situation. It is not likely that war will improve their chances.

I am, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

(15)

EXTRACT OF M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE BELLECOMBE

Mahé, 30th September 1778
No. 119

You will see, Sir, that in the letter of the Governor of Goa, he attributes the failure of the conspiracy of the English in favour of Raghoba to the intrigues and the proceedings of M. de St. Lubin. The thing appears to be beyond doubt, since it seems that M. de St. Lubin himself acknowledges it briefly and especially while telling me: " Not only does M. de Sartine's work subsist, but has even acquired strength." This is taken from a letter which he wrote to me on the 1st of May in connection with M. Du Santy. Herewith is attached a copy of it. This M. du Santy is entrusted with a mission to France. He arrived here only lately and left for Cochin to

find out the means to proceed to the Coromandel Coast *via* the south of the Peninsula, and from there take a boat to carry his packets to the Minister. He did not talk to me anything in very particular, and yet the little he said to me was with much reserve. However, it appears certain that the negotiation in question met with a complete success. Since then, some changes have taken place, for I have received a letter from the brokers at Goa, of which I am forwarding you an extract to inform you about the retirement of M. de St. Lubin to Daman, but with all the honours. The English tell us that he has obtained a concession in the neighbourhood of Cape St. John in a territory inhabited by the Koli pirates, brigands by profession. We shall know exactly how the matter stands by the forthcoming letters from Surat. By my letter No. 112, (15v°) I informed you that I had absolutely settled with M. de. St. Lubin for the total remittance of all the money which had been sent to me on his account by the Minister. I do not think that henceforward he will draw on me. If he did, pressed by the interruption of communication, I have, as a precaution, instructed our brokers at Goa to honour a Bill in my name for a small sum of Rs. 1,000 or Rs. 2,000. The money I am daily advancing to the King's treasury at Mahé hardly permits me to make further disbursements extraneous to the colony.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Picot

**Enclosed with letter No. 31**

(50) Correspondence between Messrs. Picot and M. de St. Lubin

*M. Picot's letter to M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin at Chaul or Poona,*

17th September 1777

I have been, Sir, without any news from you, since your departure. Therefore, whatever news I could get was only through the channel, always unreliable, of the public and of the jealous. However, I must write to you, but not knowing your whereabouts, I address, at all hazards, my letter to M. de Briancourt at Surat in the hope that his proximity will procure him means and definite information which I do not possess. I shall, therefore, be discreet in these few words. I have received a letter from M. Ladebat for you and another for M. Couronat, as well as the reply to your letter written to Muscat, but I dare not send you anything. That will be done only when you will have obtained for me sure means.

The person whose bust stands on your small table and from whom you delivered me a letter, has once again written to me a letter dated the 1st of March. He has sent me the duplicate of the first one, but I do not know really speaking how I can satisfy you, even for the smallest sum. However, very anxious not to leave you in the lurch on this item, you will receive from M. Anquetil at Surat in three months' time half of the amount. Therefore, address yourself at this place if you are in a position to do so. I am keeping here the other half and in this manner you can choose what is more convenient for you to receive first, for I think I am obliged to inform you that (50v°) you cannot receive the whole amount, since you will be already furnished 2/3 rds of the salary by this second remittance. Kindly consent to this arrangement which it does not depend on me to transgress. Moreover, remember that there are certain minutiae of rules and practices which are to be observed and from which you can obtain a rebate in advance. At least for this reason, which ought to be of consequence to you, I shall certainly have the satisfaction of receiving some news from you. Besides, I am sure that you do not doubt that I am deeply interested in what concerns you.

For want of better information, I could only announce to this person your arrival here and the reports which were spread afterwards. Perhaps you found suitable means to give more information to him. You know that on this point I am always quite ready to offer my services. Today I am going to inform him about the arrangements I have made to choose the shortest and the surest means to dispose of what is mentioned in this letter of 1st March. It is to this item alone that I shall confine myself until you put me in a position to explain myself more positively. You know that I cannot speak to you more freely until you decide otherwise. There is nothing new that I can communicate to you. I, therefore, terminate by repeating to you my assurances of a sincere and constant attachment, with which I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN AT CHAUL OR POONA

6th October 1777

Herewith you will find, Sir, the triplicate of the letter (51) I wrote you on the 17th ultimo. The first two left via Surat and I am risking this third one via Goa so that it could be forwarded to you if you are still at the place where we heard you were. I shall be delighted if one of these letters reaches you sufficiently in time to enable you to take advantage

of what I am announcing to you to be at your disposal here or at Surat. I hasten to inform you lest lack of means might put you to inconvenience subsequently. I shall be very happy if finally one of my letters is delivered to you. Please do inform me about it. In addition to this satisfaction, I shall have that of getting news from you, for since your departure, we know absolutely nothing definite about your activities, and I cannot write anything certain to the person whom you know. I hope that you will willingly consent to enable me shortly to discharge my duty on this subject.

I wish you perfect health and no obstacles, and have the honour to be most sincerely, etc.

(Signed) Picot

### M. Picot's letter to M. de Chevalier de St. Lubin

15th October 1777

I have just received, Sir, news from our brokers at Goa about the success of your negotiation. I offer you my sincere congratulations on it, (51v°) and wish you continued good luck with all my heart.

From the information supplied to me by the brokers, I suppose that they have the facility to correspond with you freely. I, therefore, hasten to address them this letter so that they should promptly forward it to you. I also attach herewith a quadruplicate of my letter of 17th September and duplicate of that of the 6th instant, whereby you will come to know, as I hope, about what I wrote to you and about what I have received on your behalf. If finally, this step meets with success, I shall have by this channel the pleasure of getting news about you and be informed of everything that you would like to communicate to me. I expect that you will indicate to me the surest means to regulate our correspondence, and then I shall gladly undertake to do eveything that will be advantageous to your mission and capable of contributing to the fulfilment of your plans.

I am simply waiting for your advice to send you money accordingly. Because of your proximity to Surat, you will find in that place a resource and a shortcoming here. Act therefore as you please.

While waiting for the pleasure to have direct news from you, accept the protestations of sentiments with which I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Picot

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

1st November 1777

My only intention is, Sir, to send you today through our brokers at Goa, a complete set of duplicates of (52) all the letters I have written to you since the 17th September. I hope that some of them have already reached you. I, therefore, think that I shall soon have the privilege to hear from you. In that case, I shall act, according to your pleasure, on what has been addressed to me on your behalf, and I shall not spare any means to secure for you its prompt and sure delivery. All my steps so far have tended to it, and I shall very gladly continue them to your satisfaction till the complete success of your mission. It is with these sentiments and those of most sincere attachment that I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

7th December 1777

I find, Sir, a very favourable occasion to write to you and am delighted to avail of it. For some months I have addressed you a number of letters to which you have not yet replied. I have, however, reason to believe that some of them have been delivered to you. The silence you observe with respect to me, did not prevent me from taking the necessary steps to send you the money which had been addressed to me on your account. I recently received a sum of Rs. 12,000 from Bombay. You will find half the amount at your disposal with M. Anquetil, our Counsul at Surat. The other half will shortly be received here, and I shall send it to you when the next instalment of your salary becomes due. You have already received salary for 14 months and I am not authorized to pay you in advance. From the money which M. Anquetil has received for being remitted to you, he will deduct 4d. per £ as charges, etc. and I request you to furnish him receipts for the whole amount, (52v°) notwithstanding the deduction, and to mention the kind of currency used in the payment.

I have to point out to you that the channel adopted to remit me money destined for you is not at all a sure one and that it may very well happen that nothing might reach you. In this case, the King's Treasury here,

which is always depleted, may not be in a position to make up for the amount. Therefore, make your arrangements in advance and be prepared sometimes not to receive the money due to you. The last Bill of Exchange on Bombay has been protested, and if another person had not remedied this unforeseen deficiency, it would have been impossible for me to send you any money. The same thing may be repeated without finding the same resource. Therefore, you can imagine the difficulty in which you and I may land. In order not to risk increasing mine, I request you not to draw on me other Bills of Exchange. I did not expect the Bill of Exchange for Rs. 4,000 which you delivered to M. Anquetil without any authority to thus draw on me. I am sure you will renounce such a proceeding which would affect your credit and mine. You are certainly aware of the consequences.

Besides, I have been thinking that there are very great risks in sending you money and that I cannot be held responsible for the losses or other eventualities which may result therefrom. Moreover, I have to wait for a long time for your receipts which may be lost on the way and thereby deprive my of papers necessary for my records. To obviate all this, would it not be more convenient that you should have here a proxy to whom I shall remit every month the money due to you, who would give me a receipt for it and who would then send you your (53) money at your risk and expense. This step would put everything in order.

I have recently received from the Clearing-House (of accounts due) of the (French East) India Company at Pondicherry a claim on you for Rs. 499·8 as. You will find, Sir, herewith attached a copy of this document, of which I am charged to recover from you the value. I attach a copy of the letter from the Members of the Clearing-House. I expect that, in order to avoid all prosecution, you will consent that this sum should be deducted from your salary. I am waiting for your reply on this point.

I have received letters from M. de Ladebat, the contents of which, it appears to me, do not fit in with the operations done by his ship. He has addressed me two letters, which are attached herewith, for you and others for M. Couronat to whom I have forwarded them. You will also receive the letter that has come from Muscat, about which as well as about others I wrote to you in my letter of 17th September.

The channel by which M. Le-Roy, bearer of this letter, proceeds to Chaul, is convenient for you to send me your reply immediately. I am, therefore, sure that I shall have the pleasure to receive news from you and replies to all my letters.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. DE ST. LUBIN'S LETTER TO M. PICOT FROM POONA, DATED 7TH NOVEMBER 1777 AND RECEIVED AT MAHE ON 26TH DECEMBER

For, in this Capital of the Maratha Empire, Sir, that I reside in the capacity of the Envoy of France, the King's Agent at this Court. I had informed you about it, three months (53v°) ago, by my letter which I addressed to M. Anquetil with instructions to forward it to you. I entered therein into all the details which I could give and I refer you to them. I did the same thing with respect to M. de Bellecombe by addressing to him my dispatches for the Court. You can imagine my surprise when, on opening your letter, I read that you did not know my whereabouts. In almost daily correspondence with Anquetil since the month of April, could I presume that you were not informed about it? Besides, the party-wall between Telicherry and Mahé is not so impenetrable that the rage of the English should not have pierced it. That is what I believe I understood by these words form *your* first sentence: *the channel always unreliable of the jealous.* If it is in this nation that there are persons jealous of me, I consider myself infinitely honoured by it. If it is in my nation, they do not affect me. Both can rest assured that I shall not spare anything to perpetuate this sentiment in them. Consequently, Sir, you can, while waiting for the better, tell them if, however, there is anyone in India who does not know it that a Treaty of Alliance and Commerce between the French and the Maratha nation is solemnly sworn for the last seven (five ?) months; that all our possessions are under the guarantee of our new allies whose ports are open to our trade; that there is no more question here of Raghoba, and that the English Ambassador

M. Mostyn has been dismissed two months back. This is the text which I have the pleasure throw at all the commentaries that might be made in whatever language.

I have sent two dispatches to the Minister, one by land through M. Anquetil, the other (54) by sea through M. de Bellecombe. I shall be very much obliged to hear from you if you have any ships ready to be soon dispatched to Europe. Please address your packets for me to Anquetil, as also the balance from the funds which the Minister has destined for me and the letters of M. La Fond. [24] His ship is in China, about to return here to pick up. M. Cournat who remained behind to handle the old cargo, the new one which he expects from China as well as that which he is negotiating here for the return trip to China and from there to Europe.

This is, Sir, all the news from this quarter. If I can be of any service to you here, do not hesitate and you will see how truly I am, etc.

(Signed) Le Chevalier de St. Lubin

M. Picot's reply to M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin at Poona

27th December 1777

I had at last the pleasure to hear from you, Sir. The letter you wrote me on the 7th ultimo, reached me yesterday, and I hasten to reply to it *via* Surat. I attach herewith the duplicate of my previous one of the 7th instant with a copy of the account from the Clearing-House of the (French East) India Company which accompanied it.

Accept my sincere congratulations on the happy outcome of your negotiation. I view with pleasure the precious result of your labours and ardently wish you success in everything for the glory of the Nation. I do not doubt that your Treaty is well cemented, but I cannot help speaking to you about one item which, in my opinion, is delicate. It relates to the fleet of this Nation. Its sole function is to practise piracy, (54v°) and often the conduct of its commandants is entirely contrary to the agreements made by their Government. We have had examples of it, especially in the case of the Portuguese who several times concluded Treaties of Alliance which the commandants of the fleet did not scruple to infringe, whenever it suited them. When complaints were lodged, these commandants were indeed disowned, and an attempt was made not to acknowledge those who were offenders; nay it was even alleged that the ships from Macao were not Portuguese. Recourse had, therefore, to be had to negotiation, but in the meantime, the complainants

always suffered considerable losses. The English knew so well the capabilities of this fleet that, although peace had been recently concluded by their Council of Bengal, they had their merchant ships sail only in a fleet and observed precautions as if they were in the thick of war. I have myself been a witness of it two years ago, when I was coming from Bombay to this place on a ship of the English Company. You know, Sir, we have small ships which sail along this Coast and which are not at all in a state of resistance. Their operations are impeded and even absolutely interrupted by the fear of risks. It would be essential to reassure them; this step would permit them to follow their operations to the advantage of their trade, and I urgently solicit you to enable me to procure for them the tranquility they need, or rid them of their over-confidence. I am sure you will willingly comply with my request. But at the same time you are aware that matters of such importance could be intimated to me only through the channel of the General under whose command I am. From you to me it would only be a matter of good-will which I am and shall always be ready to (55) accept.

You have already had evidence of it by my zeal to send you punctually the money which is sent to me from France on your account. If the last Bill of Exchange wes protested, it is an event with which I had absolutely nothing to do. There results from it only a slight delay, since, after all, it ought to be punctually paid, but if this unexpected resource had not come forth, where did we stand ? The King's Treasury at Mahé was not in a position to make up for this deficiency, and you ran the risk of remaining without money, I being unable to remedy the situation. It would be desirable that the Minister preferred a surer channel for his remittances. As for the employment of the money, it is certainly at your disposal, but I request you to take into consideration my last letter on this subject wherin I pointed out that although I have already made you two large remittances, I do not yet possess a single paper which would constitute for me a formal receipt. This irregularity in the accounts cannot always subsist, and I am sure you will kindly make arrangements to make my position safe. I am soon expecting a letter from you on this subject.

We had since the opening of the monsoon several small boats which returned to the Isles, and there may be others leaving from this place in May, but I can only indicate them to you as very uncertain channels for the dispatch of your letters. I think that M. de La Rochette, whom we expect in February, will dispatch a ship to France or at least to the Isles. If you send me your packets, I shall undertake to forward them.

I sent you and to M. Couronat all the letters which I had received for you. It is with pleasure that I announce to you (following the sense of your sentence) that as for my underlined expression, *you can consider yourself infinitely honoured by them,* and that the jealous do not give you reason to feel affected.

I have no news to impart to you. It appears that there will be no rupture in Europe, at least as impending as it seemed at first.

Indicate to me without hesitation how I can be of any service to you, and I shall prove to you the sentiments which I profess for you.

I have the honour to be very truly, etc.

(Signed) Picot

(58)

M. Picot's letter to M. de St. Lubin

Mahé, 12th January 1778

I had the honour to write to you, Sir, (58v⁰) in the beginning of the last month. M. LeRoy was bearer of my letter, and its duplicate must have reached you *via* Surat along with the letter which I addressed you on the 27th of the same month. The duplicate was sent to you *via* Goa. Therefore, I hope that all of them must have been delivered to you and that I shall shortly have the pleasure to receive your replies on the contents of these letters.

At last, I have received advice from Bombay that the Bill of Exchange has been paid and that half of it has been sent to Surat. I am really delighted at it, since by this means M. Anquetil and yourself are relieved of all embarrassment caused to you by this unexpected delay. Although I am sure that you received, at least at the same time as me, this news, I feel pleasure in immediately writing to you about it. Please do not forget the receipts which I ask from you for these payments.

I wish you a continuation of health and success and have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Picot

(55v°)

M. de St. Lubin's letter to M. Picot

Poona, 25th January 1778

I received in due time, Sir, your letters of 17th September, 6th and 15th October *via* Surat and Goa, and M. LeRoy delivered to me that of the 7th December. All of them are full of reproaches over my silence, but

I do not deserve any, since I had written two letters, one accompanying the Bill of Exchange for Rs. 4,000 and the other, dated 7th September. Both were addressed to M. Anquetil who returned to me the first with the Bill of Exchange, apparently thinking that it was only an advice note. It was, however, quite a different thing. The second ought to have reached you.

About this Bill of Exchange, I think I ought to draw your attention to your paragraph: " I request you not to draw upon me other Bills of Exchange. I did not expect the bill for Rs. 4,000 which you delivered to M. Anquetil without any authority to draw on me. I am sure you will renounce these proceedings which would affect your credit and mine. You (56) are certainly aware of its consequences ".

Without entering into any discussion about how unkind is such a style for a man who, far from ever giving you the slightest provocation, was always cordially inclined to do anything that could oblige you, I simply think that this very man, having delivered to you an order from the Minister *to furnish him Rs. 12,000 per year which you will include in the expenses of your establishment*, could and even ought to draw on you a Bill of Exchange for Rs. 4,000 when he had as yet received only Rs. 8,000. If it is a mistake, the Minister will certainly find it unpardonable. As for me, I shall always think that I was authorized to take these steps to which you may respond, Sir, as you like, *except the consequences* on my part and *the principle* on yours.

Please accept my regrets for the embarrassment caused to you by the commission to forward to me funds which the Minister sends you on my account. I frankly admit to you my mistake in this respect. When M. de Sartine asked me through which channel I wished to receive my money, I named M. Picot and supported my choice with reasons which I cannot repeat to men to their face. I was very far from supposing that this commission could be a burden to you, and I am very chagrined for having caused you so much inconvenience. But since the mistake is committed, until it can be remedied, kindly, Sir, accept the proposal to send my funds to M. Anquetil who will be pleased to forward them to me here. This step will put everything in order better than the one which you propose to me to *have at Mahé*, where I know no one, *a proxy to whom you will deliver every month the money due to me and who then will forward to me my money at my risk and expense.*

(*Pages 56v° and 57 are missing*)

(57v°)

as this wretched fellow could have furnished it only at the expense of the (shipping) business, I intervened, pleading that such a crime, according to our laws, not being expiable by a fine, the guilty person should be referred to the King's justice. A Portuguese priest was beaten unmercifully with sticks in his bed, in his own house, by M. Couronat, assisted by M. Madjet, English by nationality, [25] the same person whom you sent back to be confined on board the ship *le Sartine* for violent acts committed by him on landing at Mahé. By this means I saved the affront to the shipper on a promise of punishment of Captain Couronat on his return to France. His accomplice Madjet fled to the English.

M. de Bellecombe informs me that he did not receive the letter which I wrote to him on my arrival at Mahé and which you had the kindness to insert in the packet which you dispatched by a patamar along with the packets for the Court. This patamar must have been lost. I think I remember that you sent him in a boat *via* the Cape of Comorin. Please do me the favour to inform me what the position is and to forward to M. de Bellecombe the letter enclosed herewith.

M. de Salvert, after setting ashore M. LeRoy at Chaul, continued his journey to Bombay and from there, it is reported, to Daman, promising to call at Chaul again and come to Poona. I am impatiently waiting for him and I have sent persons to meet him. He will find all the carriages necessary for him and his party. The Government has given orders for the reception of the King's ships and for their defence in case of attack, for they are here in a continuous expectation of a surprise attack on Chaul or Bassein. A treachery meditated in the latter place has just been discovered and punished. This situation has enjoined on the Government the precaution to allow French ships to enter Maratha ports (58) (our ships being the only ones admitted) only when they are acknowledged by me. Therefore, Sir, I request you to warn those, who would like to pay a visit here, to anchor at Kolaba in the Chaul harbour and to write to me if they want to enter the river. Ragoji Angria (Rabhuji Angre), lord of Kolaba and Annindrao (Anandrao), Subhedar of Chaul will furnish them all that they will need while waiting for orders from the Court.

I shall terminate this letter, which is in reply to all yours, Sir, by honestly soliciting you for your friendship. From our old correspondence I thought I would find with you opportunities to win this sentiment from you. I shall very sincerely say this about myself that I have never done anything

which can turn you away from it. I could even prove that I have eagerly seized all the occasions to deserve well of you. From this you can imagine how much I must have been affected by the mood which appears to have dictated your last letter. If it has been actuated by some calumnious report, which will not surprise me, please take the trouble to speak to me frankly about it and be assured that you will receive full satisfaction. If the hatred of M. Law for me, for which I indeed challenge him to give an explanation, has influenced your dispositions, say it to me very frankly, and I shall take it once for all, regretting only that a man, to whom I have never done a wrong, could have created prejudice about me in another man with whom I never wish to behave in an unfriendly way, for, whatever may be your reply to my question, I shall never cease to be perfectly, etc.

(Signed) LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

(58v°)

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE ST. LUBIN, MAHE, 9TH MARCH 1778

I received, Sir, your letter of 25th January. Always ready to fulfil all the parts of my duty and come up to the confidence of the Minister, I neglect nothing in the execution of all my duties. Up to now I have made you remittances according to the amount that has been sent to me on your behalf and in the same currency in which they reached me. Today I have left with me in the cash-box which is destined for you (59) Rs. 3,954 from Bombay, which I am sending you. I address them for this purpose by the King's ship *le Brillant* to the French brokers at Goa, from where they will find an easy and sure means to forward them to you. Thus, you will be in possession of all the money that is due to you. Please note, Sir, that I have sent you money in a currency superior to that of Arcot, and that consequently, you have received something more than what I ought to give you. Please also note that I have deducted nothing, neither pennies (4*d* in the £) nor fees, etc., and that thus, if you are subject to these formalities, you remain indebted to the King for these items.

I once again request you to note that in spite of my repeated request, I could not obtain from you receipts which are necessary for me to account for the money I have remitted to you. I am sure you will be kind enough to send me these papers.

If the Minister sends me other funds for you, I shall be punctual in forwarding them to you, but in order that you should know exactly how you stand, I inform you that if his remittances are delayed, you will be for a long time without any money, for it will be absolutely impossible for the King's Treasury at Mahé to furnish anything. There is not a single penny. Therefore, do not lay the blame at any one's door, if you are short of money. As for the Bills of Exchange, I must indeed suspend the payment of those which you will draw on me. M. de Bellecombe, who is actually here, knows what I am writing to you.

I am sure you will be kind enough to reply to my last letter of 27th December relating to the Maratha fleet. On this item and on any other which concerns the King's service, I am ready to correspond with you freely, (59v°) but for the other matters which you discuss in your letter, I think it is advisable that neither you nor I should bother about them.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. DE ST. LUBIN'S LETTER TO M. PICOT

Poona, 7th December 1778

(Received on 23rd April 1778.)

This letter of introduction to you, Sir, has been at the instance of M. Bolts whose mere name is a powerful recommendation. Celebrated for his differences with the Company of England whose unjust administration, odious tyranny and ambitious projects he exposed to Europe, he combines the public esteem, which he has so justly earned, with the special protection of the Queen-Empress [26] whom he serves in the capacity of Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry, Captain of the ship and Commandant-General of her establishments, present as well as future, in Africa and in Asia. From all these points of view, M. Bolts needs only to present himself before you, Sir, to receive a gracious welcome which you know so well to accord to men of merit. And I am so much convinced of it that I yielded to his request only not to lose an occasion to repeat to you the assurances of sentiments with which I am, etc.

(Signed) LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

22nd April 1778

I had the honour, Sir, to inform you by my letter of the 9th ultimo that I was sending you through our brokers at Goa the sum of Rs. 3,954 which were left with me to be paid to you, but as the ship *le Brillant* on which I had placed them missed her voyage, this money came back here. Since then I took steps in vain to obtain a (60) Bill of Exchange on Goa for the said sum, as I did not wish to take risks in the small local boats. Today I am writing to our brokers of the same place to arrange to send you this sum of Rs. 3,954 (Bombay) and draw upon me at sight. I hope they will succeed therein and I shall hear the news with infinite pleasure.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

*P. S.*—of the 23rd.

I have the honour to send you the duplicate of my letter of yesterday by which I informed you that I have written to the brokers of Goa to send you the sum of Rs. 3,954. Therefore, on your side, you should also address yourself to them so that they forward you this sum as quickly as possible.

I have just now received your letter of 7th December through M. Bolts whom I shall certainly not have the pleasure to meet, since he is actually busy buying pepper at Mt. Delly from where he intends to sail straight to the Coromandel Coast. As M. Bolts enjoys full credit, I hope he will do good business.

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

16th May 1778

Since the last letter, Sir, which I had the honour to write to you on the 22nd and the 23rd ultimo, I have not received any letters from you here, even during the sojourn of M. de Bellecombe. Our brokers from Goa have not written to me about the remittance which I had charged them to make to you, and yet I know how urgent it is that you should have money in the present circumstances. Consequently, I am writing again today to these brokers, and besides, I am seeking the aid of M. Bolts and of the Armenian Camille, sincerely hoping that either of them might succeed (in remitting you money) in compliance with your wishes. On your side, Sir, draw on me Rs. 4,000, I shall pay them at sight.

I wish you, Sir, continued (60v°) success in your mission. We are given a different picture of your position, and as a good Frenchman and out of interest for what is personal to you, I would be delighted if you could confide to me information which can serve me as a guide to proceed with a steady pace in business. I have already made you similar requests in my earlier letters, but your silence certainly reproaches me for the indiscretion, a thing which I could never have foreseen.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

14th July 1778

I am, Sir, for a very long time without news from you. I have not received it either from our brokers at Goa, nor from those to whom I had addressed myself to remit to you the money due to you. I would be very happy to hear that this unexpected delay has in no way caused you inconvenience, all the less as I think that you will have followed my advice by drawing on me. I am quite ready to honour your Bills of Exchange, and I am anxiously waiting for them, if indeed all the persons whom I employed in this affair have not carried out my instructions.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

25th July 1778

I have heard, Sir, from our brokers at Goa about the Journey of M. du Santy to our part of the country and the payment they had made him of Rs. 1,000, value of a Bill of Exchange on me, of which he was the bearer. I am delighted at it, since it is at least a remittance made to you of one fourth of the sum I was for a long time trying to send you. You will hear about the reasons of the delay in the journey of M. du Santy, from whom I have not received any letter. I (61) am writing to him today. If he had come here he could have travelled on the King's frigate which called at this place in the beginning of this month.

Our brokers from Goa wrote to me on the 22nd of June that they were trying to send you a Bill of Exchange for Rs. 2,700. I ardently wish that they have succeeded therein, because I have the sincere desire to meet your needs. The duplicate, attached herewith, of my letters will prove it to you. There will be expenses and commission in the negotiation which our brokers proposed, items which will naturally be payable by you.

To this day, I have not received any letter which makes a mention to me about the money sent to you. However, rest assured that I shall not leave you without money.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

M. PICOT'S LETTER TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

12th August 1778.

My letter of the 25th ultimo must have informed you, Sir, about the plan of our brokers at Goa to remit Rs. 2,700. They have just written to me that they have executed it, but that the amount has been reduced to Rs. 2,450. It is, therefore, at least a little help while waiting for the better.

This sum of Rs. 2,450 with Rs. 1,000 paid to M. du Santy make together Rs. 3,450. Therefore, I have left with me not more than Rs. 504 to complete the remittance of Rs. 3,954, which I was charged to pay you as salary out of all the money which I received on your behalf.

This sum of Rs. 504 is in the hands of our brokers at Goa, but it ought to meet the discount for the negotiation, the comission and all the expenses incurred on this occasion. Consequently, I am writing to them to promptly settle all these items and send you the salary due to you without delay. On your side, I also request you, Sir, to (61v°) write to them. In that case, the matter is bound to be settled definitely, and I shall have the pleasure to have remitted to you all the money that the Minister had destined for you.

Since the 18th of June, I have not received any news from Pondicherry. I must not keep you in the dark about the public report that war between France and England was declared in March and that this event was known at Madras as early as the 22nd of June. You can place whatever reliance you like on it, Sir,I am not at all certain about the reliability of

this news, but at all hazards, I ought to inform you about it. Whether the news is false or true, you must have known it earlier than I from the north of the Coast.

Herewith find the duplicate of my letter of 25th July.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Picot

M. de St. Lubin's letter to M. Picot from Poona dated 1st May 1778 received at Mahe on 26th September

This letter will be delivered to you, Sir, by an officer whom I am dispatching to the Minister with important dispatches. His name is M. Du Santy, the same person whom you indeed wanted to lodge in your house along with me. I am quite confident about the good welcome you will be kind enough to extend to him once again, and I shall be responsible for the amount of Rs. 1,000 for which I furnish him on you a Bill of Exchange. I request you to honour it. If you have a ship ready to leave for Europe or for the Isles, kindly help him to get a passage in it, otherwise send him to Pondicherry by sea or land so that he finds there a means to fulfil his mission. Can he not find for this purpose at Cochin a ship leaving for the Cape of Good Hope? Kindly give him your advice and your assistance. I shall be immensely obliged to you for it.

The revolution which the English had planned and prepared and almost executed at Poona to place Raghoba on the throne was not such a good success for them as their other operations of the same kind in India. I leave it to M. Du Santy to relate to you the various details of this venture which miscarried. I shall confine myself to inform you that not only does the work of M. de Sartine subsist, but it has even acquired more strength.

I am, etc.

(Signed) Le Chevalier de St. Lubin

(62)

M. de St. Lubin's letter to M. Picot from Daman

2nd November 1778

My complaints would indeed be useless and I spare you these complaints, Sir, and confine myself solely to tell you that, unable to negotiate here the Bills of Exchange from Camotin on Bombay for the sum of

Rs. 2,450, nor negotiate with any one for Rs. 4,000 which you had asked me to draw on you at sight, I availed myself of the offer made to me by M. Trublet to pay me Rs. 2,500 on my Bill of Exchange payable by you at sight for the said sum. I have delivered it to him by first or second (of exchange) which I am sure you will honour, all the more willingly as it is now more than a year that these funds have been in your hands. I cannot help observing a strange fatality in the failure of the means which, as you tell me, you employed to send them to me, whilst I had expressly indicated to you the simple channel, which had always proved successful, to send me this money through M. Anquetil. It would be a folly to waste my time and yours by expatiating more on this subject. I refer you only to the terms of the letter which I delivered to you on behalf of M. de Sartine and I have patience.

I am, etc.

(Signed) LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN.

(62v°)

M. PICOT'S REPLY TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

Mahe, 2nd December 1778

I received, Sir, through M. Trublet your letter of the 2nd ultimo. Your news gave me great pleasure, but I would have felt still greater pleasure if you could have confided to me the continuation of your success. The circumstance may contribute to your vexation, and I sincerely wish that you will continue to overcome all the obstacles.

I would ardently wish that your suppositions on my financial situation were such as you presume them. Unfortunately, that is not so, and since the middle of July, the King has not a single rupee in his Treasury at Mahé. I am struggling to make up for the deficiency, but everything has its limits, everything runs out and finally there comes a fatal moment when everything fails. This, is, Sir, my real situation. However extreme my (financial) distress may be, I know that you must not fall short of money. I would willingly share everything with you, but it is only with feeling and regret that I am constrained to declare to you that I absolutely cannot do anything more. The payment of the money which had been remitted to me by the Minister on your behalf and which amounted to Rs. 3,954, has been made to you, of course including expenses, by our brokers at Goa, according to the account they have sent me. I, therefore, owe you nothing more. However, according to you it is easy for me, and I ought, out of duty, to furnish you the salary which is granted to you. I shall agree, if you

so wish, that it ought to be so, but not having received (63) the salary for my own garrison, I am naturally exempt from all obligation. And yet, I do not hesitate to agree with your views. Consequently, I accept the Bill of Exchange for Rs. 2,500 which you have delivered to M. Trublet on me. I shall also pay to our brokers at Goa the sum of Rs. 1,080 if they have sent it to you. Thus, the King will owe me an additional sum of Rs. 3,580. This is, Sir, what I can actually allow. Please do not draw any more the smallest amount on me, for I am forced to declare to you formally that I shall not honour it. I am not expecting anything from Europe nor from elewhere. If I find resources, I shall devote them to Mahé, and the Minister will surely approve my conduct.

If, in spite of this express declaration, you wish to continue to write to me, I shall always receive your letters with pleasure. I shall only request you to pay attention to your style. It does not at all suit me. And it is not on this tone that we should discuss the King's affairs.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) Picot

M. de St. Lubin's letter to M. Picot,

Daman, 19th December 1778

The last letter I received from you, Sir, is dated 12th August, and I replied to it through M. Trublet on the 2nd November. This one is to inform you that besides Rs. 2,500 which M. Trublet delivered to me on a Bill of Exchange payable at sight dated 31st October, I received from M. Camotin a Bill of Exchage on Bombay for Rs. 2,450 and another for Rs. 180 on Daman. I lost on that on Bombay Rs. 25 as discount. That on Daman was paid at per. Thus, Sir, I have received on the King's account (63v°) since my arrival in India the sum of Rs. 20,105 namely,

| | Rs. |
|---|---|
| By 500 pagodas at Mahé .. .. .. | 2,000 |
| By a Bill on M. Anquetil .. .. .. | 6,000 |
| By another Bill on M. Anquetil .. .. | 6,000 |
| By a Bill of Exchange furnished on you to M. Trublet .. | 2,500 |
| By a Bill of Exchange from Camotin on Bombay .. | 2,425 |
| By a Bill of Exchange from Camotin on Daman .. | 180 |
| And by Rs. 1,000 furnished to M. du Santy for his dispatch to Europe. | 1,000 |
| | 20,105 |

This letter, Sir, I think will fulfil your requirements so far as I and your accounts are concerned. I am making it a point all the more urgent to furnish you this letter, as all the papers of M. de Briancourt having been seized, you are deprived of those which deal with the accounts between you, him and me.

It was on the 3rd November that M. de Briancourt was made prisoner of war at Surat along with seven other Frenchmen who were then with him. And at the same time the English declared public rejoicings at Bombay and at Surat for the capture of Pondicherry. These two acts of hostility have brought on them, 18 days later, a formal declaration of war on the part of the Marathas who are actually marching on Bombay. Thus, Sir, I hope to give these gentlemen (the English) enough occupation to prevent them from thinking of attacking you, as they were preparing for it since the last two months. I wish you were equally safe from those from Madras.

In actual fact, all that has come to pass so far (64) between these two powers boils down to this. The English, firmly believing that if our squadron arrives, the ports of Chaul and Bassein would be open to it, offered to the Siddy of (Danda—) Rajapuri to deliver Chaul to him if he would join hands with them to capture it. As the Siddy refused to do so, they turned to Visaji Pant,[27] Governor of Bassein, and declared to him that as Raghoba had ceded this place to them, they summoned him to hand it over to them. The latter replied that he held it in the name of (Sawai) Madhavrao and that he would defend it to the last drop of his blood. On his refusal, as the English lacked forces to besiege the place which has a garrison, 8000 strong, they attacked a few villages in his district and plundered them and ravaged the country-side. In eight days, the Marathas will have descended the Ghats and these pillagers will have nothing more urgent to do than to take refuge at Bombay and at Salsette which places the Marathas are going to attack. A body of 20,000 men is also marching to Surat to create a diversion which, according to the circumstances, could be converted from a false attack into a real one. This is the actual state of things in this part. If you would inform me of those that are taking place in yours, I shall be obliged to you. At least, please inform me if you are still determined no longer to send me money. But before replying to me, read again the letter which I delivered to you on behalf of M. de Sartine.

The English have had assassinated by the Arabs near Muscat one named M. de Beauregard who was bringing me *via* Aleppo packets from

the Minister. These papers are in their hands. All that I could know is that the two big fleets had a pitched battle in (64v°) the channel and that, that of the English having been withdrawn to Portsmouth, ours retired to Brest. There must have been many bones broken in this fight. It is a good sign for us that the English do not boast of this action.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

M. PICOT'S REPLY TO M. DE ST. LUBIN

5th January 1778

The letter which you wrote to me, Sir, on the 19th ultimo reached me day before yesterday. I am almost immediately replying to it by the duplicate by making use of the channel of our brokers at Goa, which is very favourable and very safe to assure our correspondence.

I am very glad that you have intimated to me the receipt of different remittances of money which I made to you since your arrival in India. That puts me in order and I thank you for it. However, there is a little difference in our accounts, but it will be easy to adjust everything when they are audited. It is certain that I delivered to you straightway all that I received from the Minister for you and that not having money here at the King's disposal, not even for the very expenses of Mahé, it was impossible for me to do more. Nevertheless, convinced of the necessity not to leave you without money, I did not hesitate to make an advance from my own funds of Rs. 2,500 which you received from M. Trublet and of Rs. 1,080 which you demanded from the brokers at Goa. I have written to them to pay you, but I cannot do anything more. Please, Sir, have faith in my sincerity. If it depended (65) on me to meet your needs, which I know are very urgent, I would gladly do it, out of patriotism as well as out of personal feelings. As I informed you, the King has not a single penny at Mahé since (65) mid-July. It is a thing difficult to believe, but unfortunately it is only too true. Since this period, I am by myself supporting the colony whose expenses amount to nearly Rs. 15,000 per month, and my resources are very modest and very precarious.

The burden is very heavy for me. It has not yet crushed me, but a day will come when, after ruining myself because of the most onerous engagements I have taken in my private name, I shall not be able to support it. I leave it to you, Sir, to imagine my situation. My situation is hard and critical in every sense. I have read over again and again

M. de Sartine's letter which you brought me. I have the best will to comply with its contents, but I can only repeat thousands and thousands of time: *no one is expected to perform impossibilities*. Take patience, Sir, you will perhaps find resources. Rely entirely on my definite promise that I shall do everything for you if my position improves. But that is so doubtful, and I fear so much the contrary that it is very apparent that I shall be prevented for a long time from indulging in the pleasure of doing what I would like to do for you and what could but secure advantage for the success of your mission. After this faithful account, which does not in any way ease your position, you can sympathize with mine, although your compassion may regretfully see yourself abandoned because I am myself so. The Minister cannot blame me for making you the positive declaration on my well established helplessness, and he will not insist that I should have furnished your means of which (65v°) I was deprived by our reverses in India.

The difference, which exists between your accounts and mine, arises from the fact that you have passed receipts only for the net sum which you received and that I charge you, as a matter of right, for all the expenses, discount, interest, patmars and other expenses, inevitable consequences of the negotiations initiated for sending you the remittances. For example, you do not make a mention of the loss of Rs. 25 which you incurred on the Bill of Exchange for Rs. 2,450 which had already cost me much more for obtaining it. Now from this difference, you can arrive at the other items. All that will be adjusted easily when I shall present our accounts for auditing. They will prove that not only did I not retain anything out of the money destined for you, but that, on the contrary, I made a sacrifice by making, over and above, an advance of more than Rs. 3,500 from my own funds. I notice from the letters of the brokers that they have not yet sent you Rs. 1,080. Today I am instructing them to promptly attend to this matter, if they have not done so before the receipt of my letter. After this last effort on my part, which creates as much gap in the treasury of Mahé, I request you not to draw on me for any sum. I would be forced to let it be protested and to authorize to have claim on you.

What you have the kindness to relate to me on the happy success of your efforts, has filled us with joy. As a good French man, I heartily share the success which you enjoy. Would to heaven that it may continue to bless your steps until the moment comes to profit by them. I am afraid it may be considerably delayed by the loss of Pondicherry and of all

other possessions of the King in India. Not only did the English attack the places, but (66) they went as far as Patna, Yanam and Masulipatam and in the factories in the interior of the country to unearth all the persons that were French whom they made prisoners. The example of Surat proves that neutrality of the towns is not even respected. All the treaties are infringed, and that too without there being any known declaration of war. Let the events develop and we shall see what time has in store.

I thank you for the news you give me. I no longer receive any from anywhere and am completely isolated. To comply at least partly with your wishes, I send you a copy of the capitulation of Pondicherry with a memorandum of the officers and soldiers killed as well as wounded. I wish that these papers reach you safe and that they serve you as a moment of distraction in your occupations.

Please continue, Sir, what you point out to me you are doing for the benefit of Mahé, last place of the King in India. It is not possible that we shall be left undisturbed and it is on your zeal that I am relying with all confidence to inform me in time. In addition to the general advantage, I shall always be happy to receive your letters often.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) PICOT

True copy: Picot.

WRITTEN SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1778

*Translation of a letter in Marathi*

From M. Chevalier de St. Lubin, Envoy of the King of France, to Shrimant Rajashri Balajipant Nana.

Sincerest greetings. I am in good health. Kindly give me news about your health. That will delight my heart. You were kind enough to dispatch men and horses under the command of Jagannathpant. They arrived at Kalyan and from there accompanied me to Daman. They were persons conscious of their responsibility. They followed my orders and safely conducted me to Daman. I am happy that you have such men in your service. I recommend them to your special favour. At the time of my departure, you communicated to me through my Secretary Sagunji that I should present a good gun to Mahadji Shinde. I beg to inform you

that nothing noteworthy is available at Daman. I have asked for two guns from Surat. As soon as I receive them, I shall send them to you. I would request you to give one of them to Mahadji Shinde and the other to Haripant Phadke. These two noblemen are your friends and therefore, they are mine. Friendship has been established between us. And you will soon get proofs of it. When my master, the King, hears about it, all your expectations will be fulfilled. I pray that you bestow on me your entire confidence. What more shall I write?*

LUBIN

---

*Deccan College, Pune, Historical Museum, Section II-B 10(ii)

C[4] 88 May 13, 1778
(21)

M. DE SARTINE TO M. LE CHEVALIER DE ST. LUBIN

M. de Bellecombe, Sir, has forwarded to me the duplicate of the letter which you wrote to me on July 30 of the last year. The one which you dispatched to me overland has not yet reached me. As it contains the originals of the documents which you announce to me, I shall wait till I receive them before I enter into details with you concerning your negotiations at the Court of Poona.

I shall confine myself at this moment to express to you my satisfaction at the success of your mission. I must, however, communicate to you my astonishment at the anxieties which M. Laffon de Ladebat appears to feel about the cargo of his ship *le Sartine*. You have lodged complaints to me against the Captain, but it is advisable that by the earliest letter you will write to me, you should supply me details which will enable me to judge if the anxieties of the shipper are well-founded.

(22) When your first dispatch and the documents it contains enable me to give an account of your negotiation to the King, I shall inform you of the favours which His Majesty will deem it fit to confer upon you.

I must point out to you furthermore that there cannot possibly be at such a great distance two authorities independent of each other and that you should be careful to give an account of your transactions to M. de Bellecombe. From his rank and title of Governor-General of the establishments in India, you ought to realize that it is proper that he should be aware of all the details of your mission, so that he can direct it in a manner most conducive to the benefit of the King's service. I have no doubt that you would conform to his Majesty's intentions.

M. LAFFON DE LADEBAT, MERCHANT BORDEAUX

May 13, 1778

I see, Sir, from the letter you wrote me on the 5th instant that you have received information about the fate of your ship *le Sartine* by letters which your Captain dispatched to you by way of Suez on the 13th and 14th of last November. I shall wait till you address me your memorandum on the grounds of complaint which M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin appears to have given you. You should join to it the details which your Captain must have furnished you about the dealings of this officer. You can rely on me to give you justice and bring you whatever relief lies in my power.

I am, etc.,

(23)
M. de. Bellecombe

May 13, 1778

I received, Sir, your letter of the 15th October, with which was enclosed a copy of the letter written to you by M. le Chev. de St. Lubin on the 10th August and of your reply to him of the 12th October, all on the subject of the treaty of alliance and commerce which he has concluded with the Marathas of Poona on June 18, 1777.

Pending the time I enter with you into all the details of which this operation appears to me to admit, I avail myself of the last ship leaving during this season to draw your attention to the fact that before your departure, I had apprised you of the mission with which M. de Chevalier de St. Lubin was entrusted and which he appears to me to have fulfilled in several respects.

I am well aware, as you have pointed out to me, that this treaty can contribute to the prosperity of our establishments in India only insomuch as we shall be in a position to display there our forces capable of inspiring confidence in our allies. I am not neglecting the means of executing this plan as soon as circumstances permit it. But pending this revolution, I see no disadvantage in maintaining and strengthening the favourable dispositions of a nation, which alone, perhaps, can give us substantial assistance.

What embarrasses me at this moment and which fact has not escaped my notice, is the fear that this treaty of Poona might stand in the way of the success of your negotiations with Haideralikhan. However, I feel reassured, because you appear to entertain some hope that your offer of mediation between this Nawab and the Marathas will be acceptable to them. I urge you to employ all the resources which you can (24) muster from the circumstances as well as from your talents for the success of these efforts at peace, of which you know the full importance. You are aware that this is my principle, and as the chief object of our establishments in India is trade, you will be really favouring it and complying with the King's intentions by maintaining peace between the different powers on which the nation can lay the foundations of or think of extending the same trade.

It is not possible that M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin has the pretension either to be superior or even equal to you. If some expressions of an imaginative mind, perhaps too excited, have given you cause for some

anxiety in this respect, it has no foundation. I intend to recall him to the principles of subordination from which he must not deviate, and you will be convinced of it when I shall inform you of all the details on the line of conduct I shall prescribe to him on the subject of his mission.

I am respectfully, etc.

(29)

M. de Bellecombe.

Versailles, June 21, 1778

You must have seen, Sir, from one of my letters dated 13th May, my line of thinking on the treaty of alliance and commerce which M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin informed me he had concluded with the Marathas of Poona on June 18, 1777. I have not received any news from him since the letter which you sent me on the 15th of October last. It was the duplicate of the letter which he announced he had addressed to me overland and which has not yet reached me.

The letter, which I write to you today, has for its object a (30) matter which relates to M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin and on which I request you to collect all the information you can obtain, of course, taking the necessary precautions.

M. Laffon de Ladebat, a merchant at Bordeaux, owner of the ship *le Sartine* on which M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin sailed to the Malabar Coast, certainly dazzled by the promises of this officer to secure for him considerable advantages accruing from his mission, had given orders to M. Couronnat, Captain of the ship, to follow his advice and direction for the sale of his cargo. This shipper's plan was, immediately after the the sale, to load on the Malabar Coast merchandise necessary for the dispatch of his ship to China, whence it was to return to Europe in July or August this year.

It appears that there were very hot disputes between le Chevalier de St. Lubin and the Captain of *le Sartine*. The former would not permit the sale of the cargo either at Mahé where a good price could be secured or even at Mangalore where a still better price was offered. He insisted that the whole cargo be taken to the port of Chaul with the ship. After reaching this destination, le Chevalier de St. Lubin proceeded to Poona to carry out the negotiation with which he was entrusted. According to the account given by the captain to M. de Ladebat, it appears that

le Chevalier de St. Lubin gave him to understand that he would simultaneously seek means to enable the Captain to negotiate advantageously with the Maratha Government for his cargo. Impatient at the delay in this transaction and anxious to take advantage of the season to send his ship to China, the Captain addressed himself to the interpreter of the Court who informed him that there was no question at all about the sale of this cargo, that the Government had no need for it and that le Chevalier de St. Lubin had at times announced that this cargo belonged to the King and at others that it belonged to him personally.

In these circumstances, M. Couronnat did not deem it proper (31) to sacrifice the interests of his shipper, and took the decision to borrow on the spot itself 4,00,000 francs. This succour, coupled with the goods which had a special market for China and which he had brought from France and which had remained on the ship, enabled him to dispatch *le Sartine* to Canton under the care of his deputy. He remained at Chaul to watch over the safety of the goods which he was not allowed either to sell or to remove. This Captain bitterly complains of the bad treatment which le Chevalier de St. Lubin gave him. The latter, in his turn, complains that the Captain wanted to deprive the Maratha customs of the duties which the purchasers had to pay to it, and proclaims as a fraudulent sale what M. Couronnat declares only as a deposit of surety for the loan he had taken.

You will understand that it is impossible for me to judge these diverse complaints. But the result is that M. de Ladebat is in a very trying position, because of the delay in the dispatch of his ship which must have perhaps missed its voyage and which in any event must have done it with an incomplete cargo, as also because of the forced stay of his captain with the major part of its goods which remain unsold.

I request you to do your level best to obtain either through M. Picot or by such other channels which you will deem it fit to employ, the necessary information on the conduct which M. de Ladebat imputes to Chevalier de St. Lubin. From the Letter to the latter on May 13, of which I enclose here a copy, you will see that I have only very superficially spoken to him about it. I shall wait for giving my judgement until you communicate to me the information you may have collected.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

59

M. Le Chevalier de St. Lubin

Versaillers, October 13, 1778

M. Pascal du Santy, whom you charged, Sir, in the month of August 1777 to bring me your packets overland, arrived in France only in August this year, long after the receipt of the duplicates (60) which you addressed to me *via* Pondicherry.

I informed you by my letter dated May 13, that I would await the originals of the documents, which you have announced to me, to discuss with you the details of your negotiations, and give an account of it to the King.

I carefully went through the journal of your activities since your departure from France. From the pompous style in which it is written and which rather betokens the ecstacy of an excited imagination than the reserve and prudence of a negotiator, I doubt very much if I can congratulate myself on the choice I made of you for a mission which demanded as much caution as devotion to the King's interests. You will remember that by my letter of August 10, 1776, I had recommended to you prudence and secrecy in all matters. In pursuance of that and the spirit of your instructions, you should have confined yourself to conclude with the Court of Poona the treaty of friendship and commerce by which you should have secured for the King the cession of the ports which had been indicated to you on the Malabar Coast, then give me an account of your dealings, send me the original copy of the treaty in Persian to prove that it was exactly in keeping with your instructions, and finally wait for His Majesty's orders and further instructions which he would charge me to give you.

This treaty is neither attached to the packet you sent me *via* Pondicherry nor to that which M. du Santy brought me. The latter only contains the letter of the King of the Marathas to His Majesty and that which his Vazir Nana has writen to me, both in Marathi, against the practice of this Court whose correspondence has always been carried on in Persian, and he translations which you made of them.

I know that display may be necessary to inspire confidence among the the Asiatic Powers. But even this ostentation must have limits. It neither demanded the ridiculous pretension of a company of guards which you could form by depriving the ship *le Sartine* of a part of its crew nor this show of a salute and other prerogatives which are exclusively reserved for the Royal Navy. Moreover, you should never have presumed that the official capacity, with which you were invested, could exclude your negotiation from the inspection of the Government of Pondicherry to whom the King has given all the powers necessary to negotiate with the Indian Princes. I decided to send you directly to the (61) Maratha Court only because I presumed that it was urgent to secure their good will and because I felt that the preoccupations to which M. de Bellecombe would have to devote himself on his arrival at Pondicherry would not permit him to attend to this negotiation. I was confident that you would keep him informed of all your proceedings and that once the treaty of commerce was concluded, you would give him an account of the proposals which relate to the alliance. You know that by his position as Governor General he is the depository of all the forces of the King in India, and that at the the same time, his title as Commandant of His Majesty gives him the right to ratify all the treaties concluded in the region under his jurisdiction; that consequently, I could entrust to him alone the agreements to be signed, either for the troops to be furnished to the Marathas, or for those which we would be required to ask from this nation. Only a slight reflexion is needed to understand that the succours to be demanded or to be furnished must necessarily be combined with the political arrangements of which he has and ought alone to have the direction and the secret. I could never think thal you would be authorised to negotiate these matters except under his orders and in accordance with the instructions which he would give you.

Instead of following this course which the form of administration of our establishments in India demanded and of which fact you are fully aware, I find that, indulging in fantastic ideas of vain glory, you considered yourself as absolutely independent; you proclaimed everywhere the secret of your negotiation and you entered into correspondence with M. de Bellecombe, only on the assumption that he was your equal.

Such inconsiderate conduct has led His Majesty to think that you neither possess the prudence which the mission, he was pleased to entrust to you, demands nor the spirit of subordination necessary to accomplish it under the orders of the person whom he has appointed as

his representative in India. He has, therefore, ordered me to inform you that on the receipt of this letter he wants you to proceed to Pondicherry to give an account to M. de Bellecombe of the progress of your negotiation, which he absolutely forbids you from pursuing, unless this Governor deems it fit to employ you again on this job, but under his direct authority.

I warn you that it is only through such prompt submission that you can efface the unfavourable impression which His Majesty has formed about you and that he would consider any resistance on your part as formal disobedience.

After discussing your conduct concerning the official capacity (62) which His Majesty was kind enough to invest you with, I now turn my attention to the complaints which have been lodged with me by M. de Ladebat, owner of *le Sartine*.

This merchant to whom, in spite of the secrecy which I had enjoined on you, you confided the object of your mission, blindly fell a victim to your suggestions. Dazzled by the tempting promises you gave him, he trusted you to such an extent as to authorize you to direct the Captain and the supercargo of his ship in the sale of the cargo.

It appears from the account he has submitted to me that the Captain had considered it profitable to sell off at Mahé the major part of the goods, particularly arms which are in great demand on this coast, but that you opposed it, in spite of M. Picot's advice; that you likewise prevented any sale at Mangalore and at Goa, and that you forced the Captain to retain his entire cargo until you reached Chaul, where, you assured him, he would get a much better price than anywhere else.

I pass over the obstacles which the ship met with for its admission into the river and for the unloading of its goods. I do not impute to you except to a certain point these early difficulties; they were certainly due to the cautiousness of the Maratha nation or to special practices of which you should have been better informed. It is nonetheless true that the negotiations which resulted therefrom were very prejudicial to the owner, and delayed the dispatch of his ship to China which, you know, was its real destination.

But what cannot be considered as mistakes due to ignorance, is to have hoisted the square flag on board *le Sartine*, have yourself saluted on your birthday by five salvos of 15 guns each, have removed a part of the sailors and cabin-boys to turn them into guards and pages, have

demanded money and provisions from the ship for your personal use, have treated with greatest harshness the Captain, the passengers, the crew, and finally have harassed with as much harshness as arrogance men who were no longer in any way expected to be under your orders as soon as you had reached your destination.

Besides, it appears that the hopes which you had or which you pretended to have on the profitable sale of the cargo with (63) the Marathas were without any foundation, since, after a sufficiently long period of uncertainty in this respect, the Captain learned through the interpreter of the Court that they did not desire to purchase anything. This circumstance proves on your part either ignorance or dishonesty or some other private motives equally ruinous to the owner, for the Captain, who wanted to leave no stone unturned in his attempt to dispatch his ship to China, was obliged to have recourse to a loan of about 400,000 francs at 12 per cent interest towards the end of August, a transaction which you even tried to thwart by moving the Maratha Government to deal severely with him under different pretext.

I have now to make an observation on an article of your instructions to which you have given an interpretation which does not appear to me to be correct. It had been enjoined on you to obtain admission for *le Sartine* in the Maratha port in enjoyment of the privileges which, I suppose, were stipulated. Consequently it ought to be exempt from all duties on the sale of its cargo. You seem to suggest that you obtained it, and in the next breath you launch out at the greed of the merchants by accusing the Captain of *Le Sartine* of seeking to defraud the duties due to the Maratha Customs by a fraudulent sale contracted with a local merchant and disguised as a deposit for a loan.

*I point out to you on this subject—*

(1) that from the report of the Captain, of all the officers and even of several disinterested passengers, it appears that it is indeed really a loan which the former has taken to facilitate the dispatch of *Le Sartine* and that the cargo being thus only deposited, it should not be subjected to any duties.

(2) that even if the sale had been real, the duties were no more due, since you had obtained exemption from them and that, instead of protesting against his alleged fraud, you ought to have supported him in the privileges which you had stipulated.

(3) that the observation you make that the duties were due by the purchaser implies contradiction with the exemptions you have obtained, because if the goods from France are exempt from duties, the purchaser ought to enjoy this exemption like the seller (64) without which the privilege is only illusory, and the price would necessarily fall by virtue of the duties which the buyer would be obliged to pay and which would always be borne by the seller.

I cannot believe that in the stipulation which the treaty ought to embody on this point, you have been the dupe of the jugglery of words. Therefore, I must consider your declamation only as a recrimination for complaints which you knew well would be brought against you because of your conduct towards the owner and his agents.

All the news which has reached the owner uptil now, has thrown him into dispair. He finds that you have broken faith with him by preventing the sale in places in which it could have brought him good profits, that you had his cargo transported into a place where his agents can neither sell nor find the facilities necessary for its return, that his ship has missed its trip to China, that you have disposed of a part of his funds, as if they were yours, that you have harassed his Captain and his crew, that these events the report of which has spread into Europe as in India, imperil his fortune and his credit, and that he can impute his misfortunes to you who have cheated him under the cloak of friendship and good faith.

These are, Sir, the facts on which you have to justify your conduct. But I must warn you that I shall not accept any grounds of proof unless they are fully confirmed by M. de Bellecombe on the report of persons he will have employed for the examination of a conduct which I cannot understand.

I am, Sir, yours etc.,

*P. S.*—(In the Minister's handwriting). I regret very much I employed you and your conduct proves all the accounts related to me about you, a fact of which you are aware.

(64)

M. de Bellecombe

Versailles, October 13, 1778

I attach herewith, Sir, a copy of the letter I have written to M. de St. Lubin. You have seen from those which I wrote you on May 13 and June 21 that I was very much concerned about the complaints which had been lodged with me against him by M. Ladebat, owner of Le Sartine.

(105)

M. le Chevalier de Ternay

Versailles, February 7, 1779

I have discussed with you, Sir, the grounds of complaints I have received about the conduct of M. de St. Lubin who had been entrusted with a mission at the Court of the Marathas of Poona. He left on a merchant ship *Le Sartine*, which belongs to M. de Ladebat, a merchant from Bordeaux, and has misused the trust the latter had placed in him to such a point as to detain his ship, dispose of the major part of its cargo and cause immense harassment to his Captain, the officers and the crew of this ship. I have already informed M. de Bellecombe about it and have requested him to summon him to Pondicherry, secure his person and send him back to France. As circumstances might enable you to join him more easily, I communicate to you the King's order that you should arrest him, do your level best to collect the most authentic proofs of his conduct, give all the help and facilities at your disposal to the Captain to save the remnants of his cargo, and send back to France M. de St. Lubin to render an account of his conduct. You should entrust him to the charge of the Captain of the ship on which you will place him, so that he should neither escape during the crossing nor on his arrival in Europe. You can put him into fetters, if you think that this precaution is necessary.

*P. S.*—(In the Minister's own handwriting) If you cannot place him on any of His Majesty's ships, or bring him back with you, you can leave him at the Isle of France in the charge of M. de la Brillane giving him instructions to guard him in a prison, for he is the most dexterous and most cunning person I have come across.

I have, etc.

# FONDS ASIE
## Vol. 16

ARCHIVES OF THE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

**Fonds Asie: Vol. 16**

(323) Malta, July 15, 1780

AN ACCOUNTS OF THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN HINDUSTAN AND OF THE FIGHT BETWEEN A PORTUGUESE AND AN ENGLISH CORVETTE

My Lord,

If the three letters, which I had the honour to address you from India on three different occasions about my mission, have punctually reached you, you must have noticed in the first the situation in Hindustan at the time of my arrival, in the second the conclusion of the treaty of alliance and commerce between France and the Marathas, in the third the revolution which the English attempted to stir up in the Government of this nation to save themselves from the frightful situation which our alliance with it created for them; here is the fourth one which gives you an account of the events of the war which the Marathas declared against the English as soon as the latter committed the first hostilities against us in India.

I must begin by telling you, my Lord, to the glory of these brave and faithful allies, that they only took the time to ascertain the fact about the hostilities to declare war; it was announced 18 days later at Poona. The English did likewise at Bombay by proclaiming Raghoba as King of the Marathas who publicly paid homage of his future crown to the king of England by sending him an ambassador, by name, Arginache Rao (Avinashrao ?)[28] whom I since got arrested at Jidda.

As early as November 16, 1778, a Maratha army, 20,000 strong marched towards Surat, another 40,000 strong, descended into the Konkan to proceed to Salsette and Bombay. The English of Bombay also brought into the field an army of 20,000 men of which their tropp. formed (323 v°) only half the number; the rest was composed of the adherents of Raghoba. This army was to join the 12,000 English troops which, since long, were marching from Bengal to Bombay; but we had the good luck to destroy these two armies separately before they could effect their junction.

(323 v°)

On December 19, the advanced guard of the Bombay army commanded by Major Stuart and composed of 4,000 men was surprised by the Maratha advanced guard, consisting of 10,000 cavalry. It was surrounded and

reduced to 3,700; a few died on the spot ; no quarter; Major Stuart was among the killed.

On December 27, the English lost only 50 men in a skirmish with the Marathas who were trying to draw them out of their entrenched position in the village of Talegaon; of this number was Colonel Key, killed by a (cast) iron gun.

On January 3, 1779, the English having made a forward movement to occupy the pond of Talegaon, the Marathas allowed them to camp there and immediately after attacked them so vigourously that they were forced to abandon their camp, which was all spread out, and flee in disorder to the entrenched position which they had left on the previous evening.

In this entrenched camp, having endured for 17 days hunger, thirst, scarcity of wood and water and the night and days watch against the Maratha detachments which ceaselessly followed each other to keep the enemy continuously on their feet, they were finally forced out of their camp by a general attack of the Maratha army. Their army exhausted by drought and fatigue was cut into pieces in its own camp. Not a single soldier escaped; the only persons spared were the sick who were sheltered in a pagoda with a guard of 200 men. During this slaughter the three Bombay Councillors who accompanied Raghoba hid themselves in this hospital. They were captured and taken prisoners to Poona. Raghoba was captured fighting on his elephant and immediatly put under chains. All the artillery and ammunition fell into the hands of the Marathas Finally, the defeat was complete, since, out of the whole army, there returned to Bombay only the sick from the hospital numbering 280 men whom the Marathas sent back under an escort of 500 cavalry.

(324)

At the same time, another army of 40,000 Marathas had destroyed in two pitched battles 7,000 men of the English army from Bengal which, reduced to 5,000, took refuge under the canon of Surat where it arrived through the woods on March 28 without canon and without equipment.

On the sea, the Maratha fleet captured two merchant fleets from Bombay, the armed ships which conveyed them escaped with great difficulty. The ship *Britannia* of 40 guns with Captain Moore, was captured shortly afterwards after the most dogged resistance and the massacre of all his crew.

After this start, the Maratha armies cantoned themselves in the neighbourhood of Surat and Salsette to resume their operations in the month of November after the rains. I had then to depart to present myself before you, my Lord, and receive your orders on the subsequent operations for which the Marathas demand your assistance.

The English, who honour me by imputing to me their disasters, have chased me with sword, fire, poison. I would be preparing for you an Odyssey if I were to relate to you all the sufferings I had to endure during the voyage : for, besides my fight before Mocha against the English corvette, of which I have the honour to give you an account, I met with four shipwrecks on various reefs in the Red Sea. All my crew fell ill; I was without water and food; I lost my luggage; I was ransomed in Arabia and in Egypt by the Pashas and Beys. But finally, through so many perils, losses and fatigues, I arrived at Malta on a Ragurais ship freighted at Alexandria. I am in a quarantine since July 1st. It will end on the 18th and immediately after I intend to leave for Marseilles on an Eperenaro which is only a jolly-boat with four oars, but if I were to wait for a more comfortable transport, I would risk losing time which I think is precious.

Accompanying me is Don Azevedo Britto, Lieutenant-Commander of the ships of the King of Portugal and commander of the corvette which carried me. The Governor of (324 v°) Daman, his father wanted that he should accompany me to France. This brave fidalgo laconically gave him leave like a Spartan father who sends his son to war. " You will accompany," he said to him, "M. le Chevalier de St. Lubin, to France; the only instruction I give you is an order and an interdiction, order to obey all those he will give you, interdiction not to appear before me if the slightest accident happens to him by your mistake." This worthy man spoke thus to his only son because of the friendly feelings which bound us as also because he had received from the (Portuguese) Viceroy of India Don Josephe Pedro da Camera the following order : " I recommend to you M. de St. Lubin not only as a Minister of France, but as a man precious to all the nations interested in the ruin of the English in India. They would burn him alive perhaps if he fell into their hands. That is what you should beware of and I hold you responsible for it."

If my work and its success have justified the opinion which you were kind enough, my Lord, to form and express about my capacity, I may venture to feel assured of your esteem and feel confident that you will be kind enough to continue your protection to a man who, with all his zeal

and some local knowledge, will always be but the object of your benevolent creation which cast him in the career in which his gratitude constantly urged him to deserve its commendation and its support.*

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,

PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

Malta, July 15, 1780

---

*The account of the fight between a Portuguese and an English corvette is narrated on pp. 91-92.

**Fonds Asie: Vol. 16**

(354)

**M. de St. Lubin** Received on February 4, 1781

MEMORIAL

Only in France there is a man, invested with the dignity of the King's Agent, and entrusted with a delicate mission, who successfully fulfilled it by a treaty for mutual offensive and defensive alliance, a performance which the Dupleixes, Bussys, Clives and other Europeans could not accomplish uptil now.

Only in France this King's Agent, who, after crossing the seas and running all possible dangers during the voyage in the Red Sea, returned to his country to render an account of his transactions. He presented himself before the Minister, but was not even questioned on the result of his mission, although he had delivered the dispatches from the Maratha Ministry, the outcome of which perhaps ought to decide forever either the loss or the preservation of this alliance.

Only in France, I assert, where, as a reward of such services, this King's Agent is arrested, his papers which would help him to vindicate himself are seized, he is dragged out and imprisoned in the Bastille before France and England which will not fail to profit by this event to tell the Maratha Government that France had not at all dispatched this Agent to enter into an alliance with it, and that his letters of credentials were forged. The result will be a peace signed between the English and the Marathas in India and the impossibility of ever renewing this alliance for the, restoration of the French nation in the East.

On this position is claimed the protection and justice of M. de Vergennes who has full knowledge of the object of the mission in question (354v°) and its importance for the impending treaty of peace, since it is he who persuaded M. de Sartine, then Minister for the Navy, to bring about this alliance.

The French Government has only talked about the transaction of the ship *Le Sartine* to this King's Agent since the delivery of the letters from the Maratha Ministry to His Very Christian Majesty. He was asked to explain the claims of this ship's owners and thier partners, which amount to more than 18,00,000 francs against the Government.

This transaction which embraces all kinds of known and unknown interests has raised a whole lot of enemies against this King's Agent. They have contrived and plotted his ruin with the help of his own explanations before M. de Millière, who was entrusted with submitting a report of this transaction to the King's Council.

How is it that after all the facts placed before this Magistrate by this King's Agent, the Ministry should display such harshness in his case? To certify truth, is it to be guilty? To save the Government 12,00,000 francs which it is being made to pay inconsiderately, is it to be guilty? Ought not these explanations given by the King's Agent in accordance with the Minister's demand to protect him against the secret libels spread to ruin him?

Finally, if he is guilty of some fraud or treason against the State, he demands an exemplary punishment, but if he is innocent (355) what indemnification should he not expect from the King's justice? It is to the protection and compassion of M. de Vergennes that he dares to appeal on a fate as cruel and as harsh as his, after the testimony of the services which he has rendered and which are established by his own dispatches and the success of the treaty which he has signed with the Maratha Government.

$C^2$ 164

(1) Charenton (France), 15th May 1781

My Lord,

If the perusal I have just made of all the public papers which have appeared since my detention in January 1781, has not led me into an error on the actual state of Hindustan, our enemies there are still at war with the Marathas in the North and Haiderali in the South. I am very happy to see how, fortunately, this situation calls for the system of hostilities which I had the honour to submit to you at the end of the last year under the quotation: "I shall be like the whet stone, which can sharpen even a blunt knife".

This memorial must have been delivered to you by M. Le Noir.

Haiderali's successes in several encounters loudly proclaim what this capable man can achieve if he were supported by our troops; and the set-backs which he received on other occasions warn us that without our succour it is impossible for him to gain a decisive superiority over the English. Above all, he will never be able to capture Madras without

us, a *sine qua non* condition for the expulsion of the English from the Carnatic. So long as this task is not accomplished, Haiderali can only make momentary raids and depredatory incursions into the Carnatic, after which the English will regain possession more easily than they will have been plundered. From this circumstance, there arises the (2) necessity to furnish to this hero the means which he lacks to achieve this great task. His needs are confined to a corps of engineers and an artillery corps. For the rest, his infantry and cavalry are more than sufficient.

But whatever benefit we may derive from this union of our forces with his, the fact cannot be denied that a system of hostilities, solely based on the preponderence which Haiderali would thus acquire, would only rest on a very precarious foundation. For the edifice can be toppled by a single gun-shot, and unfortunately this dauntless fighter too often lays himself open to serve as an aim. It was with a shudder that I read that at the battle of Arcot an English artillery officer aimed five times at his elephant. Another rifleman may be more skilful or more lucky; and that's how our machine will collapse. The nascent courage of his son Tipu Saheb will not reassure us about his lack of experience, and the ambition of his three uncles, Sayyad Mukhdum, Ibrahim Saheb and Mir Saheb which Haiderali has so successfully curbed by making it serve his designs, cannot fail to be fatal to his heir by the dismemberment of their three Governments of Shrirangpatan, Bangalore and Sire. Haiderali's death is the signal agreed among them for the partition. The Marathas will profit by the circumstance to seize the Kingdoms of Sonda and Canara. Tipu Saheb's share will be very small. I know all that at first hand and I conclude from it that if we capitalize on Haiderali's existence, (3) every moment of the day may lead to our ruin.

It would be a different matter if we simultaneously contribute to the successes of the Marathas. It is a power which is not at all dying away and which will never be dismembered. Besides these advantages lacking in the case of Haiderali, it offers us that of a system continuously followed from reign to reign for seven centuries for the expulsion of foreign tyrants, Pathans, Mughals and others. It has successfully crushed the first and reduced the second to the yoke of the tribute, it has only to expel the English and that is its vow. I have seen from the Parliamentary debates published in the gazettes of Europe that there is nothing but a hue and cry in England against the war and in favour of peace with the Marathas whom she rightly considers as her most formidable enemies. I have seen that the English are constantly soliciting them to obtain peace and that

they have made offers to them to buy it at the cost of restorations and sacrifices which they might desire, but that the Marathas constantly reply to them that they must have time to deliberate. Now, what is this time necessary for the Marathas if not that they need for receiving our reply to their proposals? Here, my Lord, I touch a delicate point, since my enemies, who, as a consequence, became those of public weal, lead you to suspect my veracity in the account which I submitted to you of my mission. If the revelation, which the spokesman of Scotland has just made before the whole Parliament in his bitter outbursts against the (4) previous Ministry, items 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26, does not suffice to destroy the impression which you have received, I must, for what concerns me personally, leave everything to time. But this very time, which will justify me, will you not miss it, my Lord, to operate the wonders which can result from our alliance with the Marathas? I confess to you that I fear it and you yourself will fear it if, setting aside all that relates to me in this examination, you will kindly condescend to carefully weigh what there remains for me to tell you.

The Marathas await the reply from His Majesty. If this reply is in the negative, they will accept the proposals and the sacrifices of the English and all at once they will, with renewed ardour, pounce upon Haiderali on whom I so successfully persuaded them to let go their hold to have a bout with the English.

Haiderali, incapable of supporting two wars at a time, will make his individual peace with the English to resist the Marathas, and that's how the English will be left without enemies in Hindustan, and with great means to attack the Philippines, the Isles of France and of Bourbon, the Moluccas and Ceylon. They will give, as one might expect, preference to the last because of the greatest importance and facility to acquire them and preserve them; but the French and Spanish Isles will have their turn and quickly because the Dutch Isles are not in a position to offer a long resistance.

(5) If the reply to the Marathas is not in the negative and if they are awaiting the means which they have demanded from us, in this case also, the English will not fail to sound very loudly in their ears the interception of the Convoy to India and exaggerate their advantages to the point of not leaving them any hope of assistance. Then, the Marathas, led into an error, will also conclude peace, Haiderali will be forced to take the same measures to face the Marathas, and the English, freed in India, will lead their forces against our islands and those of our allies.

In both cases, the picture is thus the same, but in the first, the harm is past remedy, while in the second, the peril is less imminent if you adopt the expedient which I am going to indicate.

To avoid the baneful effect which can be produced in the mind of the Marathas by the British bragging on the ill-starred convoy to India, I propose to you, my Lord, to dispatch to Poona by the quickest route a man, who enjoys your trust, to reassure them on this event and announce to them a fesh dispatch. To facilitate, as much as it is possible for me, the success of this mission, I shall deliver to you two firmans sealed with the big and the small seals of the Maratha Court: the one is an order addressed to all the officers of the Maratha Navy to receive on the sea and escort to the nearest port any person who will present it; the other is an order to all the Commandants of the ports and of provinces (6) to furnish to the bearer all the means to proceed to Poona with safety and dispatch. I shall add to it the sign of recognition agreed between the Maratha Ministry and me to prevent any surprise on the part of the English. It is the half of a bracelet of precious stones broken by the Regent and me during my last interview with him. The other half has remained with him and the joining of the two is to serve as letters of credentials to him who will present my portion in case of my death or because of any other cause preventing me from returning there.

I am respectfully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

## MEMORIAL

(*I*)

*For M. le Pallebot de Saint Lubin, Prisoner at Charenton*

M. le Pallebot de St. Lubin went to India in 1757 as an honorary volunteer in the army, commanded by General Lally. Soon his aptitude for languages and politics of the country attracted the attention of this General, who, in 1759, sent him to Bengal, charged with a secret and delicate mission. In 1762 he returned to France where he submitted an account of his operations to his General who asked him to submit the same account to the East India Company and to the Ministry. He did

so with political memorials which were very much approved, but the reputation which they earned him created for him some envious persons who, since then, have constantly become his enemies.

During peace, M. St. Lubin offered to the Ministry to return to India to improve his knowledge of politics which he had acquired there and thus be in a position to render to his country signal services at the earliest rupture between it and England. Commending his zeal, the Ministry furnished him passports and the necessary letters of recommendation. But the voyage was entirely at the cost of M. de St. Lubin who thought that he could not better employ his fortune than by putting himself in a position to usefully serve his country. He proceeded *via* Persia where he stayed for a year to make himself familiar with the Persian language which he had already studied for three years in India, where it is the Court Language (2) and serves for political negotiations.

Having arrived in India in 1766, he successively visited its principal Courts, everywhere making his observations on the constitution, the power and the general, individual and reciprocal interests. He particularly devoted himself to discover the means to combine all these diverse, interests against the British power. And he made a successful experiment of it in the confederation which was formed in 1767 among several Indian Princes to check the ambition of the English. The result was a war which lasted three years and terminated by a disgraceful peace which the vanquished English were obliged to beg and buy on conditions which the victor wanted to impose upon them. M. De St. Lubin, as he had associated his zeal and his talents with this league, contributed to its successes, sometimes as a military leader, at others as a negotiator.

The report of an impending rupture between France and England having spread in India in 1770, M. De. St. Lubin returned to France to submit to the Ministry the result of his observations in a plan of hostilities combined with the Indian powers against the English. But on his arrival he found that the differences between the two courts were composed. However, his labours did not remain unrewarded, since they won him the esteem and the confidence of the Ministry. Three Ministers, my Lords De Boynes, Turgot and De Sartine successively made him study the affairs of the administration in India under their own supervision. There followed a (3) reform of many abuses which had found their way in this administration. This reform, which was attributed to him, created for him as many enemies as there were individuals interested

in the maintenance of these abuses. For three full years they in vain set into motion all the means which hatred could suggest to them in order to ruin him. And finally, reduced to silence, they awaited more favourable circumstances.

In 1776, His Majesty charged M. De St. Lubin with a mission in India in the capacity of his Envoy at the Court of the Marathas, to negotiate a treaty of alliance and trade. He embarked on a merchant ship from Bordeaux leaving for the same country. Soon after his arrival at the Court of the Marathas, he succeeded so completely in his mission that the English, jealous of the establishment of trade and frightened by the consequences of the alliance, attempted to destroy this work by a revolution in the Maratha Government. The minority of the Maratha King facilitated for them the means to incite among the chiefs of the kingdom a rebellion to change the Regency. But this rebellion was suppressed in four months. And immediately after, the Maratha Court, annoyed at the role which the English had played in this affair, resolved to expel them from India. The rupture between France and England appeared to the Marathas as a favourable circumstance to obtain from France some means which they lacked to put their project into execution and they invited M. De St. Lubin to return to Europe to demand them from his Court. But M. De St. Lubin, in his turn, did not fail, (4) to profit by this circumstance to convince them that the surest means to procure their demands was to declare war on England for the first hostilities which she had just committed against France in India. Consequently, war was declared. An English army sent from Bombay against them was encircled and massacred. Another sent from Bengal almost met with the same fate, since, reduced in two battles to less than half and having lost its artillery and its equipment, it saved its remnants through woods and took shelter at Surat. After this first success M. De St. Lubin left India to bring the news to France, and submit the proposals of the Maratha Court. He proceeded by the Red Sea on a Portuguese ship. The English did not hesitate to attack this ship and seize M. De St. Lubin, but the Portuguese Commander defended him so valiantly that after a fight lasting three fourths of an hour, the English ship, having lost thirty men of its crew and much damaged in its masts and riggings, was forced to let go its hold and being helpless, take shelter in the Arab port of Mocha. M. De St. Lubin continued his journey, landed in the Isthmus of Suez, and returned *via* Egypt to France where he expected a very different welcome from the one which awaited him.

On his arrival, he had to face a law-suit on behalf of the owner of the ship from Boardeaux which had carried him to the Court of the Marathas. This shipper had suffered considerable losses in (5) his trade through the incompetence and misbehaviour of the agent whom he had charged with the sale of his cargo. But, unable to recover the losses from this man without any means, he thought of representing to the Minister that as he had fitted out this ship only to promote the mission of M. De St. Lubin, it was fair that the King should recompensate him for his losses. To support this claim, he had to allege that the mercantile operation had been sacrificed to the Ministerial operation. And a petition full of false imputations, was filed against M. De St. Lubin, who was consequently arrested and imprisoned in the Bastille in the month of January 1781. A Council Committee was appointed to examine the affair and its judgement in September of the same year rejected the unjust claims of the shipper.

This judgement of the committee in justification of M. De St. Lubin would have certainly obtained his release, if his old enemies had not availed of this dispute to gratify their old hatred against him. From the beginning of the suit, they had rallied round the shipper and had furnished him an ample quota of calumnies with which the latter had composed a defamatory lampoon tending to sully the entire life of M. De St. Lubin and especially to bring his patriotism into suspicion by malicious interpretations of his conduct in India thirteen years ago *vis-a-vis* the English and the Indian powers combined against them; a conduct which had been approved and rewarded by the previous Ministers. (6) These imputations were absolutely extraneous to the case of this shipper; but he hoped to strengthen it by making his adversary appear odious with the help of these auxiliaries. He was mistaken. The Magistrate, too enlightened to be deceived by such common artifice, could indeed distinguish the principal from the accessory and the shipper was nonsuited.

However, by a fatality, always to be associated with the calumny of which the scar survived the wounds, St. Lubin's patriotism is questioned because of the suggestion of his enemies and this suspicion has prolonged his detention until the Ministry deems it proper to order otherwise.

Worn out by grief and sickness, he was on the point of dying in the Bastille from where the Minister's humanity had him transferred to Charenton. For nearly three months that the doctors have been employing

all the resources of their profession to restore his health, they have not succeeded in curing him of a universal rheumatism which may lead to paralysis. St. Lubin's life is in danger all the more imminent as the grief of his detention aggravates the pain with which he is rent.

He supplicates the Minister to set him at liberty which will enable him to try with a greater peace of mind, to restore a body so cruelly damaged.

**C² 163**

**(161)**

1st August 1783

My Lord,

I entreat you to read to the very end this letter, which is dictated solely by the desire to discharge my debt of love towards my country and my gratitude for your kindness.

Haider Ali has died, and the English, rid of this deadly enemy, indeed fondly hope to meet with favourable dispositions in his son, Tipu Sahib, who has succeeded him. Whilst he takes his decision the treaty of peace, which they have concluded with the Marathas to force him to do likewise, lays him open to the danger of seeing all his succession vanish in the space of less than a year. Not only does one of the articles of the treaty leave him at the mercy of the Marathas and of the English separately, but also unites them against him to destroy his power which has had an equally abnoxious influence on their political system, on that of the Marathas because of the continuous resistance of Haider Ali and on that of the English because of his frequent aggressions. Thus, it is evident that the common interest of the contracting parties is to ruin (161v°) Tipu Saheb and all circumstances apparently tend to the success of this plan. If the powerful forces of the English and the Marathas are combined, the sure defection of the three uncles of Tipu Saheb who have the ambition to become masters of the provinces entrusted to their management, restoration of the King of Mysore to his authority, of which Haider Ali had left him only a semblance, the insurrection of the Coorgs and the Nairs to recover their independence, the claim to Baramahal by the family of Muhammad Ali Khan, have perhaps already broken up this succession without the slightest effort. And the treaty of peace pending between France and England will probably deprive Tipu Saheb of our succour by the withdrawal of our troops, which will be one of the conditions stipulated.

The result of this preliminary review is that we shall be without allies in India, whereas the English will become all powerful there by themselves and by their alliances. And even if the English decided, in this new situation, to ratify by the final treaty on peace the concessions announced by the preliminaries, our possessions and our trade in India would be at their mercy in a still greater degree than at the treaty of peace of 1763. That is to (162) say that we shall be there at the discretion of people who havn't got any discretion. It would take too long to cite all the proofs they gave on this point during the last treaty of peace. They will do worse in future.

Such is undoubtedly the view of every observer who is superficially informed of the state of affairs in India, but every person well experienced in the politics of this country will make very different calculations. He will realize:

1. That the constant aim of the Maratha power is to reestablish the original government of the Hindus in the whole of Hindustan. It can reach this goal only by recovering the provinces usurped from it by the Mughals, and by the English from the Mughals.

2. That as the interest of the English and the Mughals is to preserve their usurpations, they will make a common cause against the Marathas. That is what the English have been doing since the last 40 years in the Carnatic through the agency of Muhammad Ali Khan, since 25 years in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa through the Nawab of the Ganges (Bengal), 23 years in Gujarat through the Nawabs of Surat and the Gulf of Cambay, and from time to time in the Deccan through the Subhedar of Golkonda. In fact, to oppose the Mughals (Muslims) to the Marathas everywhere, at the treaty of peace of Madras in 1769, they tried, by the eighth (162v°) article, to persuade Haider Ali Khan to serve them as a barrier against the Marathas, in return for a promise to stand as a guarantee for all his dominions, present and future, and for their undivided succession to his son Tipu Saheb. Consequently, to pit him against the Marathas, they instigated the latter to invade his territory, while at the same time they promised him a succour of 12,000 men to repulse them and attack theirs. But annoyed with their duplicity, Haider soon came to an agreement with the Marathas and continuously refused to fulfil the eighth article of the treaty of Madras. Thus, he was the only Mughal (Muslim) in the Peninsula who did not serve as an instrument to their anti-Maratha politics. But his successor Tipu Saheb is forced by the union of the Marathas and the

English against him to place himself under the protection of the latter on the least advantageous conditions he could obtain from them. The first, beyond any doubt, will be to renounce all connection with France and to form a league with England against the Marathas. If he does not agree, the Marathas and the English easily and pitilessly rob him; and we lose our only ally. If he accedes, he is equally lost to us.

(163)

For the last twenty years, My Lord, I have been every year predicting to the Minister the events in India for the following year. The fulfilment of all my predictions authorizes me to count on this one and I note it. I know that since the year 1769, the English have spared nothing to accomplish this goal. They are very near it, if however, they have not already reached it.

It follows from this account that our trade is first of all going to meet, on the Malabar Coast, with the same obstacles which, since the treaty of peace of 1763, have ruined us in Bengal, in the Deccan, in the Carnatic and at Surat. These obstacles will certainly be renewed, whatever may be the conditions of the final treaty, which the English will have so many motives and so many means to evade.

To this evil, imminent and perhaps already present, there is only one remedy : the Marathas. Their recent treaty with the English is founded only on a momentary interest, that of the destruction of the power of Haider and of his heir, but it is too incompatible with the ulterior interests of the contracting parties to be durable. It will be definitely broken because of the protection which the English will grant to Tipu Saheb, if he accedes to their political system. If he refuses, the treaty will last only till the complete spoilation (163v°) of Haider's heir, for, immediately after that, the English and the Maratha politics will collide, the former for the retention and the latter for the recovery of the Indian provinces.

This conflict will necessarily have one of the three consequences :

Either the Marathas will destroy the English power in Hindustan,

Or the English will subjugate the Marathas and will be masters of Hindustan,

Or these two powers, balancing each other, will be in a continuous state of war.

In all these cases, it is in the interests of France to see that the balance tilts in favour of the Marathas, and I know the two pans so well that I can state positively that her weight therein is necessary.

These are, my Lord, the thoughts of a true Frenchman, whose patriotism a cabal, bent on his ruin, wanted to tarnish in your eyes. It had not sufficient skill to challenge my knowledge before a Minister as enlightened as capable of appreciating it. I still venture (164) to offer it as a token of my esteen to your wisdom for the greatest benefit of my country and the greatest glory of your administration.

I am respectfully and gratefully,

My Lord,

Your very humble and very obedient servant,
Pallebot de St. Lubin

Cléves, [29] 1st August 1783

(157)

24th October 1783

My Lord,

Since the time I received your generous promise to put on end to my sentence, I am thinking of nothing but the means to prove to you my gratitude.

It is in this state of mind and spirit that I am actually subjecting to a critical examination the treaty of the English with the Marathas. I shall clearly demonstrate therein that this document of perpetual friendship and alliance is only a formula which ought not to deceive France, and that at whatever time she may think of expelling the English from India with the help of the Marathas, she will always find them ready to effect this revolution. It is a goal which forms the very essence of their government.

Nana Phadnis, Maratha Chief Minister, to whom I owe this assertion, proved it to me in no unmistakable terms, and I see in this treaty nothing but an act of deep policy on the part of this minister who has only seized the moment of distress and terror in which the junction of our troops with those of Haider Ali had thrown the English, in order to (157v°)

force them to purchase a temporary peace with the Marathas at the cost of great sacrifices which weaken the power of the English, on conditions which sow the seeds of its ruin in India.

Articles 1, 2 and 3 stipulate for the restoration of all the territory which had been captured by the English from the Marathas since 1777.[30]

The 4th article demands a retrospective renunciation by the English of a cession, which had been promised to them by the Marathas, of a territory adjacent to the town of Bhadoch, along the river Narbada, in virtue of the treaty signed by Col. Upton in 1776.

The fifth and the eighth require a total abandonment by the English of the territories which Sayaji and Fattesingh (Gaikwad) had ceded to them to obtain help to throw off Maratha domination which these two rebels have been forced to accept once again.

The sixth imposes on the English the humiliation to voluntarily expel from their establishments the rebel Raghoba, *alias* Raghunathrao, whom they had proclaimed as King of the Marathas and in whose name they had declared war against the legitimate government. They undertake no more to give him either shelter or support or subsistence, and they force him to surrender himself to the (158) Maratha Government, on a very hazardous promise that no harm would be done to him by it and that he would receive a maintenance allowance of Rs. 25,000 a month.

These severe sacrifices extracted from the English are as much a blow to their power as a fillip to that of the Marathas. This phenomenon redounds to the glory of your ministry, my Lord, since, in the last analysis, it is the result of the succours you dispatched to Haider Ali. Without this junction, disastrous for the English, they would not have submitted to such conditions from the Marathas. And even in this predicament, they would have rejected them, if they could foresee that peace was so near at hand in Europe, because then certain that our troops would be recalled from the camps of Haider Ali, they would have been in a position to support the two wars against Haider and the Marathas, as they had done till the arrival of our forces. Furthermore, they could have pursued these two wars successfully with the help of the reinforcements which they had received from England. The recall of our army and the augmentation of their forces would have at least placed them in a position to dictate the conditions of peace to the Marathas and Haider Ali, supposing again that the English were then disposed to conclude it, a supposition I am not at all inclined to admit ! On the contrary, I am convinced that they would have pursued the war vigorously.

If the politics of the Marathas appears to you clever, my Lord, because of the advantage they have taken of the quandary of the English at the arrival of our troops in India, you will find it equally (158v°) praiseworthy because of the manner in which they have exploited this event against Haider Ali. This hero, redoubtable by his forces and his talents, which have sometimes enabled him to resist the Marathas, must have appeared in their eyes as too dangerous a neighbour, as soon as they saw him joined by a French army. They feared that with the help of our troops he might seize the Carnatic and that with the addition of this territotry to his kingdom he might become too preponderent a power in Hindustan.

It is in this light that the ninth article is conceived. The Marathas undertake by this article to force Haider Ali to evacuate the Carnatic and return to the English all the territory and the prisoners he has captured from them.

They even carry their adroitness still further by requiring the English, by the same article, not to commit any hostilities against Haider so long as he is on good terms with them and the Marathas.

Thus the political content of this treaty, wholly advantageous as it is to the Marathas, boils down to three points.

(1) The articles, from the Ist to the 8th inclusive, diminish the power of the English by the restorations, concessions and renuciations stipulated.

(2) The ninth forces Haider Ali to confine himself to his previous limits by the forced evacuation of the Carnatic.

(3) This very article forbids the Engilish any aggrandizement at the expense of Haider Ali as long as he remains at peace with his neighbours.

This treary is, therefore, a masterpiece of Maratha politics which curbs the two other powers and (159) exclusively reserves to itself the right of aggression against them according to the circumstance and convenience and they can be summed up as follows :

If you compare, my Lord, my letter of Ist August with the news received from India in September and October, you will judge the soundness of my calculations. I have not at all been surprised to see my predictions so quickly confirmed by the event. If the distance between the places and the lapse of time were not to absolve me of the charge of having

prophesied after the event, you would be tempted to think that I was announcing the advent of a revolution of which I had been a witness. Moreover, my Lord, you have other proofs of my forecast on these matters in my memorial, addressed from the Bastille under the heading:

*fungar vice cotis, acutum*
*reddere qua ferrum valet, exfors ipsa secandi*[32]

and in my letter written from Charenton a few days after you had kindly given orders to have me transferred to this hospice.

In conformity with these predictions and notably that of 1st August, the news received from India in September and October announces that after the treaty of the English with the Marathas, Tipu Saheb, successor of Haider, evacuated the Carnatic to defend his Kingdom attacked by the English of Bombay. Without firing a shot, they captured the kingdom of Canara through the defection of the governor to whom the English restored the possession of this territory on the condition of paying them the same revenues as he used to pay to Haider Ali.

In the kingdom of Mysore, usurped by Haider Ali, another revolution! The partisans of the King, whom Haider had kept as a prisoner at Shrirangpatan, liberated this Prince and restored him to his authority. (159v°) Gen. Mathews approached this capital to become the arbitrator of this part of Haider's succession.

In the Kingdom of Calicut, the Nairs rose in revolt and regained their independence.

In Baramahal, the English of Madras under General Coote[31] seized, in the name of Muhammad Ali, all the old dependencies of the Carnatic.

Thus, at the time when this news left India, all that was left to Tipu Sahib was the kingdom of Sira, captured by his father from the Marathas who must have already recovered it. It is true that Tipu Sahib still possessed his army and ours, but stripped of his treasures and his dominions, he can no longer pay the salary of his own troops, and the treaty of peace between France and England deprives him of the assistance of ours.

In this distress, he solicited the English for peace, and he must have certainly obtained it immediately if he has accepted their domination on the same terms as the Nawab of Bengal, of the Carnatic and of Surat. There must not have been any hesitation on the part of Tipu Saheb, because the English are the only power whose interest lies in returning to him his heritage undivided on conditions which will turn his kingdom

into a barrier for the Carnatic against the Marathas. Since the year 1769, they have been devising this plan and now at last they are in a position to execute it. As a wise policy, they cannot even have any other choice, for the distribution of these territories among the various proprietors (he means original rightful masters) would turn them bit by bit into an easy prey for the Marathas who, thus, established on the portals of the Carnatic, would soon attempt to enter them. The division of these territories between the English and (160) the Marathas will meet with great difficulties on the part of the latter (original rightful masters) who are absolutely opposed to any aggrandisement of the English, and if they consent to it this division will likewise bring the Marathas into the neighbourhood of the English who are fully aware of its dangers.

But there are also other reasons which make all these arrangements impracticable.

1. This kingdom of Canara,[33] which the English have just bestowed on the governor who surrendered himself to them, belongs to a prince from whom Haider had usurped it and whom he had confined as prisoner in the fortress of Mudigere (Muddagiri), situated in the kingdom of Sira. In 1767 when the Marathas recaptured this fortress from Haider, they found there this Prince whom they liberated and carried away with them to Poona. I met him there, living honourably on their benevolence and founding his subsequent hopes on their promise to set him up again in his kingdom on the condition of old vassalage. Thus, the interest of the Marathas in seeing a man of their own govern a territory, which is bordering on theirs, is bound to clash with the grant conferred by the English on the governor who has become a tributary of the English Company.

2. The kingdom of Mysore, which had always been a tributary of the Marathas till the time when Haider, who usurped it, claimed not to pay them anything, to-day owes them arrears for ten years, i.e. a huge sum, since it is an annual contribution of one-fourth of the revenues of the kingdom. And the Marathas are not the people who will neglect any favourable opportunity to claim the account for the past and regulate it for the future. I am sure that they have already invaded it and in the present circumstances, the impossibility of payment may very well transform the invasion into taking possession of the kingdom.

**(160v°)**

3. The kingdom of Calicut, since the time it has been occupied by Haider, is in the same category as that of Mysore, so far as the Marathas are concerned.

4. Baramahal, restored to Muhammad Ali Khan whom the English have always been supporting in his refusal to pay the Chauth of the Carnatic to the Marathas, offers the same ground for dispute.

5. The kingdom of Sira, thrice captured by Haider from the Marathas and twice by the Marathas from Haider, once again becomes a subject for claims by the Marathas from Tipu Saheb.

In this labyrinth of interests, which neither the English nor the Marathas would be prepared to renounce except by force of arms, lies the thread which leads to a view-point in which I distinctly see the total ruin of the English in Hindustan, and a resource which will not bring France into conflict with England, because it does not depart in any way from the last treaty of peace between the two crowns. You will judge of this resource, my Lord, if you permit me to place it before you on my return to France. I am only waiting for the means to enable me to leave this place and set out and you have promised them to me.

I am respectfully,
My Lord,
Your most humble and most obedient servant.
PALLEBOT DE ST. LUBIN

Clèves à la Fontaine d'Or

24th October, 1783

## NOTES

1. Governor of the Isle of France now Mauritius.
2. Governor of the Isle of Bourbon now Réunion.
3. Leader of the French detachment in the service of Bassalat Jung, brother of Nizam Ali and Nawab of Adoni.
4. Governor of Madras.
5. An influential member of the Council of Madras.
6. This is a reference to the proposals made by the agents of the Peshwa Madhawrao to Law Governor of Pondicherry in the beginning of 1772 and also to the proposals made by Mahadji Shinde to Chevalier, French Director of Chandernagore in January 1773.
7. *i.e.* minted at Tours a town 236 kms. to the south-west of Paris A Franc tournois was worth 20 sous whereas a Franc minted at Paris was worth 25 sous.
8. Madhavrao died of intestinal tuberculosis.
9. The French seem to be ignorant of the fact that the Marathas had still a King, though titular, who resided at Satara and that the Peshwa who had usurped all the powers of government still styled himself as the Peshwa or Prime Minister of the Maratha King.
10. St. Lubin had demanded two elephants, forty six horses, six palanquins and forty camels (Forest, *Maratha Series*, p. 293). St. Lubin was given one elephant with palanquin, ten horses and twenty five men as escort (Khare, *Aitihasik Lekhsangraha*, VI p. 2899).
11. Obviously St. Lubin identifies the Maratha Empire with the ancient Hindu Empires of India.
12. The account of the presentation ceremony is graphically described in a news-letter, dispatched from Poona to the Court of Hyderabad (R. M. Joshi, *Sahyadri*, 1947, No. 9. pp. 591-92).
13. St. Lubin presented to Sakharam Bapu on this occasion clothes worth Rs. 362-4-0 (*Selections from the Satara Rajas' and the Peshwas' Diaries*, VI p. 80).
14. Parvatibai was the widow of Sadashivrao Bhau, a cousin of Balaji Bajirao, who died at Panipat, and is not the mother of Gangabai.
15. Governor-General at the Isle of France in 1767.
16. Mahadji Shinde was not in Upper Hindustan but was besieging Kolhapur to suppress the intrigues and the aggressions of the Raja.
17. *See* p. 13 note No. 6.
18. Mostyn, the English Resident, had managed to obtain a copy of the paper delivered by Nana to St. Lubin, on May 13 1778 [*Bombay Secretariat Secret and Political Department Diary*, 1778 (dup.) 19-B, pp. 354-55].
19. St. Lubin was present at this time in Poona and was a witness to this episode.
20. *Vide* p. 41 note No. 12.

21. Nizam Ali's general.
22. Stratton usurped the governorship of Madras when Lord Pigot was arrested.
23. Negros of the Coast of Guinea and other African Coasts. They are good soldiers.
24. M. Laffon de Ladebat, owner of the ship *le Sartine*.
25. It is passing strange that St. Lubin should have admitted an Englishman on his ship when he was entrusted by the Minister with such a delicate and secret political mission.
26. Of Austria-Hungery.
27. Visajipant Lele.
28. Raghunathrao did send an ambassador by name Hanmantrao to England but in 1781.
29. Clèves is in Germany not far from the French frontier.
30. By the second article, the English retained Salsette and by the third all rights and title to the city of Bhadoch.
31. Gen. Coote had died in the beginning of 1783.
32. The two lines in Latin mean: I shall be like the whetstone, which can sharpen even a blunt knife.
33. St. Lubin means Bednur.

# INDEX

(*The name St. Lubin appears throughout the book; hence it has not been included in the Index.*)

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRESS